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Abstract	
NGO	development	in	authoritarian	states	has	long	been	seen	as	an	important	indicator	of	
state-society	relations.	The	past	decade	has	witnessed	great	changes	in	China’s	NGO	sector:	
withdrawing	international	donors,	increasing	government	funding	of	social	service	delivery,	
rising	domestic	donors	from	the	private	sector,	and	so	forth.	Researchers	have	investigated	
the	dynamics	of	the	relationship	between	the	authoritarian	state	and	NGOs	in	China	and	the	
survival	 strategies	 of	 grassroots	 organizations,	 given	 the	 policy	 changes.	 However,	 few	
studies	have	looked	at	the	internal	politics	and	structure	of	China’s	NGO	sector,	particularly,	
language	changes	and	knowledge	production.	This	thesis	aims	to	fill	this	gap	as	reflected	in	
the	ways	in	which	“gongyi”,	translated	as	‘public	interest’	or	‘philanthropy’,	has	been	used	by	
the	Chinese	state	and	non-state	actors.	It	focuses	in	particular	on	the	relationship	between	
the	state,	Chinese	entrepreneurs,	and	NGOs.	The	changing	use	of	gongyi	both	in	official	state	
discourse	and	in	China’s	NGO	sector	shows	a	shift	from	a	state-centric	discourse	in	the	late	
1980s	towards	a	more	market-oriented	discourse	in	the	past	decade,	alongside	a	process	of	
commercialization.	 Re-examining	 Chinese	 NGOs	 in	 epistemological	 terms,	 through	 the	
language	of	gongyi,	suggests	that	China’s	NGO	sector	has	become	increasingly	heterogeneous.	
The	market	and	rising	entrepreneurship,	with	 the	help	of	 the	 local	 state,	are	shaping	 the	
sector	not	just	financially	but	in	terms	of	knowledge	production.	Moreover,	Chinese	NGOs,	
given	such	changes	in	the	past	decade,	have	strengthened	corporatism	and	social	inequality	
in	 their	 daily	 operation,	 rather	 than	 challenge	 them.	 In	 this	 sense,	 my	 study	 of	 gongyi	
understands	corporatism	in	China	in	two	ways:	how	the	local	corporatism	contributes	to	a	
more	 fragmented	 authoritarian	 state	 in	 China;	 and	 how	 it	 connects	 to	 a	 rapidly	 unequal	
society	in	people’s	daily	life.	 	
	
Based	on	my	yearlong	multi-sited	ethnography	of	an	entrepreneur-founded	foundation	and	
its	 partner	 organizations	 in	 China,	 this	 research	 reveals	 how	 gongyi,	 a	 language	 that	
popularly	 used	 by	 most	 of	 the	 organizations	 in	 China’s	 NGO	 sector,	 has	 been	 firstly	
reinvented	by	the	Chinese	business	elites,	applied	in	the	office	of	their	own	foundations,	and	
then	widely	disseminated,	learned,	and	negotiated	in	different	grassroots	organizations	in	
other	 parts	 of	 China.	 This	 research	 presents	 the	 normalization	 of	 different	 forms	 of	
corporatism	in	Chinese	NGO	sector	under	the	name	of	“doing	gongyi”.	At	the	same	time,	my	
ethnographic	 study	of	 the	everyday	 life	of	Chinese	NGO	workers	 reveals	how	gongyi	 and	
corporatism	has	been	performed,	negotiated,	and	challenged	in	various	ways.	Based	on	the	
findings	 at	 both	 organizational	 and	 individual	 levels,	 the	 thesis	 argues	 that	 gongyi	
contributes	to	and	increasingly	depoliticized	and	commercialized	culture	in	Chinese	NGOs,	
while	 also	 helping	 to	 reproduce	 social	 inequalities	 in	 today’s	 Chinese	 society	 at	 large,	
particularly	in	terms	of	gender	and	family	labor	division.	 	
	 	
	 III	
	
TABLE	OF	CONTENTS	
Acknowledgements	 I	
Acronyms	 II	
Glossary	(with	original	Chinese	characters)	 III	
Preface	 1	
Chapter	1	 	 Introduction:	Studying	gongyi	and	Chinese	NGOs	 7	
1.1	 What	this	thesis	is	about	 16	
1.2	 The	Analytical	Framework	 19	
1.2.1The	civil	society	framework	 20	
1.2.2	The	corporatism	framework	 23	
1.2.3	Gongyi	and	corporatism	in	China	 26	
1.2.4	Language	and	everyday	life	in	reformist	China	 29	
1.3	 The	organization	of	this	thesis	 38	
Chapter	2	 	 Gongyi	as	NGO	work	in	China:	the	historical	context	 41	
2.1	Gongyi	and	the	socialist	state	 44	
2.2	 Gongyi	and	Chinese	NGOs	in	the	post	Tiananmen	era	 49	
2.3	The	emerging	‘gongyi	market’	in	the	absence	of	gongmin	shehui	 54	
2.4	“Don’t	call	me	gongyi	worker”:	the	divided	Chinese	NGO	community	
in	the	past	decade	 58	
Chapter	3	 	 Research	methods:	“This	is	Dr.	Zhao	and	she	can	drink”	 65	
3.1	Enter	the	field:	researching	Chinese	NGOs	in	a	dynamic	context	 68	
3.2	Working	as	an	AF	intern	 73	
	 IV	
3.3	Producing	situated	knowledge:	‘failures’	I	had	made	at	AF	 78	
3.4	Researching	AF’s	partner	organizations	in	the	local	society	 81	
3.5	How	I	deal	with	research	ethics	in	this	thesis	 84	
3.5	Conclusion	 86	
Chapter	4	 	 The	Making	of	modern	gongyi	in	Shenzhen	 87	
4.1	becoming	a	wolf:	the	making	of	a	new	man	 92	
4.1.1	Chinese	entrepreneurs	and	wolf-spirit	 93	
4.2	Competing	for	what?	 99	
4.3	Learning	to	be	a	‘modern	gongyi	worker’	at	AF	 105	
4.3.1	“Donors	are	our	God”:	the	changing	languages	in	the	office	 105	
4.3.2	“Bringing	more	wolves	to	AF”	 107	
4.4	Chinese	state	and	the	creation	of	wolf-spirit	 111	
4.4.1	Moving	between	Beijing	and	Shenzhen:	the	moments	when	an	
ambitious	Chinese	NGO	could	be	a	problem	 116	
Conclusion	 120	
Chapter	5	 	 The	making	of	a	‘professional	gongyi	worker’:	everyday	life	
of	AF	workers	 122	
5.1	The	organizational	hierarchy	of	AF	 124	
5.2	Workers	at	the	top:	the	senior	managers	 127	
5.2.1	Tim:	a	“professional	gongyi	manager”	 127	
5.2.2	Justin:	a	busy	manager	 129	
5.3	Workers	at	the	bottom	 133	
5.3.1	Lisa	and	her	sleepless	nights	 134	
5.3.2	Jerry:	the	eliminated	good	husband	 139	
5.4	The	making	of	a	‘professional	gongyi	worker’:	discussing	NGO	
workers	in	China	 141	
	 V	
Conclusion:	Cindy’s	“mistake”	 143	
Chapter	6	 	 Everyone	can	do	gongyi:	AF	and	its	partner	organizations145	
6.1	National	Policy	Change	 149	
6.2	“Everyone	can	do	gongyi”:	AF	and	its	partner	organizations	 156	
6.3	GVC:	a	true	friend	of	gongyi	 160	
6.4	GH:	who	is	the	“true	friend	(zhen	pengyou)”?	 162	
6.5	“We	should	do	gongyi	together!”	 167	
Discussion	and	conclusion	 169	
Chapter	7	 	 The	making	of	a	‘gongyi	people’:	everyday	life	in	the	local	
society	 172	
7.1	Humphrey:	the	life	of	“poor	philanthropist”	 175	
7.1.1	Humphrey’s	early	years	 176	
7.1.2	Getting	to	know	the	business	circle:	a	failed	attempt	 178	
7.2	Perry’s	life:	a	successful	‘gongyi	people’	in	the	local	society	 180	
7.3	The	making	of	a	‘gongyi	people’	 186	
7.3.1	Building	and	managing	social	relations	 187	
7.3.2	Performing	Buddhism	 188	
Conclusion	 190	
Chapter	8	 	 Conclusion	 192	
8.1	Revisiting	the	research	questions	 193	
8.2	The	theoretical	contributions	of	this	research	 195	
8.2.1	Corporatism	 195	
8.2.2	Everyday	life	in	reformist	China	 198	
8.3	The	never-ending	gongyi	 199	
	 VI	
References	 203	
Appendix	A:	Interviews	with	NGO	workers	in	Shenzhen	 219	
Appendix	B:	Interviews	with	NGO	workers	in	Beijing	 220	
Appendix	C:	Interviews	with	NGO	workers	in	other	places	 221	
	
	
	
Acknowledgements	
	
This	thesis	is	a	product	of	my	interactions	with	a	number	of	supportive	and	inspiring	people.	
I	owe	a	tremendous	debt	of	gratitude	to	Dr.	Vasudha	Chhotray	and	Dr.	Ben	Jones.	When	I	just	
started	my	PhD	journey	back	in	the	2015	in	Norwich,	 	
I	 could	 never	 imagine	 that	 I	 would	 be	 so	 fortunate	 to	 have	 so	 much	 help,	 supports,	
encouragements,	and	friendship	from	these	two	supervisors.	The	PhD	journey	is	not	easy,	
but	 it	 is	 a	 really	 rewarding	 and	 life	 changing	 experience	 by	 working	 with	 these	 two	
wonderful	supervisors.	
	
In	China,	my	thanks	are	due	to	Sarah,	Jason,	Giddeon,	and	Sue.	This	research	cannot	be	done	
without	their	help	and	advice	during	my	yearlong	fieldwork	in	China.	Not	only	did	they	help	
me	 with	 my	 ethnographic	 work,	 but	 also,	 they	 shared	 many	 valuable	 insights	 and	
observations	with	me	as	close	friends.	I	learnt	a	lot	by	discussing	with	them	throughout	my	
whole	PhD,	for	which	I	am	really	grateful.	
	
I	would	like	to	thank	my	big	family	for	their	love,	patients	and	generosity	during	my	study.	
Thanks	in	particular	to	my	cousin	Yingying	for	her	meticulous	proofreading.	 	
	
Finally,	to	my	husband	Feilong:	thanks	for	all	your	company,	love,	and	supports	in	the	past	
few	years.	I	know	that	this	PhD	degree	is	our	shared	dream.	The	thesis	is	dedicated	to	you.	 	
	 	
	 II	
Acronyms	
	
AF	 	 	 	 	 	 A	Foundation	(a	domestic	donor)	
CAB	 	 Civil	Affairs	Bureau	(a	governmental	department	in	charge	of	NGO	issues)	
CRC	 	 China	Red	Cross	
CSSC	 	 Construction	of	Socialist	Spiritual	Civilization	
CYDF	 	 China	Youth	Development	Foundation	
GBP	 	 British	Pound	
GH	 	 	 Gongyi	Heart	(a	Chinese	NGO,	in	partnership	with	AF)	
GONGO		 Government-organized	non-governmental	organizations	 	
GVC	 	 Gongyi	Volunteer	Centre	(a	Chinese	NGO,	in	partnership	with	AF)	
INGO	 	 International	non-governmental	organization	
NGO	 	 Non-governmental	organization	
RMB	 	 Renminbi	(Chinese	Yuan)	
ROC	 	 Republic	of	China	
WDC	 	 Women	Development	Centre	(a	Chinese	NGO,	in	partnership	with	AF)	
YCL		 	 Youth	Communist	League	
YVA	 	 Youth	Volunteers	Associations	
	
1	British	Pound=9	Chinese	Yuan	(exchange	rate	as	of	01/06/2016)	
	 	
	 III	
Glossary	(with	original	Chinese	characters)	
chuxin	 	 	 	 	 original	heart	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 初心	
cishan	fa	 	 	 	 charity	law	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 慈善法	
dage	 	 	 	 	 elder	brother	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 大哥	
dajie	 	 	 	 	 elder	sister	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 大姐	
dalao	 	 	 	 	 big	boss	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 大佬	
fanzhengfu	zuzhi	 	 anti-government	organization	 	 	 	 反政府组织	
feizhengfu	zuzhi		 	 NGO	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 非政府组织	
fu	qiang		 	 	 	 wealthy	and	powerful	 	 	 	 	 	 富强	
gongmin	shehui	 	 	 civil	society		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 公民社会	
gongyi	 	 	 	 	 public	interest	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 公益	
gongyi	ren	 	 	 	 a	person	working	for	gongyi		 	 	 	 公益人	
guanxi	 	 	 	 	 relationship	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 关系	
huo	Lei	Feng	 	 	 living	Lei	Feng	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 活雷锋	
jieji		 	 	 	 	 class	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 阶级	
langxing	 	 	 	 wolf	spirit	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 狼性	
laoshi	 	 	 	 	 teacher		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 老师	
liudong	renkou	 	 	 floating	people	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 流动人口	
minjian		 	 	 	 among	the	people	 	 	 	 	 	 	 民间	
minjian	zuzhi	guanli	ju	 bureau	of	civil	organizations	administration	 	 民间组织管理局	
minzu	yingxiong		 	 national	hero	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 民族英雄	
	 IV	
qinghuai	 	 	 	 mentality	or	passion	 	 	 	 	 	 情怀 
qunzong	 	 	 	 the	common	people       群众	
rencai	 	 	 	 	 talent	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 人才	
renren	gongyi	 	 	 everyone	can	do	gongyi	 	 	 	 	 	 人人公益	
shehui	jieceng	 	 	 social	strata	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 社会阶层	
shehui	tuanti	 	 	 social	groups	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 社会团体	
shehui	zuzhi		 	 	 social	organization	 	 	 	 	 	 	 社会组织 
sushi	 	 	 	 	 human	quality	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 素质 
tian	zhi	jiao	zi	 	 	 God’s	favored	ones	 		 	 	 	 	 	 天之骄子	
wuzhengfu	zuzhi	 	 anarchic	organization	 	 	 	 	 	 无政府组织	
xiansheng	 	 	 	 Mr.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 先生	
xiaodi	xiaomei	 	 	 younger	brother	and	sister	 	 	 	 	 小弟小妹	
xiongdi	 	 	 	 	 brother		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 兄弟 
xuesheng	gongzuo	 	 student	work	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 学生工作	
zhen	pengyou	 	 	 true	friend	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 真朋友	
zhidao	 	 	 	 	 guide	or	supervise	 	 	 	 	 	 	 指导	
zhiyuanzhe	jingshen	 	 volunteer	spirit	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 志愿者精神	
ziwo	fuquan		 	 	 self-empowerment	 	 	 	 	 	 	 自我赋权	
ziyou	zhuyi	zhe	 	 	 liberalist	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 自由主义者	
zuoren	 	 	 	 	 become	person	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 做人	
	
	 	
Preface	
My	interest	of	research	political	and	social	change	in	China	started	from	about	
12	years	ago,	when	I	was	still	a	college	student	in	Guangzhou,	China.	After	years	
of	preparing	for	the	college	entrance	examination,	I	was	finally	admitted	into	a	
‘key	 university’	 in	 China.	 Entering	 a	 ‘key	 university’	 means	 a	 lot	 for	 many	
ordinary	 Chinese	 families.	 In	 1998,	 the	 then	 Chinese	 president	 Jiang	 Zemin	
initiated	the	‘Project	985’	to	develop	the	national	higher	education	system	by	
founding	 the	 world-class	 university	 in	 the	 21st	 century.	 The	 name	 985	
represents	the	date	of	its	initiation,	May	1998.	This	project	aimed	to	reconstruct	
China’s	universities	and	research	institutes	that	had	been	largely	destroyed	by	
the	Cultural	Revolution	in	the	Maoist	era.	With	large	scale	financial	and	policy	
supports	from	both	Beijing	and	various	local	governments	across	the	country,	
39	Chinese	universities	(out	of	2631)	have	been	chosen	as	the	‘key	universities’	
to	deliver	this	985	Project.	Given	China’s	big	population,	the	national	average	
admission	rate	of	the	key	universities	in	China	is	around	1%	to	2%;	there	is	a	
saying	in	China	that	all	those	‘985	students’	are	‘God’s	favored	ones’	(tian	zhi	
jiao	zi,	天之骄子).	After	starting	my	college	life,	I	soon	realized	that	being	a	‘key	
university	student’	could	enjoy	more	‘privileges’	than	I	ever	imagined.	As	the	
key	universities	are	heavily	subsidized	by	the	state,	I	only	needed	to	pay	about	
550	pounds	per	year,	including	both	tuition	fee	and	accommodation	on	campus;	
while	for	my	cousin	who	entered	into	a	non-key,	private	university	in	a	nearby	
city,	he	had	to	pay	around	4000	pounds	per	year.	Food	provided	in	my	campus	
is	subsidized	too,	at	least	one	third	cheaper	than	those	in	the	city	of	Guangzhou.	
There	 are	 also	many	 opportunities	 for	 financial	 assistance	 in	 the	 university	
sponsored	by	the	state,	from	student	loan,	studentships,	part-time	jobs,	to	even	
free	 laptops;	 while	 my	 cousin	 can	 almost	 find	 nothing	 like	 these	 in	 his	
university.	In	the	job	market,	many	employers,	from	the	various	governmental	
bodies	to	private	companies,	would	publicly	claim	that	job	applicants	from	‘key	
universities’	would	be	prioritized.	In	the	final	year,	I	was	told	by	a	faculty	that	
a	 bachelor’s	 degree	 from	 a	 key	 university	 would	 also	 give	 us	 a	 ‘cadre’s	
qualification’	as	part	of	my	personal	record	in	the	Chinese	Hukou	system,	which	
‘distinguishes’	me	from	other	university	students	who	can	only	get	a	‘qunzong	
	 2	
(the	masses	or	the	common	people,	群众)’1.	A	cadre’s	qualification	would	help	
me	get	a	speedy	promotion	if	I	choose	to	work	in	any	governmental	institutions	
after	graduation.	
But	I	also	noticed	something	unusual	behind	all	 these	privileges.	One	is	that,	
although	 there	 were	 financial	 assistances	 available,	 many	 of	 them	 had	 no	
applicants;	which	means	that	most	of	the	students	in	my	university	today	were	
from	 at	 least	middle-class	 families	 so	 that	we	 can	 hardly	 find	 enough	 ‘poor	
students’	 in	 the	 key	 universities	 anymore.	 While	 in	 my	 cousin’s	 university,	
many	of	his	course	mates	and	their	families	were	actually	in	heavy	debts	due	to	
the	high	tuition	fee	and	living	costs	for	their	undergraduate	studies.	The	other	
thing	is	more	invisible.	In	my	university,	I	found	many	staff’s	jobs	were	neither	
about	academic	research,	teaching,	nor	administrative	work.	Instead,	they	were	
allocated	to	do	‘student	work	(xuesheng	gongzuo,	学生工作)’,	including	a	wide	
range	of	jobs.	For	instance,	they	were	supervisors	of	student	societies,	directors	
of	 Communist	 Youth	 League	 (the	 youth	 branch	 affiliated	 with	 the	 Chinese	
Communist	 Party)	 on	 campus,	 regulators	 and	 ratifiers	 of	 student	 activities	
(from	 debate	 competition,	 New	 Year	 festival,	 student	 union	 election,	 to	
volunteering	activities).	As	‘student	workers’,	they	would	also	organize	many	
events	 like	 dormitory	 hygiene	 inspection,	 monthly	 political	 ideological	
education,	developing	potential	Communist	Party	members,	launching	singing	
competitions	to	celebrate	Chinese	National	Day	etc.	In	order	help	the	‘student	
work’,	 normally	 one	 or	 two	 students	 in	 each	 class	 would	 be	 chosen	 as	
‘messengers’	 to	report	 to	 the	 ‘student	workers’	 regularly2,	 their	 reports	may	
involve	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 what	 was	 happening	 among	 the	 students,	 from	
romantic	 relationships,	 gossips,	 academic	 performance,	 to	 potential	 political	
trouble	makers,	suspicious	activities	and	conversations.	Although	there	is	also	
a	similar	‘student	work’	system	in	my	cousin’s	university,	they	had	much	less	
staff	working	for	that	system;	and	the	whole	structure	was	so	loose	that	they	
can	even	elect	their	own	student	union	leader	without	any	intervention	from	
the	‘student	workers’.	 	
	
1	 This	policy	has	been	stopped	since	2016.	 	
2	 It’s	a	paid	part-time	job,	so	normally	the	messengers	were	from	poor	family	
backgrounds.	 	
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The	 different	 experiences	 of	 myself	 and	 my	 cousin’s	 undergraduate	 years	
constituted	the	first	chance	for	me	to	closely	observe	how	authoritarian	politics	
and	social	inequality	have	been	deeply	intertwined	and	performed	in	people’s	
daily	 life	 in	 China	 in	 the	 2000s.	 Entering	 into	 a	 ‘key	 university’	 did	 give	my	
classmates	and	me	many	political	and	economic	privileges	that	most	Chinese	
young	people	can	never	have.	Since	then,	I	have	been	put	into	a	‘faster	track’	as	
the	‘chosen	one’	in	the	Chinese	society.	But	at	the	same	time,	I	also	realized	that	
as	a	 ‘national	 talent’,	 I	was	also	 in	a	closer	surveillance	system	which	deeply	
shaped	 my	 daily	 life	 from	 what	 I	 can	 talk,	 what	 friends	 I	 can	 make	 to	 my	
possibilities	of	upward	mobility	and	future	career.	Being	a	good	college	student,	
in	this	context,	means	to	be	more	incorporated	into	the	existing	political	regime	
and	enjoy	the	‘benefits’	of	social	inequalities	at	the	same	time.	The	cons	and	fors	
are	also	obvious	for	everyone,	that	almost	all	my	classmates	soon	got	to	know	
how	to	take	the	most	advantages	of	this	university	system.	For	some	who	grow	
up	in	a	civil	servant	family,	many	of	them	would	try	to	build	up	good	relations	
with	the	‘student	workers’	so	that	they	can	join	the	Communist	Party	as	early	
as	 they	 can;	 for	 those	who	wanted	 to	adventure	 in	 the	business	world,	 they	
would	 spend	most	 of	 their	 time	 exploring	 the	 university	 alumni	 network	 to	
ensure	 their	 prioritization	 in	 the	 job	 hunting.	 Interestingly,	 among	 all	 my	
classmates,	 those	who	 spent	most	 of	 their	 time	 in	 the	 library	 studying	 and	
reading,	were	mostly	from	the	peasants’	families.	They	seemed	to	still	stay	in	
the	 ‘high	 school	 study	 mode’	 and	 therefore	 a	 bit	 ‘lagged	 behind’	 in	
understanding	that	they	were	actually	in	a	very	different,	dynamic	world.	My	
‘diligent’	classmates	did	all	have	good	places	to	go	after	our	graduation.	In	all	
the	48	students	in	my	class,	one	third	of	us	got	admitted	to	various	postgraduate	
programs	 in	 other	 key	 universities	 with	 scholarships;	 about	 10	 students	
received	 well-paid	 offers	 from	 big	 state-owned	 companies	 or	 transnational	
corporates;	 12	 students	 got	 into	 different	 government	 bodies	 including	5	 in	
national	 security	 departments;	 and	 3	 students	 remained	 in	 our	 original	
university	 for	 a	 funded	 doctoral	 program	 (they	 are	 all	 from	 poor	 family	
backgrounds).	While	in	my	cousin’s	case,	about	one	third	of	them	ended	up	with	
unemployed	or	part	time	jobs	when	they	graduated.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
However,	 the	higher	 education	 system	and	 everyday	 life	 on	 campus	 are	not	
always	like	what	I	have	experienced	before	1989.	Given	my	father	was	also	a	
‘university	student’,	his	experience	in	the	late	1980s	was	quite	different	from	
mine.	As	the	first	college	student	in	his	village,	he	found	most	of	his	classmates	
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were	just	as	poor	as	him.	Although	they	were	all	fully	funded	by	the	state	at	that	
time,	 they	all	needed	to	save	every	penny	so	 that	 they	can	bring	 the	savings	
back	to	feed	up	the	other	family	members.	The	political	control	in	the	late	1980s	
was	also	much	 looser,	 so	 that	when	 the	college	students	 in	Beijing	 launched	
protests	 and	 movements,	 students	 in	 my	 father’s	 college	 in	 the	 city	 of	
Chongqing,	about	1700	kilometers	from	Beijing,	all	went	to	streets	overnight.	
As	my	father	said,	most	of	them	also	wrote	petition	letters	to	support	Beijing	
students,	 even	 including	 their	 ‘student	workers'	 at	 that	 time.	 But	 things	 got	
changed	dramatically	by	the	end	of	1989,	when	he	just	graduated	that	summer.	
Before	1996,	every	college	student	in	China	would	be	allocated	with	a	job	by	
the	 state	 when	 they	 graduated,	 normally	 these	 jobs	 were	 very	 good	
government	 positions	 in	 the	 big	 cities	 or	 the	 national	ministries.	 But	 in	my	
father’s	graduation	year	of	1989,	all	the	college	students	were	asked	to	‘exercise	
themselves	from	scratch’.	My	father	was	sent	back	to	his	hometown,	working	
for	 township	 government;	while	 some	 others	 sent	 back	 to	 even	 lower	 level	
government	branches	in	the	villages.	From	then	on,	college	students	in	China	
were	never	simply	seen	as	‘national	talents’	only,	but	also	unreliable	subjects	
due	 to	 ‘educated’.	 This	 has	 led	 to	 big	 scale	 political	 reconstruction	 of	 the	
surveillance	 and	 education	 system	 in	 the	 Chinese	 universities,	 from	
compulsory	military	training	of	every	college	freshman,	strengthened	system	
of	 ‘student	 work’,	 proactively	 reshaping	 student	 organizations	 and	 campus	
culture,	to	the	remaining	socialist	legacy	of	‘cadre’s	qualification’	in	the	Hukou	
system.	My	father	often	missed	his	undergraduate	years,	talking	about	the	food	
shortages	and	street	protests	that	all	his	classmates	had	been	through	together.	
He	was	also	surprised	that	when	he	found	my	university	years	were	so	different,	
in	his	words,	“with	so	many	calculations	to	do	every	day”.	
But	 China’s	 national	 development	 in	 the	 recent	 decades	 also	 brought	 me	
chances	 to	 see	 something	 ‘new’	 in	 my	 undergraduate	 years,	 which	 finally	
turned	to	be	the	main	theme	of	my	doctoral	study.	For	instance,	 it	was	in	an	
anthropological	 lecture	 that	 I	 began	 to	 know	 the	 words	 ‘non-governmental	
organization	(NGO)’	and	‘civil	society’;	through	the	faculties	researching	labor	
movements,	I	can	visit	NGOs	in	Guangzhou	from	time	to	time	and	take	it	as	an	
escape	from	my	campus	life.	With	the	help	from	the	Yale	University,	10	students	
in	my	university	 can	 take	 a	 fellowship	 each	year	 to	be	 an	 intern	 for	 several	
American	 community-based	 organizations	 for	 at	 least	 six	 months.	 Students	
awarded	with	this	fellowship	turned	out	to	be	a	new	type	of	‘national	talent’	on	
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campus,	 featured	with	 their	 ‘intercultural	 cooperation’	 and	 ‘global	 learning’.	
These	are	something	that	my	parents	never	heard	about.	 I	also	organized	an	
underground	reading	club	with	some	friends	to	read	classic	political	theories	
on	 civil	 society	 together,	 taking	 NGOs	 as	 a	 new	 politics	 in	 China	 with	
transformative	 forces	 in	a	 long	term.	After	 finishing	my	master’s	program	at	
LSE,	I	was	determined	to	work	in	the	Chinese	NGO	sector,	with	the	belief	that	it	
could	 be	 the	 place	 to	make	 some	 real	 changes	 in	 the	 country.	 But	 soon,	my	
working	 experience	 changed	 my	 mind,	 which	 finally	 becomes	 one	 of	 the	
important	reasons	for	me	to	do	my	doctoral	research	on	the	internal	politics	of	
Chinese	NGOs	today.	
My	first	job	was	working	as	a	project	assistance	in	an	NGO	research	institute	in	
Guangzhou,	which	was	directed	by	a	very	famous	scholar	(and	also	a	practioner)	
called	as	 ‘the	godfather	of	Chinese	civil	society’.	This	 institute	had	very	good	
reputation	 among	 many	 grassroots	 organizations	 in	 China,	 providing	 small	
grants	 and	 training	 programs	 for	 these	 organizations.	 However,	 during	 my	
working	with	this	institute,	I	found	that	most	of	the	work	that	myself	and	other	
colleagues	 did,	 was	 no	 longer	 around	 the	 grassroots	 organizations	 but	
maintaining	good	relations	with	various	governmental	officials.	Just	like	what	
my	 university	 classmates	 did,	 even	 in	 the	 NGO	 world,	 maintaining	 good	
relations	with	the	state	not	only	can	bring	up	with	more	political	safety,	but	also	
there	are	many	benefits	especially	state	funding.	Although	both	this	research	
institute	and	its	director	were	under	close	political	surveillance	from	time	to	
time,	meanwhile	drinking,	banqueting	and	socializing	with	various	government	
officials	turned	out	to	be	one	of	the	most	important	jobs	that	me	and	most	of	
my	 colleagues	were	 asked	 to	 do.	 Just	 like	my	director	 said,	 “being	 a	 change	
maker	with	a	blurred	face”.	This	working	experience	just	took	me	back	to	my	
undergraduate	years	again	and	again.	When	in	most	of	the	news	reports	and	
academic	discussions,	Chinese	NGOs	have	been	portrayed	as	a	potential	change	
maker,	 something	 new	 in	 the	 society,	 but	 my	 daily	 work,	 especially	 the	
banqueting	 and	drinking	 events,	 just	made	me	 realize	how	deeply	 this	 ‘new	
sector’	has	been	embedded	within	the	politics	of	corporatism	in	today's	China,	
just	like	its	university	system.	 	 	 	 	 	 	
My	director’s	blurred	face	strategy	did	reward	the	institute	in	many	ways.	With	
good	 relations	 of	 various	 government	 officials,	 the	 institute	 gained	 political	
shelters	at	multiple	government	levels	from	the	province,	city	to	district.	This	
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was	particularly	 helpful	when	 the	whole	 organization	was	 suspected	 by	 the	
national	security	departments	due	to	its	international	donations.	At	the	same	
time,	 state	 funding	 from	 various	 governmental	 bodies	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 the	
biggest	financial	resources	in	the	institute;	it	became	a	useful	hand	in	helping	
the	 local	 government	 in	 regulating	 the	 grassroots	 organization	 in	numerous	
ways	 from	 policy	 drafting	 and	 implementation	 to	 large	 scale	 survey	 of	 the	
volunteer	groups.	Although	I	was	not	sure	whether	the	flooding	funding	from	
the	state	could	really	make	a	change	for	the	Chinese	NGOs,	it	was	obvious	that	
the	 funding	 did	 change	 someone’s	 personal	 life.	 My	 director,	 for	 instance,	
bought	 two	 villas	 in	 the	 outskirts	 of	 the	 city	 for	 weekends;	 while	 in	 the	
weekdays	he	and	his	families	lived	in	the	most	expensive	area	in	the	city	center	
of	Guangzhou.	Although	his	partner	is	a	housewife,	their	daughter	had	several	
private	teachers	from	piano,	tennis,	to	English	lessons.	All	his	clothes	and	shoes	
were	tailor-made.	Although	most	of	my	colleagues’	incomes	(around	300	to	600	
pounds	 per	month)	 were	 below	 the	 average	 level	 in	 the	 city	 of	 Guangzhou	
(around	700	pounds	in	2014),	I	understood	that	in	fact	my	then	income	was	
already	 higher	 than	 many	 other	 ordinary	 workers	 in	 the	 grassroots	
organizations.	 Comparing	 to	 my	 college	 classmates	 who	 had	 become	 ‘real	
talents’	by	working	in	the	business	world	or	government	bodies,	as	an	ordinary	
NGO	worker,	I	‘successfully’	achieved	certain	kind	of	social	mobility	in	China:	
moving	 downward	 (and	 of	 course,	my	 director	moved	 upward	 at	 the	 same	
time).	 	
Given	my	working	experiences	in	the	past	few	years,	I	realized	the	importance	
of	studying	the	internal	political	and	culture	among	Chinese	NGOs,	which	finally	
constituted	 the	 focus	 of	my	 doctoral	 research.	 In	my	 yearlong	 ethnographic	
fieldwork	across	the	country,	I	also	noticed	that	many	of	my	former	working	
experiences	just	appeared	repeatedly	in	various	organizations	and	individuals,	
from	the	drinking	and	banqueting	culture,	to	the	symbiosis	of	luxury	life	and	
the	most	basic	dormitories.	All	these	life	experience,	stories,	and	findings	from	
both	myself	and	my	informants	in	the	fieldwork,	I	believe,	are	not	only	telling	
us	 something	 ‘new’	 or	 ‘veiled’	 in	 the	 Chinese	 NGO	 sector,	 but	 also	 they	 are	
taking	me	to	back	my	old	memories	in	the	undergraduate	years	from	time	to	
time,	reminding	me	of	connecting	them	in	the	big	picture	of	political	and	social	
change	in	China	as	well	as	understanding	them	in	the	complexity	of	people’s	
everyday	life	and	practices.		 	
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Chapter	1	 	 Introduction:	Studying	gongyi	and	Chinese	NGOs	
It	was	a	morning	of	March	2017,	the	first	working	week	after	the	Chinese	New	
Year.	I	was	attending	a	two-day	conference	called	‘the	Second	Annual	Gongyi1	
(public	interest,	or	公益)	Fair	of	City	Nan’	in	the	K	Province,	China.	Including	
myself,	 there	were	 about	100	participants	 from	various	 social	 organizations	
and	volunteer	groups	across	the	province,	sitting	in	the	conference	room.	In	the	
conference	 program	 book,	 there	 were	 two	 organizers:	 a	 government	
department	called	the	Civil	Affairs	Bureau	(CAB)	of	the	municipal	government;	
the	other	was	a	local	social	organization	called	Gongyi	Heart	(GH).	As	a	research	
student,	 GH	workers	were	my	 informants	 during	my	 yearlong	 fieldwork	 on	
Chinese	NGOs	from	June	2016	to	July	2017.	GH	was	important	to	my	research	
because	I	was	doing	research	on	a	big	Chinese	foundation	called	AF,	established	
by	 a	 group	 of	 domestic	 entrepreneurs,	 and	 GH	 was	 one	 of	 their	 partner	
organizations	in	the	K	Province.	Before	visiting	GH	in	the	city	of	Nan,	I	had	spent	
six	months	working	and	living	in	AF’s	office	and	staff	dormitory	as	an	intern	to	
study	 their	 internal	 organizational	 culture	 and	 politics.	 In	 order	 to	 better	
understand	 the	 relations	 between	 AF	 and	 other	 grassroots	 organizations	 in	
China,	I	started	my	second	phase	of	fieldwork	by	looking	at	its	different	local	
partners.	However,	I	never	expected	that	my	fieldwork	with	GH	would	lead	me	
to	a	grand	conference	room	in	a	four-star	hotel	in	the	city	of	Nan,	listening	to	
hours	 of	 boring	 speeches	made	 by	 several	 officials	 from	 the	 provincial	 and	
municipal	 governments.	 The	 participants	 sitting	 in	 the	 conference	 room,	
	
1	 Gongyi	has	several	translations	in	English.	Both	as	a	verb	and	a	noun	in	the	
Chinese	language,	most	of	time	people	would	use	‘gongyi	organization’	to	refer	
to	a	non-profit	organization	 in	China.	Therefore,	many	Chinese	NGO	workers	
would	also	say	that	they	are	‘gongyi	people	(公益人)’	to	identify	their	profession,	
and	their	work	is	known	as	‘doing	gongyi	(做公益)’.	However,	in	some	English	
news	reports,	journalists	directly	translate	these	organizations	as	‘civil	society	
organizations’	 or	 even	 ‘activists’,	 and	 I	 argue	 in	 this	 thesis	 that	 this	
misunderstands	and	underestimates	the	complexity	of	the	daily	language	and	
politics	of	Chinese	NGOs.	In	the	Chinese	mainstream	media,	‘gongyi’	has	been	
understood	as	‘public	interest’,	covering	a	wide	range	of	social	issues	from	social	
welfare,	 environmental	 protection,	 anti-corruption,	 poverty	 reduction	 to	 any	
volunteering	activities	or	free	public	service.	 	 	
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mostly	AF’s	local	partner	organizations	invited	by	GH,	all	felt	as	tired	as	I	did;	
although	 the	 occasional	 free	 buffets,	 refreshments	 and	 hot	 drinks	 provided	
helped	us	stay	awake.	 	
About	 two	months	before	 the	conference,	 I	had	been	 told	by	Humphrey,	 the	
leader	of	GH,	that	he	would	organize	a	closed	event	after	the	Chinese	New	Year	
getting	all	AF’s	partner	organizations	in	the	province	together,	to	discuss	what	
they	 had	 done	 in	 the	 past	 year	 and	what	 should	 be	 improved	 in	 AF’s	 local	
network.	But	one	month	later,	I	received	a	call	from	Humphrey’s	wife	Sue,	who	
told	me	that	the	local	government	was	‘very	interested’	in	their	plans	too.	She	
explained	that	the	CAB	officials	wanted	to	make	it	part	of	the	local	gongyi	fair	
which	was	just	hosted	by	the	local	CAB	for	the	first	time	in	2016.	As	a	friend	of	
both	 Sue	 and	 Humphrey,	 I	 knew	 that	 GH	 had	 been	 doubted	 and	 regularly	
checked	on	by	the	local	government	since	its	establishment	five	years	ago,	due	
to	 their	connections	with	several	 international	donors.	As	 the	organizational	
leader,	Humphrey	had	little	choice	but	to	say	yes	to	the	CAB	demands.	From	
then	on,	the	whole	event	went	in	a	very	different	direction.	The	CAB	officials	set	
up	 most	 of	 the	 conference	 schedules:	 during	 the	 day	 there	 had	 to	 be	
government	speeches	made	by	the	provincial	and	city	level	CAB	officials,	while	
GH’s	 local	 networking	 activities	 could	 only	 be	 carried	 out	 in	 the	 evenings.	
Moreover,	 as	 the	 co-organizer	 of	 this	 ‘big	 event’,	 GH	was	 asked	 by	 the	 CAB	
officials	to	donate	about	600	pounds	to	support	the	conference.	In	Sue’s	phone	
call,	 I	 could	 feel	 that	 she	 was	 very	 angry	 not	 only	 because	 of	 the	 arranged	
government	activities,	but	also	because	600	pounds	was	a	lot	for	her	and	her	
husband.	As	two	of	the	three	full	time	workers	at	GH,	600	pounds	was	almost	
equal	to	one	month’s	income	of	Humphrey	and	Sue	combined.	 	 	
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Figure	1.1	The	daytime	conference.	Photo	by	the	author.	Location	anonymized.	 	 	
	
That	 was	 the	 reason	 why	 I	 found	 myself	 attending	 this	 conference.	 In	 the	
morning,	 there	 were	 long	 official	 speeches	 about	 the	 ‘extraordinary	
achievements’	 of	 the	 local	 CAB	 in	 developing	 the	 local	 social	 organizations;	
there	were	 graphs	 and	 charts	 to	 show	 the	 fast-increasing	numbers	 of	 social	
organization	growth	 in	 the	 city	during	 the	past	 several	 years.	 In	one	 speech	
made	by	the	vice-governor	of	the	provincial	government,	he	said	that	the	local	
government	had	spent	a	lot	of	money	in	purchasing	social	services	from	various	
organizations,	but	that	was	unsustainable	for	the	local	government’s	finance.	
So,	 in	 the	 next	 few	 years,	 organizations	 in	 the	 province	 should	 think	 about	
bringing	 in	 other	 funding	 resources.	 In	 the	 afternoon,	 Humphrey	was	 given	
opportunities	to	speak	too;	he	was	the	only	speaker	in	the	room	who	was	not	
in	a	formal	suit	but	instead	wearing	quite	an	old	(second-hand)	outdoor	jacket	
and	baseball	cap.	His	speech	did	not	mention	too	much	about	GH’s	work	but	
was	mostly	 about	 several	 domestic	 foundations	 like	AF.	Humphrey’s	 speech	
introduced	how	AF	had	supported	various	organizations	in	the	K	Province	from	
finance	to	project	management	in	the	last	year.	At	the	end	of	the	speech,	he	was	
more	like	a	salesman	for	AF,	promoting	its	child	protection	projects,	and	calling	
for	more	local	organizations	to	join	him	as	part	of	AF’s	network.	In	many	ways,	
Humphrey’s	 speech	 echoed	with	 that	 of	 the	 vice-governor.	He	 tried	 to	 align	
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himself	with	the	vice-governor	by	portraying	GH	as	a	mediator	and	introducer	
of	a	more	sustainable,	politically	safe,	financial	resource:	the	emerging	Chinese	
entrepreneurs	and	their	foundations.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	governmental	sessions	ended	at	4pm,	followed	by	a	free	dinner,	and	the	
evening	session	of	AF’s	local	network	started	at	6pm.	This	evening	session	took	
place	in	a	small	budget	hotel,	with	a	very	different	atmosphere.	Apparently,	the	
50	attendees	travelling	from	different	parts	of	the	province	knew	each	other	
well;	during	the	ice	break	session,	the	meeting	room	was	full	of	laughter.	As	the	
hosts,	Humphrey	and	Sue	were	very	excited	to	invite	them	to	sit	around	so	that	
they	could	have	small	group	discussions	during	the	whole	session.	Humphrey	
started	 the	 session	 with	 some	 jokes,	 calling	 the	 attendees	 ‘my	 dear	 gongyi	
sisters	and	brothers’.	 	
	 	
Figure	1.2	AF’s	 local	partners’	meeting	 in	 the	evening.	Photo	by	 the	author.	
Location	anonymized.	
	
The	evening	session	lasted	for	about	90	mins.	The	first	40	mins	was	a	summary	
of	 the	disaster	relief	projects	 that	 they	had	done	 in	 the	 last	winter.	With	 the	
direct	 instructions	 from	AF,	GH	 set	up	 some	awards	 for	 those	organizations	
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which	had	sent	out	the	most	disaster	relief	materials,	those	that	could	get	the	
most	media	 reports,	 as	well	 as	 the	most	 successful	 in	 local	 fundraising.	My	
previous	fieldwork	in	AF’s	headquarters	office	had	already	let	me	know	that	the	
awards	would	bring	these	partner	organizations	more	funding	from	AF	for	the	
next	year,	so	the	award	winners	announced	in	the	session	were	quite	excited.	
For	the	remaining	50	mins,	GH	set	up	a	short	training	workshop	to	enhance	the	
‘organizational	 capacity’	 for	 the	 attendees,	 while	 the	 guest	 trainer,	
recommended	by	AF,	was	working	at	an	Internet	company	as	the	manager	of	
the	 corporate	 social	 responsibility.	 The	 trainer	 did	 not	 mention	 anything	
related	to	how	to	run	a	volunteer	group	or	how	to	do	disaster	relief	work	in	the	
local	community;	instead	he	started	by	analyzing	how	‘weak’	were	the	Chinese	
grassroots	organizations	today	in	using	online	fundraising	tools.	And	then	most	
of	the	training	contents	were	about	how	to	‘Internetize’	the	social	organizations	
from	 their	 daily	 operation;	 in	 his	 words,	 ‘We	 need	 to	 embrace	 this	 time	 of	
modern	gongyi’.	The	trainer	used	many	cases	of	 the	most	successful	Chinese	
internet	 companies	 in	 demonstrating	 how	 effective	 their	 online	 platforms	
could	be	in	‘mobilizing	public	participation’,	and	this	attracted	most	attendees’	
attention.	 	 	 	 	 	
Just	several	minutes	before	the	end	of	this	short	training,	Sue	suddenly	asked	
me	whether	I	could	stay	for	one	more	hour	afterwards,	since	they	were	going	
to	have	another	 smaller	meeting,	 for	which	 they	needed	a	volunteer	 to	 take	
some	 notes	 and	 write	 a	 brief	 summary.	 I	 agreed.	 This	 unexpected	 session	
started	 at	 8	 pm	with	 about	 15	 people.	 As	 the	 hotel	worker	 in	 charge	 of	 the	
evening	 sessions	 asked	 all	 of	 us	 to	 leave	 their	 conference	 room	 at	 8:30pm,	
therefore	Sue	decided	to	just	hold	this	one-hour	meeting	in	the	lobby	outside	
the	conference	room.	The	 lobby	was	 free	and	 located	on	 the	 top	 floor	of	 the	
budget	hotel,	so	no	one	would	interrupt	us.	As	the	meeting	began,	I	realized	that	
it	was	 in	 fact	planned	by	GH’s	other	donor,	Oxfam.	An	Oxfam	project	officer	
came	to	meet	a	group	of	the	disabled	people	in	the	city,	who	had	been	working	
with	 GH	 in	 the	 past	 two	 years	 to	 improve	 the	 public	 barrier-free	 facilities	
through	various	 forms	of	 policy	 advocacy	 to	 the	 local	 CAB.	This	 project	 had	
been	funded	by	Oxfam.	But	obviously,	both	GH	and	Oxfam	did	not	want	the	local	
government	to	know	too	much	about	their	connections,	so	the	Oxfam	worker	
arrived	silently	with	a	list	of	questions	for	evaluating	the	project.	After	briefly	
introducing	 herself,	 the	Oxfam	worker	 then	 gave	 the	 question	 list	 to	 all	 the	
participants	and	she	became	a	facilitator	of	their	discussions.	Unlike	the	award-
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giving	and	training	sessions	in	AF’s	local	partner	networking	event,	GH	workers	
especially	Humphrey	and	Sue	did	not	get	many	chances	to	talk.	For	most	of	the	
time,	 it	was	 only	 the	members	 of	 the	 disabled	 group	 sharing	 their	 different	
experiences	 during	 the	 past	 two	 years.	 At	 the	 very	 beginning,	 I	 felt	 a	 bit	
awkward	because	there	was	a	very	foul-smelling	toilet	just	besides	the	lobby,	
which	seeped	into	the	whole	 lobby.	The	 light	 in	the	 lobby	was	very	dim	too;	
there	were	several	sofas	in	the	lobby,	but	they	looked	more	like	pieces	of	old	
furniture	abandoned	by	the	budget	hotel,	full	of	dust.	However,	the	attendees	
seemed	 to	 be	 fine	 with	 all	 these	 conditions	 and	 continued	 without	 any	
complaint.	Although	I	did	not	get	the	chance	to	ask	them	questions,	I	could	still	
sense	 that	 many	 of	 them	were	 probably	 from	 the	 poorest	 class	 in	 the	 city,	
wearing	ragged,	slightly	smelly	clothes	and	shoes.	But	very	soon	as	the	meeting	
began,	both	GH	workers	and	the	disabled	group	members	were	very	focused	
on	the	discussions,	asking	questions	actively,	even	though	some	of	them	had	
had	 a	 long	 day	 at	 the	 conference.	 Very	 interestingly	 in	 this	 meeting,	 only	
infrequently	would	the	participants	describe	what	they	did	as	‘gongyi’.	Rather,	
they	would	use	the	word	‘self-empowerment’	(ziwo	fuquan,	自我赋权),	which	
was	learnt	from	a	previous	Oxfam’s	training	program.	 	
The	different	settings	above	constituted	one	of	the	longest	working	days	during	
my	fieldwork;	I	never	expected	to	see	so	many	different	but	overlapping	actors	
in	one	day.	The	sessions	were	just	 like	a	microcosm	of	the	fast-changing	and	
heterogeneous	Chinese	NGO	sector	in	the	past	decade.	Mostly	seen	as	‘a	new	
creature’	 created	 by	 Chinese	 economic	 reform	 and	 open-up	 policy,	 the	 past	
three	 decades	 have	 witnessed	 the	 growth	 of	 various	 non-governmental	
organizations	in	China.	As	most	of	the	social	organizations	were	demolished	in	
the	 socialist	 era,	 many	 of	 the	 NGOs	 have	 gained	 vigor	 from	 the	 legacies	 of	
traditional	 clans	 and	 the	 entering	 of	 various	 international	 donors	 since	 the	
1980s.	According	to	the	national	statistics	of	the	year	20182,	there	were	more	
than	 816	 thousand	 organizations	 registered	 with	 various	 government	
departments	 in	China,	 covering	numerous	 fields	 from	education,	health,	 and	
rural	development	 to	humanitarian	assistance.	What	was	 striking	about	 this	
growing	sector	was	the	‘great	leap	forward’	in	the	past	decade,	with	about	half	
	
2	 Source:	https://www.chinanews.com/sh/2019/07-12/8892801.shtml	
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of	the	registered	organizations	appearing	after	2008.	The	morning	government	
session	in	my	fieldwork	above	echoes	with	this	‘NGO	growing’	narrative,	that	
the	whole	Chinese	NGO	sector	 today	has	been	recognized,	 tolerated,	or	even	
encouraged	by	the	state.	The	government	officials	in	the	city	of	Nan	would	take	
this	‘growing	industry’	as	part	of	their	working	achievements	which	would	then	
be	perfectly	demonstrated	in	a	four-star	hotel	in	front	of	the	provincial	leaders	
at	the	‘gongyi	fair’.	 	
Alongside	 these	 growing	 numbers	 of	 organizations,	 however,	 are	 also	 the	
longer	 running	 debates	 regarding	 the	 relations	 between	 the	 Chinese	 social	
organizations	and	the	authoritarian	state.	As	the	above	story	of	the	local	CAB	
and	their	political	demands	towards	Humphrey’s	organization	suggests,	there	
are	always	tensions,	struggles,	and	negotiations	between	the	state	and	many	
organizations	 in	 China.	 The	 forced	donation	 asked	by	 the	 local	 CAB	officials	
reveals	the	rent-seeking	nature	of	the	state	power	in	regulating	Chinese	NGOs	
at	the	local	level.	Beijing’s	hostile	and	suspicious	attitude	towards	international	
organizations,	as	we	can	see	from	Oxfam’s	experience	above,	has	also	led	to	the	
withdrawal	of	international	donors	from	China	in	the	past	decade.	As	part	of	
the	survival	strategy,	grassroots	organizations	like	GH	have	had	to	find	a	way	
to	work	with	the	local	government	and	the	officials.	 	
But	at	the	same	time,	we	can	also	see	that	this	‘official	performance’	could	be	
somehow	closely	linked	with	another	force:	the	rising	domestic	donors	and	the	
Chinese	entrepreneurs.	Although	AF	did	not	show	up	directly	during	the	whole	
day,	 its	 strong	 influence	 among	 the	 grassroots	 organizations	 and	 its	 close	
connections	with	the	local	government	can	also	be	well	demonstrated	by	the	
vice-governor's	 speech,	 Humphrey’s	 public	 statement,	 the	 awards	 and	 the	
training	workshop	in	the	evening	session.	Given	that	international	donors	have	
been	leaving	China	during	the	past	decade,	the	rise	of	Chinese	entrepreneurs	as	
domestic	donors	is	playing	a	crucial	role	in	supporting	and	shaping	the	Chinese	
NGO	sector.	Although	there	were	only	about	1000	foundations	in	China	in	the	
early	 2000s	 and	 most	 of	 them	 had	 been	 founded	 by	 the	 government,	 the	
number	of	Chinese	 foundations	had	 increased	 to	more	 than	7500	by	August	
20193 .	 Most	 of	 the	 newly	 established	 foundations	were	 founded	 by	 private	
	
3	 Source:	http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.org.cn/news-23275.html	
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entrepreneurs	 or	 their	 companies,	 and	 they	 have	 out-numbered	 the	
government-established	 foundations	 since	 2007.	 From	 the	 two	 evening	
sessions	above,	we	may	also	find	that	these	new	domestic	donors	may	differ	
from	their	international	counterparts	in	many	ways.	They	sponsored	different	
projects,	 used	 different	 languages	 and	 knowledge,	 enjoyed	 very	 different	
relations	with	the	Chinese	state,	and	built	up	their	local	network	with	different	
strategies.	 	 	
What	 interests	me	most	 in	these	three	different	settings	 is	 the	 language	that	
different	 actors	 used	 in	 different	 situations.	 Although	 the	 CAB	 officials,	
Humphrey	 and	 the	 guest	 trainer	 in	 the	 evening	 session	 all	 used	 the	 same	
language	 of	gongyi	 to	 communicate	what	 they	 thought	NGOs	 should	 do,	 the	
meaning	 of	 this	 language	 and	 the	way	 it	was	 used	has	 both	 differences	 and	
similarities	among	these	different	actors.	For	 the	vice-governor,	gongyi	 is	an	
official	language	to	cover	all	the	social	welfare	issues,	in	which	NGOs	are	taken	
as	an	integral	part	of	the	service	delivery.	Government	officials	performed	their	
dominant	power	in	all	areas	of	the	conference,	from	managing	the	conference	
schedule,	and	the	venue	layout	to	their	speeches.	Even	though	unhappy	with	
the	conference	organization	and	forced	donation,	GH	was	 ‘incorporated’	 into	
this	 governmental	 performance	 as	 a	 representative	 of	 the	 new,	 domestic	
donors.	 For	 Humphrey,	 although	 he	 tried	 to	 use	 the	 same	 language	 in	 this	
governmental	activity,	he	emphasized	the	importance	of	another	social	force,	
the	Chinese	entrepreneurs,	emerging	in	the	field	as	a	funding	resource	outside	
the	state	apparatus.	Moreover,	the	commercialized	‘modern	gongyi’	training	in	
the	 evening	 seemed	 to	 strengthen	 Humphrey’s	 standpoint	 that	 the	 new	
domestic	donors	are	not	only	changing	the	financial	landscape	of	Chinese	NGO	
sector,	but	that	they	are	also	introducing	new	skills,	organizational	culture,	and	
thinking	patterns	among	the	grassroots	organizations.	The	absence	of	gongyi	in	
the	last	Oxfam	session	indicates	that	the	use	of	gongyi	is	not	only	a	linguistic	or	
cultural	issue	in	China,	it	is	also	a	new,	domestic	knowledge	different	from	the	
traditional	development	industry,	whose	production	process	has	been	deeply	
embedded	within	the	political	and	social	dynamics	in	China.	 	
Also	 important	 but	 less	 visible	 in	 the	 three	 different	 performances	 (or	 non-
performance)	of	gongyi	is	the	different	groups	of	people	who	were	using	(or	not	
using)	it.	For	the	local	government	officials,	the	gongyi	performance	was	used	
to	strengthen	their	extraordinary	political	and	social	status	in	front	of	the	local	
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NGO	community.	This	is	also	partly	the	reason	why	Humphrey,	a	man	who	can	
barely	afford	the	600	pounds	 ‘donation’,	must	make	sense	of	his	work	in	the	
public	by	connecting	GH	with	another	group	of	elites	-	the	new	domestic	donors	
and	their	extraordinary	founders.	In	this	case,	speaking	gongyi	in	the	AF’s	way	
and	acting	like	AF	did	empower	GH	in	facing	the	local	government,	although	at	
the	 same	 time	 it	 also	 helped	 to	 conceal	 the	 huge	 economic	 and	 social	 gap	
between	the	rich	domestic	donors	and	the	poor	NGO	frontline	workers	such	as	
Humphrey	in	China.	This	dilemma	of	gongyi	appeared	directly	in	the	case	of	the	
disabled	groups.	Since	most	of	them	who	were	living	at	the	bottom	of	Chinese	
society	and	not	speaking	gongyi,	this	poor,	disabled	group	were	more	invisible	
and	 isolated	 in	 the	 mainstream	 society.	 Their	 organization	 were	 neither	
recognized	by	the	state	nor	the	emerging	domestic	donors	such	as	AF.	This	was	
highlighted	by	the	fact	that	their	meeting	had	to	be	held	quietly	under	the	dim	
light	next	to	an	unpleasant	smelling	toilet.	 	 	 	
The	Chinese	language	of	gongyi	is	the	major	subject	of	this	thesis.	As	a	language	
that	has	been	popularly	used	 in	Chinese	society	since	 the	national	economic	
reform,	the	past	three	decades	have	witnessed	its	changing	meanings	given	the	
social	and	political	changes	in	the	country.	In	particular,	I	pay	attention	to	the	
recent	 history	 of	gongyi	 in	 the	 past	 decade,	 since	 this	 is	 the	 period	 that	 the	
whole	Chinese	NGO	industry	reached	its	highest	number	and	growth	rate,	along	
with	 new	 knowledge,	 actors,	 and	 politics.	 In	 this	 thesis,	 I	 argue	 that	 this	
language	 of	 gongyi,	 as	my	 ethnography	 of	 AF	 and	 its	 partner	 organizations	
presents,	is	key	word	to	understanding	the	changing	landscape	of	Chinese	NGO	
sector	in	the	past	decade.	Presenting	an	increasingly	complicated	picture	of	the	
Chinese	NGO	community,	this	study	examines	the	emerging	domestic	donors	
from	 the	 private	 sector	 and	 the	 accompanying	 changes	 of	 knowledge	
production	 and	 organizational	 culture.	 Through	 ethnographic	 research	 of	
Chinese	NGOs	and	the	everyday	life	of	their	workers,	this	study	tells	a	story	of	
how	a	seemingly	growing	NGO	industry	(and	the	civil	society	at	large)	in	the	
authoritarian	state	has	gone	through	the	process	of	normalization	in	the	past	
decade.	The	thesis	argues	that	this	process	has	strengthened	the	status	quo	of	
the	authoritarian	regime	by	NGOs’	deeper	embeddedness	within	corporatism	
in	various	ways,	and	it	has	also	helped	with	reproducing	social	inequality	in	the	
Chinese	 society.	 This	 chapter	 introduces	 the	 main	 research	 questions,	
arguments	and	the	analytical	framework	of	the	thesis.	
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1.1	What	this	thesis	is	about	 	
My	 research	 aims	 to	 answer	 the	 following	 interconnected	questions.	 Firstly,	
given	the	rise	of	the	Chinese	private	economy	and	the	authoritarian	state,	how	
did	Chinese	entrepreneurs	identify	themselves	as	new	donors	under	the	name	
of	 gongyi,	 and	 how	 did	 they	 imagine	 NGOs	 should	 be	 like	 in	 China?	 This	
question	looks	at	the	process	of	how	gongyi	has	been	imagined	and	reinvented	
under	the	tremendous	influence	of	the	Chinese	entrepreneurs	as	new	domestic	
donors.	The	question	responds	to	one	of	the	most	critical	aspects	of	this	widely	
used	language	of	gongyi:	where	its	knowledge	resource	comes	from	and	how	it	
is	practiced	 in	terms	of	daily	 language	and	working	skills.	My	answer	to	this	
question	 is	 mostly	 based	 on	my	 six-month	 ethnography	 in	 AF’s	 head	 office	
working	as	a	full-time	intern.	Frequently	reported	as	a	‘national	gongyi	model’,	
AF’s	 founders,	 a	 small	 group	 of	 the	most	 successful	 Chinese	 entrepreneurs,	
largely	 decided	 AF’s	 organizational	 structure,	 working	 strategy	 and	 daily	
operation.	Therefore,	Chinese	entrepreneurs	become	a	crucial	part	of	studying	
gongyi;	my	ethnographic	work	of	these	entrepreneurs’	personal	backgrounds,	
social	status,	public	and	internal	speeches,	media	presentations,	as	well	as	their	
interactions	with	the	ordinary	NGO	workers	would	be	helpful	in	answering	this	
question.	 	 	 	
Secondly,	 how	did	 the	Chinese	 state	 think	 about	 and	 contribute	 to	 this	 new	
gongyi	in	different	local	contexts?	This	question	analyzes	why	and	how	gongyi,	
an	 entrepreneur-invented	 language,	 can	 be	 tolerated,	 legitimized,	 or	 even	
encouraged	by	some	local	Chinese	states,	how	the	new	domestic	donors	and	
their	 local	partners	have	been	incorporated	by	the	state,	and	the	crucial	role	
that	gongyi	plays	in	this	regard.	The	answer	to	this	question	lies	in	my	studies	
of	 the	 different	 NGO-government	 relations	 in	 multiple	 sites:	 between	 the	
municipal	 government	of	 Shenzhen	city	and	AF,	between	 the	government	of	
city	Nan	 and	GH,	 and	 so	 forth.	My	 answer	 to	 this	 question	presents	 various	
forms	 of	 corporatism	 in	 China	 which,	 I	 argue,	 is	 very	 important	 for	 us	 to	
understand	how	gongyi	 can	be	disseminated,	 learned,	 and	negotiated	across	
the	country.	 	 	 	 	 	
Thirdly,	 what	 did	 this	 gongyi	mean	 for	 ordinary	 Chinese	 NGO	 workers,	 in	
particular,	 how	 did	 gongyi	 shape	 the	 private	 life	 and	 personal	 identities	 of	
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Chinese	NGO	workers,	and	how	did	 they	deal	with	gongyi	 in	different	ways?	
This	 question	 looks	 at	 how	 gongyi	 worked	 at	 an	 individual	 level	 from	 the	
perspectives	 of	 gender,	 religion	 and	 cultural	 norms.	 The	 answer	 to	 this	
question	is	based	on	the	first	two	questions.	On	the	one	hand,	my	ethnographic	
work	 of	 living	 with	 AF’s	 workers	 in	 its	 dormitory	 reveals	 how	 the	
entrepreneurial	gongyi	can	serve	as	a	mechanism	for	reproducing	inequalities	
among	NGO	workers,	with	the	help	of	the	labor	re-division	in	Chinese	families	
since	the	economic	reform.	On	the	other	hand,	my	study	of	the	private	lives	of	
AF’s	 local	 partners	 also	 helps	 us	 understand	 how	 the	 different	 forms	 of	
corporatism	 in	 the	 local	 society	 can	 be	 practiced	 as	 an	 arrangement	 of	
organizing	 people’s	 everyday	 life,	 which	 constitutes	 their	 different	
understandings	of	‘doing	gongyi’.	The	answer	to	this	question	shows	how	the	
knowledge	and	language	of	gongyi	help	to	strengthen	the	polarized	nature	of	
Chinese	NGOs	and	their	workers,	which	is	deeply	embedded	within	the	highly	
differentiated,	unequal	Chinese	society	today.	
In	 answering	 these	 three	 main	 questions,	 this	 research	 understands	 the	
multiple	meanings	and	performances	of	gongyi	by	applying	it	to	the	dynamic	
NGO-state	 relations	 in	 China	 as	 well	 as	 the	 everyday	 life	 of	 Chinese	 NGO	
workers.	Considering	the	crucial	roles	that	the	Chinese	entrepreneurs	played	
in	shaping	Chinese	NGOs,	I	present	the	process	of	how	gongyi,	once	a	socialist	
morality,	 has	 become	 increasingly	 commercialized	 in	 recent	 years.	 The	 new	
meanings	 of	 gongyi	were	 firstly	 reinvented	 by	 these	 Chinese	 entrepreneurs,	
which	were	called	as	‘modern	gongyi’.	By	looking	at	the	daily	operation	of	AF	in	
the	 city	 of	 Shenzhen,	 I	 argue	 that	 this	 modern	 gongyi	 is	 producing	 new	
knowledge	and	skills.	 	 As	a	 farewell	 to	 the	 socialist	 traditions,	 this	 ‘modern	
gongyi’	 puts	 an	 emphasis	 on	 the	 spirit	 of	 aggressiveness	 in	 NGO	 workers’	
everyday	 life,	 a	 characteristic	 known	 as	 ‘wolf	 spirit’,	which	 is	 shared	 by	 the	
market	economy	and	many	Chinese	enterprises	today.	This	new	gongyi	also	led	
to	profound	changes	at	the	individual	level:	more	employees	(mostly	men)	with	
the	mastery	of	the	new,	commercialized	languages	and	fewer	‘family	burdens’	
were	 seen	 to	be	better	 equipped	with	 the	 ‘wolf	 spirit’	 to	do	modern	gongyi,	
while	 female	workers	were	 increasingly	marginalized	 in	China’s	NGO	sector.	
Furthermore,	 this	 research	 also	 argues	 that	 although	 gongyi	 seems	 to	 be	 a	
“commercialized	(and	seemingly	depoliticized)”	knowledge	reinvented	by	the	
Chinese	 entrepreneurs,	 its	 dissemination	 and	 reproduction	 is	 largely	
embedded	in	various	forms	of	local	politics	in	different	places.	In	some	cases,	
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the	 modern	 gongyi	 model	 helped	 strengthen	 corporatism	 by	 building	
partnerships	 between	 AF,	 the	 local	 government,	 and	 government-organized	
NGOs	(GONGOs).	In	some	others,	however,	it	turned	out	to	be	a	political	shelter	
for	 the	 grassroots	 organizations	 to	 disguise	 their	 cooperation	 with	
international	 donors.	 Being	 a	 ‘successful	 gongyi	 worker’	 in	 this	 sense	 also	
involves	new	elements	other	than	the	commercialized	skills:	it	means	that	the	
NGO	workers	need	to	reorganize	their	everyday	life	in	order	to	cultivate	and	
maintain	various	social	relations	in	the	local	society.	 	 	
By	 discussing	 the	 role	 of	 the	 Chinese	 state	 played	 in	 different	 case	 studies,	
gongyi	presents	a	more	complicated	picture	of	deepening	corporatism	in	China	
in	various	 forms.	Corporatism	in	this	sense,	 is	not	only	a	national	regulatory	
framework	towards	the	civil	society	in	an	authoritarian	state,	but	it	also	works	
in	 more	 indirect	 and	 decentralized	 ways	 by	 collaborating	 with	 the	 private	
sector,	 entrepreneurs	 and	 some	 NGO	 leaders	 in	 different	 places	 across	 the	
country.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 multiple	 meanings	 of	 doing	 gongyi	 as	 a	
profession	in	the	Chinese	NGO	community	also	unveils	an	increasingly	unequal	
society	in	the	making	under	this	corporatism.	 	
It	should	be	noted	that	there	have	been	several	seemingly	similar	but	different	
words	mentioned	so	far	in	this	thesis:	social	organization	(shehui	zuzhi,	社会
组织),	non-governmental	organization	(fei	zhengfu	zuzhi,非政府组织),	and	civil	
society	 organization	 (gongmin	 shehui	 zuzhi,	 公民社会组织 ).	 	 In	 many	
literatures	 and	 news	 reports,	 these	 words	 are	 taken	 as	 equivalent	 to	 one	
another,	pointing	to	some	vague	and	broadly	defined	forces	or	groups	outside	
the	 state.	 But	 in	 China’s	 context,	 they	 are	 used	 in	 very	 different	 ways	 by	
different	groups	of	people,	indicating	different	political	meanings	and	types	of	
organizations.	Therefore,	it	is	first	helpful	to	clarify	the	kinds	of	organization	I	
am	specifically	 looking	at	 in	 this	 thesis.	The	 first	one,	 ‘social	organization’	 is	
widely	 used	 in	 governmental	 documents,	 especially	 when	 people	 try	 to	
categorize	 various	 GONGOs,	 community	 centers,	 academic	 associations	 and	
business	 unions.	 It	 covers	 a	wide	 range	 of	 organizations	 both	 including	 for-
profit	 and	 non-profit	 ones,	 without	 mentioning	 the	 autonomy	 of	 these	
organizations.	 The	 second	 one,	 the	 non-governmental	 organization,	 or	 fei	
zhengfu	zuzhi,	 is	a	Western	word	 imported	 into	China	 in	 the	1980s.	While	 it	
reflects	organizations’	independence	from	the	state,	this	translation	is	also	the	
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most	controversial	 in	China.	In	some	cases,	 feizhengfu	zuzhi	 is	confused	with	
wuzhengfu	 zuzhi	 (anarchic	 organization),	 or	 fanzhengfu	 zuzhi	 (anti-
government	organization)	(Suo,	2008).	In	my	former	work	experience	and	this	
fieldwork	with	Chinese	NGOs,	the	word	‘NGO’	has	been	very	popular	among	the	
Chinese	 organizations	 deeply	 influenced	 by	 various	 international	 donors.	
These	organizations	often	posit	themselves	as	part	of	‘the	growing	third	sector’	
or	 ‘civil	 society’	 outside	 the	 state	 and	 the	 market,	 working	 for	 social	
development	 issues	 in	 China.	 Given	 NGOs’	 controversial	 translations	 and	
transnational	 links,	 I	 find	many	Chinese	NGO	workers	would	nowadays	only	
use	this	term	among	themselves	in	private	conversations;	when	in	front	of	the	
Chinese	government	or	the	general	public,	they	turn	to	using	the	term	‘social	
organizations’	in	order	to	avoid	political	troubles.	Based	on	‘NGO’,	‘civil	society	
organization	(CSO)’	goes	a	bit	further	in	its	political	contents.	As	I	discuss	in	the	
next	chapter,	‘civil	society’	has	been	seen	as	a	term	of	political	danger	brought	
by	the	Western	world	and	which	has	been	censored	in	China	in	the	past	few	
years.	 Hence,	 ‘CSO’	 in	 China	 has	 been	 often	 related	 to	 social	 or	 political	
movements	 and	 is	 more	 welcomed	 among	 advocacy	 groups	 and	 political	
activists.	 	
In	this	thesis,	 the	organizations	I	study	overlap	between	‘social	organization’	
and	 ‘NGO’	 in	China’s	 context.	All	 of	 them	would	publicly	 claim	 that	 they	 are	
‘social	organizations’	doing	‘gongyi	deeds’,	or	simply	‘gongyi	organizations‘.	But	
many	 of	 the	 organizations’	 workers	 I	 study	 had	 personal	 connections	 with	
international	donors;	they	may	have	been	a	former	worker	of	the	international	
donors,	 received	 funding	 or	 training	 programs	 from	 them,	 or	 had	 studied	
abroad.	Therefore,	on	many	informal	occasions,	they	would	also	use	Western	
words	like	‘NGO’	to	identify	themselves.	In	what	follows,	I	situate	the	two	major	
themes	of	this	thesis	-	corporatism	and	everyday	life	in	reformist	China	-	in	the	
larger	fields	of	theoretical	debates.	 	
	
1.2	The	Analytical	Framework	
In	discussing	corporatism	in	this	section,	I	 firstly	introduce	how	the	relevant	
debates	 have	 been	 developed	 in	 understanding	 state-society	 relations	 in	
reformist	 China.	 In	 particular,	 I	 present	 the	 debates	 around	 two	 different	
scholarly	 traditions	 in	 understanding	 Chinese	 NGOs:	 civil	 society	 and	
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corporatism.	 	 In	this	thesis,	I	argue	that	the	corporatism	framework	would	be	
better	 than	 the	 civil	 society	 approach	 in	 analyzing	 the	 internal	 structural	
changes	of	the	Chinese	NGO	sector	in	the	past	decade,	as	it	still	provides	a	very	
useful	 framework	in	understanding	the	changing	regulatory	strategies	of	 the	
Chinese	 state	as	well	 as	 the	dynamic	political	 and	 social	 environment	 in	 the	
country	at	large.	But	my	research	also	extends	the	literature	on	corporatism	in	
two	ways.	 	
On	the	one	hand,	this	thesis	presents	a	more	complicated	picture	of	the	making	
of	corporatism	in	China	by	taking	new	actors	and	knowledge	from	the	private	
sector	 into	consideration.	On	the	other,	 the	thesis	goes	further	to	 look	at	the	
essential	 (but	 understudied)	 role	 that	 corporatism	plays	 in	 shaping	 Chinese	
NGOs	in	different	places.	In	this	sense,	I	present	the	fragmented	nature	of	the	
Chinese	state	and	analyze	how	this	fragmentation	has	contributed	to	different	
state-NGO	relations.	I	argue	that	the	depoliticization	trend	and	normalization	
process	 of	 the	 Chinese	 NGO	 sector	 is	 largely	 based	 upon	 the	 deeper	
development	 of	 corporatism	 in	 different	 places	 across	 the	 country.	 Then	 in	
section	1.2.4,	 I	 turn	to	the	second	major	theme	of	the	thesis:	everyday	life	 in	
reformist	China.	 	 Given	the	changing	landscape	of	the	Chinese	NGO	sector	and	
the	 dynamic	 political	 environment,	 the	 continuities	 and	 changes	 in	 NGO	
workers’	everyday	lives	demonstrate	the	cultural	and	social	meanings	of	“doing	
gongyi”	 in	 China’s	 context.	 In	 this	 section,	 by	 engaging	 with	 the	 existing	
literature	on	Chinese	popular	language	and	everyday	life	in	the	reformist	era,	I	
pay	 attention	 to	 the	meanings	 of	gongyi	 from	 two	perspectives:	 gender	 and	
social	inequality.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
1.2.1The	civil	society	framework	 	
There	have	been	two	main	types	of	literature	-	corporatism	and	civil	society	-	
debating	 Chinese	 NGOs,	 developing	 from	 different	 academic	 traditions	 and	
historical	periods.	To	better	understand	the	discussion	around	corporatism	in	
this	section,	I	will	first	introduce	the	civil	society	approach	and	its	debates.	 	 	 	
Many	scholars	rely	on	insights	from	the	literature	on	civil	society,	which	usually	
assumes	that	social	actors	have	a	contentious	or	counterbalancing	relationship	
with	 the	 state	 (Cohen	 and	 Arato,	 1992;	 Fine,	 1997)	 and	 that	 the	 various	
activities	 it	 explains	will	 lead	 to	 political	 change	 (e.g.	 Putnam,	 1993;	 Keane,	
	 21	
2003).	The	dominant	 literature	maintains	 that	NGOs	could	be	a	 challenge	 to	
authoritarianism	 by	 increasing	 political	 participation	 (especially	 among	
marginalized	populations)	and	keeping	state	power	in	check	 	 (Mercer,	2002),	
and	thus	a	fundamental	source	of	democratization	(Diamond,	1994).	Most	civil	
society	 scholars	 see	NGOs	 from	 a	 decidedly	 liberal	 perspective,	maintaining	
that	democracy	requires	this	autonomous	civil	society	to	balance	a	strong	state	
and	represent	the	diverse	interests	within	society.	In	China’s	context,	academic	
discussions	on	whether	and	how	to	apply	civil	society	theories	in	the	country	
have	 been	 ongoing	 since	 the	 1989	 Student	 Movement	 in	 Beijing.	 	 In	 his	
research,	Zhao	(1998,	2002,	2013)	analyzed	how	the	weaknesses	of	the	various	
movement	 organizations	 in	 Beijing	 finally	 contributed	 to	 the	 failure	 of	 the	
larger	 movement,	 and	 this	 he	 attributed	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 ‘civil	 society’	 and	
‘organizational	 capacity’	 in	 the	 country.	 Therefore,	 Zhao	 called	 for	 more	
‘intermediate	 organizations	 between	 the	 state	 and	 the	 society’	 in	 China,	 a	
perspective	which	shares	many	common	arguments	with	 the	NGO	 literature	
referred	to	above.	 	
Zhao’s	 research	 has	 been	 further	 developed	 with	 China’s	 increasing	
development	of	urbanization	and	marketization	reform,	which	leads	to	more	
and	more	research	on	the	relations	between	the	emerging	urban	middle	class	
and	a	growing	civil	society	in	China	(e.g.	Cai,	2005;	Zhang,	2010;	Tomba,	2014;	
Zhou,	2014).	These	studies	can	be	found	from	a	wide	range	of	examples	such	as	
qigong	groups,	private	entrepreneurs,	new	pop	cultures	and	clubs	in	various	
Chinese	cities,	which	have	all	been	seen	as	expressions	of	a	new	social	stratum	
in	 the	 society	 indicating	 the	 possibilities	 of	 a	 separate,	 more	 independent	
sphere	 outside	 the	 state.	 Among	 the	 studies	 of	 the	 ‘middle	 class	 and	 civil	
society’,	researchers	on	Chinese	social	media	and	NGOs	directly	link	these	new	
phenomena	with	political	change	(Yang	and	Calhoun,	2007;	Yang,	2012,	2017).	
While	 studies	 on	 religious	 associations	 and	 women’s	 groups	 offered	 the	
possibilities	of	how	these	‘voluntary	associations’	may	lead	to	the	development	
of	 an	 autonomous	 social	 sphere	 (e.g.	Howell,	 1995,	 2007,	 2012;	 Cao,	 2008),	
researchers	of	Chinese	online	platforms	and	marketized	media	emphasize	the	
various	ways	 that	 this	 rising	sphere	may	change	 the	political	agendas	of	 the	
Chinese	state	around	many	social	 issues	(e.g.	Yang	and	Calhoun,	2007;	Zhan,	
2017).	 These	 two	 research	 groups	 together	 contribute	 to	 more	 analyses	 of	
social	movement	in	urban	China,	 looking	at	how	‘voluntary	associations’	and	
their	collaborations	with	ordinary	citizens	online	have	ultimately	affected	the	
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rise	and	 fall	 of	 various	environmental	movements	 in	different	Chinese	 cities	
(e.g.	Ji,	2000;	Wong,	2016;	Hsu	and	Hsu,	2017).	 	
Therefore,	some	researchers	conclude	that	even	though	civil	society	might	not	
bring	democracy	to	China,	civil	liberties	are	sure	to	increase	because	of	the	very	
existence	 of	 these	 social	 organizations	 (e.g.	 Morton,	 2005).	 In	 recent	 years,	
there	 have	 been	 researchers	 looking	 at	 the	 increasing	 number	 and	 various	
types	 of	 organizations,	 taking	 it	 as	 the	 ‘growth	 of	 China’s	 civil	 society’ 4 .	
According	to	this	approach,	the	main	obstacles	to	Chinese	NGOs	developing	a	
more	‘mature	civil	society’	may	lie	in	two	factors:	the	collaboration	among	these	
organizations	(Peng	and	Wu,	2018;	Yang	and	Cheong,	2019),	and	their	relations	
with	 the	 Chinese	 state	 (Hsu	 and	 Jiang,	 2015;	 Zhu,	 Ye	 and	 Liu,	 2018).	 Many	
studies	 on	 China’s	 NGOs	 today	 emphasize	 the	 importance	 of	 organizational	
collaboration	between	NGOs	to	form	a	stronger	‘civil	society’,	so	as	to	provide	
more	 social	 welfare	 services	 and/or	 build	 up	 a	more	 independent	 network	
outside	 the	state	apparatus	 (e.g.	Ma	and	Parish,	2014;	Spires,	Tao	and	Chan,	
2014;	Shieh,	2017;	Wu,	2017).	The	independence	of	Chinese	NGOs	in	relation	
to	the	state	has	become	the	major	concern	of	many	civil	society	researchers.	 	 	
This	liberal	civil	society	approach	has	been	facing	many	challenges	of	empirical	
evidence	 in	 China’s	 context.	 Some	 scholars	 have	 come	 to	 realize	 that	 civil	
society	 may	 be	 different	 in	 China.	 They	 argue	 that	 China’s	 civil	 society	 is	
described	as	highly	regulated	(Xiaoguang	and	Heng,	2008),	 limited	by	“Asian	
characteristics”	(Madsen,	1993),	and	usually	less	confrontational	than	in	other	
contexts	(Pye	and	Ogden,	2003).	Many	note	that	the	state	must	be	taken	into	
consideration	 when	 using	 the	 concept	 of	 civil	 society	 (Chamberlain,	 1993;	
Nevitt,	 1996).	 As	 Spires	 (2011)states,	 there	 could	 be	 “organizational	
isomorphism”	between	the	governmental	bodies	and	non-governmental	actors	
in	China,	so	that	 ‘we	should	not	assume	NGOs	in	an	authoritarian	state,	even	
	
4 	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 more	 and	 more	 researchers	 in	 this	 approach	 do	
recognize	the	different	types	of	these	emerging	Chinese	organizations,	although	
they	do	not	necessarily	problematize	the	differences	(e.g.	Lai	et	al.,	2015;	Shieh,	
2017).	For	instance,	some	researchers	view	the	rapidly	increasing	number	of	
private	 charitable	 foundations	 and	 celebrity	 philanthropy	 as	 a	 great	
opportunity	for	the	Chinese	NGO	sector	to	get	more	funding	and	enhance	their	
efficiency	and	internal	governance,	etc	(e.g.	Deng,	2015).	 	 	
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independent	 grassroots	 organizations,	 are	 working	 toward	 democratic	
purposes’	(p35).	Ogden	(2002)	argues	that	some	NGOs	may	weaken	the	state,	
but	 that	 in	 itself	 does	not	necessarily	 bring	 any	benefits	 to	 the	 society.	Beja	
(2008)	and	Hildebrandt	(2011)	argue	that	some	Chinese	NGOs	may	prioritize	
the	specific	needs	of	the	state	and	marginalize	those	seeking	for	more	radical	
change	in	China,	so	as	to	maintain	the	extraordinary	political	status	in	the	NGO	
community.	 	
Given	 these	 challenges	 in	 the	 liberal	 civil	 society	 approach,	 some	 scholars	
rectify	 this	with	 the	 Gramscian	 concept	 of	 civil	 society,	 suggesting	 that	 civil	
society	is	more	like	an	extension	of	the	capitalist	state.	In	this	regard,	Howell’s	
research	(2012)	tries	to	bring	market	back	to	the	analysis	of	Chinese	NGOs.	By	
tracing	 the	 different	 historical	 periods	 of	 the	 Chinese	 NGO	 sector	 since	 the	
national	economic	reform,	Howell	finds	that	the	rise	and	fall	of	Chinese	NGOs,	
labor	organizations	 in	particular,	have	been	highly	dependent	upon	national	
economic	conditions	at	different	times,	which	also	affects	the	Chinese	state’s	
various	 attitudes	 and	 changing	 regulations	 towards	 different	 types	 of	
organizations.	 The	 correlations	 between	 NGO	 development	 and	 economic	
growth	can	be	best	 found	 in	the	early	2000s	when	China	had	 just	 joined	the	
World	Trade	Organization.	Since	then,	China	as	a	‘world	factory’	has	witnessed	
a	rapidly	increasing	number	of	labor	unrest,	and	the	state	has	also	begun	to	take	
a	 more	 hostile	 strategy	 towards	 organizations	 working	 on	 labor	 rights	
protection	issues.	Howell’s	research	inspires	us	to	question	the	dichotomized	
nature	 of	 the	 state-society	 (or	 state-NGO)	 relations	 in	 China,	 as	 the	
development	 of	 the	 Chinese	 NGO	 sector	 may	 have	 already	 been	 deeply	
embedded	into	the	neoliberal	marketization	reform	and	globalization	trend.	
	
1.2.2	The	corporatism	framework	
To	 some	 degree,	 researchers	 of	 the	 corporatism	 tradition	 have	 some	
similarities	with	the	Gramscian	approach	mentioned	in	the	last	section.	Both	of	
them	 look	 at	 the	 political	 economy	 factors	 in	 shaping	 the	 state	 and	 society	
relations	in	China,	evaluating	political	and	social	change	from	a	longer	historical	
perspective.	 But	 the	 Gramscian	 approach	 and	 corporatism	 framework	 are	
trying	 to	answer	different	questions.	By	putting	 the	development	of	Chinese	
NGOs	 into	 the	 structure	 of	 neoliberalism	 at	 the	 global	 level,	 the	 Gramscian	
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approach	 is	 useful	 in	 evaluating	 the	 dynamics	 between	 the	 state	 and	 NGOs	
through	 the	 changing	 regulations	 of	 Chinese	 NGOs.	 But	 unlike	 civil	 society	
researchers	who	seek	to	explore	how	the	society	can	change	the	state	politics	
in	China,	corporatism	aims	to	explain	the	status	quo	(Hildebrandt,	2013):	with	
the	growing	civil	society	in	China	in	the	past	decades,	why	can	we	still	see	no	
visible	political	change	in	the	country?	How	can	we	understand	the	resilience	
of	China’s	authoritarianism?	 	 	
Schmitter	(1974:	93-4)	calls	corporatism	“a	system	of	interest	representation”	
where	 organizations	 are	 given	 “representational	 monopoly	 within	 their	
respective	 categories	 in	 exchange	 for	 observing	 certain	 controls	 on	 their	
selection	 of	 leaders	 and	 articulation	 of	 demands	 and	 supports”.	 Corporatist	
insights	 have	 been	 increasingly	 adopted	 to	 explain	 the	 negotiated,	 highly	
structured	 relationship	 between	 the	 state	 and	 society	 in	 China.	 The	 use	 of	
corporatism	has	been	firstly	and	widely	used	by	social	scientists	to	analyze	the	
political	factors	in	shaping	the	Chinese	economic	development	path	as	well	as	
the	relations	between	the	Chinese	state	and	the	private	sector.	Walder	(1987)	
holds	 that	 China’s	 corporatist	 tradition	 should	 be	 better	 understood	 in	 its	
socialist	history	of	state-owned	factories,	which	created	a	system	of	public	ties	
between	 selected	 subordinates	 (the	 ordinary	 factory	 workers)	 and	 their	
superiors	(factory	leaders)	that	was	in	accord	with	the	dictates	of	Party	policy.	
This	system	almost	inevitably	slipped	sideways	into	personalized	patron-client	
relationships	 and	 favors	 trading,	 which	 has	 not	 yet	 been	 touched	 by	 the	
national	economic	reform.	Instead,	this	clientelist	corporatism	constitutes	an	
important	 feature	of	China’s	 economic	development	model	 in	 the	past	 three	
decades.	For	instance,	Wank	(1999)	and	Pearson	(1997)	find	that	despite	the	
expansion	 of	 the	 sphere	 of	 the	 market,	 the	 power	 of	 the	 state	 imposes	
constraints	on	every	aspect	of	business	and	often	uses	its	leverage	to	pressure	
entrepreneurs	into	redistributing	wealth	to	the	community.	The	corporatism	
literature	is	particularly	insightful	in	analyzing	China’s	economic	and	political	
development	from	a	decentralized	perspective.	Researchers,	such	as	Oi	(1989),	
Shue	 (1988)	 and	 Duckett	 (1998),	 suggest	 that	 the	 local	 state	 can	 be	
entrepreneurial	 and	 productive	 in	 facilitating	 China’s	 economic	 reform.	 The	
local	state	is	neither	a	shaper	nor	a	regulator	of	markets	only;	rather,	it	is	the	
player	in	the	local	market	(Oi,	1995).	Furthermore,	given	studies	on	different	
development	paths	in	different	Chinese	provinces	(e.g.	Blecher	and	Shue,	2001;	
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Remick,	2002;	Hsu	and	Hasmath,	2012),	the	subtleties	of	state–society	relations	
across	the	country	are	brought	to	the	fore.	 	
Some	NGO	researchers	hold	that	corporatism	could	better	explain	Chinese	NGO	
development	by	questioning	the	nature	of	the	‘growing	civil	society’.	They	are	
partly	 inspired	the	Gramscian	approach	in	examining	Chinese	civil	society.	 If	
one	looks	at	the	organizations	established	by	the	state,	one	may	find	it	is	these	
organizations,	 rather	 than	 the	 non-state	 ones,	 that	 have	 been	 dominating	
China’s	NGO	sector	in	the	past	three	decades	(Spires,	2011;	Hildebrandt,	2011;	
Hsu	 and	 Hasmath,	 2015;	 Lai	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 Therefore,	 many	 corporatism	
researchers	look	at	the	roles	that	GONGOs	play	in	shaping	the	whole	NGO	sector,	
even	though	the	funding	resources	and	non-state	actors	have	been	much	more	
diversified	than	ever	before	(Spires,	2011;	Xijin,	2011;	Zhu,	Ye	and	Liu,	2018;	
Kang,	 2019).	 More	 importantly,	 given	 the	 restrictions	 and	 repressive	
regulations	 towards	Chinese	NGOs,	 in	order	 to	 survive	and	get	 funding,	 it	 is	
possible	that	many	of	China’s	local	NGOs	are	more	willing	to	be	incorporated	
within	the	current	regime	(Hildebrandt,	2012).	Similarly,	some	studies	reveal	
that	many	Chinese	NGO	leaders	keep	special	ties	with	local	officials	for	political	
protections	(ibid.;	Fulda,	Li	and	Song,	2012).	The	whole	NGO	sector	may	then	
exclude	 those	 who	 are	 ‘politically	 contentious’	 rather	 than	 challenge	 the	
authoritarian	institutions	(Hildebrandt,	2015).	Meanwhile,	they	also	argue	that	
the	civil	society	approach	takes	the	interactions	between	the	Chinese	state	and	
NGOs	as	a	 zero-sum	game	or	balance	of	power;	however,	 some	corporatism	
researchers	 argue	 that	 the	 game	 players	 could	 be	 symbiotic	 (Spires,	 2011).	
NGOs	and	their	leaders	in	China	may	share	more	similarities	with	the	state	than	
differences.	 	
In	short,	under	the	corporatism	framework,	researchers	challenge	the	assumed	
link	 between	 democracy,	 economic	 liberalization	 and	 NGO	 development	 in	
China.	Empirical	evidence	of	East	Asia	has	demonstrated	that	liberalization	in	
both	 economy	 and	 politics	 could	 be	 tolerated	 within,	 or	 even	 mutually	
consolidates,	 authoritarianism	 (Evans,	 1995;	 Leftwich,	 1995).	 So,	 the	
techniques	 used	 to	 discipline	 Chinese	 NGOs	 could	 be	 more	 advanced,	
complicated,	subtle	and	invisible	(Howell,	2019).	In	recent	years,	inspired	by	
the	corporatist	political	economy	studies	of	China’s	local	states,	more	and	more	
researchers	 have	 examined	 the	 differences	 between	 how	 NGOs	 are	
administered	 in	 different	 areas	 in	 China,	 how	 local	 states	 implement	 the	
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national	 regulations	 in	 different	 ways,	 and	 how	 local	 officials	 manage	 their	
personal	relations	with	NGOs	with	various	strategies	(e.g.	Hildebrandt,	2013;	
Hsu	and	Hasmath,	2014a;	Hsu,	2012).	These	studies	are	particularly	helpful	in	
understanding	the	heterogeneity	of	China’s	political	and	social	development	in	
a	more	decentralized	way.	 	 	
	
1.2.3	Gongyi	and	corporatism	in	China	 	
Although	this	research	on	AF	and	other	Chinese	NGOs	is	greatly	inspired	by	the	
debates	of	both	the	civil	society	and	corporatism	framework,	it	engages	more	
directly	with	and	also	contributes	to	the	corporatism	approach.	 	 	
Firstly,	the	main	research	subjects	in	the	thesis	are	the	organizations	that	have	
been	 recognized	 and/or	 at	 least	 tolerated	 by	 the	 state.	 As	 I	 present	 in	 the	
empirical	chapters,	most	of	the	organizations	I	studied	in	my	fieldwork	are	the	
mainstream,	‘overground’	organizations	that	had	various	kind	of	ties	with	the	
Chinese	state,	but	not	those	who	have	been	seen	as	political	threats	in	China.	
The	linguistic	history	of	gongyi	(see	the	next	chapter)	can	also	be	traced	back	
to	China’s	socialist	revolution.	In	this	sense,	my	research	of	gongyi	documents	
the	 ‘normalization’	 process	 of	 how	 the	 NGO	 community	 in	 an	 authoritarian	
state	 like	China	have	moved	 from	an	underground,	marginalized,	or	political	
opposition	 status	 (as	 discussed	 by	 many	 civil	 society	 scholars)	 to	 an	
overground,	legitimatized	industry,	without	greatly	challenging	the	status	quo.	 	
Based	on	the	current	corporatism	literature	that	mostly	focuses	on	the	relevant	
regulatory	 policies	 and	 GONGOs	 in	 China,	 this	 research	 documents	 and	
analyzes	a	more	complicated	picture	of	how	corporatism	works	in	China.	The	
increasingly	complicated	picture	is	mostly	demonstrated	in	the	collaboration	
between	the	local	state,	entrepreneurs,	and	Chinese	NGOs.	In	this	thesis,	I	argue	
that	corporatism	is	not	just	appearing	in	the	increasing	state	surveillance	and	
regulations	towards	NGOs,	but	it	is	also	working	through	many	indirect	ways:	
for	instance,	deeper	collaboration	between	the	state	and	the	emerging	domestic	
donors	at	the	local	level;	the	commercialization	of	the	NGO	sector;	the	changing	
everyday	life	of	ordinary	NGO	workers	in	China.	The	new	knowledge	of	‘doing	
gongyi’,	I	propose,	is	largely	a	product	of	these	new,	complicated	interactions	
between	the	three	groups	of	actors	in	this	thesis.	
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Secondly,	based	on	my	multi-sited	fieldwork	across	seven	different	provinces	
in	China,	this	research	on	gongyi	never	takes	the	Chinese	state,	entrepreneurs,	
or	 NGO	 workers	 as	 homogenous	 actors.	 Instead,	 I	 present	 the	 various	
performances	and	understandings	of	gongyi	by	putting	it	back	to	different	local	
contexts.	In	this	sense,	I	present	the	fragmented	nature	of	the	Chinese	state	and	
analyze	 how	 this	 fragmentation	 has	 contributed	 to	 different	 state-NGO	
relations.	 In	 the	 past	 ten	 years,	 the	 Chinese	 state	 at	 the	 national	 level	 has	
strengthened	its	political	control	towards	the	international	donors	as	well	as	
NGOs	 involved	 with	 contentious	 politics.	 But	 the	 changing	 regulatory	
framework	has	never	performed	evenly	in	the	local	society.	The	thesis	argues	
that	 although	 gongyi	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 “commercialized	 (and	 therefore	
depoliticized)”	 knowledge	 reinvented	 by	 the	 Chinese	 entrepreneurs,	 its	
dissemination	and	reproduction	is	largely	embedded	in	various	forms	of	local	
politics	 in	 different	 places.	 The	 widely	 used	 language	 as	 gongyi	 in	 the	 last	
decade	is	never	a	phenomenon	of	depoliticizing	in	its	nature,	or	a	retreat	from	
a	more	contentious	politics	in	China;	rather	it	is	still	a	highly	political	language	
but	with	different	performances	from	the	previous	historical	periods.	 	 	 	
My	multi-sited	fieldwork	also	leads	me	to	think	about	corporatism	in	China	in	
a	more	contextual	and	decentralized	way.	In	practice,	we	may	find	corporatism	
is	not	only	a	national	regulatory	framework	established	by	a	strong,	centralized,	
Chinese	state	at	the	time	of	the	1989	Beijing	Student	Movement,	but	that	there	
are	also	various	forms	of	corporatism	based	on	different	negotiations	between	
the	local	state	and	NGOs	in	their	everyday	life	within	the	past	decade.	 In	the	
empirical	chapters,	we	may	find	that	Chinese	state’s	surveillance	towards	NGOs,	
whether	 they	 are	 legally	 registered	 or	 not,	 is	 everywhere.	 For	 people	 like	
Humphrey,	although	his	organization	has	been	legally	registered	for	years,	his	
contacts	with	international	donors	has	been	closely	watched	by	the	local	police.	
That	is	also	the	reason	why,	as	I	write	at	the	beginning	of	this	thesis,	Oxfam’s	
meeting	with	him	can	only	take	place	in	a	dark	hotel	corridor.	Registration	gives	
Chinese	NGOs	 the	 legitimacy	 for	 their	 daily	 activities,	 so	 they	 are	 no	 longer	
‘underground’	anymore.	However,	 it	 also	means	 that	all	 these	organizations,	
including	 AF	 and	 GH,	 have	 to	 be	 checked	 by	 the	 local	 authorities	 regularly.	
According	to	the	national	NGO	regulations	(see	more	in	Chapter	6),	AF	and	GH	
must	 submit	 their	 annual	 work	 plans,	 financial	 reports,	 funding	 resources,	
partner	 organizations’	materials	 and	 so	 forth	 to	 the	 local	 government	 every	
year	for	approval,	so	that	to	‘maintain’	their	legal	status.	 	
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That	is	one	of	the	reasons	why	that	most	of	the	NGOs	I	encountered	had	to	use	
certain	language,	like	gongyi,	to	identify	themselves	in	their	daily	work,	so	as	to	
be	incorporated	into	and	recognized	by	the	local	government.	But	the	way	that	
these	 organizations	 and	 their	workers	 understood	 and	 used	 gongyi	 is	 quite	
different.	For	foundation	workers	in	one	of	the	biggest	cities	in	China,	they	try	
to	 fit	 themselves	 into	 the	 urban	 ‘white	 collar’	 community	 as	 a	 ‘gongyi	
professional’,	and	therefore	they	need	to	learn	to	be	a	new	man	with	‘wolf	spirit’	
in	a	fast-changing	society.	But	in	the	other	places,	NGO	workers	prefer	to	refer	
to	themselves	simply	as	‘gongyi	people’	(rather	than	a	professional	attached	to	
a	 certain	 institution),	 as	 this	 name	gives	 them	more	 flexibility	 in	presenting	
their	 faith	 in	 and	 social	 relations	 to	 the	 local	 society,	 especially	 their	
connections	with	the	local	state,	government	officials,	and	the	business	world.	 	
In	this	sense,	I	argue	that	corporatism	is	not	just	a	concept	for	understanding	
state	politics	in	authoritarian	countries,	but	it	also	means	various	arrangements	
of	 organizing	 people’s	 everyday	 life	 from	 their	 social	 relations,	 political	
ideology,	family	life,	to	their	religions.	
However,	this	research	should	not	be	understood	as	a	mere	counter	argument	
to	 the	 liberal	 civil	 society	 literature	 in	 understanding	 Chinese	 NGO	
development.	As	some	criticism	towards	corporatism	suggests	(Howell,	2007;	
Hildebrandt,	2013),	many	corporatism	studies	over	emphasize	the	state	power	
and	capacity	while	neglecting	the	dynamics	and	changes	 in	China,	which	has	
been	better	captured	by	the	civil	society	approach.	My	research	does	look	at	the	
‘new’	languages,	influential	actors	and	funding	resources,	as	well	as	many	other	
changes	that	have	happened	in	the	Chinese	NGO	sector;	however,	I	argue	that	
such	changes	are	not	necessarily	‘new’	in	the	Chinese	society	in	a	larger	picture.	
For	 instance,	 the	market	 (and	 entrepreneurs	 from	 it)	 is	 not	 a	 ‘new’	 actor	 in	
influencing	Chinese	NGOs	today;	as	I	discuss	in	the	next	chapter,	they	have	been	
seen	as	 ‘natural	allies	of	Chinese	NGOs’	since	the	failure	of	 the	1989	Student	
Movement	 in	 Beijing	 (Wang,	 2011).	 	 As	 the	 corporatism	 literature	 shows,	
clientelism	 between	 Chinese	 private	 entrepreneurs	 and	 the	 local	 states	 has	
been	deeply	embedded	in	the	national	economic	development	process	during	
the	 past	 three	 decades.	 Therefore,	my	 ethnographic	work	 on	 their	 relations	
through	 the	 daily	 operation	 of	 Chinese	 NGOs	 may	 help	 develop	 our	
understanding	of	how	such	clientelism	has	been	practiced	 in	different	 forms	
and	situations.	 	
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Moreover,	 my	 research	 goes	 further	 to	 examine	 how	 and	 when	 such	
corporatism	 in	 different	 places	 can	 be	 challenged	 or	 solidified.	 As	 my	
ethnography	on	Chinese	NGO	workers	 (and	 the	next	 section)	 shows,	 people	
may	 have	 different	 interpretations	 and	 strategies	 of	 “doing	 gongyi”	 in	 their	
everyday	life.	Some	of	my	AF	colleagues	would	take	the	highly	commercialized	
gongyi	language	as	an	effective	tool	in	competing	with	GONGOs	and	the	other	
state	affiliations	in	the	fundraising	market.	But	at	the	same	time,	they	would	be	
very	careful	in	deciding	whether	to	send	humanitarian	aid	to	the	capital	city	of	
Beijing	when	needed	in	a	natural	disaster,	since	they	worried	that	this	action	
would	 raise	 political	 doubts	 from	 the	 national	 leaders.	 In	 other	 words,	 my	
ethnographic	 account	on	 corporatism	 in	China	 is	not	 in	 an	 institution-based	
approach	 to	provide	a	 large-scale	 sample	of	 testing	which	 theory	 (be	 it	 civil	
society	 or	 corporatism)	 is	 correct	 or	 not.	 Instead,	 this	 thesis	 is	 a	 practice-
oriented	work	to	take	corporatism	as	an	arrangement	of	organizing	people’s	
personal	network,	social	relations,	career,	and	private	life	(Zhang,	2002).	Given	
the	 increasing	 corporatism	 in	 the	 Chinese	 NGO	 sector	 in	 the	 past	 decade,	
different	 actors	 need	 to	 find	 their	 own	 ways	 of	 dealing	 with,	 negotiating,	
resisting	and	making	sense	of	this	situation	in	their	daily	life.	This	thesis	aims	
to	expand	our	understanding	of	the	concept	of	corporatism	in	China’s	context.	 	 	 	 	
	 	
1.2.4	Language	and	everyday	life	in	reformist	China	 	
As	a	popular	language	widely	used	in	people’s	everyday	life,	gongyi	is	not	only	
useful	in	the	normalization	process	of	Chinese	NGOs,	but	it	also	redefines	NGO	
work	as	a	new	profession	in	the	Chinese	society.	Therefore,	in	this	thesis,	I	also	
discuss	gongyi	in	terms	of	NGO	workers’	everyday	life.	The	changing	popular	
languages	in	China,	including	gongyi,	provide	a	good	opportunity	to	observe	the	
fast-changing	Chinese	society	and	people’s	everyday	life	during	the	past	three	
decades.	This	section	provides	a	literature	review	of	how	these	languages	have	
been	 studied	 by	 social	 scientists	 (especially	 anthropologists)	 to	 understand	
social	and	cultural	change	in	China.	This	literature,	I	believe,	offers	insights	for	
this	thesis	to	understand	gongyi	in	methodological	and	theoretical	terms.	 	
Many	researchers	pay	attention	to	the	changing	use	of	popular	language	and	
the	making	of	social	hierarchies	in	reformist	China.	 	 The	term	of	suzhi	(human	
quality),	 for	 example,	 is	 a	 ‘key	word’	 in	 understanding	 the	making	 of	 social	
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hierarchy	 in	 reformist	China	 (Woronov,	2016).	 Suzhi	was	popularized	 in	 the	
late	1980s,	concurrent	with	the	economic	reforms	and	spread	of	the	theory	of	
human	capital	accumulation	(Anagnost,	2004;	Greenhalgh	and	Winckler,	2005;	
Hoffman,	2010).	For	instance,	Greenhalgh	(2008)	understands	how	suzhi	was	
initiated	 by	 the	 discussions	 of	 population	 control	 and	national	 development	
within	an	elitist	group	of	Chinese	physical	scientists	and	missile	engineers.	She	
puts	the	policy	making	process	of	China’s	One	Child	Policy	from	the	1970s	to	
1980s	 in	 a	 broader	 context:	 the	 scientization	 and	statisticalization	of	
sociopolitical	life	in	the	post-socialist	era.	Research	on	the	lower	classes	or	the	
powerless	of	Chinese	society,	on	the	other	hand,	views	suzhi	as	an	important	
lens	through	which	to	analyze	immigrant	workers,	prostitutes,	or	peasants	in	
China,	as	it	has	been	used	by	the	state	to	create	new	forms	of	social	hierarchy	
between	the	‘high’	and	the	‘low	quality	people’	in	the	national	economic	reform	
(Zheng,	 2009;	Woronov,	 2016).	Inspired	by	 the	 studies	 on	 ‘suzhi’,	 this	 thesis	
also	 pays	 attention	 to	 the	 relations	 between	 gongyi	 and	 social	 inequality	 in	
China	from	two	main	perspectives:	class	and	gender.	 	
The	language	of	class	has	raised	heated	debates	due	to	the	increasing	number	
of	studies	on	the	emerging	middle	class	and	the	newly	rich	in	urban	China	(e.g.	
Goodman,	2008;	Osburg,	2013b;	Tomba,	2014);	their	daily	life	has	been	studied	
from	many	 aspects	 including	 housing,	 consumption,	 profession,	 and	 family.	
However,	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘middle	 class’	 is	 controversial	 in	 these	 discussions,	
since	 the	 word	 ‘class	 (jieji,	 阶级)’	 is	 rarely	 used	 in	 China	 today	 (Woronov,	
2015).	As	researchers	note,	class	has	been	closely	related	to	China’s	socialist	
revolution	history	of	 ‘class	struggles’,	when	Chinese	people	were	categorized	
by	 their	 different	 ‘class	 elements	 (jieji	 chengfen,	 阶级成分)’.	 Therefore,	 as	 a	
word	heavily	burdened	by	meanings	of	social	unrests,	conflicts,	and	many	other	
socialist	memories,	‘class’	has	become	unwelcome	in	Chinese	society	since	the	
economic	reform	(Guo,	2008).	In	the	1990s,	‘social	strata	(shehui	jieceng,	社会
阶层 )’	 replaced	 ‘class’	 to	 describe	 people’s	 different	 economic	 and	 social	
conditions	in	China	(ibid.).	The	changing	language	of	class	is	not	only	a	linguistic	
phenomenon,	but	it	also	presents	changing	attitudes	towards	social	inequality	
in	Chinese	society	today.	As	Anagnost	(2008)	points	out,	 the	use	of	 the	term	
“social	 strata”	 erases	 the	 Cultural	 Revolution	 from	 historical	 memory,	
depoliticizes	social	hierarchy,	and	removes	the	possibility	of	using	social	class	
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as	an	analytic	category	(see	also	Guo,	2012).	 	 As	a	result,	the	concept	of	classes	
as	 structural	 social	 categories	 inexorably	 in	 conflict	 with	 each	 other,	 as	 in	
Maoist	 social	 theory,	 has	 now	 been	 replaced	 with	 a	 neoliberal	 concept	 of	
individual	responsibility,	so	each	person	is	individually	responsible	for	his	or	
her	own	“social	status”	(Anagnost,	2008;	Tomba,	2009;	Ren,	2013).	Woronov’s	
(2016)	anthropological	 study	on	China’s	vocational	 schools	 reveals	how	 this	
depoliticized,	individualistic	concept	of	‘social	strata’	can	be	strengthened	and	
reproduced	among	younger	generations	in	school.	Often	identified	as	‘stupid’	
or	 ‘lazy’	 in	 the	 mainstream	 Chinese	 culture,	 vocational	 school	 students	 are	
socially	excluded	from	‘white-collar	jobs’	or	‘high	quality	people’	in	China.	By	
articulating	inequality	as	a	cultural	and/or	intellectual	difference,	new	forms	of	
hierarchy	can	be	established	and	tolerated	among	the	ordinary	Chinese.	 	
My	study	of	gongyi	 in	 this	 thesis	echoes	with	 the	studies	on	 ‘social	strata’	 in	
China:	 as	 witnessed	 during	 my	 fieldwork,	 ‘doing	 gongyi’	 (or	 participating	
charitable	activities)	on	many	public	occasions	has	been	seen	as	‘a	new	lifestyle	
of	 being	 middle	 class’	 in	 urban	 China	 today,	 and	 was	 particularly	 popular	
among	 the	 various	 foundation-organized	 ‘charity	 marathons’	 in	 the	
metropolitans.	 But	 behind	 this	 ‘new	 lifestyle’,	 as	 Woronov’s	 study	 (2016)	
shows,	 is	 the	alienation	and	exclusion	of	 the	beneficiaries	of	 their	charitable	
projects	in	rural	China.	Similar	to	‘social	strata’,	the	practices	of	the	increasingly	
commercialized	gongyi	 in	AF’s	office	and	 its	project	 sites	 also	help	 to	 create	
hierarchies	between	different	NGO	workers	based	on	their	commercial	skills	
and	economic	conditions,	and	this	greatly	affects	their	career	paths.	This	study	
of	gongyi	as	a	profession	and	a	new	class	identity	in	urban	China	reveals	how	
NGOs	contribute	to	the	increasing	social	inequality	rather	than	reduce	it.	 	 	
Researchers	of	the	new	popular	languages	in	China	have	also	discussed	them	
from	a	gender	perspective.	Hoffman’s	(2006)	study	of	‘rencai	(talent,人才)’	in	
Dalian	 City’s	 job	 market	 argues	 that	 the	 new	 forms	 of	 labor	 flows	 and	
professionalism	 in	 reformist	 China	 should	 be	 understood	 from	 the	 gender	
perspective;	 gender-specific	 differences	 have	 been	 incorporated	 into	 ideas	
about	 professionalism.	 Hoffman	 finds	 that	 the	 emerging	 private	 sector	 was	
seen	as	a	 ‘battlefield’	with	more	risks	and	potentially	higher	payment.	Inside	
many	 Chinese	 families,	 there	were	 “one	 family,	 two	 systems”:	women	were	
often	those	to	stay	 inside	the	remaining	socialist,	 ‘less	competitive	(and	thus	
less	 profitable)’	 bodies,	 like	 the	 state-owned	 companies,	 public	 education	
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institutes,	and	public	services.	Even	though	such	jobs	could	be	much	lower	paid	
than	the	private	sector,	the	‘low	competition	and	stable	welfare’	would	make	
sure	that	they	had	enough	energy	for	family	care.	At	the	same	time,	men	were	
expected	to	fight	in	the	private	sector	and	make	a	good	fortune	(ibid).	Therefore,	
the	 ideas	of	 ‘national	 talents’	 are	 linked	with	new	visions	of	what	a	 ‘secure’,	
‘happy’	modern	family	should	be	 like,	based	on	the	 ‘strategical	split	of	 labor’	
within	families.	Hoffman’s	findings	have	been	further	developed	by	other	social	
scientists	 intersecting	with	 different	 aspects	 of	 everyday	 life	 in	 China.	 Cao’s	
(Cao,	2010)	research	on	the	discourse	of	‘xinyang	suzhi	(faith	quality,	信仰素
质)’	of	the	Christian	church	in	the	city	of	Wenzhou,	for	instance,	suggests	how	
suzhi	 has	 become	 increasingly	 masculinized	 in	 the	 everyday	 practice	 of	
Christian	 entrepreneurs	 (p97-125).	 Cao’s	 fieldwork	 revealed	 that	 many	
Christian	churches	 in	Wenzhou	were	dominated	by	male	 leaders,	promoting	
‘high	quality	believers’	in	the	local	community.	Such	‘faith	quality’	discourse	can	
be	understood	as	a	‘top-down,	elitist’	approach	of	spreading	faith,	which	was	
performed	 in	 the	grand	evangelical	banquets	organized	by	 the	affluent	head	
Christians.	 These	 banquets	 were	 carefully	 designed	 by	 the	 male	 leaders	 to	
create	closedness	amongst	the	successful	entrepreneurs	in	the	local	community	
by	distributing	their	own	magazines	and	giving	speeches	on	topics	such	as	‘God	
is	my	CEO’.	But	at	 the	same	 time,	women	believers	can	only	appear	on	such	
occasions	as	a	receptionist,	a	waitress,	or	 ‘a	 learner’	of	these	head	Christians	
since	their	‘faith	quality’	was	not	‘high	enough’.	 	 	 	 	
My	fieldwork	on	Chinese	NGO	workers	also	finds	a	very	similar	family	structure	
in	 their	 private	 life	 of	 ‘one	 family,	 two	 systems’.	 As	 there	were	many	more	
women	than	men	in	the	Chinese	NGO	sector,	most	of	the	female	workers	were	
not	expected	to	be	the	major	bread	winners	of	the	family	while	their	partners	
worked	 in	 other	 ‘competitive,	 profitable’	 industries.	 Such	 family	 structure	
made	the	 low	payment	widely	acceptable	among	most	of	 the	NGO	workers	 I	
met,	 which	 consequently	 led	 to	 a	 more	 extraordinary	 status	 of	 Chinese	
entrepreneurs	 in	 this	 sector:	 gongyi	 needed	 to	 be	 more	 ‘competitive’	 by	
bringing	 more	 male,	 business-background,	 senior	 managers.	 By	 identifying	
gongyi	as	an	industry	lacking	“competitiveness”,	the	Chinese	entrepreneurs	as	
emerging	donors	are	asking	for	more	 ‘ambitious’	workers	in	the	NGO	sector,	
which	they	called	“wolf	spirit”.	In	my	case	studies,	I	find	that	this	wolf	spirit	has	
strengthened	 the	 existing	 ‘one	 family,	 two	 systems’	 as	 it	 requires	 longer	
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working	 hours	 and	 less	 family	 obligations,	 which	 finally	 turns	 to	 a	 major	
obstacle	for	most	women	workers	and	“good	daddies”	in	their	career	ladder.	 	 	 	 	
My	research	into	gongyi	attempts	to	deepen	the	current	discussions	of	language	
and	 everyday	 life	 in	 reformist	 China	 in	 the	 following	 ways.	 Firstly,	 as	 the	
literature	of	 language	and	everyday	life	presented	as	above,	the	old	and	new	
languages	 in	 reformist	China	are	not	only	a	cultural	or	 linguistic	expression.	
They	 have	 become	 important	 thinking	 patterns,	 knowledge,	 and	 power	
structures	that	ordinary	Chinese	people	use	to	make	sense	of	their	everyday	
work	 and	 life	 in	 a	 fast-changing	 society.	 	 In	 particular,	 as	 the	 literature	 on	
gender	and	class	show,	these	languages	help	us	understand	how	various	forms	
of	social	inequality	can	be	expressed,	tolerated,	and/or	resisted	at	an	individual	
level	in	their	daily	practices	of	the	popular	languages.	Similarly,	my	research	on	
gongyi	suggests	that	this	popular	language	has	produced	a	localized	knowledge	
of	what	an	NGO	should	look	like	in	China	as	well	as	shaping	the	power	structure	
in	 China’s	 NGO	 sector.	 Inspired	 by	 studies	 on	 ‘suzhi’	 as	 a	 ‘key	 word’	 in	
understanding	 the	 various	 forms	 of	 social	 hierarchies	 in	 reformist	 China,	 I	
argue	that	gongyi	should	also	be	understood	as	the	‘key	word’	in	understanding	
the	changing	landscape	of	the	Chinese	NGO	sector	over	the	past	decade.	 	
This	 thesis	 argues	 that	 in	 the	 past	 decade,	 the	 emerging	 domestic	
entrepreneurs	in	China’s	NGO	sector,	by	bringing	in	commercialized	knowledge	
and	organizational	culture,	have	reinvented	the	meaning	of	gongyi.	The	rise	of	
commercialized	gongyi	in	China	should	be	better	understood	by	putting	it	back	
to	 the	daily	work	and	 life	of	 individual	NGO	workers	 in	 terms	of	 their	 class,	
gender	and	religious	background.	Seen	as	a	‘progressive	force’	in	China,	Chinese	
NGO	workers	 are	 in	 an	 awkward	 situation.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 they	 are	 in	 a	
symbiotic	relationship	with	the	private	sector:	they	have	to	depend	on	the	new	
rich	Chinese	for	fundraising,	to	move	from	the	marginal	to	a	more	mainstream	
position	so	as	to	be	recognized	by	these	new	domestic	donors.	But	at	the	same	
time,	they	are	also	expected	to	respond	to	various	social	problems	and	to	reflect	
on	 the	 increasing	 social	 inequality	 and	 injustice	 during	 China’s	 economic	
reform.	 In	 fact,	 they	 themselves	 could	 be	 the	 victims	 of	 the	 rapidly	 divided	
Chinese	society	today.	This	complicated	situation	leads	Chinese	NGO	workers	
to	produce	new	knowledge	of	what	NGO	work	should	be	like	in	China’s	context.	
Secondly,	my	research	of	gongyi	in	terms	of	people’s	private	lives	also	helps	us	
better	understand	political	ideologies	and	social	change	in	China.	As	the	studies	
	 34	
on	 suzhi	 have	 shown	 as	 above,	 the	 popularity	 of	 suzhi	 language	 is	 largely	 a	
political	product	of	the	neoliberal	national	development	model	in	China,	and	a	
farewell	 to	 the	 socialist	 language	of	 ‘class	 struggles’.	 But	 as	Hoffman	 (2006)	
demonstrates	in	her	research	on	college	students	in	Dalian,	high	suzhi	college	
students	may	not	necessarily	be	 self-claimed	 individualists;	 on	 the	 contrary,	
they	would	identify	themselves	with	a	new	political,	collective	value:	“patriotic	
professional”.	Although	this	thesis	unveils	the	polarization	and	inequalities	of	
various	NGO	workers	 in	 their	 everyday	 life,	my	 fieldwork	also	discusses	 the	
reasons	why	 such	 inequalities	 have	been	 tolerated	 at	 the	 individual	 level	 to	
some	degree	and	how	different	workers	consider	each	other.	As	my	research	
shows,	‘doing	gongyi’	in	some	cases	is	not	just	a	job,	but	also	a	‘standing	with	
private	 entrepreneurs’	 and	 other	 NGO	 workers	 to	 ‘reform	 the	 state’.	 While	
learning	 from	 the	 private	 sector	 to	 be	 more	 ‘wolf-like’,	 certain	 political	
ideologies	-	identified	as	‘liberalist	values’	in	my	fieldwork	-	still	remain	crucial	
factors	 in	 shaping	 NGO	 workers’	 career	 choice	 and	 self-identity	 in	 their	
everyday	 life.	 Although	 these	 ‘liberalist	 values’	 have	 been	 performed	 as	 a	
departure	 from	 the	official	 socialist	propaganda	as	with	 suzhi,	 somehow	 the	
organizations	and	NGO	workers	in	these	cases	can	be	warmly	welcomed	by	and	
deeply	incorporated	into	the	local	state.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Moreover,	many	other	popular	languages	that	have	been	studied	as	seen	above	
were	firstly	created	by	the	Chinese	state,	for	example,	suzhi,	or	floating	people;	
their	changing	meanings	were	also	 largely	shaped	by	other	domestic	 factors	
like	 the	 local	government	policies,	gender	gaps,	or	 religions.	My	research	on	
gongyi,	however,	involves	global	actors.	I	present	how	the	international	donors	
(though	withdrawing	from	China)	have	influenced	the	meanings	and	individual	
workers	of	gongyi	in	terms	of	political	ideology,	personal	career,	and	working	
ethics,	and	how	the	falling	of	a	Westernized	language	and	its	legacies,	known	as	
‘civil	society’,	gave	rise	to	a	localized	gongyi.	 	 	 	 	
	
By	analyzing	the	daily	operation	of	AF	and	its	partner	organizations,	this	thesis	
engages	with	two	larger	debates.	One	is	the	debate	on	the	role	that	NGOs	play	
in	 authoritarian	 states.	Many	 researchers	 of	 this	 debate	 connect	 NGOs	with	
democratization,	 regime	 change,	 state	 governance,	 or	 governmentality,	
discussing	to	what	degree	that	NGOs	as	part	of	the	‘growing	civil	society’	can	
help	 challenge	 the	 existing	 regimes	 (Mercer,	 2002;	 Lewis,	 2013;	 Froissart,	
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2014).	Such	work	 is	particularly	extensive	on	Eastern	European	countries	 in	
the	 post-socialist	 transition,	 as	 well	 as	 China,	 Vietnam,	 Cuba,	Myanmar	 and	
sometimes	the	Middle	East.	However,	research	on	NGOization	and	civil	society	
has	begun	to	challenge	those	literatures	in	a	broader	context,	stating	that	most	
NGO	efforts	 are	 palliative	 rather	 than	 transformative.	 For	 instance,	 Banks	&	
Hulme	(2014)	argues	that	in	doing	“democracy	promotion	work”,	most	foreign	
donors	have	taken	NGOs	as	“clients”	to	work	on	their	limited	set	agendas.	The	
trend	of	technocracy	in	the	development	industry	has	aimed	to	work	with	more	
“professional	 organizations”	 to	 delivery	 projects,	 rather	 than	 those	 that	 are	
deeply	 embedded	 in	 the	 local	 political	 and	 social	 movements	 (Choudry	 &	
Kapoor,	2013).	In	Banks	at	al	(2015)’s	research,	they	classify	the	NGO	world	
into	 two	 types:	 one	 is	 the	 NGOs	 that	 project-based	 and	 donor-dependent,	
aiming	 to	 be	 a	 professional	 service	 delivery	 organization;	 the	 other	 is	 that	
membership-based	organizations	 such	as	 labor	unions	 and	 religious	 groups,	
with	deeper	roots	and	transformative	forces	in	the	local	society.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Ishkanian’s	 (2008)	 study	 of	 NGOs	 in	 post-socialist	 Armenia	 embraces	 the	
criticisms	 of	 NGOization	 in	 authoritarian	 states.	 Except	 for	 the	 trend	 of	
technocracy	 in	 the	 development	world,	 she	 goes	 further	 to	 understand	why	
most	 NGOs	 in	 Armenia	 failed	 to	 bring	 structural	 change	 by	 contextualizing	
international	donors	 and	 their	 local	 partner	organizations	 in	 social,	 political	
and	economic	changes	in	Armenia.	Her	anthropological	research	demonstrates	
that	the	international	donors	and	the	booming	new	organizations	in	Armenia	
could	 be	 more	 like	 a	 useful	 strategy	 for	 social	 mobility	 in	 NGO	 workers’	
everyday	life,	which	is	a	product	of	the	dramatic	social	and	economic	change	in	
a	certain	historical	period	that	cannot	be	simplified	as	something	‘new,	liberal	
politics’	 or	not.	Being	 “a	professional	NGO	worker”	 in	Armenia	 in	 the	1990s	
became	 an	 important	 social	 ladder	 for	 the	 previous	 ‘socialist	 workers’	 to	
maintain	 their	economic	conditions	and	deal	with	 the	political	uncertainties.	
Also,	 establishing	 a	 professional	 NGO	 and	 networking	with	Western	 donors	
could	be	a	bonus	for	the	former	socialist	politicians	to	win	elections	in	the	new	
democracy,	rather	than	to	change	the	status	quo.	
Banks	 (2015)’s	 and	 Ishkanian’s	 ethnographic	 account	 set	 up	 an	 insightful	
framework	for	me	to	look	at	the	multiple	roles	that	NGOs	play	in	a	country	in	
political	 transition.	 As	 my	 case	 studies	 present,	 my	 focus	 is	 on	 those	
organizational	 and	 people	 that	 had	 various	 ties	 with	 international	 donors.	
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However,	given	the	leaving	of	external	donors,	NGOs	and	their	workers	in	China	
have	been	more	intertwined	with	the	state	and	business	circles,	which,	just	like	
Armenian	 NGO	 workers	 did	 in	 the	 1990s,	 becomes	 a	 way	 of	 dealing	 with	
political	and	economic	uncertainties	and	rebuilding	their	own	social	identities	
in	 this	 fast	 changing	 country.	 This	 research	 echoes	 with	 the	 criticisms	 of	
NGOization	 literatures,	 revealing	 the	 fact	 that	 Chinese	 NGOs	 are	 “palliative	
rather	than	transformative”	(Banks	et	al	2015:	709).	 In	 fact,	my	case	studies	
unveil	 that	 most	 of	 the	 Chinese	 NGOs	 have	 become	 more	 service	 delivery	
oriented	after	the	leaving	of	international	donors.	Like	Ishkanian,	in	order	to	
understand	why	Chinese	NGOs	fail	to	be	a	driver	of	transformative	forces,	this	
research	 puts	 these	 organizations	 and	 their	 workers	 back	 to	 the	 changing	
landscape	of	Chinese	NGO	sector	and	its	dynamic	relations	with	the	state.	 	 	 	 	 	 	
During	my	 fieldwork,	 I	 repeatedly	encountered	statements	describing	 ‘doing	
gongyi’	as	something	that	the	emerging	Chinese	urban	middle	class	should	do	
as	their	new	lifestyle	and	thinking	pattern	as	‘a	modern	citizen’	in	the	country.	
It	is	not	difficult	to	question	the	‘truth’	or	logic	of	such	statements,	but	what	is	
perhaps	more	important	for	me	in	this	thesis	is	to	understand	the	reasons	why	
people	would	make	such	statements.	My	ethnography	of	NGO	workers	reveals	
the	 links	 between	 gongyi	 and	 the	 middle	 class	 in	 China:	 by	 bringing	 new	
knowledge	 and	 identifying	 themselves	 with	 ‘modern	 values’,	 Chinese	 NGO	
workers	attempt	to	redefine	their	profession	of	gongyi	as	part	of	the	emerging	
middle-class	community	in	the	country.	At	the	same	time,	the	workers	of	their	
partner	organizations	in	different	places	need	to	identify	themselves	in	a	more	
relational	approach;	gongyi	turns	out	to	be	a	performance	of	cultivating	their	
social	relations	and	strengthening	their	extraordinary	social	status	in	the	local	
society.	 	 	 	
This	 leads	 us	 to	 the	 second	 debate	 around	 business	 elites	 and	 the	 current	
studies	 of	 philanthrocapitalism.	 Many	 scholars	 have	 already	 noted	 the	
democratic	and	political	concerns	with	relying	on	elite	philanthropists	to	play	
such	a	role	in	creating	social	policy	(see	e.g.,	Nickel,	2015;	Webb	Farley,	2015).	
Philanthropists	have	long	been	criticized	for	being	unaccountable	and	unequal	
influence	 on	 national	 and	 international	 development	 agenda	 (Eikenberry	 &	
Mirabella,	 2018).	 Scholars	 understand	 philanthrocapitalism	 both	 as	 a	
neoliberalist	ideology	and	certain	ruling	practices	in	the	development	industry.	 	
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For	 instance,	Wilson	 (2014)’s	 research	 on	 a	 development	 project	 in	Uganda	
finds	that	the	project	sponsor,	a	philanthropic	organisation	based	in	New	York,	
tries	to	create	a	“fantasy”	(1144)	since	its	cause-related	marketing	campaigns	
invite	 Western	 consumers	 to	 enjoy	 their	 imagined	 distance	 from	 ‘African’	
suffering.	The	research	argues	that	philanthrocapitalism	is	better	understood	
as	an	ideological	formation,	which	mobilises	a	disavowed	enjoyment	of	global	
inequality.	Meanwhile	in	practice,	taking	the	Gates	Foundation	as	an	example,	
McGoey	(2012,	2018)	looks	at	how	the	American	billionaires	have	restructured	
charitable	 foundations	 based	 on	 their	 previous	 business	 experiences	 and	
influenced	the	state	education	programs	through	their	big	donations	in	the	US.	 	 	
Like	 the	 big	 philanthropists	 in	 the	 global	 north,	 the	 newly	 super	 rich	
entrepreneurs	in	emerging	economies	like	China,	India,	Russia,	and	Brazil	are	
“learning	from	their	American	counterparts”	(Jansons,	2015).	In	China’s	case,	
given	that	international	donors	have	been	leaving	the	country,	these	domestic	
philanthropists	have	become	more	and	more	crucial	for	national	development	
programs.	The	way	that	Chinese	entrepreneurs	and	their	partner	organizations	
imagine	and	run	charitable	organizations	shows	us	the	complicated	process	of	
how	philanthrocapitalism	as	a	global	trend	could	take	place	in	a	specific	context	
in	both	ideology	and	practice.	
Ideologically,	the	Chinese	entrepreneurs	and	their	foundations	are	new	to	the	
Chinese	 society	 since	 the	establishment	of	 the	 socialist	 state	 in	1949.	As	we	
discuss	 in	Chapter	2,	 they	have	been	 long	viewed	as	a	 “progressive	 force”	 in	
China’s	economic	reform	in	the	past	four	decades,	which	is	different	from	their	
counterparts	 in	 the	 capitalist	 societies	 like	 the	 US.	 Davies’s	 anthropological	
research	 on	 Chinese	 celebrity	 entrepreneurs	 (Davies,	 2010:	 193-215)	 takes	
these	entrepreneurs	as	a	new	cultural	and	political	phenomenon.	His	research	
observes	 how	 these	 entrepreneurs	 have	 performed	 as	 a	 new	 role	model	 in	
Chinese	 society.	 The	 ‘new’	 image	 they	 are	 presenting	may	 offer	 them	 great	
power	over	not	only	reshaping	the	Chinese	economy,	but	also	over	the	political	
ideologies	and	social	relations	of	ordinary	Chinese	people	including	grassroots	
NGO	workers.	Therefore,	 in	understanding	 the	emerging	domestic	donors	 in	
China,	I	think	it	is	equally	important	to	look	at	how	they	have	been	imagined,	
presented,	and	interpreted	by	the	ordinary	Chinese	and	the	mass	media,	which	
is	very	helpful	for	us	to	understand	why	it	is	entrepreneurs,	rather	than	other	
social	groups,	that	could	be	the	major	inventors	of	the	popular	gongyi.	 	 	
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In	terms	of	practices,	this	research	echoes	with	McGoey	(2018)’s	study	on	Gates	
Foundation,	exploring	how	Chinese	NGOs	have	been	changed	from	within,	such	
as	 their	 internal	structure	and	organizational	culture.	This	 is	also	something	
that	the	AF	workers	called	as	“wolf	spirit”	in	their	daily	work	(see	Chapter	4	
and	 5).	 However,	 China’s	 case	 can	 contribute	 to	 the	 current	
philanthrocapitalism	 debates	 by	 bringing	 the	 important	 role	 that	 the	 state	
plays	 in	 shaping	 those	 philanthropists’	 practices.	 As	 we	 may	 find	 from	 the	
current	literatures,	most	of	the	research	takes	the	state,	whether	in	the	US	or	
Africa,	 as	a	 relatively	passive	 role	 in	dealing	with	 the	big,	 individual	donors.	
However,	 China’s	 case	 may	 present	 us	 a	 different	 story	 of	 how	
philanthrocapitalism	can	take	place	in	a	different	way.	 	 	
As	I	previously	discuss	in	this	chapter,	research	on	Chinese	entrepreneurs	has	
been	 long	 connected	 with	 corporatism	 of	 the	 local	 state.	 Although	 some	
researchers	 acknowledge	 the	 roles	 that	 entrepreneurs	 play	 in	 the	 policy	
making	process	(e.g.	Oi,	1995;	Schubert	&	Heberer,	2017;	Tsai,	2005),	others	
argue	that	the	Chinese	state	still	remains	to	be	the	decisive	power	in	shaping	
private	 entrepreneurs’	 political	 attitudes	 and	 daily	 practices	 towards	 the	
existing	regime,	rather	than	vice	versa	(Tsai,	2005;	Dickson,	2007,	2008,	2018;	
Chen	 and	 Dickson,	 2017).	 Therefore,	 when	 considering	 how	 and	 why	 the	
“business	practices”	have	been	brought	into	the	NGO	community	by	the	new,	
domestic	donors,	this	research	also	looks	at	the	role	that	the	Chinese	state	plays	
in	shaping	these	practices.	 	
	
1.3	The	organization	of	this	thesis	
This	thesis	is	organized	as	follows.	In	the	first	chapter,	I	introduce	the	analytical	
framework	of	the	thesis	by	discussing	the	two	major	themes:	corporatism	and	
everyday	life	in	reformist	China.	As	a	popular	language	used	by	various	actors,	
gongyi	 provides	 us	 with	 a	 chance	 to	 examine	 three	 things:	 the	 state-NGO	
relations	in	an	authoritarian	state;	the	everyday	life	of	NGO	workers	in	a	fast-
changing	society;	and	how	these	two	things	at	different	 levels	are	connected	
with	one	another.	Therefore,	my	analysis	of	gongyi	is	organized	around	these	
two	themes.	In	the	first	chapter,	I	introduce	how	corporatism	and	everyday	life	
in	 reformist	 China	 has	 been	 discussed	 in	 the	 scholarly	 world,	 and	 how	my	
research	 findings	 can	 engage	 and	 contribute	 to	 these	 discussions.	 Then	 the	
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second	chapter	turns	to	the	research	context	of	gongyi	and	NGO	development	
in	China	from	a	historical	perspective.	In	this	chapter,	I	talk	about	how	gongyi	
has	been	used	in	three	historical	periods:	the	socialist	and	post-Mao	era;	the	
late	 1980s	 to	 early	 2000s;	 and	 the	 past	 decade.	 Specifically,	 I	 discuss	 the	
process	 of	 how	gongyi	 has	 firstly	 been	 closely	 linked	under	 the	 influence	 of	
Western	donors	to	the	ideas	of	civil	society,	and	then	how	it	turns	to	the	market	
given	the	policy	changes	in	the	recent	years.	Chapter	3	presents	the	process	and	
reflections	 of	 how	 I	 did	my	 fieldwork	 in	 researching	gongyi	with	AF	 and	 its	
partner	 organizations	 in	 different	 places.	 During	 my	 yearlong	 ethnographic	
work,	 I	 had	 different	 professional	 identities	 whilst	 working	 with	 different	
organizations.	For	the	first	half	of	the	fieldwork,	I	was	an	intern	working	with	
AF	and	living	with	its	workers,	learning	to	be	a	‘professional	gongyi	worker’	as	
a	 freshman.	 But	 in	 the	 second	 half	 with	 AF’s	 partner	 organizations,	 I	 was	
introduced	with	a	more	‘respected	identity’	as	‘Teacher	Zhao’,	and	therefore	I	
had	the	benefit	of	being	positioned	differently	which	gave	me	the	advantage	of	
seeing	things	from	a	different	perspective.	
Chapters	4	to	7	present	the	ethnographic	parts	of	this	thesis.	Chapters	4	and	5	
discuss	 the	 series	 of	 highly	 commercialized	 reform	 launched	 by	 the	
entrepreneurs	 sitting	 on	 AF’s	 council	 board.	 Chapter	 4	 focuses	 on	 the	 daily	
operation	in	the	AF	office,	and	so	presents	us	with	how	‘modern	gongyi’	was	
performed	in	these	reforms.	In	particular,	I	discuss	the	impacts	of	this	highly	
commercialized	modern	gongyi	on	an	individual	level,	as	we	can	see	that	a	new	
man	with	‘wolf	spirit’	is	in	the	making.	In	both	Chapters	4	and	5,	I	discuss	how	
this	 ‘wolf	 spirit’	 was	 affecting	 AF	 workers’	 everyday	 life	 and	 how	 it	 finally	
strengthened	and	reproduced	the	social	inequalities	between	men	and	women	
both	in	the	workforce	and	at	home	in	China.	I	argue	that	this	commercialized	
gongyi	was	not	 just	happening	 to	 the	AF	or	 the	workers,	but	 that	 it	 is	also	a	
product	of	collaboration	between	the	local	state	and	entrepreneurs	in	the	city.	
Chapters	 6	 to	 7	 turns	 to	 the	 partner	 organizations	 in	 other	 parts	 of	 China.	
Although	all	the	partner	organizations	of	AF	spoke	the	same	language	of	gongyi	
in	 my	 fieldwork,	 the	 ways	 that	 they	 imagined	 and	 performed	 gongyi	 were	
different	 from	 one	 place	 to	 another.	 The	 two	 chapters	 present	 the	
dissemination	process	of	gongyi	as	negotiations	between	local	states	and	NGOs	
in	 two	 different	 places.	 In	 Chapter	 6,	 we	 find	 that	 although	 AF’s	 partner	
organizations	may	have	different	understandings	of	how	to	do	gongyi,	similar	
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to	the	state-NGO	relations	in	Shenzhen,	these	partner	organizations	were	also	
deeply	incorporated	into	the	local	state	in	different	ways.	In	this	sense,	Chapter	
6	 is	a	mirror	and	an	extension	of	Chapter	4.	Similar	 to	Chapter	5,	Chapter	7	
discusses	the	everyday	life	of	NGO	workers	in	the	partner	organizations.	But	
unlike	the	‘gongyi	professionals’	working	in	the	big	cities,	these	NGO	workers	
prefer	to	identify	themselves	in	a	more	ambiguous	way:	“gongyi	people”.	This	
identification	 features	 the	 importance	 of	 cultivating,	 bridging	 and	managing	
various	social	relations	in	the	local	society	(but	not	attaching	themselves	to	a	
specific	 big	 foundation).	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 new	 identity	 reveals	 how	 being	
incorporated	into	the	local	state	has	become	a	way	of	living	in	the	local	society,	
and	how	people’s	family	life,	personal	faith,	and	social	relations	have	all	become	
performances	 of	 doing	 gongyi.	 Chapter	 8	 concludes	 the	 whole	 thesis	 by	
revisiting	the	three	main	research	questions	in	this	section	and	summarizes	the	
research	findings.	
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Chapter	2	 	 Gongyi	as	NGO	work	in	China:	the	historical	context	 	
In	September	2016,	three	months	after	I	started	my	fieldwork,	Beijing	initiated	
the	national	‘charity	law’	(cishan	fa,	慈善法).	 	 This	law	has	been	widely	seen	
as	the	first	national	regulation	on	Chinese	NGOs	and	their	activities	in	a	more	
formal	 and	 institutional	 way,	 covering	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 the	 NGO	 issues	 like	
registration,	fundraising,	internal	governance,	accountability,	and	so	on.	When	
I	 was	 doing	 my	 fieldwork,	 many	 Chinese	 NGOs,	 foundation	 workers	 in	
particular,	were	talking	about	this	law	with	very	mixed	opinions.	As	a	law	that	
had	been	drafted	in	Beijing	for	years	before	its	enforcement,	what	interests	me	
most	 is	 the	 language	 that	 the	 ruling	 party	 uses	 to	 define	 the	 various	 social	
organizations	in	the	country.	In	fact,	this	law-drafting	work	can	be	dated	back	
to	the	late	1980s,	when	the	then	Chinese	political	leader	Zhao	Zhiyang	launched	
a	 series	 of	 political	 reform	 plans	 along	with	 economic	 reforms;	 therefore,	 a	
working	group	was	set	up	in	the	central	government	to	draft	laws	on	citizens’	
associational	 rights	and	 freedom	of	 speech	 in	1987	 (Wang,	2014).	However,	
this	working	group	was	dismissed	after	the	1989	Student	Movement	in	Beijing,	
and	 a	 series	 of	 very	 repressive	 NGO	 regulations	 were	 set	 up	 in	 China	 (see	
chapter	6).	For	a	very	long	time,	NGOs,	including	various	international	donors	
in	China,	have	been	seen	as	potential	political	threats	in	the	eyes	of	Beijing.	It	
was	not	until	2014	that	Beijing	finally	restarted	to	draft	its	first	comprehensive	
law	 on	NGO	 issues	 on	 the	 national	 scale.	 But	 this	 time	 in	 this	 new	 law,	 the	
Chinese	 lawmakers	avoided	using	 the	 terms	 like	 ‘associational	 rights’	 or	 the	
Westernized	‘NGO’,	although	they	also	tried	to	cover	social	development	issues	
and	NGO	activities	in	the	country	as	many	as	they	could.	Therefore,	in	the	first	
part	of	the	charity	law,	a	very	vague,	widely	defined	‘charitable	organization’	
was	introduced	by	using	the	language	of	gongyi1:	
‘Charitable	 activities’	 in	 this	 law	 refers	 to	 the	 following	 public	
interest2	 activities	voluntarily	carried	out	by	natural	persons,	legal	
	
1	 Source	and	translation:	http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.cn/articles/the-
charity-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/	
2	 The	original	word	in	Chinese	is	‘gongyi’	(公益),	here	the	China	Development	
Brief	 translates	 it	 as	 ‘public	 interest’.	 I	 have	 also	 seen	 another	 translation	
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persons	 and	other	organizations	 through	 the	donation	of	 property,	
the	provision	of	services	or	other	means:	
(1)	Helping	the	poor	and	the	needy;	
(2)	Assisting	the	elderly,	orphans,	the	ill,	the	disabled,	and	providing	
special	care;	
(3)	Alleviating	losses	incurred	by	natural	disasters,	accidents,	public	
health	incidents	and	other	emergencies;	
(4)	Promoting	the	development	of	education,	science,	culture,	health,	
sports	and	other	causes;	
(5)	 Preventing	 and	 alleviating	 pollution	 and	 other	 public	 hazards,	
protecting	and	improving	the	eco-environment;	
(6)	Other	public	interest	activities	in	accordance	with	this	law.	
During	 my	 fieldwork	 in	 China,	 I	 have	 heard	 some	 comments	 from	 legal	
professionals	 criticizing	 that	 the	definition	of	 ‘what	 is	 charity	and	charitable	
organization’	is	totally	a	mess	because	‘gongyi’	is	also	a	very	broad	term,	which	
may	lead	to	many	misunderstandings	in	the	practice.	But	from	a	historical	and	
sociological	perspective,	we	can	also	view	these	seemingly	confusing	terms	in	
the	 law	 as	 a	 compromise	 in	 the	 state-society	 negotiations	 and	 struggles	 in	
China’s	context.	From	the	law	drafting	on	associational	rights	to	the	charity	law,	
Chinese	 NGOs	 and	 civil	 society	 at	 large,	 have	 gone	 through	 a	 very	 long	
negotiating	process	with	the	state.	These	negotiations	are	still	undergoing,	and	
the	 multiple	 understandings	 of	 gongyi	 are	 the	 products	 of	 this	 negotiating	
process.	However,	most	of	comments	I	have	heard	from	Chinese	NGO	workers	
and	 news	 reports	 in	 the	 field	 were	 positive.	 Many	 of	 them	 hold	 that	 the	
establishment	of	the	law	means	that	NGOs	in	China,	once	a	‘political	threat’	in	
the	relevant	regulations,	have	finally	gained	a	normalized	status	in	the	country.	
Some	 of	 their	 roles	 and	 functions,	 defined	 by	 “doing	 gongyi”,	 have	 been	
	
version	 from	 the	 UNDP	 that	 takes	 gongyi	 as	 ‘social	 welfare’,	 see:	
https://www.cn.undp.org/content/china/en/home/library/democratic_gove
rnance/handbook-of-charity-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china.html	
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recognized	by	 the	Chinese	 state,	which	may	bring	more	 space	 for	 the	whole	
NGO	sector.	Such	opinions	were	shared	by	many	of	my	informants	at	AF,	the	
foundation	that	has	been	called	as	“the	role	model	of	Chinese	gongyi”.	 	
To	some	degree,	using	gongyi,	a	localized	language,	to	define	various	‘charitable	
activities’	in	the	law	means	that	gongyi	has	become	a	concept	with	social	and	
cultural	 meanings	 in	 the	 Chinese	 society,	 although	 people	 may	 use	 and	
understand	it	in	different	ways.	As	a	former	university	student	and	NGO	worker	
in	China,	I	have	heard	tons	of	discussions	of	how	to	be	recognized	by	the	state	
since	my	college	years.	Treating	as	a	threat	without	formal	regulations,	only	the	
student	 activities	 approved	 by	 the	 ‘student	 workers’	 on	 my	 campus	 were	
allowed	(as	I	introduced	in	the	preface).	Likewise,	outside	the	campus,	only	the	
NGOs	 with	 certain	 kinds	 of	 special	 ties	 with	 the	 local	 government	 and/or	
officials	can	have	better	chances	to	survive.	Therefore,	I	can	deeply	understand	
why	my	informants,	whether	working	in	the	NGO	sector	or	not,	were	excited	
with	the	feeling	that	the	NGO	work	has	finally	been	recognized	by	the	state.	 	
Restrictive	regulations	towards	civil	society	and	NGOs	are	by	no	means	unique	
in	authoritarian	states	today.	Yet	the	conception	of	Chinese	NGO	work	as	gongyi	
in	the	recent	decades	and	the	specific	culture	and	political	meanings	attached	
to	NGOs	are	distinct	in	China.	How	have	been	Chinese	NGOs	understood	by	the	
state	and	the	Chinese	society	in	different	historical	periods?	Why	it	is	gongyi,	
rather	than	other	languages	that	was	ultimately	accepted	and	used	by	the	state,	
entrepreneurs,	 and	 NGO	 workers	 in	 China?	 This	 chapter	 introduces	 the	
historical	 background	 of	 gongyi	 by	 exploring	 these	 two	 questions	 above.	 In	
particular,	I	focus	on	the	history	of	who	has	discussed	gongyi	in	the	past	three	
decades	and	how.	Firstly,	this	chapter	presents	the	history	of	gongyi	in	its	early	
years,	when	it	was	a	state-centric	discourse	to	maintain	the	socialist	morality	
and	collective	values	in	the	changing	Chinese	society	in	the	post	Mao	era.	Then	
I	discuss	its	close	connections	with	other	non-state-actors,	 including	Chinese	
NGOs,	entrepreneurs	and	the	market,	in	the	recent	two	decades	(which	also	sets	
up	the	context	of	my	research	subjects).	
Looking	into	the	history	of	gongyi	in	the	past	two	decades,	we	can	find	that	this	
popular	language	was	not	always	widely	used	as	it	is	today,	it	has	been	through	
ups	and	downs.	From	the	1990s	to	the	early	2000s,	gongmin	shehui	(公民社会，
civil	society),	a	translated	Western	concept,	was	the	competing	language	that	
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many	 Chinese	 NGO	 workers	 used	 to	 identify	 what	 they	 did.	 The	 rising	 of	
gongmin	 shehui	 in	 that	 historical	 period	 came	 with	 the	 entering	 of	 various	
international	 donors	 and	 national	modernization	 projects	 in	 the	 country.	 In	
many	aspects,	the	change	from	gongmin	shehui	to	gongyi	indicates	the	changing	
NGO	 regulations	 and	 state-society	 relations	 in	 China:	 the	 Chinese	 state	 has	
begun	to	take	a	more	hostile	attitude	towards	international	donors	and	social	
activists,	it	encourages	more	organizations	to	work	as	social	service	deliverers	
under	 its	 new	 regulations.	 In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 argue	 that	 it	 is	 the	 deepening	
development	 of	 state	 corporatism	 and	 surveillance	 in	 the	 past	 decade	 that	
finally	 led	 to	 the	 censorship	 of	gongmin	 shehui	 language	 and	 the	 rising	 of	 a	
(seemingly)	 depoliticized	 gongyi.	 Furthermore,	 the	 state	 corporatism	 has	
become	 more	 complicated	 by	 collaborating	 with	 the	 new	 rich	 Chinese	 and	
corporates	under	the	name	of	gongyi	marketization.	In	the	end	of	this	chapter,	
I	also	talk	about	the	increasing	heterogenous	nature	of	Chinese	NGO	sector	by	
looking	at	those	who	stopped	using	the	gongyi	language	in	their	work.	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
2.1	Gongyi	and	the	socialist	state	
Gongyi,	normally	 translated	as	 ‘public	 interest’,	was	originally	an	 intellectual	
term	used	by	scholars	and	revolutionaries	 in	 the	 late	1800s.	As	a	 translated	
word	from	Japanese,	people	used	this	word	to	clarify	a	political	sphere	beyond	
the	 traditional	 empire	 and	warlords	 of	 that	 time.	 In	 the	 traditional	 Chinese	
culture,	the	boundaries	between	‘public’	and	‘private’	was	very	vague.	There	is	
an	old	saying	in	a	Chinese	poem	which	can	be	dated	back	to	2500	years	ago:	
“Under	the	sky,	nothing	isn't	the	king's	land;	the	people	who	lead	the	lands,	no	
one	 isn't	 the	 king's	 subjects."3	 In	 the	 revolution	 of	 destroying	 the	 last	 Qing	
dynasty	 in	 the	 late	 1800s,	 Chinese	 revolutionaries	 used	 the	 new	 concept	 of	
‘public	interest’	to	justify	their	actions	as	well	as	to	construct	a	new,	modern	
state.	Revolutionaries	like	Sun	Yat-sen	who	was	also	the	founder	of	Republic	of	
China	(ROC),	used	the	term	to	differentiate	what	they	did	as	being	for	“gongyi”,	
public	interest	and	common	people,	rather	than	for	emperors	and	royal	families	
(Ma,	1994).	In	the	ROC	period,	private	businessmen	were	encouraged	by	the	
state	to	fight	against	the	dumping	goods	from	the	European	countries.	During	
	
3	 Source:	https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_sovereign	
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the	Maoist	era,	between	the	1950s	and	1970s,	gongyi	became	redundant	since	
under	the	socialist	revolution	all	social	resources	became	public	and	there	was	
no	need	to	distinguish	between	the	‘private’	and	the	‘public’.	Institutions	and	
organizations	seen	to	be	‘private’	were	criticized	as	‘capitalist	tails’	that	must	
be	 ‘cut	 down’,	 which	 included	 private	 businesses,	 traditional	 clans,	 private	
hospitals	and	schools,	private	cinemas	and	publishing	industry,	etc.	In	this	‘new	
China’,	 many	 new	 attempts	 were	made	 to	 redefine	 what	 is	 ‘public’.	 A	 large	
number	of	public	services	were	established	under	the	name	‘people’	from	the	
People’s	University,	people’s	libraries	and	parks,	to	People’s	Daily.	In	this	period,	
many	new,	socialist	languages	were	created	in	the	country	as	a	substitution	of	
‘public	interest’,	or	gongyi.	 	 	 	 	 	
Although	the	revival	of	gongyi	did	not	occur	till	the	economic	reform	era	in,	a	
historical	link	remained	with	original	the	socialist	state.	The	most	well-known	
spokesperson	for	gongyi	among	many	Chinese	today	may	not	be	anyone	in	the	
ROC	period,	 but	 a	 ‘role	model’	 called	Lei	 Feng	 (雷峰),	 one	of	 the	most	well-
known	 “communist	 soldiers”	 in	 socialist	 China	 (Reed,	 1995;	 Zhuang,	 2010).	
Though	considered	a	hero,	Lei	Feng	was	described	as	an	ordinary,	quiet	and	shy	
young	man	in	the	official	propaganda.	His	good	deeds	included	helping	an	old	
lady	to	get	back	home	and	buying	a	train	ticket	for	a	woman	who	lost	her	wallet.	
It	was	exactly	 the	persistence	of	 these	small	good	deeds	 in	his	daily	 life	 that	
gave	him	the	title	of	great	“communist	soldier”.	After	his	sudden	death	in	an	on-
the-job	accident	in	1962,	the	party	officially	launched	the	“learn	from	Lei	Feng”	
movement.	Until	now,	March	5th	of	every	year	is	still	celebrated	as	“the	learning	
from	Lei	Feng’s	day”	in	China.	
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Figure	2.1	A	poster	of	Lei	Feng	holding	Mao’s	book	in	the	Cultural	Revolution,	
saying	“Chairman	Mao’s	good	soldier	–	Lei	Feng”.	 	 	
	
Before	 the	 1980s,	 Lei	 Feng	 had	 mostly	 been	 praised	 for	 his	 loyalty	 to	 the	
political	leader	Mao	as	well	as	his	self-sacrificing	spirits	(Reed,	2006).	In	most	
of	his	stories,	Lei	Feng	anonymously	helped	others	not	because	they	were	“the	
weak”;	but	because	they	were	“the	comrades”	sharing	the	same	bitterness	as	
proletarians	(ibid.).	So	 the	good	deeds	were	a	way	to	 implement	Mao’s	class	
struggle.	 	 Whereas	after	the	economic	reform,	the	official	propaganda	of	Lei	
Feng	 was	 changed	 from	 “being	 loyal	 to	 communism,	 class	 struggle	 and	
chairman	Mao”	to	“doing	deeds	every	day	to	serve	the	people”,	no	matter	which	
class	 “the	 people”	 belonged	 to	 (Zhang,	 1999).	 He	 was	 depicted	more	 like	 a	
“warm	hearted	person”	than	a	“communist	soldier”	(Zhan,	2011).	Meanwhile	
since	1980s,	on	“Lei	Feng	day”,	people	would	no	longer	study	“chairman	Mao’s	
quotations	on	class	struggles”.	Instead,	many	students	and	people	working	for	
the	 state-owned	 companies	 or	 governmental	 bodies	 would	 be	 organized	 to	
provide	certain	free	service	for	others,	so	as	to	“enhance	their	moral	level”.	Such	
state-organized	free	services,	including	haircut,	car	wash,	and	street	cleaning,	
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would	also	be	called	as	“doing	gongyi”	under	the	name	of	‘serving	the	people’	in	
1980s	(ibid).	
Against	this	background,	the	revival	of	gongyi	that	began	in	the	1970s	in	China	
was	not	like	its	original	meaning	as	‘public	interest’,	because	it	was	not	used	to	
define	what	is	public	and	what	is	not.	On	the	contrary,	it	is	a	state	creation	of	a	
new	 interpretation	of	socialist	morality.	Gongyi	 is	 still	promoted	as	part	of	a	
(state-sponsored)	 collective	 mentality,	 aimed	 at	 pacifying	 rather	 than	
strengthening	the	Maoist	class	struggle:	people	involved	in	the	gongyi	activities	
should	no	longer	be	viewed	through	a	class	perspective.	The	series	of	activities	
entitled	“learning	from	Lei	Feng”	in	the	post	Mao	era	was	part	of	a	larger	project	
launched	 by	 the	 Central	 Committee	 of	 China	 Communist	 Party:	 the	
Construction	of	Socialist	Spiritual	Civilization	(CSSC)	in	the	late	1970s.	CSSC	in	
the	 early	 1980s	 was	 put	 forward	 to	 emphasize	 the	 importance	 of	 Marxist	
education,	 so	 as	 to	 make	 sure	 that	 Chinese	 people,	 in	 the	 chaos	 and	
uncertainties	of	the	post-Mao	era,	could	still	maintain	the	ideals	of	communism	
and	comradeship	among	people.	But	very	soon	in	1986,	when	the	then	political	
leader	 Deng	 Xiaoping	 was	 determined	 to	 deepen	 the	 economic	 reform,	 the	
contents	 of	 CSSC	 were	 also	 changed:	 its	 aim	 was	 redefined	 as	 ‘nurturing	
patriotic	 socialist	 citizen’	 in	 order	 to	 ‘push	 forward	 national	 modernization	
development	 and	 speed	 up	 comprehensive	 reform	 and	 opening	 up	 policy’	
(Zhan,	2017).	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
It	is	in	this	context,	in	the	late	1980s,	that	gongyi	was	incorporated	into	a	state	
discourse,	 part	 of	 a	 project	 to	 create	 ‘new’	 supporters	 of	 China’s	 economic	
reform	who	are	 ‘patriotic’	and	 ‘more	modernized’.	As	 the	discussion	of	suzhi	
discourse	presented	(Hoffman,	2010),	the	Chinese	state	at	that	time	was	trying	
to	create	its	people,	especially	the	university	students,	as	‘national	talents’	to	
support	 the	new	market-based	economy,	 for	which	 the	state	 initiated	a	new	
language	as	 ‘high	quality	people’	 (p17).	But	 it	never	means	 that	 these	 ‘more	
modernized,	high	quality	talents’	should	be	just	the	same	as	the	people	in	any	
Western	countries.	 In	Hoffman’s	study	of	China’s	new	professionalism	in	the	
1990s,	she	found	the	Chinese	state	also	emphasized	its	socialist	morality	and	
collective	 spirit	 in	 the	 daily	 practices	 of	 Chinese	 universities,	 for	which	 she	
called	it	as	‘patriotic	professionalism’.	Under	this	background,	the	various	social	
activities	 organized	 by	 the	 state	 in	 the	 name	 of	 ‘doing	 gongyi’	 became	 very	
important	 ways	 of	 promoting	 the	 spirit	 of	 ‘serving	 the	 people’	 among	 the	
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younger	generations	in	the	reformist	China.	A	good	example	is	the	intersection	
between	gongyi	and	the	‘volunteerism’	that	began	in	the	mid	1990s.	At	that	time	
the	Communist	Youth	League,	as	the	youth	branch	of	the	Chinese	Communist	
Party,	established	numerous	Youth	Volunteers	Associations	(YVA)	across	the	
country	to	cultivate	zhiyuan	jinshen	(volunteer	spirit,	志愿者精神)	(Rolandsen,	
2008).	 In	many	mainstream	media	 reports	 in	 China,	 these	 volunteers	 were	
upheld	 for	 their	 selflessness	and	portrayed	as	 the	 “living	Lei	Feng	 (活雷锋)”	
(Hansen	and	Pang,	2014).	Activities	included	visiting	orphanages	to	helping	the	
elderly;	sometimes	such	activities	were	accompanied	by	study	sessions	during	
which	the	newest	political	ideologies	issued	by	the	ruling	party	were	presented	
(ibid).	During	my	own	college	years	 in	China,	 I	also	attended	these	“learning	
from	Lei	Feng”	activities	with	my	classmates	every	semester,	including	visiting	
orphanages	and	studying	political	speeches	made	by	the	then	national	leaders.	
Most	of	these	activities	were	organized	by	the	University	YVA.	In	official	reports,	
these	university	students	and	state-owned	company	employees	were	described	
as	the	role	models	of	‘qualified	modern	citizens’	in	the	reformist	era,	because	
they	 did	 not	 only	 have	 more	 advanced	 knowledge	 in	 China,	 but	 also	 they	
reached	 higher,	 collective	 moral	 standards	 for	 the	 whole	 country’s	 future	
development	(Rolandsen,	2008;	Zhuang,	2010).	The	Lei	Feng	discourse	 is	so	
influential	that	even	until	today,	many	Chinese	NGOs,	no	matter	which	field	they	
work	in,	are	still	being	reported	as	“living	Lei	Feng”	in	the	mainstream	media.	 	 	
From	the	‘living	Lei	Feng’	to	youth	volunteers,	the	popular	use	of	gongyi	in	the	
post	Mao	period	could	be	seen	as	part	of	the	bigger	state	modernization	project.	
Although	gongyi	has	origins	in	the	socialist	history,	its	revival	in	the	1980s	to	
1990s	was	more	like	a	process	of	negotiation,	adaptation	and	reinterpretation	
of	what	socialist	morality	and	capitalist	development	should	be	like	in	a	country	
in	 transition.	 Although	 some	 GONGOs	 and	 spiritual	 groups	 appeared	 after	
Mao’s	death	(Palmer,	2007),	the	imagination	and	practices	of	doing	gongyi	at	
that	time,	was	closely	linked	to	government-organized	voluntary	activities	in	
the	mainstream	Chinese	society.	 	
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2.2	 Gongyi	and	Chinese	NGOs	in	the	post	Tiananmen	era	
What	made	gongyi	to	be	more	like	its	original	meaning	as	‘public	interest’	was	
the	appearance	of	the	first-generation	NGOs	in	the	1990s	(Howell,	1995).	In	the	
early	 stages,	 these	 NGOs	 looked	 like	 many	 other	 government-organized	
voluntary	 groups,	 as	 their	 activities	 seemed	 to	 be	 very	 similar,	 like	 bird	
watching,	tree	planting,	street	cleaning,	etc4.	However,	given	their	independent	
relations	with	the	Chinese	state,	they	were	more	often	called	as	minjian	zuzhi	
(organization	among	the	people,	民间组织).	Minjian	(民间)	is	a	very	traditional	
Chinese	word	to	categorize	all	the	social	forces	outside	the	state	from	imperial	
China,	 including	 a	 large	 range	 of	 organizations	 like	 clans,	 folk	 religions,	
peasants’	rebellion	groups,	business	associations,	etc.	Although	the	traditional	
minjian	did	not	emphasize	the	independence	from	the	state,	it	did	indicate	there	
could	be	something	different	(or	sometimes	even	opposite)	from	the	state.	As	
we	have	discussed	in	Section	2.1,	 the	Chinese	state	 in	the	socialist	era	firstly	
eradicated	most	of	those	minjian	organizations	by	defining	them	as	the	legacies	
of	the	feudalism	and	capitalism.	Therefore,	for	a	very	long	time	there	was	no	
specific	 state	 regulations	 or	 institutions	 specifically	 for	 administrating	 any	
social	organizations	in	China.	This	led	to	a	relatively	open	space	for	many	self-
claimed	minjian	organizations	showing	up	after	Mao’s	death	between	1976	to	
1988.	As	Veg	 (2019),	 in	 this	period,	as	 long	as	 these	organizations	were	not	
identified	 as	 a	 direct	 political	 threat	 to	 social	 stability,	 they	 were	 simply	
neglected	or	tolerated	by	Beijing.	 	
However,	 the	various	political	movements	 in	 the	1980s,	 especially	 the	1989	
Beijing	 Student	 Movement	 in	 Tiananmen	 Square,	 made	 the	 Chinese	 state	
realize	the	importance	of	regulating	social	organizations	in	a	more	systematic	
way.	By	the	end	of	1989,	a	set	of	national	regulations	were	announced	on	NGO	
issues,	which	turned	out	to	be	the	foundations	of	China’s	NGO	policy	reform	in	
the	 past	 three	 decades	 (Howell,	 2012).	 In	 these	 regulations,	 business	
associations	which	were	beneficial	 for	 the	economic	development	have	been	
encouraged;	 organizations	 with	 government	 supports	 as	 their	 supervisory	
bodies	 were	 allowed	 to	 register;	 while	 the	 independent	 labor	 unions,	
	
4	 Interview	with	two	NGO	workers	B1	(15/11/2016)	and	B13	(25/07/2017)	in	
Beijing.	See	appendix.	 	
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underground	 student	 organizations	 and	 religious	 groups	 were	 strictly	
prohibited	(ibid.).	Moreover,	state	apparatus	began	to	set	up	across	the	country	
for	 close	 surveillance	 from	 organizational	 registration,	 financial	 resources,	
annual	check,	staff	background	review,	to	detailed	instructions	of	establishing	
a	 ‘qualified’	 board	 and	 so	 forth.	 In	 1998,	 a	 government	 department	 called	 	
‘minjian	 zuzhi	 guanli	 ju’	 (民间组织管理局 ,	 translated	 as	 ‘bureau	 of	 civil	
organizations	administration’)	was	set	up	under	the	supervision	of	Ministry	of	
Civil	Affairs;	since	then	from	up	to	bottom,	every	local	government	in	China	has	
a	relevant	institution	in	charge	of	NGO	regulation	issues.	That	said,	since	Mao’s	
death,	 the	 ruling	 party	 in	 China	 has	 been	 through	 many	 changes	 in	
understanding	 and	 regulating	 various	 non-state	 actors.	 By	 establishing	
government	institutions	specifically	for	‘minjian	organizations’,	for	a	very	long	
time	Chinese	NGOs	were	officially	identified	as	something	politically	suspicious,	
with	different	features	from	the	state,	and	therefore	subject	to	be	‘governed’	by	
the	 state.	 In	 this	 period,	 the	 language	 of	 gongyi	 did	 not	 enter	 the	 official	
documents	 and	 speeches	 regarding	 NGO	 issues	 yet,	 since	 most	 NGOs	 were	
depicted	as	suspicious	or	even	negative.	The	positive	meanings	of	gongyi,	or	
public	interest,	would	not	be	attached	with	them.	 	 	
It	was	the	first-generation	NGOs	in	the	1990s,	trying	to	legitimatize	themselves	
in	 the	public,	 that	began	to	use	the	word	gongyi.	As	minjian	was	a	confusing	
word	with	traditional	meanings	and	political	doubts,	some	of	the	NGOs	began	
to	identify	themselves	as	minjian	organizations	working	for	‘public	interests’,	
so	as	to	distinguish	themselves	in	two	ways:	firstly,	they	were	not	part	of	the	
socialist	 gongyi,	 they	 were	 people-based	 organizations,	 not	 a	 government	
apparatus.	 Secondly,	 they	were	 not	 ‘political	 threats’	 to	 the	 country	 and	 its	
people;	 they	were	organized	to	promote	gongyi,	or	public	 interest.	The	 first-
generation	 NGOs	 were	 mostly	 funded	 by	 various	 international	 agencies,	
establishing	 their	 own	 organizational	missions	 (Ji,	 2000).	 In	 the	 late	 1990s,	
some	 of	 them	 turned	 into	 environmental	 advocacy	 groups,	 women’s	
organizations,	 etc.	 In	 many	 circumstances,	 these	 organizations	 were	 more	
tended	to	interpret	gongyi	with	a	new	word	(that	is	different	from	the	socialist	
morality):	gongmin	shehui,	or	civil	society,	a	language	directly	translated	from	
the	Western	world.	By	connecting	gongmin	shehui	with	gongyi,	the	emerging	
Chinese	NGOs	 in	 the	1990s	redefined	 the	Lei-Feng-like,	 socialist	gongyi	with	
different	meanings.	 	
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According	to	Ma	(1994),	the	notion	of	gongmin	shehui	did	not	appear	in	Chinese	
intellectual	debates	till	1986.	Initially,	the	term	was	only	used	by	a	small	group	
of	 Chinese	 theorists	 attempting	 to	 understand	 the	 differences	 between	 a	
socialist	 society	 and	 a	 capitalist	 society.	 After	 the	 failure	 of	 1989	 Student	
Movement,	many	intellectuals,	whether	in	exile	or	at	home,	began	to	emphasize	
the	autonomous	nature	of	civil	society	(Zhao,	1998),	taking	independence	from	
the	state	as	an	alternative	to	authoritarianism.	However,	 their	notion	of	civil	
society	was	more	 like	 an	urgent	 solution	 in	 responding	 to	 the	 failure	 of	 the	
student	movement.	It	was	these	‘liberal	intellectuals’	that	greatly	impacted	the	
emerging	Chinese	NGOs.	During	my	fieldwork,	I	find	that	some	founders	of	the	
first-generation	 NGOs	 in	 China	 had	 close	 links	 with	 the	 1989	 Student	
Movement5 .	 Some	 of	 them	were	 activists	 in	 the	movement	 themselves	 and	
therefore	 maintained	 close	 relations	 with	 the	 political	 dissidents.	 Others	
admitted	 that	 their	 ideas	 of	 civil	 society	 were	 greatly	 influenced	 by	 these	
activists6 .	 In	 the	 1990s	 to	 early	 2000s	 that	 Chinese	 NGOs	 began	 to	 use	 the	
notion	of	gongmin	shehui,	or	civil	society,	in	terms	of	what	it	was	against	rather	
than	 what	 it	 stood	 for.	 By	 distancing	 themselves	 from	 the	 state-sponsored	
gongyi,	NGOs	 tried	 to	 re-define	 their	activities	as	 the	 ‘real	gongyi’	 since	 they	
were	from	‘minjian’.	For	example,	the	volunteers	and	donations	mobilized	by	
the	Communist	Youth	League	were	referred	to	as	‘forced	volunteerism’	or	‘fake	
volunteerism’7,	arguing	that	these	participants	were	not	joining	such	activities	
out	of	their	own	thinking.	Hence	according	to	these	NGOs,	‘real	volunteers’	were	
only	those	who	engaged	in	‘good	deeds’	from	their	own	‘independent	thinking’	
(Jia	and	Sun,	2013).	 	
Gongmin	shehui	is	also	used	as	an	umbrella	term	for	all	individuals	who	engage	
in	anti-state	politics,	no	matter	how	different	 their	economic	 conditions	and	
personal	 backgrounds	 are.	 One	 of	 my	 interviewees,	 Humphrey,	 often	
complained	to	me	that	he	had	severe	conflicts	with	Perry,	a	leader	of	another	
organization.	 These	 two	 organizations	were	 both	 sponsored	 by	 AF,	 but	 had	
very	different	 ideas	about	how	to	redistribute	 the	sponsor’s	 funding	 in	 their	
network.	 Humphrey	 was	 like	 a	 proletariat	 and	 his	 organization	 could	 only	
	
5	 Interview	with	an	NGO	worker	B1	(15/11/2016)	in	Beijing.	
6	 Interviews	with	an	NGO	worker	H3	(17/07/	2017)	in	H	Province.	
7	 Both	B1	and	H3	had	the	same	comments	on	CYL’s	activities.	 	 	
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afford	to	hire	himself	and	another	full-time	worker;	this	led	him	to	portraying	
himself	as	a	representative	of	those	at	the	margin	of	the	society.	By	contrast,	
Perry’s	organization	had	more	than	20	workers	and	was	more	like	a	middle	or	
upper	 class	 in	 a	 Chinese	 metropolitan.	 He	 also	 had	 his	 own	 companies,	
properties	and	cars	in	the	city.	Perry’s	proposals	tended	to	be	more	ambitious	
than	 Humphrey’s	 and	 aimed	 at	 mobilizing	 more	 state	 funding	 and	 well-off	
citizens	 to	 participate	 in	 his	 charitable	 projects.	When	 I	 asked	 him	whether	
gongyi	 consisted	 in	 doing	 good	 deeds,	 Humphrey	 vehemently	 rejected	 this	
definition:	“No,	of	course	not.	We	are	all	liberalists,	we	believe	in	the	gongmin	
shehui	values,	a	smaller	government	and	a	big	society.	So	we	should	do	gongyi	
together!”	Humphrey	said.	
From	the	discussions	above,	we	may	find	that	intellectuals	and	NGO	practioners	
has	reinvented	‘gongyi’	with	a	new	value	system,	a	mere	normative	knowledge,	
and	a	political	ideology	to	solidify	activists,	departing	from	a	socialist	language.	
As	an	ideology,	we	can	hardly	see	any	serious	discussions	of	how	different	civil	
society	theories	could	be	applied	in	analyzing	social	change	in	China,	or	what	
kind	of	internal	conflicts	of	Chinese	gongmin	shehui	may	have	among	Chinese	
NGOs.	 Moreover,	 gongmin	 shehui	 changes	 ‘gongyi’	 to	 be	 an	 action-oriented	
knowledge.	As	one	NGO	worker	told	me,	‘gongmin	shehui	is	not	done	by	talking,	
but	only	by	doing’.	The	 issue	 seems	 to	be	not	what	kinds	of	gongmin	 shehui	
China	is	going	to	have,	but	how	to	construct	this	gongmin	shehui	and	when	can	
Chinese	people	achieve	gongmin	shehui.	In	2011,	activist	and	NGO	leader	Liang	
Xiaoyan	in	a	public	speech	delivered	in	Hong	Kong	University,	told	her	audience	
that	she	had	dedicated	herself	to	‘constructing	China’s	gongmin	shehui’.	Asked	
by	the	host	how	he	felt	about	the	speech,	a	student	responded:	 	
“Actually,	I	still	do	not	know	what	exactly	gongmin	shehui	is.	But	one	
thing	I	know	is	that,	 if	everyone	just	participates	in	it,	 this	gongmin	
shehui	can	be	better”8.	 	 	 	 	
In	 this	sense,	 this	consensus	among	Chinese	activists	around	the	meaning	of	
gongmin	shehui	and	how	to	achieve	it	has	changed	the	political	nature	of	gongyi.	
At	least	among	China’s	NGO	sector,	gongyi	was	no	longer	being	used	in	socialist,	
state-centric	discourses	for	the	national	economic	development.	In	many	news	
	
8	 Source:	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vg4hsoFPFP4	
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reports	 and	 research,	 2008	 was	 being	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 ‘year	 of	 China’s	
gongmin	 shehui’	 (e.g.	 Deng,	 2008;	 Teets,	 2009;	 Yang,	 2017).	 That	 is	 largely	
because	 for	 the	 first	 time,	people	 found	NGOs	 in	China	did	not	have	to	work	
underground:	a	large	number	of	volunteers	and	social	organizations	joined	in	
the	disaster	relief	work	following	the	devastating	Sichuan	earthquake	that	year.	
Almost	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 many	 local	 governments	 at	 the	 provincial	 and	
municipal	levels	began	to	reform	NGO	regulations,	making	the	NGO	registration	
process	much	easier	(Hildebrandt,	2011).	
However,	the	popularity	of	this	revived	‘gongmin	shehui’	did	not	last	long.	The	
major	 sponsors	 behind	 many	 national	 organizations	 promoting	 ‘gongmin	
shehui’	from	the	early	2000s	were	international	agencies	and	have	been	seen	
as	a	threat	to	the	state.	Since	2010,	Oxfam	China	has	been	under	strict	political	
surveillance	 and	 their	 volunteer	 recruitment	 in	 all	 Chinese	 universities	was	
abolished;	 many	 of	 their	 local	 partner	 organizations	 were	 subjected	 to	
surveillance	and	police	checks9.	In	2011,	these	sanctions	were	formalized	in	an	
article	calling	for	more	‘innovative	and	scientific	social	management	in	China’,	
written	by	the	then	General-Secretary	of	the	ruling	party’s	Central	Commission	
of	Justice	and	Law,	Zhou	Benshun.	In	this	article,	Zhou	wrote	that	the	country	
should	‘guard	against	mistaken	beliefs	and	propaganda,	lest	we	fall	into	the	trap	
of	 so-called	gongmin	 shehui	 that	 some	Western	countries	have	 set	 for	us’	 10.	
Subsequently,	 gongmin	 shehui	 was	 listed	 in	 an	 internal	 Communist	 Party	
propaganda	document	as	one	of	the	‘seven	don’t-says’.	
To	some	degree,	the	Chinese	government’s	reaction	confirms	that	the	notion	of	
gongmin	 shehui	 has	 become	 a	 contentious	 force	 threatening	 mainstream	
propaganda.	Since	the	censorship,	a	very	visible	change	is	that	people	no	longer	
use	 ‘gongmin	 shehui	 construction’	 when	 explaining	 gongyi	 in	 public.	 As	
gongmin	shehui	has	been	seen	as	a	radical	and	dangerous	language,	it	needs	to	
give	way	to	a	more	‘depoliticized’	or	‘neutral’	understanding	of	gongyi.	 	
	
	
9 Source:	 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/feb/23/china-tells-
schools-ban-oxfam	
10 	 Source:	 https://www.theepochtimes.com/chinese-official-warns-against-
trap-of-civil-society_1497993.html	
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2.3	The	emerging	‘gongyi	market’	in	the	absence	of	gongmin	shehui	
The	censorship	of	gongmin	shehui	and	repression	of	international	donors	did	
not	 necessarily	 mean	 that	 new	 meanings	 of	 gongyi	 would	 be	 absolutely	
different.	Despite	government	censorship,	gongmin	shehui	 is	still	the	focus	of	
discussion	and	has	had	a	profound	political	impact,	in	terms	of	the	way	in	which	
people	 think	 about	 their	 relationship	with	 others	 and	with	 the	 state.	 In	my	
fieldwork,	I	often	found	many	foundation	leaders	and	ordinary	NGO	workers,	
though	 quite	 different	 from	 political	 dissidents	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 work	 and	
personal	background,	in	many	private	occasions	they	all	tried	to	explain	to	me	
that	 they	were	 strong	 supporters	 of	 ‘China’s	gongmin	 shehui’	 and	were	 just	
working	 for	 it	 in	 a	 different	 way	 by	 collaborating	 with	 the	 private	
entrepreneurs.	 	 	
Chinese	entrepreneurs	have	never	been	far	away	from	the	NGO	sector.	After	
the	failure	of	1989	Student	Movement,	some	Chinese	intellectuals	have	called	
for	“an	alliance	between	intellectuals	and	entrepreneurs	as	an	important	step	
in	formation	of	gongmin	shehui	[to	constrain	the	state	power]”	(Ma	1994).	That	
said,	 for	 the	 advocates	 of	 a	 gongmin	 shehui,	 entrepreneurs	 are	 seen	 as	 an	
important	 ally	 rather	 than	 something	 outside	 of	 it.	 Although	many	 Chinese	
entrepreneurs	 have	 begun	 to	 set	 up	 their	 own	 foundations	 or	 donate	 to	
charitable	 projects	 as	 early	 as	 the	 late	 1980s,	 the	 attempts	 of	 taking	
entrepreneurs	and	the	private	sector	as	a	crucial	part	of	gongyi	and	Chinese	
NGO	sector	did	not	appear	until	2010,	which	has	been	summarized	as	a	school	
of	 ‘gongyi	marketization’	 in	many	news	 reports11.	 Interestingly,	 if	we	 search	
‘gongyi	 marketization’	 today	 online,	 we	 may	 find	 that	 the	 most	 influential	
advocates	of	this	gongyi	marketization	are	not	the	entrepreneurs	themselves,	
but	a	small	group	of	people	with	multiple	‘hats’	on	their	heads.	An	examine	of	
how	gongyi	marketization	was	promoted	at	the	beginning	and	who	were	the	
	
11	 My	summary	of	the	changing	meanings	of	‘gongyi	marketization’	here	is	
inspired	by	an	article	written	by	a	Chinese	NGO	practitioner	Liu	Tao	(2018).	
The	article	(in	Chinese)	can	be	found	here	
http://www.gongyisixiang.org/yanjiu/news-id/9194/.	
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advocates	may	help	us	understand	the	new	meanings	of	gongyi	and	its	relations	
with	the	state	in	the	recent	decade.	 	 	
Mr.	 Xu	 Yongguang	 is	 one	 of	 the	 important	 advocates	 in	 promoting	 gongyi	
marketization	among	Chinese	NGOs.	In	fact,	Xu	is	not	an	entrepreneur;	he	has	
been	reported	more	like	a	‘liberal’	or	‘open-minded’	government	official	with	
successful	experiences	in	‘dealing	with	market’.	As	a	senior	official,	Xu	worked	
for	 Youth	 Communist	 League	 (YCL),	 the	 youth	 branch	 of	 the	 Chinese	
Communist	Party	from	1970s	to	1980s,	during	which	he	drafted	the	political	
reform	proposal	 for	 the	 YCL,	 trying	 to	 launch	 competitive	 elections	 and	 de-
administration	reform	within	YCL.	By	the	end	of	1989,	he	established	the	China	
Youth	Development	 Foundation	 (CYDF),	 a	GONGO	affiliated	with	YCL.	 In	his	
leadership	of	CYDF,	Xu	launched	a	very	famous	charitable	project	named	the	
Hope	Project.	It	was	a	program	of	financial	assistance	for	Chinese	rural	students	
with	donated	money	from	the	general	public.	Backed	by	the	ruling	party,	CYDF	
asked	the	ministry	of	education	and	all	the	local	communist	party	branches	to	
do	 the	 resource	 mobilization	 and	 promotion	 work	 in	 Greater	 China	 (Zhan,	
2011).	 The	 promotion	 strategy	 of	 this	 project	 was	 dominantly	 patriotic:	 to	
claim	that	the	motherland	was	suffering	from	heavy	financial	burdens,	it	should	
be	 everyone’s	 (including	 overseas	 Chinese)	 responsibility	 to	 “help	 the	weak	
compatriots”	(ibid).	From	1989	to	2004,	the	Hope	Project	received	more	than	
220	million	yuan	(about	2.2	billion	pounds)	from	public	donation,	supported	
more	 than	2500,000	 students,	 and	 funded	9508	elementary	 schools	with	 its	
own	 namesake	 (Hsu,	 2017).	 In	 many	 aspects,	 Xu’s	 Hope	 Project	 was	 more	
aligned	with	the	collective,	socialist	morality	of	gongyi	and	a	distinctive	state-
centric	feature.	Therefore,	 for	a	very	long	time,	Xu	and	the	Hope	Project	was	
seldom	 mentioned	 as	 part	 of	 the	 Chinese	 NGO	 community	 that	 were	 self-
claimed	as	‘minjian	organizations’	or	‘China’s	gongmin	shehui	constructors’.	On	
the	contrary,	given	the	strong	supports	of	the	state,	the	Hope	Project	was	more	
like	the	‘irrational’	or	‘fake’	gongyi	that	was	criticized	by	many	first-generation	
NGOs	since	people	hardly	know	whether	those	public	donations	were	given	on	
a	voluntary	basis	or	not.	 	 	
However,	the	criticism	towards	the	Hope	Project	did	not	last	long.	In	fact,	most	
of	the	criticisms	came	from	activists	and	their	international	donors	that	were	
proposing	a	very	different	agenda	that	we	have	discussed	as	gongmin	shehui	in	
China.	However,	given	the	censorship	of	gongmin	shehui	language,	many	of	the	
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activists	had	 to	act	 in	a	 low	profile,	 and	more	 international	donors	began	 to	
withdraw	 from	 the	 country	 (Teets	 and	 Hsu,	 2016;	 Sidel,	 2018).	 Under	 this	
condition,	some	interesting	phenomena	appeared.	For	one	thing,	many	INGO	
workers	in	China	began	to	look	for	domestic	job	opportunities;	they	started	a	
new	career	in	the	rapidly	increasing	domestic	foundations	like	AF.	During	my	
fieldwork,	 many	 of	 my	 informants,	 especially	 the	 organizational	 leaders	 or	
senior	managers,	had	working	experiences	with	various	 INGOs	before	2010.	
These	previous	INGO	workers	became	the	major	practioners	of	a	new	gongyi	
after	the	fall	of	gongmin	shehui	period.	 	
Furthermore,	as	the	political	activists	had	to	be	‘more	silenced’	in	the	country,	
people	 enjoying	 special	 ties	 with	 the	 Chinese	 state	 and	 business	 elites	 had	
bigger	voices	in	China’s	NGO	community.	In	my	fieldwork,	I	was	surprised	to	
find	 that	 some	 of	 the	 young	 NGO	workers	 in	 recent	 years	 only	 knew	 Liang	
Xiaoyan	as	a	grassroots	NGO	worker	working	for	rural	education.	But	Liang	was	
quite	 famous	 in	my	 college	 years	 as	 an	 activist	 and	 a	 survivor	 of	 the	 1989	
Beijing	 Student	Movement,	 her	 public	 speech	 in	 the	 campus	 attracted	more	
than	two	hundred	students	in	a	classroom	which	can	only	hold	one	hundred.	At	
the	same	time,	almost	everyone	I	met	in	the	fieldwork	knew	Xu	Yongguang	very	
well,	especially	what	he	had	done	as	an	“open-minded”	government	official	in	
his	early	years.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
In	2006,	Xu	resigned	his	leadership	at	CYDF	and	joined	Narada	Foundation,	a	
private	foundation	that	was	fully	funded	by	a	real	estate	company	in	Shanghai.	
Since	 then,	 he	 has	 become	 the	 board	 chair	 of	 Narada	 Foundation.	 In	 many	
interviews	and	reports,	Xu	described	the	Hope	Project	as	“a	social	innovation	
to	reform	the	state-owned	welfare	system”,	declared	himself	as	‘an	explorer	of	
Chinese	 gongyi	 industry’.	 According	 to	 Xu,	 gongyi	 was	 neither	 a	 socialist	
morality	 nor	 a	 liberal	 political	 stance,	 rather	 it	 should	 be	 like	 a	 formal	
profession	 with	 its	 own	 knowledge,	 logics	 and	 skills.	 But	 where	 did	 the	
knowledge	 and	 skills	 come	 from?	 Xu	 puts	 forward	 that	 gongyi	 should	 be	
working	in	the	same	principle	as	the	market	because	there	were	intrinsic	values	
of	‘marketization’	by	tracing	back	the	history	of	marketization	reform	in	China.	
Therefore,	he	claimed	that	‘gongyi	marketization	is	the	absolute	correct	way’	of	
whole	Chinese	NGO	community.	In	this	sense,	Xu	suggested	that	NGOs	should	
learn	from	private	companies	in	the	organizational	structure:	donors	are	like	
investors,	donations	are	equivalent	exchanges,	beneficiaries	are	customers	or	
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buyers,	and	the	values	of	NGOs	must	be	promoted	by	marketing	and	branding	
processes.	 Xu	 also	 identified	 that	 NGO’s	 working	 procedures	 should	 be	
designed	 from	 ‘marketing	 positioning’,	 ‘product	 development’,	 ‘pricing’,	 to	
‘marketing’;	just	the	same	as	any	companies.	In	2016,	Xu	went	further	to	argue	
that	‘only	the	gongyi	projects	that	can	be	replicated	in	a	large	scale	should	be	
praised,	 while	 those	 looking	 at	 small	 or	 marginalized	 issues	 should	 be	
obsoleted	in	the	gongyi	market	due	to	their	low	efficiency’.	 	
By	taking	gongyi	as	an	industry,	a	market,	and	a	profession,	Xu’s	speeches	have	
been	warmly	welcomed	by	both	 the	Chinese	entrepreneurs	and	government	
departments.	In	the	empirical	chapters	of	this	thesis,	we	can	find	that	Xu’s	ideas	
were	 very	 much	 implemented	 in	 the	 new	 foundations	 like	 AF	 and	 then	
disseminated	across	 their	partner	organizations.	Moreover,	 the	new	 ideas	of	
gongyi	 embraced	 the	 changing	 regulatory	 strategies	 in	 Beijing.	 In	 2010,	 the	
then	 Chinese	 president	 Hu	 Jintao	 made	 a	 speech	 on	 ‘scientific	 social	
management’,	 in	which	 he	mentioned	 eight	major	 tasks	 for	 the	 ruling	 party	
including	“supporting	people’s	organizations”	and	improving	the	management	
of	services	for	marginalized	groups	(Howell,	2019).	Since	then,	more	and	more	
government	 funding	 from	 various	 levels	 of	 the	 state	 has	 entered	 into	 the	
Chinese	NGO	sector,	under	the	name	of	social	service	subcontracting.	Although	
the	 government	 subcontracting	 trend	 is	 not	 the	 major	 topic	 of	 this	 thesis,	
almost	all	the	NGOs	I	visited	in	the	research	were	involved	in	this	government	
subcontracting	more	 or	 less.	 According	 to	 Kang’s	 research	 (2019),	 the	 two-
pillared	 funding	 game	 between	 the	 government	 and	 the	 new	 foundations	 is	
largely	based	on	the	same	logic:	learning	from	the	market	competition.	In	order	
to	 succeed	 in	 the	 funding	 game,	NGOs	 need	 to	 compete	with	 each	 other	 for	
‘higher	project	efficiency’,	accept	the	status	quo,	and	fit	themselves	into	various	
governmental	 and	 foundation’s	 demands 12 	 (ibid).	 “Supporting	 people’s	
organization”,	as	introduced	by	Hu	Jintao,	turned	out	to	be	an	important	drive	
of	producing	more	‘professional’	subcontractors	in	many	aspects	(Kwan	Chan	
and	Lei,	2017).	 	
	
12	 In	Chapter	4	and	6,	I	discuss	how	the	big	domestic	donors	like	AF	also	needed	
to	fit	itself	into	the	governmental	demands	at	the	local	level,	which	constitutes	
an	important	part	of	my	analysis	on	corporatism	in	China.	 	 	
	 58	
	
2.4	“Don’t	call	me	gongyi	worker”:	the	divided	Chinese	NGO	community	in	
the	past	decade	
The	ideas	of	taking	gongyi	as	a	market	raised	lots	of	discussions	among	Chinese	
NGOs.	However,	 there	were	very	 limited	NGO	workers	who	publicly	showed	
their	disagreements	with	Xu.	During	my	 fieldwork	 in	 the	 city	of	 Shenzhen,	 I	
came	 across	 a	 public	 debate	 on	 ‘whether	 marketization	 is	 good	 or	 bad	 for	
gongyi’	 in	September	2016,	according	to	my	knowledge,	 that	debate	was	the	
only	public	event	to	openly	discuss	the	different	logics	behind	marketization	in	
Chinese	NGO	sector	in	recent	years.	Before	the	debate,	I	was	even	told	by	one	
of	 the	debaters	 from	the	negative	side,	Gideon,	 that	 they	cannot	 find	enough	
teammates	to	argue	against	the	gongyi	marketization.	The	debaters	from	each	
side	perfectly	presented	the	different	reactions	of	this	new	trend	of	gongyi.	 	
The	affirmative	party	of	the	debate,	holding	‘marketization	is	good’,	all	worked	
for	entrepreneur-founded	foundations	or	GONGOs.	While	the	three	debaters	of	
the	negative	side	were	from	grassroots	organizations.	For	most	of	the	time,	the	
positive	 side	 started	 their	 speeches	 by	 referring	 to	 the	 economist	 Frieditch	
Hayek,	 saying	 that	 “anything	without	market	 could	only	 lead	 to	 ‘the	 road	 to	
serfdom’”.	Then	 they	 iterated	Xu’s	 ideas	and	 took	marketization	as	 the	most	
valuable	 experience	 that	 China	 has	 been	 through	 in	 the	 past	 three	 decades.	
Meanwhile,	the	negative	party	held	that	the	logics	behind	the	market	and	the	
‘gongyi	 sector’	 could	 be	 very	 different,	 so	 they	 were	 worried	 that	 this	
‘efficiency-based	 gongyi’	 only	 leads	 to	 big,	 oligarchic	 organizations	 enjoying	
most	of	the	resources.	Some	of	them	also	made	it	clear	that	this	marketization	
trend	would	be	‘a	betrayal	of	minjian	and	China’s	gongmin	shehui	construction’,	
as	it	would	be	a	self-constrain	of	people’s	political	imagination	of	Chinese	NGOs.	 	 	
The	debate	above	demonstrated	the	divided	nature	of	Chinese	NGO	community	
today.	In	the	Post	Tiananmen	era,	the	first-generation	NGO	workers	were	much	
united	under	the	name	of	‘constructing	China’s	gongmin	shehui’.	Along	with	the	
increasing	numbers	of	NGOs	in	China,	a	highly	heterogenous	NGO	sector	has	
been	established.	The	whole	sector	has	become	much	more	complicated	with	
new	donors,	new	funding,	new	knowledge,	and	so	forth.	Not	everyone	can	get	
used	to	the	changing	environment	in	the	past	few	years.	Although	most	of	the	
NGO	workers	I	met	during	my	fieldwork	in	China	called	themselves	as	gongyi	
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workers,	there	were	also	people	who	refused	to	identify	themselves	under	the	
name	of	gongyi.	 	
The	 workers	 I	 present	 here	 questioned	 gongyi	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 knowledge	
resources,	 internal	hierarchies,	 and	working	purpose.	 Some	of	 them,	 though	
quite	 limited,	 were	 from	 within	 AF.	 But	 more	 were	 from	 grassroots	
organizations	 working	 for	 ‘sensitive	 issues’	 in	 China,	 especially	 those	 from	
grassroots	women’s	group	working	for	the	immigrant	workers’	communities.	
They	 felt	 that	 they	 had	 been	 largely	marginalized	 in	 this	 new	 “professional	
gongyi”	 13.	 	 In	my	 interviews,	 some	of	 them	began	 to	deny	what	 they	do	as	
‘gongyi’,	 an	 identity	 that	 they	 once	 shared	 with	 many	 ‘gongmin	 shehui	
supporters’.	Some	of	them	told	me	directly	that,	“don’t	call	me	a	gongyi	worker,	
I	am	not	doing	gongyi”.	Instead,	they	preferred	to	use	the	new	term	of	‘feminists’	
or	 ‘women	 workers’,	 rather	 than	 putting	 themselves	 back	 into	 a	 shared	
community	with	other	types	of	NGOs	again.	 In	 interviews	with	two	women’s	
organizations,	 some	 informants	 suggested	 that	 the	 biggest	 difficulty	 of	 their	
community	organization	was	to	get	domestic	funding	from	new	donors.	For	a	
long	 time,	 they	 had	 been	 funded	 by	 international	 donors,	 but	 international	
funding	 has	 been	 now	 strictly	 prohibited	 by	 Beijing.	 Meanwhile,	 the	 new	
domestic	 foundations	 asked	 them	 to	 prove	 their	 organizational	 capacity	 in	
terms	of	“branding,	public	communication,	and	marketing”	so	as	to	guarantee	
their	“competitiveness”.	An	informant	said:	
“These	new	words	really	make	me	dizzy.	I	do	not	know	how	our	work	in	the	
community	can	be	related	to	these	words.	I	 just	find	the	new	foundations	do	
not	really	care	about	our	projects	or	the	people	we	are	working	for,	not	at	all.	
They	just	look	for	a	lot	of	numbers,	the	donation	numbers,	the	numbers	of	how	
many	people	we	can	serve,	how	many	media	reports...But	all	I	want	is	a	space	
that	our	children	can	have	a	place	to	go	after	school…They	[the	foundations]	
don’t	have	a	heart”14.	 	
	
13	 From	the	interviews	with	Y3	(04/04/2017)	in	Y	Province,	H4	(15/09/2015;	
18/07/2017)	 and	 H5	 (12/09/2015;17/07/2017)	 in	 H	 Province,	 and	 an	
informal	conversation	with	Gillian	in	December	2016	(see	Chapter	6).	 	
14	 Interview	with	H4	(18/07/2017)	in	H	Province.	 	
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Therefore,	 their	 funding	 applications	 with	 these	 new,	 domestic	 foundations	
could	hardly	succeed	since	their	work	in	the	immigrant	workers’	community	
cannot	 be	 proved	 as	 ‘efficient’	 and	 ‘professional’.	 Not	 surprisingly,	 these	
women’s	 groups	 have	 been	 rapidly	 marginalized	 in	 the	 mainstream	 NGO	
industry.	Although	they	constituted	the	most	critical	group	of	resisting	gongyi,	
their	voice	was	hardly	heard	by	the	sector.	In	September	2016,	I	attended	the	
national	charity	fair	in	Shenzhen;	it	was	in	this	event	that	I	witnessed	the	debate	
on	“gongyi	marketization”	discussed	at	the	beginning	of	this	section.	Although	
the	 negative	 side	 arguing	 against	 the	 marketization	 trend	 finally	 won	 the	
debate,	the	reality	was	just	the	opposite:	none	of	the	women’s	groups	had	been	
invited	for	this	debate;	in	fact	I	 	 could	hardly	see	any	organizations	working	
for	 the	 female	 factory	 workers’	 rights	 among	 the	 hundreds	 of	 organization	
attendees.	 Just	 before	 the	 opening	 of	 the	 charity	 fair,	 two	 grassroots	
organizations	working	 for	 immigrant	 factory	workers	 in	Shenzhen	were	 just	
shut	down	by	the	city	government.	
Not	 surprisingly,	 these	 “women	 workers”	 can	 hardly	 survive	 this	 changing	
landscape,	since	many	of	them	were	actually	former	factory	girls	without	the	
new	knowledge	to	help	them	adjust	to	such	changes.	In	2017	when	I	was	still	
doing	my	fieldwork	in	China,	an	informant	Daisy	working	for	female	immigrant	
workers	suddenly	contacted	me	online,	asking	if	I	knew	any	job	opportunities	
in	other	NGOs	in	Guangzhou.	I	was	surprised	to	know	that	as	the	organization	
founder,	Daisy	just	dismissed	the	whole	organization	since	they	cannot	survive	
the	 political	 dynamics	 and	 funding	 draining	 anymore.	 Given	 her	 working	
experience	in	women’s	work,	Daisy	had	tried	to	find	an	NGO	job	in	the	field	of	
women’s	 development,	 but	 only	 to	 find	 there	were	 less	 and	 less	 grassroots	
organizations	working	on	this	issue.	As	a	former	factory	girl	herself,	Daisy	did	
not	have	a	higher	education	degree,	which	made	her	chances	of	getting	into	a	
domestic	foundation	almost	 impossible.	When	I	 finished	my	fieldwork,	Daisy	
ended	up	 in	an	 insurance	company	as	a	saleswoman;	her	social	media	posts	
were	no	longer	talking	about	gender	or	class	equality	issues,	but	about	how	the	
life	insurance	may	help	people	have	a	happier	life.	 	
	
2.5	Conclusion:	researching	gongyi	in	a	Chinese	Foundation	 	
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In	the	official	published	Lei	Feng’s	Diary,	he	wrote	the	famous	sentence	that	has	
been	recited	all	the	primary	students	in	China	until	today:	“one’s	life	is	limited,	
but	the	service	for	the	people	is	unlimited.	I	will	devote	my	limited	life	to	the	
unlimited	service	for	the	people”.	In	2014,	one	of	the	largest	online	shopping	
websites	in	China,	Taobao,	introduced	a	service	named	‘Lei	Feng	Diary’	for	its	
every	customer:	the	more	you	buy,	the	more	money	that	the	stores	on	Taobao	
would	donate	to	charitable	foundations	including	AF.	The	Diary	would	record	
customers’	donations	automatically,	 so	 that	 to	remind	people	 to	buy	more	 if	
their	 donation	 numbers	 go	 down.	 Customers	 with	 high	 online	 orders	 and	
donations	would	be	 given	 some	delivery	priorities,	 named	as	 “red	 soldiers”.	
This	new	Lei	Feng	Diary	was	 soon	 reported	by	 the	People’	Daily,	 one	of	 the	
biggest	official	newspaper	in	China,	calling	this	as	the	“gongyi	of	our	times”.	 	
So	far,	the	chapter	provides	a	historical	understanding	of	the	language	of	gongyi	
in	China.	 From	 learning	 from	Lei	 Feng,	 serve	 the	people,	gongmin	 shehui,	 to	
gongyi	market,	the	meanings	and	practices	of	gongyi	have	been	greatly	shaped	
by	the	Chinese	state	in	the	past	three	decades.	However,	since	China’s	economic	
reform,	Chinese	entrepreneurs	and	the	private	sector	has	never	been	far	away	
from	the	NGOs.	For	followers	of	gongmin	shehui,	the	development	of	market	in	
China	were	seen	as	 their	 ‘natural	allies’	 in	 front	of	 the	state,	although	INGOs	
supported	most	of	these	organizations	in	the	post	Tiananmen	era.	However,	we	
may	also	find	that	such	thinking	about	the	Chinese	state	and	market	would	be	
soon	 challenged:	 the	 regulatory	 strategies	of	 the	Chinese	 state	have	become	
more	adaptive	and	selective	in	dealing	with	different	types	of	organizations;	the	
market	and	 the	 rising	Chinese	entrepreneurs	have	a	very	ambiguous	 face	 in	
front	of	the	state.	Meanwhile,	the	individuals	who	are	now	working	in	this	new	
gongyi	era	are	never	new:	they	could	be	just	from	the	state	and	INGOs.	From	
the	 people	 who	 are	 no	 longer	 use	 gongyi,	 the	 changing	 history	 of	 gongyi	
presents	the	widening	social	gap	in	the	Chinese	society	in	terms	of	class	and	
gender.	 In	 the	 later	 empirical	 chapters	 of	 this	 thesis,	 I	 will	 present	 my	
ethnographic	 study	of	 the	everyday	practices	of	 this	new	gongyi	 in	different	
contexts	 in	China,	analyzing	how	its	new	meanings	have	been	shaped	by	the	
corporatism	 in	 different	 places	 and	 how	 social	 inequalities	 have	 been	
reproduced	from	its	internal	structure.	But	before	that,	I	will	firstly	discuss	the	
process	of	how	I	did	the	fieldwork	with	various	Chinese	NGO	workers.	In	this	
section,	I	will	briefly	introduce	the	background	of	my	main	case	studies,	which	
can	help	us	move	to	the	next	chapter	on	research	methods.	 	
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The	 cases	presented	 in	 this	 thesis	 are	 from	my	yearlong	ethnographic	work	
with	 a	Chinese	 foundation,	AF,	 and	 their	partner	organizations	 in	difference	
provinces.	 AF	 is	 a	 foundation	 established	 by	 a	 group	 of	 the	most	 successful	
entrepreneurs	in	China.	Among	its	7	founders,	two	of	them	are	Internet	tycoons	
in	China,	one	is	a	famous	banker,	one	established	a	very	successful	real	estate	
company,	and	the	rest	are	big	manufacturers.	Given	such	influential	founders,	
AF	attracted	lots	of	media	attention	even	before	it	had	been	legally	registered.	
In	the	past	decade,	it	had	been	often	seen	as	a	role	model	of	Chinese	gongyi	in	
many	news	reports.	 	
In	China,	normally	the	right	to	raise	public	donation	was	given	to	GONGOs	as	a	
privilege.	Although	the	newly	rich	Chinese	have	been	encouraged	by	Beijing	to	
do	charitable	work	since	2004,	according	to	the	national	regulation	they	can	
only	set	up	private	foundations,	receiving	donations	from	their	own	families	or	
companies.	Given	 these	 restrictions,	AF	has	been	 told	 as	 a	 ‘breakthrough’	of	
China’s	NGO	regulation	reform	in	the	past	decade.	In	fact,	AF	was	one	of	the	first	
foundations	that	were	not	organized	by	the	state	but	gained	the	public	donation	
right	in	China,	although	it	took	its	founders	several	years’	endeavor	before	it	
could	be	 finally	 legally	 registered	as	 a	public	 foundation	 in	Shenzhen	city	 in	
2011.	By	the	end	of	2010,	an	influential	Chinese	TV	program	interviewed	one	
of	 AF’s	 founders	 J	 on	 his	 work.	 In	 this	 program,	 he	 publicly	 expressed	 his	
disappointment	with	China’s	national	foundation	regulations,	saying	he	desired	
to	innovate	the	“traditional	gongyi”	by	setting	up	this	new	public	foundation	so	
that	 more	 Chinese	 people	 can	 get	 involved.	 Soon	 this	 interview	 was	
broadcasted	on	 the	 state-owned	China	Central	Television.	 In	 the	early	2011,	
being	 introduced	 by	 a	 senior	 official	 of	 the	 central	 government,	 the	 city	
government	of	Shenzhen	permitted	AF	to	register	as	a	public	foundation	with	
public	fundraising	rights	within	the	city.	This	was	taken	as	a	milestone	of	NGO	
regulation	reform	in	China	at	that	time.	 	 	 	 	
Except	its	registration	story,	what	made	AF	to	be	the	pioneer	of	“Chinese	gongyi”	
were	two	unexpected	GONGO	scandals.	As	we	discussed	in	the	history	of	gongyi	
language,	 gongyi	 was	 deeply	 embedded	 in	 a	 socialist	 morality	 with	 close	
connections	with	the	Chinese	state.	For	a	long	time,	people	viewed	gongyi	as	an	
equivalent	of	GONGO,	Fei	Long	or	the	collective	spirit.	However,	gongyi’s	close	
connections	with	 the	state	 turned	out	 to	be	very	detrimental	during	various	
anti-corruption	campaigns	in	China	since	2000s.	In	the	2008	Sicuan	earthquake,	
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the	general	public	donated	more	than	7million	pounds	in	6	months.	While	more	
than	50%	donation	went	to	the	local	governments	directly,	about	40%	donation	
was	 received	 by	 various	 GONGOs.	 However,	 given	 more	 and	 more	 media	
reports	on	governmental	corruption	of	these	donations,	GONGOs	cannot	escape	
such	 charges	 as	well.	 By	 the	 end	 of	 2008,	 a	 senior	 official	 of	 one	 of	 China’s	
biggest	GONGOs,	China	Red	Cross	(CRC),	was	sentenced	for	ten	years’	prison	
because	of	donation	misuse.	A	bigger	scandal	occurred	in	2011,	when	people	
found	that	a	20-year-old	lady	Guo	Meimei,	had	kept	showing	off	her	extremely	
luxurious	 life	online,	but	she	had	a	 job	 title	as	a	manager	of	CRC.	Millions	of	
Chinese	 netizens	 soon	 responded	 with	 angry	 posts.	 This	 scandal	 launched	
massive	 suspicions	 and	 criticisms	 towards	 GONGOs	 nationally.	 In	 2011	 and	
2012,	the	public	donation	that	CRC	received	decreased	dramatically	by	80%.	
many	 other	 foundations	 also	 experienced	 similar	 fundraising	 declines.	
Ultimately	since	2000s,	the	image	of	gongyi	workers,	no	matter	which	kind	of	
organizations	they	worked	for,	has	been	 largely	polarized:	 if	gongyi	workers	
are	not	selfless	socialists	like	Lei	Feng;	then	they	must	be	corrupted	Guo	Meimei.	 	
It	 is	 these	 two	 consecutive	 scandals	 that	 give	 the	 rise	 of	 “new	 foundations”.	
Taking	AF	as	an	example,	in	2007	it	only	received	about	1	million	pounds	when	
it	was	still	affiliated	with	a	GONGO	 in	China.	But	 in	 the	next	year	during	 the	
Sicuan	 earthquake,	 AF’s	 donation	was	more	 than	 20	million,	most	 of	which	
came	from	small	individual	donors.	This	number	was	much	higher	than	most	of	
the	GONGOs	at	that	time.	After	the	Guo	Meimei	scandal,	AF	became	one	of	the	
most	 trusted	 foundations	 to	 receive	 public	 donation.	 In	 the	 2013	 Ya’an	
earthquake,	AF	received	about	40	million	pounds,	becoming	one	of	the	richest	
foundations	 in	China.	The	extraordinary	fundraising	performance	made	AF	a	
role	 model	 to	 “innovate	 the	 tradition	 gongyi”	 in	 numerous	 media	 reports.	
During	my	fieldwork	with	AF,	I	found	that	although	AF	is	much	younger	than	
many	other	GONGOs	or	international	agencies,	this	organization	could	be	quite	
ambitious	about	what	it	wanted	to	achieve.	Many	AF	workers	tried	to	set	up	a	
new	image	of	what	a	gongyi	worker	should	be	like	in	the	mainstream	Chinese	
society,	for	which	they	called	“the	professionalization	of	gongyi	workers”.	This	
worker,	they	claimed,	should	be	distancing	from	the	state	sponsored	gongyi.	 	 	
AF	had	more	than	80	workers	in	its	headquarters.	These	workers	came	with	
very	 different	 backgrounds,	 from	 government,	 public	 relations,	 media,	
branding,	 sales	 and	 digital	 marketing,	 banking,	 to	 traditional	 international	
	 64	
development	 agencies	 like	 Save	 the	 Children	 and	 Oxfam.	 In	my	 fieldwork,	 I	
found	that	its	workers	had	very	different	views	of	their	founders	and	colleagues.	
It	was	a	big	and	influential	organization	in	China,	but	full	of	internal	tensions,	
debates	or	 even	 struggles	about	how	 to	do	gongyi	 correctly.	While	 some	AF	
workers	 had	 been	 working	 with	 various	 international	 organizations,	 their	
founders	proposed	to	make	it	as	a	“customer-centered	bank”	so	as	to	‘occupy	
the	gongyi	market’.	It	was	the	diversity	and	conflicts	within	AF	that	offered	me	
great	opportunities	to	observe	and	document	the	complicated	process	of	how	
gongyi	as	a	discourse	and	knowledge	could	be	shaped	by	different	actors.	 	 	
But	AF	should	never	be	seen	as	a	single	organization	only.	As	a	role	model	in	
China’s	NGO	sector,	it	also	built	up	a	very	big	national	network	supporting	more	
than	1000	organizations	across	the	country,	from	cities,	towns	to	villages.	Its	
gongyi	ideals	had	to	be	implemented	by	its	local	partners	in	practice.	Therefore,	
AF	 was	 also	 deeply	 embedded	 into	 the	 politics	 between	 different	 local	
governments,	grassroots	organizations	and	the	local	communities.	In	the	fifth	
chapter,	we	find	that	some	of	AF’s	local	partner	organizations	would	like	to	take	
advantage	of	AF’s	 famous	 founders	 to	socialize	with	 the	 local	business	elites	
and	officials;	but	others	use	its	fame	to	leverage	political	recognition	from	the	
local	 government.	 Although	 almost	 all	 the	 actors	 involved	 spoke	 the	 same	
gongyi	language,	studies	of	how	AF’s	work	can	be	done	at	the	local	level	can	let	
us	 know	 how	 gongyi	 can	 be	 spread,	 learned	 and	 reinterpreted	 across	
boundaries.	In	the	next	chapter,	I	will	discuss	my	reflections	of	doing	fieldwork	
with	Chinese	NGOs	with	more	details.	
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Chapter	 3	 	 Research	methods:	 “This	 is	 Dr.	 Zhao	 and	 she	 can	
drink”	
This	research	is	based	on	my	12	months’	multi-sited	ethnography	in	China	from	
June	2016	to	July	2017.	Before	the	fieldwork,	I	have	had	three	years’	working	
experience	with	grassroots	organizations	and	an	international	donor	in	the	city	
of	Guangzhou,	 from	which	I	realized	that	the	domestic	donors	and	the	rising	
‘philanthropists’	in	China	could	be	a	very	crucial	social	force	in	China	but	most	
of	them	still	kept	unknown.	Therefore,	my	original	plan	was	to	study	these	new	
“philanthropic	 foundations”	 in	 the	city	of	Shenzhen	and	make	a	comparative	
study	with	the	grassroots	organizations	in	Guangzhou.	In	the	first	six	months,	I	
had	chances	to	work	closely	with	an	entrepreneur-founded	foundation	in	their	
office	five	days	a	week	as	an	intern	from	June	2016	to	December	2016.	I	also	
moved	 into	 their	 staff	 dorm.	The	 internship	with	AF	 changed	my	mind,	 as	 I	
began	to	realize	that	the	new	foundations	like	AF	were	not	just	a	different	type	
of	NGOs	in	China,	but	also	they	were	trying	to	shape	the	whole	NGO	sector	by	
producing	new	knowledge,	language,	and	culture.	By	the	various	funding	and	
training	programs,	domestic	donors	like	AF	were	trying	to	construct	their	own	
"industrial	chain"	by	working	with	a	number	of	grassroots	organizations	across	
the	country.	My	fieldwork	within	AF's	office	and	its	different	workers	opened	a	
new	window	for	my	research,	so	I	decided	to	change	my	research	plan	from	the	
comparative	 study	 between	 the	 ‘old’	 and	 ‘new’	 organizations	 to	 multi-sited	
ethnographic	 research	 of	 AF’s	 “industrial	 chain”	 under	 the	 name	 of	 doing	
modern	gongyi.	
Multi-sited	 ethnography	 has	 been	 popularly	 used	 in	 the	 studies	 of	 social	
mobility,	immigration,	and	globalization	in	recent	years.	 	 According	to	Falzon	
(Falzon,	 2009:2),	 “the	 essence	 of	 multi-sited	 research	 is	 to	 follow	 people,	
connections,	 associations,	 and	 relationships	 across	 space”.	 As	 an	 influential	
donor	in	China,	the	daily	conversations	in	AF’s	office	were	not	just	about	its	own	
workers,	the	workers	were	also	talking	about	the	people	and	projects	in	many	
different	places;	their	dynamic	relations	with	different	local	governments	and	
their	partner	organizations	were	very	frequently	discussed	in	the	office.	These	
conversations	 reminded	me	not	 to	 take	AF	and	other	organizations	as	mere	
different,	 scattered	case	 studies	as	my	original	 research	plan,	but	 to	analyze	
their	 connections	 and	 differences	 in	 a	 bigger	 picture:	 how	 these	 different	
organizations	 together	 contributed	 to	 a	 newly	 constructed	 knowledge	 as	
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gongyi	that	can	be	tolerated	by	the	different	local	states	and	welcomed	by	the	
Chinese	businessmen.	 	 	
While	my	 internship	 led	me	 to	 AF’s	 partner	 organizations	 by	 following	 the	
flows	of	the	donation	money,	the	daily	conversations	and	practices	in	people’s	
teahouse	and	the	Buddhist	pray	room	made	me	realize	that	gongyi	should	also	
be	seen	as	different	lifestyles	in	the	Chinese	society,	rather	than	a	“professional	
job”	(see	Chapter	5	and	7).	Xiang's	(2007)	anthropological	research	on	Indian	
IT	workers	greatly	inspired	me	during	my	fieldwork	with	various	Chinese	NGO	
workers.	Xiang’s	work	looks	at	how	the	high-end,	profitable	IT	industry	could	
be	possible	 in	 Silicon	Valley	 given	 the	production	of	 “IT	 grooms”	 in	Andhra,	
India.	 It	 is	 in	 the	 small	 Indian	 towns	 and	 villages	where	 the	 negotiation	 on	
marriage	and	dowry	were	conducted,	which	largely	decided	the	how	much	the	
Indian	families	could	invest	on	their	sons'	IT	education,	and	whether	these	"IT	
grooms"	can	realize	their	"American	dreams"	afterward	(p.24-38).	As	he	said	
in	 another	 article	 (Xiang,	 2013),	multi-sited	 ethnography	 "constructs	 rather	
merely	 reflects	 reality",	 therefore	 ethnographers	 should	 "trace	 people's	
concerns,	calculations,	and	strategies…according	to	the	logic	of	how	the	reality	
is	 internally	 constituted	 in	 practice"	 (p.	 296).	 My	 ethnographic	 work	 with	
Chinese	 NGO	 workers	 in	 their	 dorm,	 teahouse,	 and	 homes	 gave	 me	 more	
perspectives	 to	 analyze	 and	 reconstruct	 the	 meanings	 of	 gongyi	 that	 I	 had	
observed	 in	 various	 NGOs’	 offices.	 People’s	 multiple	 interpretations	 and	
performances	 of	 gongyi	 with	 the	 flowing	 donation	 from	 AF	 to	 the	 other	
organizations	have	indicated	that	the	language	of	“gongyi"	was	never	a	random	
pick	in	their	daily	work	and	life,	rather	it	is	based	on	many	careful	calculations	
of	 their	 own	 social	 status,	 economic	 conditions,	 gender,	 and	 the	 dynamic	
political	environment	in	different	local	societies.	 	
The	first	half	of	my	fieldwork	was	mostly	done	by	participant	observation	and	
ethnography.	 I	 had	 dual	 identities	 while	 I	 was	 working	 at	 AF:	 a	 doctoral	
researcher	collecting	data	for	the	thesis,	and	a	full-time	intern	working	for	the	
research	and	evaluation	team	in	the	office.	I	was	not	only	closely	observing	the	
daily	practices	of	AF’s	internal	politics	and	its	workers,	but	also,	I	learned	how	
to	be	a	good	gongyi	worker	through	interactions	with	different	colleagues.	This	
learning	process,	as	I	present	in	this	chapter,	covers	a	wide	arrange	of	issues	
from	participating	in	various	internal	meetings,	doing	the	intern	jobs	under	the	
supervision	of	my	team	leader,	joining	the	midnight	chats	with	my	roommates,	
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and	 so	 forth.	 In	 the	 eyes	 of	 many	 AF	 workers,	 the	 whole	 learning	 process	
transformed	me	from	‘an	AF	freshmen	from	the	UK’	to	be	‘my	friend	Hailing’;	I	
was	not	a	neutralized,	indifferent	observer	at	AF;	rather	in	many	cases,	I	was	a	
participant	in	the	field,	a	consultant	of	my	working	team,	and	a	friend	of	many	
AF	workers.	Hence,	most	of	my	data	collected	in	this	first	stage	were	not	from	
formal,	one	to	one	 interviews,	 though	all	 the	AF	staff	had	already	known	my	
dual	 identities.	The	data	was	 from	my	daily	participant	observation	 and	 the	
organizational	 documents,	meanwhile,	 I	 also	 kept	 a	 diary	 every	 day	 to	 take	
down	field	notes	and	my	reflections.	 	
From	 February	 2017,	 after	 10	 days'	 pilot	 study	 in	 December	 2016,	 I	 spent	
another	month	doing	ethnography	in	AF's	partner	organization	in	K	province,	
also	living	and	working	with	them.	It	was	in	K	that	I	got	chances	to	see	how	AF’s	
ideas	of	gongyi	were	learned,	discussed	and	negotiated	at	the	daily	operations,	
and	how	different	 the	 local	NGO	workers	could	be	 from	those	sitting	 in	AF's	
office	in	terms	of	their	daily	life.	Meanwhile,	I	began	to	have	a	bigger	picture	of	
AF's	national	network	and	to	know	who	is	who	in	the	network	is.	 	 From	March	
2017,	based	on	my	preliminary	findings	and	personal	networks	in	province	K,	
I	traveled	across	the	country	to	do	more	interviews	with	AF's	 local	partners,	
visited	AF's	 former	employees,	 and	ended	up	with	more	 interviews	of	 some	
other	 foundation	 workers.	 My	 interviews	 were	 done	 in	 11	 different	 cities	
covering	7	provinces	in	China;	most	of	the	interviewees	were	the	organizations'	
leaders.	 During	my	 fieldwork,	 I	 found	 that	 all	 the	 foundation	workers	 I	 had	
worked	with,	whether	via	formal	interviews	or	participant	observations,	were	
located	 in	 the	 most	 prosperous	 cities	 in	 China:	 Beijing,	 Guangzhou,	 and	
Shenzhen.	Most	of	their	partner	organizations	I	have	ever	visited	were	in	the	
western	 part	 of	 China,	 mostly	 underdeveloped	 regions.	 For	 the	 rest	 of	 the	
chapter,	 I	present	more	details	of	how	my	multi-sited	fieldwork	was	done	in	
China,	what	challenges	and	reflections	that	I	have	got	in	this	process;	and	more	
importantly,	how	I	posited	myself	differently	in	the	various	fieldwork	sites	and	
how	I	deal	with	research	ethics	both	in	the	field	and	at	desk.	 	 	 	 	
For	 my	 whole	 fieldwork,	 I	 did	 40	 one	 to	 one	 interviews,	 mostly	 done	 in	
November	2016,	 and	 from	March	 to	 July	2017.	Most	 of	 the	 interviews	were	
conducted	in	various	restaurants,	along	with	dinners	or	lunch.	Among	all	the	
interviewees,	15	are	AF's	 then	or	 former	workers;	11	are	 from	AF's	partner	
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organizations;	 14	 are	 NGO	 workers	 in	 other	 foundations	 or	 grassroots	
organizations	in	China.	
	
3.1	Enter	the	field:	researching	Chinese	NGOs	in	a	dynamic	context	
As	a	former	NGO	worker	in	China,	I	deeply	understand	that	China’s	NGO	sector	
is	a	very	closed	circle	than	many	other	research	subjects	in	the	local	context.	
The	 most	 direct	 and	 visible	 answer	 for	 this	 closeness	 is	 the	 government’s	
hostile	attitudes	towards	many	organizations,	given	the	authoritarian	nature	of	
the	state	(see	chapter	6).	Some	organizations	are	running	underground;	more	
are	swinging	from	the	gray	area	to	the	overground	in	their	daily	work.	In	fact,	
even	 for	 “powerful	 foundations”	 like	 AF,	 their	 national	 network	 with	 other	
NGOs	(which	has	been	widely	reported	by	the	Chinese	media)	is	also	technically	
“illegal”	according	to	the	national	regulations.	This	political	climate	has	been	
worsened	since	international	donors	have	become	more	“sensitive”	in	the	eyes	
of	Beijing	in	the	past	few	years,	which	has	made	fieldwork	research	affiliated	
with	 a	 Western	 university	 more	 difficult 1 .	 Under	 this	 condition,	 it	 is	 not	
surprising	to	find	that	many	organizations	would	be	quite	hesitant	and	cautious	
to	 researchers,	 especially	 those	 unknown	 to	 them	 and	 from	 a	 Western	
university.	They	might	simply	not	want	to	reveal	their	“illegal	working	details”	
which	may	make	them	in	trouble.	 	
However,	 this	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 researching	 NGOs	 in	 a	 party-state	 is	
impossible.	On	the	contrary,	in	many	Chinese	NGOs’	eyes,	scholars	and	public	
intellectuals	 could	 be	 their	 “natural	 allies”	 (Wu,	 2012).	 In	 March	 2016,	 a	
popular	Chinese	magazine	named	China	Philanthropist	launched	a	special	issue	
on	a	group	of	five	social	scientists	researching	Chinese	NGOs,	calling	them	“yi	
shi	 (intellectuals	 for	 public	 interests)”.	 A	 common	 feature	 of	 these	 five	
researchers	is,	they	all	have	senior	faculty	positions	in	Chinese	universities,	at	
the	same	time	they	keep	very	close	connections	with	the	Chinese	NGO	sector	as	
active	 participants.	 Three	 of	 them	 had	 their	 own	 organizations,	 including	
	
1	 During	my	fieldwork	with	AF	and	some	of	its	partner	organizations	between	
2016	 and	 2017,	 I	 found	 them	 began	 to	 reduce	 their	 connections	 with	
international	organizations	and	Western	scholars,	partly	due	to	the	more	and	
more	political	surveillances	from	the	national	security	departments.	 	
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foundations	 and	 community-based	 organizations.	 Also,	 all	 of	 them	were	 the	
board	members	of	many	different	foundations,	acting	as	consultants	or	judges	
of	many	grant-making	projects,	or	as	trainers	of	NGO	training	programs.	They	
had	all	participated	in	the	relevant	policymaking	process	too,	at	both	central	
and	local	government	 levels.	The	front-page	(as	below)	features	five	Chinese	
scholars,	saying:	'they	are	intellectuals,	producing	ideas	for	the	frontline	NGO	
workers.	They	are	moving	from	thinkers	to	change-makers;	they	participate	in	
social	 development	 and	 explore	more	 public	 sphere	 for	 the	 society'.	 Such	 a	
statement	means	 that	 there	have	been	close	collaborations	between	Chinese	
NGOs	and	researchers.	
	 	
Figure	3.2	Source:	the	magazine	of	China	Philanthropist	
	
In	 the	 international	academic	world,	 there	are	also	more	and	more	research	
and	publications	on	NGOs	 in	China,	 from	large-scale	survey	(e.g.Hildebrandt,	
2011),	 big	 data	 analysis	 (e.g.	Ma	 and	 DeDeo,	 2018;	 Zhu,	 Ye	 and	 Liu,	 2018),	
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interview	(e.g.	Tang	and	Zhan,	2008;	Wu	and	Chan,	2012;	Hsu	and	Hasmath,	
2016),	to	ethnography	(e.g.	Spires,	2007).	In	fact,	my	main	research	subject,	AF,	
had	also	been	researched	by	several	scholars	in	the	past	few	years2,	therefore	
they	were	not	surprised	at	all	when	I	talked	about	my	research	proposal	for	the	
first	time.	In	this	sense,	it	is	more	likely	that	many	Chinese	NGOs	look	forward	
to	changing	the	current	policies	and	institutions	for	long,	for	which	they	need	
more	sympathetic,	trustworthy,	and	well-informed	researchers	to	work	with.	
The	 biggest	 challenge,	 under	 many	 circumstances,	 maybe	 not	 telling	 their	
experiences	and	concerns	out	or	not,	but	to	whom	they	can	tell	and	how	their	
narratives	would	be	interpreted.	That	is	to	say,	 it	 is	still	possible	to	research	
with	Chinese	NGOs,	although	there	is	a	relatively	high	threshold	for	researchers	
to	enter	to	China's	NGO	world3.	It	is	crucial	for	researchers	to	build	trust	with	
their	 informants	 and	understand	 the	political	 dynamics	 in	 the	 local	 context;	
therefore,	 a	 researcher	 with	 an	 insider's	 perspective	 could	 have	 more	
advantages	in	getting	access	to	his	or	her	fieldwork	(Zhao,	2017).	 	
Researchers	working	on	 a	 geographical	 community	may	 find	 themselves	 “at	
home”	in	their	research	given	the	similar	race,	gender,	or	cultural	background	
(Giwa,	2015).	In	my	research,	 it	 is	the	life	experience	as	an	NGO	worker	that	
makes	me	be	seen	more	like	an	“insider”	in	the	eyes	of	my	informants,	which	
helped	me	gain	trust	with	the	informants	later.	My	fieldwork	started	with	a	dual	
identity	as	both	an	AF	intern	and	a	postgraduate	researcher	from	June	2016;	
before	 that,	 I	had	 three	 ‘job	 interviews’	with	different	AF	workers	 to	get	 the	
research	approval,	from	which	I	began	to	have	a	sense	that	this	new	foundation	
may	have	a	more	complicated	structure	than	I	expected.	
The	first	two	interviews	were	done	between	me	and	AF	workers	in	charge	of	
their	research	projects.	I	was	first	introduced	to	an	AF	worker	A	by	one	of	my	
close	friends	B	working	at	another	foundation	in	Shenzhen.	A	kindly	suggested	
	
2	 During	my	 internship,	 I	 found	 at	 least	 two	 Ph.D.	 students	 and	 one	 senior	
faculty	 from	 overseas	 universities	 had	 already	 visited	 AF	 for	 their	 research	
projects.	Meanwhile,	AF	also	had	experiences	of	hiring	Chinese	researchers	as	
their	consultants	from	time	to	time.	
3 	 China	 scholars	 today	 may	 have	 to	 admit	 that	 this	 threshold	 has	 become	
higher	and	higher	in	recent	years	after	Xi’s	presidency	since	2013.	 	
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me	to	emailing	my	CV,	research	introduction	and	cover	letter	to	her,	and	then	
she	recommended	me	to	the	human	resource	department	and	forwarded	my	
email.	Very	soon	I	got	a	Skype	interview	invitation,	which	was	mostly	on	my	
research	topics,	personal	background	as	well	as	former	working	experiences.	
This	interviewer	Cindy,	a	project	officer	in	AF’s	research	team,	became	a	great	
help	of	my	research	during	the	yearlong	fieldwork.	After	another	week	of	this	
interview,	I	suddenly	got	another	call	when	I	was	in	the	Amsterdam	airport	on	
my	way	back	 to	 China.	 This	 time,	 the	 interviewer	was	 Cindy’s	 line	manager	
Justin;	 he	 was	 calling	 to	 know	 more	 about	 my	 personal	 and	 working	
background.	 Justin	 also	 showed	 his	 interests	 with	 my	 research	 topic	 and	
discussed	how	my	research	may	contribute	to	AF’s	work	and	the	whole	NGO	
sector	 in	China.	Although	Justin	said	that	 I	would	receive	a	 formal	offer	very	
soon,	a	week	later	I	was	caught	by	surprise	when	I	received	the	third	call	from	
the	 human	 resource	 department,	which	 turned	out	 to	 be	 another	 interview.	
This	human	resource	interview	was	quite	different	from	the	former	two,	with	
many	 standardized	 managerial	 questions	 like	 "what's	 your	 advantage	 and	
disadvantage",	 "what	 is	 your	 career	 plan"	 and	 so	 forth.	 In	 their	 questions,	 I	
came	to	realize	that	the	human	resource	team	was	confused	with	my	dual	roles	
both	 as	 an	 intern	and	a	 researcher;	 they	did	not	quite	understand	why	as	 a	
researcher	 I	 did	 not	 ask	 for	 an	 intern	 stipend	 either.	 While	 in	 the	 former	
interviews	I	had	been	frequently	asked	about	the	details	of	my	former	working	
experiences,	like	who	was	I	working	with,	and	what	my	projects	were	about,	
etc.	Although	I	finally	confirmed	my	internship	with	AF,	I	realized	that	it	could	
have	a	complicated	organizational	structure	with	two	groups	of	workers.	On	
one	hand,	some	workers	were	looking	for	the	"familiarities"	within	China's	NGO	
circle;	what	 they	 did	 in	 the	 first	 two	 interviews	were	 conducted	 to	 test	my	
knowledge,	 personal	 network,	 and	 political	 understanding	 of	 Chinese	 NGO	
sector,	to	make	sure	that	I	would	be	a	"sympathetic	researcher"	to	understand	
the	 complexity	 of	 AF.	 But	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 my	 interview	 with	 the	 human	
resource	team	shows	there	is	another	different	force	that	tried	to	restructure	
AF,	making	 it	 a	more	 formalized	 organization	without	 too	many	 differences	
from	a	company.	 	 	
Before	my	work	with	AF,	I	had	been	told	that	its	research	director	Justin	would	
be	my	supervisor.	But	in	my	first	two	weeks,	Justin	and	his	team	members	were	
traveling	so	that	I	had	to	do	self-introduction	repeatedly	to	other	colleagues.	
Very	 soon	 when	 Justin	 came	 back,	 he	 invited	 me	 and	 all	 the	 other	 project	
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officers	 to	 have	 dinner	 together,	 during	 which	 he	 did	 a	 very	 detailed	
introduction	 about	my	working	 and	 education	background,	 taking	me	 like	 a	
colleague	who	had	been	working	with	him	for	some	time.	In	fact,	it	was	also	in	
the	dinner	that	I	realized	that	Justin	and	I	had	many	mutual	friends;	and	thus,	
my	former	working	experience	made	me	 like	a	“friend”	to	him	rather	than	a	
stranger,	even	though	it	was	the	first	day	we	met.	With	Justin’s	introduction,	
the	other	people	seemed	to	be	quite	comfortable	with	my	appearance	so	that	
they	began	to	talk	about	many	sensitive	issues	from	the	fundraising	pressure	
from	 the	AF	board,	 the	 severe	 competition	with	GONGOs,	 to	 various	China’s	
political	movements	in	the	1980s.	After	this	dinner,	the	other	project	officers	
began	to	 invite	me	for	more	dinners	and	other	social	events,	also	I	got	more	
access	to	internal	meetings	and	documents.	 	
Comparing	 with	 AF,	 the	 processes	 of	 approaching	 its	 partner	 organizations	
were	more	complicated.	 In	order	 to	guarantee	the	voluntary	participation	of	
my	 informants,	 I	 did	 not	 ask	 the	 then	 AF	workers	 to	 introduce	me	 to	 their	
partner	organizations,	as	I	noticed	that	their	'partnership'	maybe	not	very	equal	
between	the	AF	(as	a	donor)	and	the	grassroots	organizations	(as	recipients).	
On	many	occasions,	I	found	that	AF	was	in	a	more	dominated	role	in	front	of	its	
partner	organizations.	So	I	got	access	to	these	organizations	through	my	former	
co-workers	and	friends	in	China’s	NGO	sector:	through	some	mutual	friends,	I	
knew	Humphrey,	Sue	and	their	organization	GH4	 that	happened	to	be	an	AF’s	
partner	organization	 in	 the	past	 five	years.	 In	 fact,	Humphrey	and	Sue	were	
more	likely	to	take	me	as	“an	old	friend”	given	our	mutual	friends,	they	kindly	
hosted	me	in	their	home	and	allowed	me	to	observe	their	organization’s	daily	
operation	in	the	office.	I	did	one	month’s	ethnographic	work	with	GH,	during	
which	 I	 began	 to	 develop	 a	 more	 detailed	 picture	 of	 the	 other	 partner	
organizations	in	AF’s	national	network.	It	was	also	through	Humphrey	and	Sue	
that	I	can	get	access	to	many	other	organization	leaders	later	in	my	fieldwork.	 	
But	it	should	be	noted	that	“being	a	friend	of	GH”	did	not	necessarily	help	me	to	
get	through	all	the	AF	partner	organizations.	During	my	second	stage	fieldwork,	
I	visited	AF’s	partner	organizations	 in	11	different	places	and	talked	to	their	
workers;	but	 I	had	also	been	 refused	by	 three	organizations.	All	 these	 three	
	
4	 I	 have	mentioned	Humphrey	 and	 Sue	 at	 the	beginning	 of	 the	 introduction	
chapter,	more	of	their	stories	can	be	found	in	chapter	6	and	7.	 	
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organizations	had	very	 close	 ties	with	 the	 local	 government;	 although	 I	was	
introduced	 by	 Sue	 as	 her	 ‘good	 friend’,	 they	 became	 very	 cautious	with	my	
identity	as	a	research	student	in	a	Western	university.	Furthermore,	as	I	discuss	
in	 Chapter	 6	 and	 7,	 in	 these	 'refusing	 moments'	 I	 realized	 that	 people	 like	
Humphrey	and	Sue	were	actually	'marginalized'	in	the	Chinese	NGO	community	
due	to	their	conflicts	with	the	local	government,	close	ties	with	Oxfam,	and	their	
lower-class	status	in	the	society.	In	a	casual	conversation	with	an	NGO	leader	
in	May	 2017,	 for	 instance,	 he	 criticized	 Humphrey	 and	 Sue's	 organizational	
leadership	because	they	'could	not	be	more	integrated	into	the	local	business	
circle	 but	 just	 focus	 on	 some	 minor	 social	 problems’.	 Therefore	 being	
introduced	by	Humphrey	and	Sue	may	not	necessarily	give	me	any	advantages	
of	becoming	‘a	trusted	friend’	or	‘sympathetic	researcher’;	on	the	contrary,	my	
friendship	with	them	may	sometimes	put	me	in	a	more	disadvantaged	position	
in	getting	access	to	different	types	of	organizations.	
	
3.2	Working	as	an	AF	intern	
NGOs	in	authoritarian	states	like	China	are	often	discussed	as	"sensitive	issues"	
that	should	be	strictly	protected	under	research	ethics.	That	said,	researchers	
should	always	consider	the	potential	political	risks	of	the	research	participants	
in	every	step	of	the	research	(Nyiri,	2008).	That	includes	questions	like	how	to	
gain	participants'	consent,	how	to	record	and	store	the	research	data,	how	to	
protect	 participants'	 privacy	 by	 effective	 anonymization,	 and	 how	 to	
disseminate	 the	 research	 findings	 in	 different	 situations,	 etc.	 Although	 I	 do	
acknowledge	 and	 understand	 the	 possible	 risks	 of	 researching	 the	 "illegal	
activities"	 and	 "underground	 organizations"	 in	 China,	 the	 general	 research	
ethics	 above	 may	 also	 simplify	 the	 complicated	 power	 relations	 between	
researchers	and	informants	in	different	situations.	On	the	one	hand,	with	the	
growing	number	of	social	organizations	and	the	advancement	of	technologies,	
the	Chinese	state	has	been	more	sophisticated	in	social	surveillance	(Creemers,	
2017).	That	is	to	say,	it	is	possible	that	“being	underground	or	illegal”	does	not	
necessarily	mean	that	they	are	unknown	to	the	state	and	thus	always	in	danger	
of	 “disclosure”.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 the	 large-scale	 existence	 of	 “underground	
organizations	 and	 illegal	 activities”	 is	 more	 likely	 a	 result	 of	 negotiation,	
compromise,	and	cooperation	between	some	Chinese	NGOs	and	the	state;	they	
have	 been	 tolerated	 by	 the	 state	 in	 non-institutional	 ways	 (Tang	 and	 Zhan,	
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2008).	In	these	conditions,	the	state	or	officials	may	have	already	known	"the	
underground	 world"	 very	 well.	 What	 more	 important	 for	 the	 researcher	 in	
conducting	 ethical	 fieldwork	 in	 this	 dynamic	 environment	 then,	 is	 not	 to	
essentialize	the	concept	of	“political	sensitivity”	in	the	local	context.	Instead,	an	
ethical	 researcher	 should	 carefully	 observe	 and	 recognize	 the	 changing	
boundaries	between	what	has	been	 tolerated	by	 the	 authoritarian	 state	 and	
what	has	not,	so	that	to	adjust	their	research	strategies	accordingly.	
In	my	fieldwork,	I	found	this	politics	of	being	tolerated	greatly	complicated	the	
power	relations	between	my	informants	and	me.	As	I	discuss	in	chapter	4,	being	
tolerated	 in	 AF's	 case	 can	 be	 largely	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 distinctive	
social	 and	 economic	 status	 of	 its	 founders,	 a	 small	 group	 of	 successful	
entrepreneurs	in	China.	Seen	as	a	representative	of	Chinese	entrepreneurs,	AF's	
charitable	activities	and	projects,	no	matter	they	are	technically	illegal	or	not,	
have	been	widely	reported	by	the	mainstream	Chinese	media.	At	the	same	time,	
independently	registered	with	a	city	famous	for	 its	private	economy,	AF	also	
maintains	a	close	collaboration	with	various	local	government	institutions	and	
senior	 officials,	 which	 can	 be	 found	 from	 AF’s	 internal	 governance,	 project	
operation,	organizational	branding,	to	even	its	office	decoration.	Except	for	the	
GONGOs	in	China,	such	deep	collaboration	is	very	rare	to	be	seen	in	the	Chinese	
NGO	sector.	So	in	many	ways,	being	tolerated	by	the	Chinese	state	in	AF's	case	
means	obtaining	a	political	privilege	in	the	local	context.	Under	this	situation,	
although	 I	 am	 researching	 a	 seemingly	 "politically	 sensitive	 issue"	 in	 China,	
some	 informants	 in	my	 research	 are	 quite	 privileged	 people	 in	 the	 Chinese	
society,	enjoying	a	much	higher	political,	economic,	and	social	status	than	me.	
This	created	very	unbalanced	power	relations	between	AF's	board	members,	
its	senior	management	team	and	me.	
This	unbalanced	power	relations	started	 from	my	 first	working	day	at	AF.	A	
project	assistant	made	a	brief	 introduction	of	AF’s	history,	during	which	she	
talked	about	how	a	founder,	Luke	Lee,	had	contributed	to	AF.	“Then	does	Luke	
Lee	still	come	to	see	us	in	the	office	like	before?”	I	asked	her,	wondering	if	I	can	
meet	Luke	during	my	internship	there.	“No,	I	guess	we	don’t	have	that	honor.	
He	is	such	a	big	man	with	so	many	things	to	do	every	day,	extremely	busy...And	
I	need	to	remind	you	that	we	call	Luke	Lee	as	Lee	xiansheng	(Mr.	Lee,	李先生),	
we	wouldn’t	 call	 his	 full	 name.	 This	 is	 his	 exclusive	 name	here”,	 the	 project	
assistant	 answered.	 Xiansheng	 is	 a	 traditional	 Chinese	 title	 to	 honor	 those	
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outstanding	male	 intellectuals	 or	 educators,	 while	 calling	 one’s	 full	 name	 is	
seen	as	disrespect	to	those	senior	or	more	powerful.	Although	Luke	Lee	did	not	
even	finish	his	primary	education,	his	work	on	gongyi	did	earn	him	great	social	
influences	and	titles	beyond	his	economic	status.	Later	in	the	fieldwork,	I	found	
that	AF	 founders’	 extraordinary	 social	 status	was	not	only	 recognized	by	 its	
workers	but	also	widely	accepted	by	many	of	its	partner	organizations	at	the	
grassroots	level.	Every	year,	AF	would	send	out	some	awards	and	prizes	for	its	
favorite	partner	organizations;	 interestingly,	AF	workers	were	very	proud	to	
set	up	a	special	prize	for	these	grassroots	organizations:	meeting	Luke	Lee	in	
person	and	shaking	hands	with	him.	Under	this	condition,	it	was	not	surprised	
to	learn	that	other	AF	leaders,	from	its	other	founders,	board	members,	general	
secretary,	to	program	directors	all	had	their	“exclusive	names”.	 	
This	process	of	“language	learning”	from	the	first	day	not	only	helped	me	better	
understand	 the	 meaning	 of	 being	 a	 gongyi	 worker	 in	 this	 new	 Chinese	
foundation,	but	also	using	the	language	greatly	defined	my	relations	with	AF’s	
leaders:	I	have	been	identified	as	a	young,	inexperienced	postgraduate	student	
who	should	respect	and	learn	from	these	successful	leaders.	When	I	was	talking	
with	AF’s	general	secretary	in	some	team	meetings,	I	needed	to	call	him	“laoshi	
(teacher,	老师)”	like	all	the	other	workers,	although	he	understood	that	I	was	
an	independent	researcher	at	the	same	time.	Sometimes	in	our	conversations,	
the	general	secretary	would	perform	his	authority	by	asking	me	questions	like	
“how	is	your	research	going,	what	do	you	know	about	our	organization	so	far”.	
No	matter	how	I	answered	his	questions,	in	most	cases	he	would	interrupt	me	
very	quickly	and	try	to	reorganize	my	answers	into	the	directions	he	wanted.	
These	 questions	 were	 more	 like	 “class	 tests”	 to	 reconfirm	 my	 status	 as	 a	
“student”	in	front	of	an	“authoritative	teacher”.	 	 Such	conversations	reveal	the	
hierarchy	between	my	informants	and	me.	So	in	most	circumstances	at	AF,	my	
fieldwork	was	not	a	"politically	risky"	project	in	an	authoritarian	state,	rather	
it	was	more	 likely	a	study-up	ethnography	of	social	and	economic	elites	 in	a	
fast-changing	society.	Although	it	is	important	to	protect	and	"keep	honest"	to	
these	 elite	 research	 participants	 like	 many	 other	 powerless	 groups	 in	 the	
society,	 some	 researchers	 of	 elite	 studies	 also	 put	 forward	 that	 in	 practice	
researchers	should	manage	their	project	strategically,	being	aware	of	possible	
interventions	 from	 the	 powerful	 researched	 in	 knowledge	 production	
(Cookson,	1994).	
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Being	 a	 Chinese	 woman,	 my	 gender	 did	 help	 me	 in	 getting	 access	 to	 the	
roommates.	By	the	end	of	the	first	month,	in	dinner	they	began	to	talk	about	
their	working	problems	especially	the	payment	issues	in	front	of	me,	asking	for	
my	opinions,	 from	which	I	realized	that	I	was	no	 longer	a	“stranger”	 in	their	
eyes.	In	fact,	these	roommates	became	another	important	"walking	sticker"	for	
my	adventure	at	AF.	The	dorm	experience	did	provide	me	more	insights	into	
understanding	the	nature	of	gongyi	in	a	bottom-up	perspective	to	observe	AF	
workers’	different	working	schedules,	family	life,	living	environment,	and	their	
daily	anxieties5.	
Although	sitting	in	the	office	let	me	know	the	working	environment,	in	many	
cases,	 it	 was	 the	 various	 social	 events,	 casual	 talks,	 and	 dinners	 after	work	
brought	me	more	 useful	 insights	 into	 understanding	 how	AF	workers	 think	
about	 their	work.	Quite	often	 I	would	have	dinner	or	have	coffee	during	 the	
lunch	 break	 with	 a	 small	 group	 of	 AF	 workers	 in	 a	 relatively	 relaxed	
atmosphere,	during	which	I	can	ask	more	difficult	questions	and	share	some	of	
my	observations	(like	the	organizational	hierarchy	and	inequality)	so	that	we	
can	have	a	deeper	discussion.	In	many	circumstances,	these	workers	would	also	
talk	about	their	problems	or	complaints	among	themselves	proactively,	which	
turned	out	to	be	another	useful	way	to	understand	the	organizational	culture	
and	its	internal	politics.	 	
From	the	second	month	of	my	internship,	as	I	had	been	invited	to	more	dinners	
and	social	events	after	work,	I	found	myself	face	a	great	pressure	of	drinking.	
Drinking	has	been	taken	as	a	widely	used	method	to	promote	"brotherhood"	in	
AF	and	its	partner	organizations,	which	I	had	encountered	many	times	during	
my	 fieldwork.	 As	 Osburg	 (2013a,	 2013b)	 argues	 in	 his	 ethnography	 in	
Chengdu’s	 businessmen,	 drinking	 and	 banqueting	 together	 were	 very	
important	ways	in	performing	their	masculinity,	reclaiming	elites’	power,	and	
strengthening	 the	 “brotherhood	culture”	 for	 future	profit-making.	Therefore,	
drinking	and	banqueting	constituted	important	parts	of	Osburg’s	ethnographic	
work	in	China.	My	fieldwork	echoes	with	Osburg’s	experience.	Quite	often	being	
a	 young	 woman	 made	 me	 a	 "target"	 of	 being	 pushed	 to	 drink	 as	 more	 as	
possible,	and	the	male	senior	managers	would	give	orders	of	who	should	drink	
on	the	table.	In	these	drinking	events,	I	started	another	lesson	in	the	learning	of	
	
5	 More	can	be	found	in	Chapter	5.	
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how	to	build	"brotherhood"	with	other	NGO	workers,	which	I	discuss	deeper	in	
Chapter	5.	It	was	in	such	drinking	events	that	people	began	to	talk	more	about	
their	 family	 life,	 their	 pressures	 and	 anxieties,	 and	 their	 understandings	 of	
Chinese	politics.	Joining	this	drinking	culture	did	bring	me	some	benefits	in	my	
fieldwork	later.	After	taking	three	glasses	of	wine	for	the	first	time	in	front	of	a	
senior	manager	 Larry,	 I	 found	myself	 did	 not	 have	 any	 obstacles	 to	 getting	
access	to	most	of	the	social	events.	Quite	often	Larry	would	introduce	me	like	
"this	is	Dr.	Zhao	and	she	can	drink";	and	then	I	became	"a	welcomed	guest"	in	
the	banquet.	This	gave	me	more	freedom	to	ask	questions	and	build	personal	
relationships	with	more	male	leaders.	
	
Figure	3.2	A	photo	was	taken	during	a	dinner	with	AF	workers	in	2016.	One	AF	
worker	 (left)	was	 pushing	 another	 other	 (right)	 to	 gulp	 the	 liquor	 down.	 A	
senior	manager	sitting	outside	the	photo	was	giving	orders.		
	
However,	it	was	also	in	such	events	that	I	witnessed	how	some	female	workers	
at	my	age	who	refused	to	drink	in	the	banquets	were	becoming	more	and	more	
marginalized	in	the	organization,	how	those	who	did	not	want	to	drink	were	
struggling;	 and	 how	 the	 junior	 male	 and	 female	 workers	 who	 actively	
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participated	in	drinking	and	toasting	each	other	successfully	became	“a	brother”	
of	 his	 or	 her	 line	manager.	 As	 a	 person	with	 a	 slight	 allergy	 to	 alcohol,	my	
participation	 in	 this	drinking	 culture	 confirmed	my	gendered	 identity	 in	 the	
eyes	 of	my	 informants	 and	 demonstrated	 how	powerful	 that	 these	 drinking	
events	 were	 in	 shaping	 Chinese	 NGO	 workers’	 career	 and	 daily	 work	 in	
unexpected	ways.	Banqueting	and	drinking	in	this	sense	were	a	performance	of	
reclaiming	 the	 existed	 power	 relations	 in	 the	 office;	 by	 discussing	 "private	
matters",	these	relations	extended	to	other	aspects	of	life.	Ethnography	in	this	
context	means	that	I	as	a	female	NGO	researcher	needs	to	enter	and	explore	in	
a	highly	masculinized	culture	with	risks,	biases,	and	physical	challenges.	 	 	 	
	
3.3	Producing	situated	knowledge:	‘failures’	I	had	made	at	AF	 	 	
As	I	was	becoming	a	‘real	gongyi	worker’	at	AF,	I	realized	that	I	was	facing	more	
and	more	dilemmas	in	the	organization.	On	the	one	hand,	moving	into	the	dorm	
and	keeping	a	low	profile	did	bring	me	more	contacts	or	even	'friendships'	with	
many	'ordinary'	AF	workers;	but	on	the	other	hand,	such	strategies	also	made	
me	 miss	 some	 opportunities	 of	 knowing	 those	 'extraordinary	 workers'.	 	
According	 to	my	 former	working	 experience,	most	 NGO	workers,	 especially	
those	work	at	the	grassroots	level,	would	be	wearing	very	casual	t-shirts	and	
jeans	every	day.	That	was	also	what	I	did	during	my	internship	at	AF.	But	very	
soon	I	found	that	the	lifestyle,	including	people's	wearing	and	eating	habits,	was	
quite	divided	at	AF.	Most	of	AF	workers	working	for	its	humanitarian	assistance	
projects	were	just	wearing	like	me	in	a	very	casual	way,	since	they	may	need	to	
travel	 to	 their	project	sites	 in	 the	village	 from	time	 to	 time.	 In	order	 to	save	
money,	most	of	them	would	also	go	to	the	staff	canteen	every	day	that	offered	
affordable	lunch.	But	there	were	also	some	workers	(about	10	out	of	80)	who	
never	showed	up	in	the	staff	canteen.	Instead,	they	would	drive	their	own	cars	
together	(normally	Benz	or	BMW)	to	the	nearby	shopping	malls	to	enjoy	sushi	
for	lunch.	The	outlook	of	these	'extraordinary	workers'	was	quite	different	from	
others	 too,	 from	 tailor-made	 shirts	 to	 designer	made	 skirts.	 Although	 these	
workers	 may	 have	 very	 different	 positions	 at	 AF,	 from	 directors	 to	 project	
assistant,	 what	 threaded	 them	 together	 were	 two	 things:	 ‘local	 citizens’	 of	
Shenzhen	and	experiences	of	studying	abroad	from	a	very	young	age.	
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During	 my	 first	 days	 at	 AF,	 I	 encountered	 a	 project	 assistant	 of	 this	
‘extraordinary	 group’,	 who	 just	 finished	 her	 a-level,	 undergraduate	 and	
master’s	program	in	the	UK.	She	came	up	to	me	and	asked	whether	I	was	‘from	
the	UK	too’.	She	then	asked	many	details	of	my	personal	backgrounds	from	my	
hometown,	 undergraduate	 university,	 master’s	 program,	 to	 my	 current	
academic	 affiliation;	 while	 she	 seemed	 to	 be	 not	 interested	 in	 my	 former	
working	experiences	at	all.	In	the	beginning,	I	thought	she	might	be	just	curious	
about	my	appearance	in	the	office,	just	like	many	other	colleagues.	But	later	I	
realized	that	her	questions	were	more	like	‘an	evaluation’	of	my	‘qualification	
of	entering	to	the	extraordinary	group’,	and	obviously,	I	failed.	 	
Two	things	let	me	know	that	I	had	‘failed	the	evaluation’.	The	first	was	that	after	
the	first	conversation,	I	had	never	received	any	invitations	from	them	again	for	
any	 social	 events.	 My	 family	 background	 as	 an	 immigrant	 of	 Shenzhen,	 my	
casual	clothes	in	the	office,	and	the	close	relationships	with	the	other	‘ordinary	
workers’	built	up	through	the	lunches	and	dinners	together,	largely	defined	that	
what	I	 looked	like	at	AF.	 I	was	not	a	typical	 ‘local	Shenzhener’,	 ‘high-end’,	or	
‘international’	person	as	they	expected.	 	
The	second	thing	indicated	my	‘failure’	in	a	more	direct	way.	Two	months	after	
I	arrived	at	AF,	 I	came	across	Tim	 in	 the	 lift.	At	 the	age	of	28,	Tim	had	been	
promoted	as	the	fundraising	director	at	AF;	he	was	almost	like	a	‘leader’	of	the	
‘extraordinary	group’	 that	 I	met	at	AF6.	Although	Tim	and	I	met	 in	 the	office	
quite	often,	we	never	had	chances	to	talk	since	he	never	appeared	in	any	social	
events	organized	by	the	'ordinary	workers'.	When	I	met	him	in	the	lift	on	the	
20th	floor,	there	were	only	two	of	us	in	that	narrow	space	while	he	kept	staring	
at	the	changing	floor	numbers.	So	I	decided	to	be	the	icebreaker.	I	said,	“I	heard	
that	 you	 are	 graduated	 from	 the	 London	 School	 of	 Economics?	Me	 too!”	 He	
turned	to	me:	“oh	really?	What	degree	do	you	get	from	there	then?	Master’s	or	
undergraduate?”	“Master’s”,	I	replied.	“Ok,	well,	I	got	my	undergraduate	degree	
there,	 three	 years,	 you	 know”,	 he	 said	 with	 an	 unnoticeable	 smile.	 At	 that	
moment,	we	arrived	on	the	ground	floor	and	the	lift	door	was	open.	As	we	both	
walked	out	of	the	 lift,	he	asked	me:	"are	you	walking	to	the	metro	station	or	
driving	home?"	"Metro	station",	I	answered.	"Ok,	I	need	to	go	to	the	car	park	to	
get	 my	 car	 now.	 Bye!”	 Tim	 said	 to	 me	 very	 quickly.	 Tim’s	 reactions	 in	 our	
	
6	 More	Tim’s	story	can	be	found	in	chapter	5.	 	
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conversation	made	me	soon	realized	that	I	was	‘failed’	to	join	their	group	again.	
During	my	whole	 internship	 at	 AF,	 I	 hardly	 had	 any	 chances	 to	 talk	 to	 Tim	
privately,	although	I	did	interview	him	after	finishing	my	internship.	 	 	 	 	
In	many	aspects,	my	former	working	experience	did	affect	 the	way	I	posited	
myself	in	the	field.	In	the	beginning,	I	took	the	casual	clothes	and	the	'friends'	I	
made	at	AF	for	granted,	as	those	seemed	to	be	the	lifestyle	that	most	AF	workers	
shared.	This	consequently	led	me	to	some	unexpected	‘failures’	in	my	fieldwork.	
However,	I	also	find	that	these	failures	contribute	to	my	deeper	understandings	
of	 the	polarized	nature	of	 the	gongyi	workers	 in	 their	 daily	 life,	 particularly	
those	 AF	 workers	 who	 lived	 in	 the	 dorm.	 After	 talking	 to	 Tim	 in	 the	 lift,	 I	
suddenly	 realized	 that	 it	 might	 be	 almost	 impossible	 for	 my	 roommates	 to	
become	Tim	one	day,	even	though	they	were	working	in	the	same	space	every	
day.	My	roommates'	upward	mobility	has	been	largely	limited	from	the	place	
and	economic	conditions	they	were	born	into,	the	education	background	they	
had,	and	the	clothes,	food,	and	transport	they	can	choose	everyday.	 	
Given	my	 ‘failures’,	 sympathetic	 stance	with	 the	 ‘ordinary	workers’,	 and	 the	
changing	positionality	in	doing	the	fieldwork,	the	empirical	data,	and	analysis	
presented	 in	 this	 thesis	 are	 producing	 “situated	 knowledge”(Stoetzler	 and	
Yuval-Davis,	 2002) 7 .	 Situated	 knowledge	 production	 allows	 me	 to	 become	
answerable	for	what	I	learn	to	see	–	that	is,	accountability	means	that	‘analyses	
cannot	 be	 complicit	 with	 dominant	 representations	 which	 reinscribe	
inequalities’	and	that	the	researcher	must	be	accountable	for	their	knowledge	
claims	 (Bhavnani,	 1994:	 29).	 Except	 being	 a	 researcher	 from	 a	 Western	
university,	 my	 sub-identities	 including	 a	 woman,	 a	 second-generation	
immigrant	in	Shenzhen,	a	former	NGO	worker	in	China,	an	intern,	a	roommate,	
and	sometimes	a	 friend	of	my	 informants,	 largely	determine	what	 I	 can	 see,	
hear,	 and	 experience	 in	 the	 field	 (Giwa,	 2015).	 Particularly,	 my	 academic	
training	 in	 the	 UK	 and	 former	 working	 experiences	 with	 grassroots	
organizations	in	China	together	decide	my	problem	consciousness;	and	thus	in	
the	interactions	with	my	informants,	the	questions	I	asked	and	the	language	I	
used	also	revealed	who	I	am	and	what	stance	I	could	take	in	their	eyes,	which	
in	return	influences	how	they	redefined	and	answered	my	questions	(England,	
	
7	 A	feminist	methodology	claims	that	all	knowledge	is	partial	and,	to	use	Donna	
Haraway’s	term,	‘situated’(Haraway,	1988).	
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1994).	Therefore,	 according	 to	 the	 feminist	 objectivity	 (Haraway,	 1988),	my	
research	 is	 based	 on	 limited	 location	 and	 position	which	 produces	 situated	
knowledge,	rather	than	transcendence	and	splitting	of	subject	and	object.	This	
feminist	 approach	 also	 leads	 to	 the	 question	 of	 reflexivity	 in	 this	 research:	
researcher	accountability	to	knowledge	claims	and	critical	examination	of	the	
micro-politics	of	research	(Joseph	and	Moira,	2007).	 	
	
3.4	Researching	AF’s	partner	organizations	in	the	local	society	
After	finishing	my	internship	in	AF’s	office,	I	started	the	second	stage	fieldwork	
by	 interviewing	 AF’s	 partner	 organizations,	 most	 were	 done	 by	 snowball	
sampling.	 I	started	my	research	with	one	AF’s	partner	organization,	GH,	 in	K	
Province	whose	founders	happened	to	have	many	mutual	friends	with	me.	This	
time	again,	I	was	treated	more	like	“an	old	friend”,	received	warm	hospitality	in	
K	 Province.	 GH's	 openness	 to	my	 research	 provided	me	 a	 better	 horizon	 to	
understand	 how	 and	why	 the	 ideas,	 knowledge,	 and	 skills	 of	 gongyi	 can	 be	
disseminated,	learned	and	renegotiated	at	the	grassroots	level.	Also,	the	one-
month	participant	observation	at	GH's	office	helped	me	to	analyze	gongyi	in	the	
local	political	dynamics.	More	important,	it	was	through	GH	that	I	got	to	know	
more	other	partner	organizations	 in	different	provinces.	GH	workers	shared	
their	contacts	and	introduced	me	to	them.	In	most	cases,	GH's	introduction	was	
successful	 in	 guaranteeing	my	 next	 interview,	 as	 long	 as	 the	 organizational	
leaders	were	“friends”	with	GH’s	leaders.	But	sometimes	GH’s	introduction	did	
not	 get	 any	 feedback,	which	 could	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 silent	 decline.	Most	 of	 such	
organizations	 were	 GONGOs	 with	 a	 very	 different	 background.	 In	 these	
circumstances,	GH’s	founder	Sue	said:	“I	am	not	surprised	with	them	at	all.	We	
had	many	meetings	together,	but	we	are	not	known	to	each	other.	They	are	not	
in	the	same	circle	with	us”.	 	
These	 research	experiences	of	 “silent	decline”	 confirmed	 the	 closedness	and	
segregated	nature	 of	 China’s	NGO	 sector,	 and	 thus	 personal	 relations	 play	 a	
crucial	role	in	entering	this	research	field.	In	Fulda	&	Hsu	(2020)’s	research,	she	
analyzes	this	phenomenon	as	a	mechanism	of	"social	capital	accumulation	and	
transfer"	between	Chinese	NGOs.	Researchers	are	positioned	and	repositioned	
not	 only	 by	 their	 education	 background,	 age,	 and	 gender	 (like	 what	 I	
encountered	in	the	AF	dorm	room),	but	more	importantly,	people	in	Chinese	
	 82	
NGO	world	(not	limited	to	researchers)	are	identified	by	his	or	her	former	life	
experience	and	personal	networks	(ibid.).	In	fact,	even	for	AF’s	former	workers	
who	 never	 met	 me	 before,	 all	 of	 them	 accepted	 my	 interview	 invitations	
without	much	hesitation,	when	they	knew	that	I	was	an	intern	at	AF.	 	 It	is	the	
life	experience	and	personal	networks	that	 indicate	one’s	political	 ideologies	
and	 the	 “circle”	 that	 one	 belongs	 to,	 which	 largely	 decides	 the	 attitudes	 of	
Chinese	NGOs	to	different	researchers.	 	
Researching	AF’s	partner	organizations	was	quite	a	different	experience	from	
its	 headquarters.	 Given	 AF	was	 an	 important	 financial	 resource	 for	most	 of	
these	organizations;	I	decided	to	use	my	personal	network	to	approach	them	to	
ensure	their	voluntary	participation,	rather	than	being	introduced	by	AF	or	its	
current	workers.	 I	was	 taken	as	a	very	different	person	 in	 interviewing	AF's	
partner	organizations.	For	GH,	as	we	had	many	mutual	friends,	they	also	took	
me	like	"an	old	friend"	who	was	supposed	to	be	understanding	and	sympathetic	
to	 what	 they	 were	 doing.	 For	 other	 grassroots	 organizations	 that	 were	
unknown	 to	me,	many	of	 them	 thought	highly	 of	my	 education	background,	
viewing	me	as	an	"authority	of	gongyi”.	Most	of	them	called	me	“teacher	Zhao	
(赵老师 )”;	 some	 of	 the	 interviewees	 even	 asked	 me	 to	 “zhidao	 (guide	 or	
supervise	指导)"	their	projects	before	we	met.	Although	I	was	also	invited	to	
have	dinner	with	some	of	these	informants,	none	of	them	had	ever	pushed	me	
to	drink	or	toast	during	the	dinner.	In	other	word,	I	was	no	longer	taken	as	a	
"gendered	subordinate”	but	an	outsider	and	an	authority	in	many	cases.	 	 	 	
But	my	fieldwork	with	these	partner	organizations	was	never	easier	than	in	the	
AF	 office.	 Given	 many	 of	 the	 organizations,	 I	 planned	 to	 visit	 were	 very	
financially	 depended	 on	 AF's	 funding,	 at	 the	 beginning	 I	 thought	 their	
understandings	of	gongyi	might	have	many	similarities	with	AF.	But	I	gradually	
realized	 that	 these	 partner	 organizations	 were	 quite	 different	 than	 I	 had	
imagined	in	many	aspects;	their	relations	with	various	donors	and	their	daily	
practices	 were	 very	 deeply	 embedded	 in	 the	 local	 politics,	 especially	 their	
relations	with	the	local	government.	 	
My	first	understanding	of	the	complexity	of	the	local	organizations	did	not	come	
from	the	interviews	or	any	other	conversations,	but	 from	an	unexpected	call	
that	Humphrey	received	in	an	evening	when	I	was	having	tea	with	him	and	Sue	
in	their	apartment.	The	caller	shouted	at	Humphrey	very	loudly	from	the	very	
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beginning	to	the	end	with	great	anger	so	that	I	could	hear	what	he	said	very	
clearly.	The	 caller	was	 complaining	 that	GH	did	not	distribute	 the	 resources	
received	from	various	foundations	more	among	its	“local	brothers”	in	the	city;	
at	the	end,	the	caller	threatened	Humphrey	that	“you	need	to	be	more	careful	
in	 retributing	 things	 as	 long	 as	 you	want	 to	 work	 in	 the	 city.	 You	 are	 now	
making	trouble	to	yourself”.	During	the	call,	Humphrey	said	nothing	but	 just	
listening	to	him	very	quietly.	I	was	really	surprised	by	such	a	'straightforward'	
caller,	but	Sue	and	Humphrey	seemed	to	be	calm	with	it.	Sue	said,	
“This	 happens	 almost	 every	 month,	 the	 local	 organizations	 were	
watching	 us.	 These	 organizations	 are	 not	 easy	 to	 deal	 with…they	
wanted	 to	be	our	 ‘brothers’…	At	 the	beginning	when	 they	 found	us	
receive	donations,	they	began	to	invite	us	to	drink	and	banquet	with	
them…But	that	is	not	possible!	Who	wants	to	make	friends	with	these	
people?!”	 	
Then	I	was	told	the	caller	was	a	leader	of	a	local	volunteer	group,	who	was	also	
an	 official	 working	 in	 the	 city	 government	 in	 charge	 of	 social	 organization	
issues.	In	the	local	NGO	community,	especially	when	it	comes	to	the	township	
and	village	level,	such	kinds	of	organization	leaders	were	not	rare	to	be	seen;	
these	 groups	 constituted	 important	 parts	 of	 AF’s	 national	 disaster	 relief	
network.	 Just	 as	 Sue	 said,	 I	 encountered	 another	 call	 like	 this	 during	 my	
research	with	GH,	asking	Humphrey	to	“think	about	his	local	brothers	more”.	 	 	
These	two	calls	made	me	realize	that	for	many	Chinese	NGOs,	maintaining	good	
relationships	 with	 the	 local	 government	 means	 more	 than	 avoiding	 the	
politically	sensitive	issues	in	an	authoritarian	state	as	well	as	maintaining	good	
relations	with	the	donors.	The	state	could	be	anywhere	and	anyone,	affecting	
from	NGO’s	office	work	to	what	kinds	of	‘friends’	that	NGO	workers	could	make	
in	their	everyday	life.	Working	in	the	local	society	asks	Humphrey	and	Sue	to	
manage	 their	 social	 relations	 very	 carefully,	 which	 had	 been	 a	 very	 big	
challenge	for	them.	During	my	fieldwork	with	various	organizations,	most	of	
the	organization	 leaders	were	only	 open	 to	 the	 ‘formal’	 questions	 regarding	
their	development	history,	financial	resources,	governmental	relations,	etc.	But	
when	 it	 comes	 to	 their	 personal	 networks	 and	 private	 life,	 most	 of	 the	
informants	would	become	much	hesitant	 and	 try	 to	bypass	 those	questions.	
That	is	especially	the	case	for	informants	who	enjoyed	an	extraordinary	social	
status	in	the	local	NGO	community	and	maintained	a	good	relationship	with	the	
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local	government	officials.	Most	of	them8	 tried	to	avoid	my	questions	on	their	
economic	conditions,	family	backgrounds,	personal	connections	with	the	local	
political	 and	 business	 elites,	 and	 sometimes	 their	 religions;	 although	 at	 the	
same	time	they	were	more	open	to	discuss	the	NGO	regulations	and	other	more	
politically	sensitive	issues	in	China.	The	different	interactions	between	me	and	
different	 organization	 leaders,	 their	 hesitance	 in	 particular,	 to	 some	 degree	
revealed	the	complexity	of	the	local	state-NGO	relations.	 	 	 	 	 	
	
3.5	How	I	deal	with	research	ethics	in	this	thesis	 	
The	different	fieldwork	experiences	with	AF	and	the	other	organizations	lead	
me	 to	 the	 questions	 of	 how	 to	 deal	with	 research	 ethics	 in	 different	 power	
relations	and	contexts.	For	AF	and	some	of	its	partner	organizations,	they	had	
established	 very	 solid	 connections	 with	 the	 local	 government	 since	 their	
registration;	what	they	did	were	not	only	tolerated	but	also	encouraged	or	even	
privileged	 by	 the	 Chinese	 state	 in	 China's	 NGO	 sector.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	
organizations	like	GH	were	more	likely	a	semi-underground	organization,	often	
seemed	 like	 a	 "trouble-maker"	 in	 eyes	of	 the	 local	 government.	Taken	 these	
differences	 into	consideration,	 it	would	be	problematic	 if	we	essentialize	the	
"political	sensitivity"	question	across	these	different	organizations,	since	they	
may	face	very	different	levels	of	political	risks.	In	this	research,	I	use	a	slightly	
different	 strategy	 of	 doing	 anonymization.	 I	 anonymize	 all	 the	 names	 of	
organizations	and	individuals	mentioned	in	the	thesis.	But	for	some	grassroots	
organizations	that	might	be	"politically	sensitive"	in	the	local	community,	I	also	
anonymize	the	place	they	were	located	so	that	to	avoid	the	potential	risks	for	
them.	For	others	that	have	been	widely	accepted	by	the	mainstream	society	and	
the	local	government,	their	cities	or	provinces	are	specified.	Therefore,	for	all	
the	 AF’s	 partner	 organizations	 at	 the	 local	 level,	 I	 would	 not	 specify	 their	
geographic	locations.	In	fact,	during	my	whole	fieldwork,	I	did	not	disclose	any	
specific	information	on	who	and	where	I	was	going	to	visit	any	AF	workers.	 	
	
8	 Except	Humphrey	and	Sue,	another	two	organization	leaders	discussed	their	
private	life	with	me,	for	which	I	present	in	Chapter	7.	 	
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In	getting	consents,	in	AF's	case,	I	wrote	a	formal	email	with	my	research	plan	
and	later	discussed	relevant	research	ethics	regulations	with	its	leaders	face	to	
face.	Finally,	I	got	verbal	approval.	For	the	other	organizations	and	individuals,	
in	 order	 to	 better	 protect	 them,	 there	 was	 only	 verbal	 communication	 and	
approval	before	my	research	so	to	ensure	that	there	would	not	be	any	formal	
evidence	showing	they	had	been	interviewed	by	a	researcher	from	a	Western	
university.	For	the	same	reason,	in	all	the	interviews	I	never	used	recorder	but	
took	notes	by	my	handwriting,	laptop,	or	smartphone.	
Some	scholars	argue	that	even	though	sometimes	powerless	in	researching	the	
powerful,	researchers	in	the	academic	world	do	have	more	power	in	analyzing,	
writing	and	publishing	processes	(Joseph	and	Moira,	2007;	Hertz	and	Imber,	
2014).	This	constitutes	an	important	reason	why	we	should	be	"sympathetic"	
not	only	to	the	powerless	but	also	to	the	elites	that	are	more	powerful	than	us.	
But	it	should	be	noted	that	such	an	argument	is	based	on	a	hypothesis	that	the	
academic	world	is	to	some	degree	independent	from	the	people	we	research,	
which	 offers	 researchers	 the	 power	 to	 write	 and	 publish	 critically.	 This	
hypothesis	and	argument	are	challengeable	in	many	ways.	At	the	global	level,	
given	more	and	more	business	elites	are	now	entering	the	non-profit	world	by	
big	 donations	 and	 setting	 up	 their	 own	 charities,	 it	 is	 not	 surprising	 to	 find	
many	of	 them	also	 support	 large	numbers	of	 research	and	higher	 education	
programs,	 which	 in	 return	 legitimatizes	 their	 wealth	 and	 power	 in	 many	
academic	discussions	(McGoey,	2012).	Therefore,	“a	sympathetic	researcher”	
of	 these	 elites	 and	 their	 organizations	 would	 inevitably	 lead	 to	 the	 lack	 of	
analysis	in	class	and	other	forms	of	social	inequality.	In	my	fieldwork	of	China’s	
newly	 founded	 foundations,	 I	 find	 some	 of	 them,	 like	 their	 international	
counterparts,	also	pay	attention	to	the	academic	world.	 	
Take	 AF	 for	 example,	 they	 have	 sponsored	 many	 international	 academic	
conferences	 in	China	 every	 year	 in	 the	 field	 of	 child	protection	 and	disaster	
relief,	 not	 to	mention	 the	 research	projects	 directly	 collaborated	with	 social	
scientists.	 Moreover,	 AF	 leaders	 were	 very	 aware	 that	 being	 part	 of	 the	
academic	world	could	be	very	useful	in	producing	more	influence	in	the	country.	
When	I	talked	about	my	research	topic	with	its	general	secretary	for	the	first	
time,	he	asked	me:	“So	you	are	going	to	write	a	book?	That	is	great	for	us!”	Then	
he	turned	to	other	colleagues:	 “Have	you	ever	noticed	how	many	books	that	
SEE	[Society	of	Entrepreneurs	and	Ecology	 in	Beijing]	has	already	had	now?	
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Two!	 But	 AF	 has	 none.	We	 should	 let	 ourselves	 be	 known	 by	 the	 academic	
world;	we	should	make	AF	a	good	case	so	when	people	study	Chinese	gongyi,	
they	will	 think	 about	 us".	 In	 AF's	 case,	 these	 new	 foundations	 are	 not	 only	
changing	the	Chinese	NGO	sector	and	the	society	at	large	by	their	donation	and	
projects	but	also	the	new	ideas	and	knowledge	they	produce	is	shifting	both	the	
NGO	and	academic	world.	Therefore,	as	a	researcher,	criticality	and	reflexivity	
should	come	first	before	sympathy	in	this	situation.	
Meanwhile,	my	sympathy	has	been	mostly	demonstrated	 in	some	grassroots	
organizations	and	NGO	workers	who	were	not	only	problematized	by	the	local	
state,	 but	 also	 marginalized	 by	 their	 counterparts	 due	 to	 their	 gender	 and	
economic	conditions	in	the	Chinese	society.	My	sympathetic	stance	with	these	
"powerless"	NGO	workers	made	the	fieldwork	with	them	much	easier.	While	I	
attended	many	drinking	and	banqueting	events	with	AF's	leaders,	I	also	talked	
to	the	other	young	female	and	male	workers	who	were	upset	with	such	social	
activities.	My	allergy	to	alcohol	raised	many	 interesting	discussions	between	
me	and	these	informants	who	shared	their	thinking	and	puzzles	of	their	work	
and	life.	Also,	close	observation	of	their	daily	life	and	work	helps	me	to	analyze	
the	relations	between	gongyi	and	social	inequality	in	China	in	a	bigger	picture.	 	
	
3.5	Conclusion	
This	 chapter	 talks	 about	 the	 process	 of	 how	 I	 did	my	 ethnographic	work.	 It	
discusses	the	challenges	and	strategies	of	researching	NGOs	in	an	authoritarian	
state	with	fast	socio-economic	changes.	Given	that	the	Chinese	NGO	sector	has	
been	in	a	gray	area	for	long,	the	closedness	of	this	sector	has	established	a	high	
threshold	for	researchers.	However,	it	is	not	saying	that	doing	such	research	is	
impossible.	During	my	fieldwork	with	Chinese	NGOs,	my	personal	experience	
in	working	within	this	sector	before	did	give	me	advantages	to	gaining	access	
to	my	informants	at	both	organizational	and	individual	levels.	Although	I	had	
‘failing’	moments	and	difficulties	with	people	 from	more	elitist	backgrounds,	
such	experiences	also	reminded	me	of	linking	different	NGO	workers’	everyday	
life	 with	 the	 normalization	 of	 the	 whole	 NGO	 sector	 in	 the	 country,	 paying	
attention	 to	 the	 homogenous	 nature	 of	 different	 actors.	 In	 the	 next	 four	
chapters,	I	will	present	my	empirical	findings	with	more	details	and	analyses	
on	these	different	actors	and	their	interactions	with	doing	gongyi.	
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Chapter	4	 	 The	Making	of	modern	gongyi	in	Shenzhen	
	
Located	in	the	CBD	area	of	Shenzhen,	AF’s	office	was	situated	in	a	skyscraper,	
as	 any	 medium	 sized	 company	 might	 be.	 The	 space	 had	 been	 unified	 and	
decorated	to	host	at	least	50	workers;	everyone	had	their	own	nametag	and	a	
computer	on	their	desk.	The	office	occupied	almost	a	whole	floor	of	the	building;	
except	for	the	large	open	office	space,	there	were	several	small	rooms	specially	
designed	 for	 its	 council	board	chair,	general	 secretary,	and	 for	conferencing.	
Five	months	before	 I	 started	my	 fieldwork	at	AF,	 the	 then	general	 secretary	
decided	to	set	up	two	fingerprint	readers	near	the	 lift;	every	AF	worker	was	
required	to	input	their	fingerprints	before	starting	work	each	day	in	order	to	
monitor	 their	 working	 hours.	 This	 was	 part	 of	 a	 large	 internal	 reform	 of	
‘learning	from	corporate	management’.	There	was	a	reception	area	and	a	fridge	
with	soft	drinks	sponsored	by	Coca	Cola,	so	that	everyone	could	have	unlimited	
free	 drinks	 during	 their	 working	 hours.	 The	 whole	 working	 space	 of	 AF	 is	
wrapped	around	by	clear	glass,	along	with	a	visitors’	corridor	throughout	the	
whole	working	 space.	 So,	 the	 office	 is	much	 like	 a	 huge	 fish	 tank:	 from	 the	
visitors’	 corridor,	 people	 can	 see	 very	 clearly	what	 every	worker	was	doing	
inside.	In	the	corridor,	there	were	pictures	showing	AF’s	achievements	from	the	
past	 decade,	 from	 handshaking	 with	 the	 then	 vice	 Prime	 Minister	 in	 2012,	
government	 awards	 from	 Beijing	 and	 Shenzhen,	 to	 its	 increasing	 donation	
numbers	and	disaster	relief	works.	 	
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Figure	4.1	A	fingerprint	reader	at	AF	near	a	lift.	Photo	by	the	author.	
 
Figure	4.2	A	picture	of	AF	office.	Photo	by	the	author.	
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At	first	sight,	it	seemed	that	AF’s	office	was	like	any	well-equipped	company	in	
Shenzhen.	 	 However,	 AF’s	 office	 is	 provided	 by	 a	 local	 GONGO	 (called	 the	
Shenzhen	Non-governmental	Organization	Association,	SNOA)	for	free,	in	order	
to	 demonstrate	 how	 successful	 the	 city	 government	 is	 in	 supporting	 local	
‘philanthropists’	 and	 their	 foundations.	 Indeed,	 the	 Shenzhen	 government	
seemed	to	be	more	‘supportive’	in	helping	the	local	organizations	than	many	
other	city	governments	in	China	(see	chapter	6).	There	was	an	exhibition	just	
next	door	to	AF’s	office	organized	by	SNOA	to	show	the	development	of	local	
NGOs.	Most	of	the	exhibition	was	presenting	how	active	and	diverse	Shenzhen’s	
social	 organizations	 were,	 with	 an	 emphasis	 of	 entrepreneur-sponsored	
foundations,	 chambers	 of	 commerce,	 and	 various	 voluntary	 groups	 in	 the	
middle-class	communities.	As	a	role	model	of	China’s	NGO	regulation	reform	in	
recent	years,	 the	Shenzhen	government	has	appeared	in	many	Chinese	news	
reports	and	research	papers.	Normally	when	people	such	as	 the	Civil	Affairs	
Bureau	 officials	 from	 other	 provinces	 came	 to	 Shenzhen	 to	 learn	 about	
Shenzhen’s	social	development	model,	,	they	would	be	taken	to	the	exhibition	
first.	And	then	the	visitors	would	take	a	tour	walking	through	AF’s	 ‘fish	tank	
office’.	AF	became	a	living	example	of	the	exhibition	to	show	how	successfully	
the	entrepreneurs	and	local	companies	had	been	in	collaboration	with	the	city	
government	 in	 contributing	 to	 Shenzhen’s	 social	 development,	 and	 how	
transparent	these	new	foundations	were	in	doing	“modern	gongyi”.	 	
	
Organizations	like	AF	could	be	seen	as	‘typical	mainstream’	NGOs	in	China;	they	
were	relatively	more	independent	from	the	state	than	most	of	the	GONGOs	(at	
least	 from	 its	 founders	 and	 funding	 structure),	 legally	 registered,	 and	 doing	
‘gongyi’.	But	from	its	office,	though	seemingly	different,	we	can	still	have	a	sense	
that	 their	 daily	 operation	 might	 be	 greatly	 shaped	 by	 the	 Chinese	 state.	
Compared	with	some	other	local	governments	that	I	studied	in	the	fieldwork1,	
	
1 	 Some	 of	 AF’s	 partner	 organizations	 in	 different	 provinces	 I	 visited	 also	
enjoyed	free	offices	offered	by	the	local	government	or	GONGOs.	But	most	of	the	
office	space	in	the	other	places	were	quite	small	and	basic;	in	many	cases,	these	
free	office	rooms	would	not	be	the	first	choice	for	NGOs.	More	information	can	
be	found	in	chapter	6.	 	
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the	 Shenzhen	 government	 was	 much	 more	 generous	 and	 sophisticated	 in	
dealing	with	NGO	issues,	and	they	had	a	clear	definition	of	what	gongyi	should	
be	 for	 in	 the	 city.	 AF,	 as	 a	 good	 example	 of	 Chinese	 entrepreneurs’	 rising	
awareness	 of	 social	 responsibilities,	 has	 been	 accepted	 as	 part	 of	 the	 local	
government’s	social	development	projects.	 	 	 	 	
	
This	chapter	discusses	the	very	popular	term	of	‘modern	gongyi’	since	this	was	
the	 word	 that	 I	 heard	 very	 frequently	 from	 many	 Chinese	 foundations,	
grassroots	 organizations,	 government	 officials,	 news	 reports,	 and	 the	 ‘big	
philanthropists’	 throughout	 my	 yearlong	 fieldwork.	 I	 have	 discovered	 that	
‘modern	 gongyi’	 is	 never	 a	 simple	 linguistic	 term,	 but	 an	 influential	 concept	
with	specific	knowledge,	skills	and	political	indications	in	China’s	NGO	sector.	
As	 a	 role	 model	 of	 Chinese	 ‘modern	 gongyi’,	 AF	 workers	 were	 performing	
‘modern	 gongyi’	 in	 their	 office	 every	 day,	 which	 I	 present	 in	 this	 chapter.	
Moreover,	as	seen	in	the	next	chapters,	it	was	also	happening	in	many	different	
places	 like	the	AF	workers’	dorm,	everyday	 life,	and	the	other	organizations.	
This	chapter	aims	to	answer	these	questions:	what	does	‘modern	gongyi’	mean	
and	 how	 has	 it	 been	 reinvented	 as	 knowledge	 about	 Chinese	 NGOs	 in	 the	
context	of	Shenzhen?	What	are	 the	roles	 that	 the	Shenzhen	government	and	
entrepreneurs	have	played	 in	shaping	 the	knowledge	production	of	 ‘modern	
gongyi’?	 	 I	answer	the	questions	in	the	following	ways.	 	
	
Firstly,	my	research	takes	‘modern	gongyi’	as	a	new	man	in	making	a	reformist	
China,	particularly	in	the	city	of	Shenzhen.	The	use	of	the	word	‘modern’	here	
refers	to	both	the	Shenzhen	government	and	the	entrepreneurs	attempting	to	
define	AF	and	many	other	local	foundations	as	a	new	and	more	“progressive”	
creature,	 departing	 from	 the	 GONGOs	 that	 have	 been	 seen	 as	 ‘traditional’	
socialist	legacies.	As	a	farewell	to	the	‘traditional’,	this	‘modern	gongyi’	puts	an	
emphasis	 on	 the	 spirit	 of	 aggressiveness	 in	 people’s	 daily	 work	 and	 life,	 a	
character	that	has	been	seen	as	a	symbol	of	the	city	since	its	establishment	as	
China’s	economic	reform	pioneer	three	decades	ago;	it	has	been	called	a	‘wolf-
like	spirit’	in	many	Shenzhen	private	enterprises	today.	In	this	chapter,	I	argue	
that	the	wolf-like	spirit,	or	the	aggressiveness	shared	by	many	workers	in	the	
AF	has	aimed	to	create	a	new	type	of	organization	in	China’s	NGO	sector:	by	
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imagining	themselves	as	a	representative	of	the	rising	private	entrepreneurs,	
they	are	ambitious	to	compete	with	GONGOs	as	a	“reformer”.	This	new	type	of	
NGOs	 with	 ‘wolf-spirit’	 have	 no	 longer	 been	 a	 mere	 ‘follower’	 of	 the	
international	development	agencies,	even	though	some	of	their	workers	have	
had	 working	 experiences	 with	 various	 international	 donors.	 Instead,	 these	
Chinese	NGOs	have	become	a	‘competitor’	of	the	Western	donors.	 	 	 	 	 	
	
Secondly,	 ‘modern	 gongyi’	 has	 brought	 new	 languages,	 skills,	 and	
organizational	structure	changes	to	the	Chinese	NGO	sector.	 It	has	brought	a	
‘donor/customer-centered’	 culture	 that	 can	 be	 better	 promoted	 among	 the	
ordinary	 Chinese.	 But	 the	 new	 personhood	 and	 languages	 should	 be	
understood	in	political	terms.	These	new	skills	and	languages,	as	a	process	of	
implementing	the	‘wolf	spirit’	in	AF’s	daily	operation,	have	also	led	to	profound	
changes	in	terms	of	its	human	resource	structure:	new,	male	employees	with	
better	mastery	of	the	new	languages	were	brought	into	the	organization,	which	
created	a	bigger	gap	and	conflicts	between	employees	in	terms	of	gender	and	
income	in	AF’s	office.	By	putting	AF’s	case	into	a	bigger	picture	of	social	change	
in	China’s	reform	and	the	local	contexts	of	Shenzhen,	I	argue	that	this	‘modern	
gongyi’	 has	 become	part	 of	 the	 reproduction	mechanism	of	 ‘one	 family,	 two	
systems’	in	China,	contributing	to	the	widening	gender	gap	in	the	workforce.	 	 	 	 	
	
The	 first	 chapter	 of	 this	 thesis	 analyzes	 the	 different	 approaches	 in	
understanding	Chinese	NGOs,	in	which	I	argue	that	the	corporatism	framework	
is	more	relevant	for	this	thesis	in	analyzing	the	politics	of	NGO-state	relations	
in	 China.	 This	 chapter	 is	 an	 extension	 of	 the	 theoretical	 debates	 on	 the	
corporatism	approach	by	looking	at	the	process	of	making	‘modern	gongyi’	in	
AF’s	 office.	 For	 most	 of	 the	 time	 during	 my	 internship	 with	 AF,	 the	 city	
government	did	not	show	up	directly	in	the	office	on	a	daily	basis.	It	was	the	
ideas	 and	 commands	 from	 entrepreneurs	 and	 the	 senior	management	 team	
that	occupied	most	of	my	energy	in	learning	how	to	be	a	‘modern	gongyi	worker’	
at	AF.	However,	in	several	public	crises	that	AF	encountered	in	2016,	I	began	to	
realize	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 deep	 collaboration	 between	 AF	 and	 the	 local	
government	in	Shenzhen.	As	I	discuss	in	the	third	section,	most	of	these	crises	
were	not	only	publicly	challenging	AF’s	organizational	image	as	a	role	model	of	
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‘modern	 gongyi’	 in	 China,	 but	 athey	 were	 also	 questioning	 the	 increasing	
influence	 of	 private	 entrepreneurs	 in	 Chinese	 society.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	
patronage	 and	 support	 from	 the	 Shenzhen	 government	 did	 help	 AF	 and	 its	
modern	gongyi	model	to	be	‘normalized’	in	China,	and	this	provides	us	with	a	
good	opportunity	 to	understand	how	such	corporatism	at	 the	 local	 level	can	
happen	and	be	challenged	in	the	country.	
	 	
In	the	following	sections,	this	chapter	firstly	introduces	in	brief	how	the	‘city	
characteristics	of	Shenzhen’	have	been	formed	since	China’s	economic	reform.	
In	particular,	 I	discuss	how	‘wolf-spirit’	appeared	in	the	local	corporates	and	
how	it	has	been	promoted	among	AF	workers	as	a	‘modern	gongyi	worker’.	I	
also	 pay	 attention	 to	 the	 process	 of	 how	 it	 has	 been	 incorporated	 into	 the	
Shenzhen	 government’s	 changing	 regulations	 of	 the	 local	 NGO	 community.	
Then	the	chapter	looks	at	the	specific	skills	and	daily	work	of	‘modern	gongyi’	
in	AF’s	office,	documenting	the	commercialized	organizational	culture	created	
by	the	entrepreneurs.	In	particular,	this	chapter	analyses	the	impacts	of	these	
new	knowledge	and	languages	on	the	human	resource	management	of	different	
AF	workers.	 Finally,	 the	 chapter	 discusses	 the	moments	when	 this	 ‘modern	
gongyi’	could	be	challenged	and	how	such	challenges	could	be	dealt	with	by	the	
help	of	the	Shenzhen	government.	Those	discussions	can	help	us	understand	
the	boundaries	of	the	‘modern	gongyi’	model	in	China.	 	 	
	
4.1	becoming	a	wolf:	the	making	of	a	new	man	
	
I	have	been	to	Shenzhen	Airport	many	times	during	my	fieldwork,	 travelling	
from	 there	 to	 other	Chinese	 cities.	While	 I	was	waiting	 for	my	 flights	 at	 the	
airport,	what	 attracted	me	most	were	 the	airport	bookshops.	 Just	 like	many	
other	airport	bookshops	I	have	been	to	in	different	countries,	the	bookshops	at	
Shenzhen	airport	had	many	types	of	books	for	travelers	to	kill	time.	But	all	the	
Shenzhen’s	bookshops	had	a	screen	in	the	front	of	the	shop	with	a	loudspeaker,	
showing	 various	 lectures	 made	 by	 some	 Chinese	 business	 elites.	 These	
speeches	covered	a	wide	range	of	topics	from	business	management,	personal	
leadership,	how	to	establish	a	start-up,	and	how	to	find	your	first	gold,	to	their	
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own	business	experiences.	There	were	often	a	 lot	of	books	and	DVDs	on	the	
same	themes	piled	up	for	sale	besides	the	screen,	occupying	the	central	area	of	
these	bookshops.	According	to	my	travel	experiences	at	the	airport	bookshops,	
Jack	Ma,	the	Chinese	Internet	tycoon,	must	be	the	winner	in	the	competition	of	
the	big	bosses.	He	is	not	only	a	passionate	speaker,	but	his	speeches	involved	
many	his	personal	stories	of	how	he	became	successful	from	scratch	in	the	past	
two	decades,	in	order	to	convince	audiences	that	everyone	can	‘go	big’	if	you	
have	a	certain	kind	of	personality	or	just	“think	like	Jack	Ma”.	 	 	
	
Jack	Ma	 is	not	 just	popular	 in	Shenzhen	airport;	 in	many	other	city	airports,	
people	can	also	see	him	on	screens,	in	bookshops,	and	in	commercials.	In	fact,	
most	of	those	books	in	the	airports	were	not	even	published	by	Ma	himself.	In	
a	public	interview,	Ma	said	that	the	publishers	would	not	even	notice	him;	most	
of	 the	 bestselling	 books	were	 violating	 his	 intellectual	 property	 rights.	 That	
means	people	in	China	today	are	not	just	interested	in	the	specific	methods	or	
skills	Ma	used	 to	build	up	his	business	empire,	but	also	 in	his	narrative	and	
thinking	patterns	of	‘how	to	be	successful’	in	China,	which	has	been	called	the	
‘wolf-like	spirit’	in	many	of	Jack	Ma’s	speeches.	The	titles	of	the	books	sold	in	
the	 bookshops	 mostly	 included	 ‘wolf-spirit’	 in	 different	 permutations	 from	
‘wolf-like	 marketing	 skills’,	 ‘wolf-like	 team	 building	 and	 human	 resource	
management’,	 ‘wolf-spirit	 culture	 in	e-commerce’	 and	so	 forth.	Then	what	 is	
this	‘wolf-spirit’	about	and	how	could	it	be	introduced	to	the	non-profit	world	
in	China?	 	 	 	 	 	
	
4.1.1	Chinese	entrepreneurs	and	wolf-spirit	
	
The	 ‘wolf-spirit’	was	originally	 from	a	best-selling	Chinese	novel	 called	Wolf	
Totem	in	2004.	The	book	is	about	a	Chinese	man	in	his	late	twenties	who	left	
his	home	 in	Beijing	 to	work	 in	 Inner	Mongolia.	Through	descriptions	of	 folk	
traditions,	rituals,	and	life	on	the	steppe,	Wolf	Totem	compares	the	culture	of	
the	ethnic	Mongolian	nomads	with	the	Han	Chinese	farmers	 in	the	area.	The	
book	praises	the	"freedom,	independence,	respect,	unyielding	before	hardship,	
teamwork	 and	 competition"	 of	 the	 former	 and	 criticizes	 the	 "Confucian-
	 94	
inspired	culture"	of	the	latter,	which	is	"sheep-like".	By	the	end	of	the	novel,	the	
author	extended	its	conclusion	by	saying	that	the	“sheep-like	culture”	should	
be	 discarded,	 and	 the	 Han	 Chinese	 should	 learn	 from	 the	 other	 cultures	
especially	those	which	had	been	historically	more	aggressive:	the	Westerners,	
for	example,	given	they	were	the	‘wolf	on	the	sea’.	Although	this	wolf-like	spirit	
seems	 to	 be	 too	 aggressive	 and	 racist	 in	 many	 ways,	 it	 is	 somehow	 in	
accordance	with	many	 Chinese	 entrepreneurs	who	 have	 taken	 the	 risk	 and	
made	breakthroughs	by	their	own	hard	work	 in	 the	reformist	era,	proving	a	
major	difference	from	the	‘socialist	workers’	during	the	command	economy.	 	
	
One	of	the	good	examples	is	the	company	of	Huawei,	with	its	CEO	Ren	Zhengfei	
who	changed	his	career	in	the	1980s	from	the	army	to	the	business	world.	On	
the	official	website,	Huawei	introduces	its	company	culture	as	follows2:	
	
The	 major	 organizational	 culture	 of	 Huawei	 Company,	 which	
demonstrates	 the	 set	of	 key	values,	 beliefs	 and	attitudes	 shared	by	
organizational	 members,	 is	 known	 as	 ‘wolf-culture’.	 The	 first	
character	 of	 wolves	 is	 bloodthirsty.	 Employees	 of	 Huawei	 are	
extremely	 sensitive	 to	 the	market	 information	 and	 could	 response	
promptly	to	any	changes.	The	second	character	of	wolves	is	resistant	
to	coldness.	The	fearlessness	of	difficulties	and	eagerness	of	making	
progress	 are	 insisted	 by	 every	member	 of	 Huawei,	 no	matter	 how	
complicated	the	hardship	is…	The	‘wolf-culture’	brings	Huawei	a	high	
level	 of	 keen	 insight	 about	 the	 unsteady	 market	 and	 assists	 the	
company	 to	quickly	 react	 to	any	existing	opportunities.	As	a	 result,	
Huawei	 could	 expand	 its	 business	 volume	 about	 approximately	
twenty	percent	every	year.	 	
	
4.1.2	Wolf-spirit	and	AF	
	
	
2	 Source:	https://huaweico.wordpress.com/our-culture/	
	 95	
Although	‘wolf-spirit’	has	been	quite	popular	in	the	Chinese	business	world,	it	
was	quite	unusual	to	talk	about	this	among	the	Chinese	NGOs	when	I	was	doing	
my	fieldwork	in	the	2016.	In	my	former	work	experience	in	China’s	NGO	circle,	
I	 had	 never	 heard	 about	 this	 word	 from	 any	 organizations	 I	 knew.	 On	 the	
contrary,	 ‘aggressiveness’	or	 ‘wolf-spirit’	 seemed	not	 to	be	welcomed	among	
many	 organizations,	 and	 NGO	 workers	 were	 more	 likely	 to	 present	 their	
‘softness’.	In	my	interviews	with	different	NGO	workers,	most	of	them	would	
firstly	 talk	 about	 their	 NGO	 work	 experience	 by	 telling	 stories	 about	 their	
‘original	heart	(chuxin,	初心)’,	or	where	their	original	gongyi	compassion	came	
from.	Quite	often	these	stories	were	about	their	faith	in	Buddhism	(see	chapter	
5	and	7),	and	this	narrative	was	particularly	common	among	the	NGO	workers	
who	had	left	the	business	world.	‘Wolf-spirit’,	in	many	circumstances,	was	still	
a	new	word	in	many	NGOs’	daily	work.	 	 	 	 	
	 	
At	AF,	this	“wolf-spirit”	was	firstly	introduced	by	Jack	Ma	to	define	what	modern	
gongyi	 should	 be	 like	 in	 its	 spirit.	 Then	 it	 was	 gradually	 learned	 by	 their	
foundation	workers	who	came	from	other	traditional	international	agencies.	At	
an	annual	dinner	for	AF’s	council	board	members	and	its	workers	in	2011,	one	
of	AF’s	important	council	board	members,	Jack	Ma,	delivered	a	speech,	calling	
its	workers	to	have	‘wolf-spirit’	in	their	daily	work3:	
	
“In	our	board	meeting	during	the	day,	the	executive	team	has	already	
got	enough	praises	for	their	hard	working	in	the	past	year.	All	I	want	
to	say	now	is	that,	I	think	our	activities	are	not	sexy	enough	for	the	
young	people;	we	cannot	mobilize	more	of	them	to	join	and	donate	to	
us.	More	importantly,	our	working	team	is	lack	of	a	spirit	of	wolves;	
our	workers	need	to	be	more	aggressive	in	their	daily	work.	AF	is	now	
the	leader,	much	more	influential	than	most	of	our	competitors	in	the	
gongyi	 sector.	But	we	should	be	 like	a	wild	wolf	 that	always	has	a	
strong	sense	of	crisis	in	competing	with	others.	Wolves	are	very	acute	
and	proactive	in	finding	their	food	and	expanding	their	territories.	We	
	
3	 Source:	a	video	of	AF’s	internal	archive.	Translated	by	the	author.	 	
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should	just	be	like	them,	to	be	more	aggressive	to	cultivate	all	of	our	
energy	to	attract	donations	and	mobilize	people.	We	should	not	only	
think	about	how	to	make	a	big	business	in	China,	but	also	think	about	
the	whole	world”.	 	 	
Table	4.1	AF’s	council	board	members	in	2011	(11	people	in	total)4	
Name	 Personal	background	 Have	other	
foundation	
affiliations	
Chi	Chou5	
(board	chair)	
Professor	in	Development	
Economics	at	Peking	University.	 	
Male.	
Yes.	
Heng6	 Founder	and	CEO	of	a	listed	real	
estate	company.	 	
Male.	
Yes.	
Luck	Lee7	 (AF	
founder)	
Movie	star	and	financial	investor.	 	
Male.	
No.	
Chuanzhi	Liu8	 Founder	and	CEO	of	a	high-tech	
company,	Lenovo.	 	
Male.	
Yes.	
	
4	 Source:	the	official	website	of	AF.	In	2016	when	I	was	doing	fieldwork	with	AF,	
the	council	board	still	kept	11	members,	with	only	one	people	changed.	 	 	
5	 Name	anonymized	here.	
6	 Anonymized.	
7	 Anonymized.	
8	 Chuanzhi	Liu	has	been	affiliated	with	a	number	of	philanthropic	foundations	
in	China	and	widely	reported	as	a	‘philanthropist’	in	many	mainstream	Chinese	
media.	Therefore,	 I	don’t	 anonymize	his	name	here,	 as	his	 specific	 affiliation	
with	AF	may	not	that	easily	recognized	as	other	council	board	members	who	
have	less	involvements	with	gongyi.	I	also	apply	this	anonymization	method	to	
Pony	Ma	and	Jack	Ma	in	this	table.	
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Pony	Ma	 Founder	and	CEO	of	a	high-tech	
company,	Tencent.	 	
Male.	
Yes.	
William	Ma9	 Former	CEO	of	a	commercial	bank	
(retired).	
Male.	 	
Yes.	
Jack	Ma	 Founder	of	a	high-tech	company,	
Alibaba.	 	
Male.	
Yes.	
Sheng	Niu	 10	 Founder	and	CEO	of	a	listed	food	
company.	 	
Male.	
Yes.	
Yang	Si11	 Founder	and	CEO	of	a	listed	real	
estate	company.	 	
Male.	
Yes.	
Peng12	 Former	senior	official	in	Beijing,	
general	secretary	of	AF	from	2011	
to	2014.	 	
Male.	
Yes.	
Amy	Zhou13	 Friend	of	Luck	Lee,	financial	
investor.	 	
Female.	
Yes.	
	
	
9	 Anonymized.	
10	 Anonymized.	
11	 Anonymized.	 	
12	 Anonymized.	
13	 Anonymized.	
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Jack	Ma	was	 not	 the	 only	 one	 to	 promote	 the	 ‘wolf-sprit’	 at	 AF.	 During	my	
fieldwork,	 I	heard	and	read	repeatedly	 from	various	 internal	documents	and	
ordinary	 workers	 about	 how	 the	 general	 secretaries	 of	 the	 foundation	 had	
problems	in	communicating	with	their	council	board	members.	They	had	been	
criticized	as	having	a	“lack	of	wolf-spirit"	when	they	found	themselves	having	
difficulties	 in	 achieving	 the	 growth	 rate	 of	 fundraising	 targets	 set	 up	 by	 the	
council	 board	 every	 year.	 For	 instance,	 when	 James	 had	 just	 taken	 the	
leadership	post	at	AF,	he	and	the	whole	senior	management	team	received	an	
‘assignment’	from	its	then	council	board	committee	president,	William.	William	
gave	the	team	a	list	of	ten	big	Chinese	companies’	CEOs,	asking	the	executive	
team	to	find	out	the	CEOs’	contacts,	arrange	meetings	in	a	month	and	persuade	
at	least	three	to	five	CEOs	to	donate	to	AF.	In	fact,	as	one	of	the	most	successful	
bankers	in	China,	William	already	knew	all	these	CEOs	well.	The	purpose	of	this	
assignment	 was	 to	 motivate	 the	 ‘wolf	 spirit’	 among	 the	 AF	 leadership	 to	
‘challenge	 themselves’,	 so	 that	 they	could	 ‘stimulate	more	personal	potential	
and	team	spirit’	in	attracting	funding	and	donors.	When	he	discovered	that	the	
management	 team	 failed	his	 test,	William	was	 so	disappointed;	he	 criticized	
James	by	saying	he	‘does	not	have	enough	training	in	the	business	world’.	 	
	 	
At	the	beginning,	I	was	very	confused	why	Jack	Ma	and	William	would	introduce	
‘wolf-spirit’	to	AF	workers,	since	the	differences	between	their	own	companies	
and	 the	 charitable	 foundation	 were	 so	 obvious.	 If	 for	 a	 company,	 being	
aggressive	means	that	people	should	always	have	a	sense	of	crisis	in	competing	
with	other	companies	in	the	market,	then	what	does	it	mean	for	the	non-profit	
sector	in	China?	Who	should	be	their	competitors,	and	what	are	they	competing	
for?	 Also,	 ‘wolf-like’	 companies	 like	 Huawei	 and	 Alibaba	 offer	 very	 good	
salaries14	 to	their	workers	to	motivate	their	‘wolf-spirit’	and	competitiveness;	
but	for	most	Chinese	NGO	workers	whose	average	income	could	be	lower	than	
	
14	 The	average	annual	salary	at	Huawei	in	2017	was	more	than	60	thousand	
pounds	per	person,	while	in	the	same	year	the	national	average	just	reached	7	
thousand	pounds	in	urban	China.	Source:	
https://t.cj.sina.com.cn/articles/view/6434923859/17f8d2553001004zh3	
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the	 national	 average	 income,	 how	 can	 AF	 and	 its	 workers	 deal	 with	 their	
increasingly	wolf-like	work?	 	 	
	
4.2	Competing	for	what?	
Larry	was	part	of	the	senior	manager	team15	 in	charge	of	all	AF’s	disaster	relief	
work.	When	Larry	talked	about	“competing	with	others”	in	the	office,	one	of	the	
possible	“competitors”	he	thought	of	was	the	international	agencies	working	in	
China.	 Although	 Larry	 was	 the	 second	 worker	 to	 have	 jumped	 across	 from	
Oxfam,	in	his	eight	years	at	AF	he	had	witnessed	more	and	more	people	joining	
AF	 from	 various	 international	 organizations.	 This	 is	 particularly	 interesting	
that	in	an	internal	meeting	note	of	2011,	I	found	that	the	then	board	members	
decided	to	take	Oxfam	China	as	their	major	“rival”	in	the	disaster	relief	field	in	
the	country.	Indeed,	for	people	like	Larry	and	maybe	some	of	his	new	colleagues,	
they	seemed	very	proud	of	working	with	the	influential	entrepreneurs	to	“beat	
their	former	employers”.	In	an	internal	meeting	with	his	working	team	in	2016,	
Larry	talked	about	the	achievements	that	AF	had	made	in	the	past	few	years:	
 
“In	 2010	 and	 11,	 our	 board	 member	 Si	 saw	 the	 effective	 work	 of	
Oxfam’s	disaster	 relief	 team	 in	 several	 earthquakes	 in	China.	 So	he	
asked	us	to	take	Oxfam	as	our	‘benchmarking	organization’.	But	now	
[in	2016],	we	have	already	been	far	beyond	Oxfam.	The	main	reason,	
to	 be	 frank,	 is	 that	we	 have	 enough	money.	We	 can	 spend	 a	 large	
amount	of	money	on	disaster	 recovery	and	backup	 infrastructures,	
building	large-scale	warehouses,	maintaining	good	supply	chains	and	
purchasing	 massive	 disaster	 relief	 materials	 beforehand.	 Now	 the	
scale	of	our	disaster	preparation	system	 in	western	China	 is	2	 to	4	
times	larger	than	Oxfam.	If	I	were	still	in	Oxfam,	I	can	never	do	that,	
since	 its	 internal	examination	and	approval	procedures	would	 take	
years	 long	 for	 such	 big	 projects.	 If	 any	 big	 natural	 disasters	 really	
come	up	now,	Oxfam	can	never	react	in	a	short	time.	But	now	at	AF,	I	
can	approve	any	project	budget	fewer	than	500	thousand	yuan	(about	
	
15	 I	discuss	AF’s	personal	management	system	and	hierarchy	more	specifically	
in	the	next	chapter.	 	 	
	 100	
50	thousand	pounds)	simply	by	a	signature.	We	do	not	have	so	many	
project	regulations	as	 INGOs,	not	 too	many	demands	of	our	project	
results	and	evaluations.	It	is	much	easier	to	get	things	done	here,	more	
flexible,	more	space,	and	a	larger	platform	for	personal	development”.	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
From	Larry’s	speech,	we	may	find	that	his	agreement	with	the	entrepreneurs	
was	partly	based	on	the	criticism	of	 the	 international	organizations’	work	 in	
China,	which	also	partly	explained	the	withdrawal	of	INGOs	from	China	in	the	
past	 decade.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 compared	 to	 the	 domestic	 foundations,	
international	 organizations	 had	 lost	 their	 dominant	 status	 as	 a	 financial	
resource	 in	 China.	 The	 rising	 entrepreneurs	 and	 domestic	 foundations	 had	
begun	 to	 “win	 the	 battlefield”	 by	 using	 more	 aggressive	 strategies	 of	
organizational	 branding,	 marketing,	 fundraising	 mobilization,	 etc.	 	 On	 the	
other	 hand,	 the	 bureaucracy	 and	 fixed	 norms	 in	 many	 international	
organizations	also	brought	obstacles	in	dealing	with	the	dynamic	situations	in	
their	work.	 In	this	aspect,	entrepreneur-founded	organizations	seemed	to	be	
more	“flexible”	with	less	internal	regulations	and	hence	“higher	efficiency”.	In	
fact,	as	an	organization	with	about	ten	years’	history,	AF	still	did	not	have	its	
own	project	monitoring	and	evaluation	system	when	I	was	doing	my	fieldwork	
there,	 even	 though	 some	of	 its	 senior	managers	had	been	experts	of	project	
evaluation	in	other	international	organizations.	 	 	
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Diagram	4.2	The	organizational	structure	of	AF	in	2016.	Source:	AF’s	official	
website.	 	
	
	
Similar	to	Larry,	his	old	colleague	Calvin	also	realized	INGOs’	problems,	which	
made	him	determined	to	work	with	domestic	entrepreneurs	even	earlier.	It	was	
in	 2005	 that	 Calvin	 decided	 to	 leave	 his	 community	 development	 work	 in	
Guizhou	 Province,	 when	 he	 found	 that	 participatory	 development	 methods	
taught	by	the	international	organization	he	worked	for	was	merely	a	“project	
performance”	in	the	villages.	Given	the	rapid	urbanization	in	the	nearby	cities,	
in	less	than	two	years	most	of	the	villagers	in	their	work	sites	had	chosen	to	be	
‘farmer-workers’	in	the	cities,	which	would	normally	greatly	help	to	raise	their	
living	 conditions	 but	 also	 hollow	out	 the	 villages.	 The	 “slow”	 or	 “long-term”	
community	development	projects,	in	Calvin’s	eyes,	were	too	“outdated”	to	get	
the	 local	 economic	 development	 up	 to	 speed.	 For	 instance,	 in	 some	 of	 the	
villages	where	international	donors	had	supported	the	drilling	of	a	new	well,	
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the	project	officers	just	found	the	well	was	locked	in	their	project	evaluation	
afterwards.	On	a	fieldtrip	with	Calvin,	he	told	me:	
	
“Only	children	and	the	elderly	had	been	left	in	the	village;	they	do	not	
need	the	well	at	all.	We	had	made	lots	of	effort	to	make	sure	the	daily	
management	 of	 the	 well	 can	 be	 arranged	 in	 a	 more	 democratic,	
participatory	way	among	villagers.	But	where	was	the	key	keeper?	He	
was	working	on	a	construction	site	outside	the	village!”	
	
After	 this,	Calvin	began	 to	 realize	how	greatly	 rural	China	and	peasants	had	
been	changed	by	its	economy,	as	well	as	to	question	whether	the	experiences	
and	knowledge	of	INGOs’	development	work	could	really	be	applied	in	the	local	
context	of	China.	In	our	conversations,	Calvin	shared	his	ideas	frankly	that	he	
thought	 only	 the	 “power	 of	 e-commerce	 can	 really	 help	 people	 in	 the	 rural	
areas",	and	therefore	“it	is	better	to	teach	people	to	do	online	business,	rather	
than	any	community	development	projects”.	Very	early	on	in	2006,	Calvin	went	
to	 a	 domestic	 environmental	 foundation	 established	 by	 a	 group	 of	 Chinese	
entrepreneurs	in	Beijing;	in	2010,	Calvin	joined	AF.	 	
	
But	INGO	is	not	the	only	“enemy”	of	AF	(and	it	has	been	“defeated”).	The	reason	
why	AF	workers	accepted	the	new	thinking	pattern	and	worked	well	with	their	
“wolf-like”	 entrepreneurs	 is	 also	 embedded	 in	 their	 political	 stances	 with	
Chinese	 private	 entrepreneurs	 in	 a	 bigger	 political	 structure.	 When	 I	 was	
talking	with	AF	workers,	whether	it	was	in	or	outside	the	office,	no	matter	what	
posts	they	may	hold,	the	most	frequent	thing	they	would	mention	were	not	any	
specific	projects	they	were	doing	at	that	moment.	On	the	contrary,	they	were	
deeply	concerned	about	AF’s	donation	numbers.	This	phenomenon	reminded	
me	of	what	Jack	Ma	mentioned	in	his	annual	speech	with	AF	workers.	 In	the	
speech,	 Jack	Ma	made	 it	 clear	 that	 every	AF	worker	 should	 try	 their	best	 to	
“mobilize	 people	 for	more	 donations”.	 	 Therefore,	 it	 seemed	 that	many	 AF	
workers	 shared	 the	 same	 concerns	 as	 the	 entrepreneurs.	 This	 was	 unusual	
because	AF	had	been	more	successful	than	most	of	the	organizations	in	terms	
	 103	
of	its	donations	in	the	country.	At	a	dinner	with	several	senior	managers	in	the	
summer	of	2016,	Calvin	told	me	of	their	“money	anxiety”:	
	
“Have	 you	 ever	 heard	 of	 the	 500	 Million	 Yuan	 (about	 56	 million	
pounds)	Club	in	China?	According	to	last	year’s	donation	statistics,	the	
top	5	 foundations	(with	 the	most	donations)	were	all	GONGOs,	and	
they	all	received	more	than	500	million	yuan	last	year.	We	are	the	only	
one	 of	 the	 top	 10	 foundations	 not	 supported	 by	 the	 government.	
Although	we	tried	so	hard	to	do	fundraising	last	year,	we	only	reached	
200	million	 yuan	 in	 the	 end;	 the	 financial	 gap	between	AF	 and	 the	
GONGOs	is	becoming	bigger	and	bigger.	Our	board	members	are	so	
concerned	about	this”.	 	
	
Calvin	then	made	a	joke	about	the	GONGOs:	 	
	
“You	 know,	 the	 GONGOs	 have	 so	 many	 special	 links	 with	 various	
ministries	 and	 government	 branches,	 so	 they	 do	 not	 need	 to	 do	
anything	at	all.	Companies,	whether	 they	were	 foreign	or	domestic,	
would	 just	 donate	 to	 them	 so	 eagerly	 in	 order	 to	 build	 up	
governmental	 ties.	 Maybe	 the	 most	 important	 person	 in	 these	
foundations	is	the	telephone	operator,	because	he	needs	to	receive	so	
many	donors’	calls	a	day!”	 	
	
At	 that	 dinner,	 I	 realized	 that	 Calvin	 and	 his	 colleagues	were	 very	 proud	 to	
represent	a	new	social	 force	“outside	the	state”:	the	emerging	entrepreneurs	
from	the	private	sector.	Calvin’s	words	on	entrepreneurs	and	GONGOs	can	be	
better	understood	in	the	political	economy	in	reformist	China.	For	a	very	long	
time	in	China’s	history,	entrepreneurs	and	the	private	sector	were	seen	as	the	
lowest	class	according	to	Confucius,	since	they	were	greedy	and	not	that	stable	
as	farmers	and	craftsmen	(Yang,	2013)	.	In	the	socialist	era,	entrepreneurs	were	
criticized	 as	 capitalists,	who	 should	be	politically	 repressed	 (Guthrie,	 2009).	
However,	 after	 Mao’s	 death	 and	 the	 fall	 of	 the	 Cultural	 Revolution,	
entrepreneurs	have	been	seen	as	one	of	the	most	important	forces	to	stimulate	
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China’s	 economic	 development.	 Researchers	 have	 found	 that	 most	 of	 the	
reforms	were	 initially	 started	 by	 experiments	 in	 a	 smaller	 region,	 normally	
launched	by	a	small	group	of	entrepreneurs	with	their	own	private	businesses	
(Dickson,	2007).	Their	networking	and	cooperating	with	the	local	government	
officials	did	help	to	innovate	the	local	policies	and	make	the	local	state	more	
tolerant	and	open	 in	 terms	of	political	participation	 (Tsai,	2005).	Under	 this	
background,	 in	many	 people’s	 eyes,	 including	 Calvin	 and	 his	 colleagues,	 the	
entrepreneurs	 were	 the	 “progressive”	 force	 in	 China.	 In	 fact,	 private	
entrepreneurs	in	China	have	long	been	seen	as	a	“natural	alliance”	with	Chinese	
liberal	intellectuals	and	social	movements.	This	was	first	discussed	in	the	post	
1989	 era	 as	 an	 urgent	 solution	 to	 dealing	 with	 the	 failure	 of	 the	 student	
movement	in	Beijing.	Later,	the	growing,	marketized,	private	economy	seemed	
also	to	confirm	the	“fact”	that	the	private	sector	is	a	liberal,	progressive	force	in	
China,	challenging	the	old,	socialist	party-state.	As	we	may	find	from	AF’s	case,	
this	 “progressive”	narrative	of	Chinese	entrepreneurs	can	partly	 legitimatize	
their	dominant	status	in	the	Chinese	NGO	sector.	
	
Not	only	were	AF	workers	identifying	themselves	as	“representatives	of	a	more	
progressive	 force”,	but	 they	also	 felt	 they	 shared	 the	 same	 “battlefield”	with	
private	 entrepreneurs	 against	 various	 state	 agencies.	 Although	 many	
entrepreneurs	did	enjoy	benefits	created	by	the	economic	reform	policies	of	the	
state,	on	many	occasions	their	competitors	were	also	the	multi-layered	state:	
the	state-owned	companies.	As	Huang	(2008)	states,	even	though	the	Chinese	
state	 had	 withdrawn	 from	 many	 industries,	 private	 enterprises	 have	 been	
systematically	excluded	from	a	great	number	of	profitable	industries	including	
banking	and	finance,	energy,	public	transport,	telecommunications	and	so	forth.	
The	barriers	 for	private	enterprises	 to	receiving	 loans	 from	the	state-owned	
banking	system	were	often	much	bigger	than	many	of	them	could	overcome.	
Moreover,	the	late	1990s	witnessed	a	rapidly	increasing	number	of	large	state-
owned	companies	in	big	cities,	mostly	run	by	provincial	or	central	governments	
as	well	as	the	reducing	of	small	private	enterprises	(ibid).	So,	the	nature	of	the	
Chinese	state	is	much	more	than	a	regulator	of	the	market;	rather,	it	is	a	strong	
player	in	the	market	competing	with	foreign	and	private	capitals	(Oi,	1995).	 	
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In	AF’s	case,	by	allying	with	private	entrepreneurs,	the	organization	performed	
the	 ‘modern	gongi’	by	distancing	 itself	 from	the	state	and	GONGOs.	The	wolf	
spirit,	in	this	context,	helped	to	set	up	a	new	image	of	‘being	an	innovator’	and	
‘a	winner’	in	China’s	NGO	sector	and	its	international	counterparts.	 	 	 	
	
4.3	Learning	to	be	a	‘modern	gongyi	worker’	at	AF	
	
To	do	‘modern	gongyi’	means	something	more	than	‘wolf	spirit’.	My	fieldwork	
in	AF’s	office	as	a	full-time	worker	let	me	learn	the	new	languages,	skills	and	
qualifications	of	how	to	apply	the	wolf	spirit	in	the	daily	work.	This	section	talks	
about	 the	 specific	 skills	 and	 languages	 used	 in	 AF’s	 office,	 how	AF’s	 human	
resource	system	was	changed	in	order	to	be	more	‘competitive’,	and	how	this	
new	knowledge	became	part	of	the	NGO	regulation	reform	in	Shenzhen.	 	 	
	
4.3.1	“Donors	are	our	God”:	the	changing	languages	in	the	office	
	
When	I	was	doing	fieldwork	in	AF’s	office,	its	then	board	chair	William	was	the	
former	CEO	of	a	Chinese	commercial	bank.	 In	order	 to	mobilize	more	public	
donation	and	set	up	a	better	image	of	how	AF	had	done	“modern	gongyi”,	he	
firstly	gave	the	senior	management	team	“a	special	 training”,	asking	them	to	
contact	company	CEOs	for	donations	(see	section	4.1.2).	After	this	“training”,	
William	launched	some	reforms	to	change	the	whole	organizational	structure:	
for	 instance,	by	changing	the	roles	of	all	staff	to	“account	managers”	so	as	to	
“serve	our	donors	better”.	 	 In	an	internal	speech,	William	said	that	many	AF	
workers	were	too	devoted	to	their	humanitarian	assistance	projects;	they	were	
“too	 product-oriented	 but	 not	 client-centered	 enough”.	 Actually,	 during	 the	
fieldwork,	 it	 took	me	 a	while	 to	 understand	William’s	 language,	 such	 as	 the	
meaning	 of	 “product”	 or	 “client”	 here.	 In	 a	 media	 report,	 William	 proudly	
explained	his	ambitious	reform	as	this:	 	
	
“We	are	going	to	be	the	foundation	with	the	most	individual	donors	in	
China...	So,	we	need	to	let	people	know	that,	no	matter	how	much	they	
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donate,	whether	 it	 is	one	 jiao	(about	1	cent)	or	one	yuan	(10	cent),	
they	are	all	the	masters	of	AF.	In	the	language	of	a	commercial	bank,	
they	are	all	our	clients,	our	‘God’.	We	need	to	serve	them	well	so	that	
more	people	can	join	us”.	 	 	
	
William’s	 speech	 above	 revealed	 entrepreneurs’	 thoughts	 of	 “what	 AF	 is	
supposedly	for”.	Based	on	the	propositions	of	NGO	marketization,	foundations	
turn	out	to	be	more	like	a	 listed	company	with	numerous	shareholders.	AF’s	
transparency	and	accountability	work,	to	a	large	extent,	were	mostly	done	for	
their	donors.	In	this	sense,	AF’s	various	humanitarian	projects	were	reduced	to	
‘products’	 (for	 attracting	 more	 donations);	 donors	 become	 ‘clients’	 and	 the	
owner	 of	 the	 ‘products’.	 AF	 workers	 were	 the	 “servers	 of	 their	 clients”;	
everyone	was	asked	to	have	a	“donor’s	perspective”	in	their	daily	work.	This	
meant	that	even	when	some	of	them	were	doing	humanitarian	assistance	work	
in	villages,	they	also	needed	to	think	about	doing	public	communications	and	
branding	at	the	same	time,	which	made	the	pictures	and	stories	they	collected	
in	the	village	particularly	important	for	AF.	 	
	
In	fact,	this	“client/donation-centered”	culture	also	turned	the	foundation	office	
into	a	big	stage	for	performing	“accountability	and	transparency”	to	the	general	
public.	During	my	fieldwork	in	the	office,	I	found	that	AF’s	office	was	basically	
an	‘attraction’	to	show	its	“transparent	working	environment”	(as	the	opposite	
of	 ‘corrupted	 GONGOs’)	 to	 its	 visitors,	 the	 whole	 working	 space	 of	 AF	 is	
wrapped	by	clear	glass,	along	with	a	visitors’	corridor	throughout	 the	whole	
working	space.	 	
	
William’s	 reform	 gained	most	 support	 from	 the	 other	 two	 Internet	 tycoons	
sitting	on	AF’s	board;	 since	 their	e-commerce	companies	were	 so	 influential	
among	the	ordinary	Chinese	people,	therefore	when	AF’s	projects	have	had	free	
access	 to	 campaigning	 through	 their	 e-commerce	 websites	 on	 a	 daily	 basis	
since	2013,	this	new	foundation	won	a	huge	advantage	in	terms	of	marketing	
and	 fundraising.	 So,	 to	 establish	 a	 ‘donor-centered’	 culture	was	not	 to	 think	
about	the	general	public’s	expectations	of	AF,	but	also	to	serve	the	demands	of	
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those	online	platforms.	An	important	part	of	AF’s	reform	then,	was	to	make	all	
its	humanitarian	projects	more	‘sellable’	through	various	e-commerce	websites.	
During	my	internship	at	AF,	in	my	monthly	meetings	with	all	other	workers	on	
different	humanitarian	assistance	projects,	what	people	discussed	most	were	
not	 about	what	was	 going	on	at	 the	project	 sites,	 but	 the	different	donation	
numbers	 of	 different	 projects.	 From	 July	 to	 August	 2016,	 those	 meetings	
became	once	a	week,	since	a	big	online	fundraising	event	called	“Gongyi	Day”	
was	 going	 be	 held	 by	 one	 of	 the	 Internet	 tycoons	 sitting	 on	 AF’s	 board	 in	
September,	under	the	name	of	‘enhancing	rational	gongyi	in	China”.	During	that	
period,	 AF	 workers,	 from	 the	 public	 communications	 team,	 and	 finance	
managers,	 to	 disaster	 relief	 assistants,	were	 all	 trying	 their	 best	 to	mobilize	
their	partner	organizations	across	the	country,	mostly	grassroots	NGOs,	to	help	
promote	their	projects	 in	different	places	 in	order	to	attract	more	donations	
(see	more	in	chapter	6).	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
4.3.2	“Bringing	more	wolves	to	AF”	
	
For	AF,	competing	with	GONGOs	in	terms	of	fundraising	means	it	had	to	put	a	
lot	 of	 effort	 in	 public	 communication	 and	marketing,	 in	 order	 to	make	 their	
humanitarian	actions	more	‘attractive’	to	the	general	public.	In	order	to	achieve	
the	donation	numbers	and	growth	rate	that	had	been	set	by	the	board	members	
in	the	previous	year,	in	2016	the	then	general	secretary	decided	to	hire	more	
workers	with	 sophisticated	skills	 in	marketing	and	branding	 in	 the	business	
world.	Consequently,	AF’s	structural	change	was	also	conducted	in	its	human	
resource	management,	although	this	change	seemed	to	be	more	complicated	
than	simply	learning	a	new	language.	 	
	
Like	most	of	the	prosperous	areas	in	urban	China,	Shenzhen	has	more	men	than	
women:	among	its	12	million	population,	more	than	60%	are	men.	The	gender	
gap	in	the	local	high-tech	companies	is	even	bigger:	for	Huawei,	in	the	past	five	
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years	only	20%	of	its	workers	are	women16.	In	another	of	Shenzhen’s	Internet	
giant,	Tencent,	 its	female	employees	equal	 less	than	one	third17.	As	Huawei’s	
CEO	Ren	Zhengfei	said	in	an	interview	this	year,	“In	order	to	reach	the	annual	
income	of	one	hundred	billion	US	dollars	in	the	next	three	years,	we	need	to	
build	an	iron-like	army	to	win	this	battle”.	Indeed,	the	employees	in	Huawei	are	
very	much	 like	 an	 army	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 gender.	 For	most	 of	 the	 high-tech	
companies	 in	 China,	 and	 Shenzhen	 particularly,	 ‘wolf	 spirit’	 in	 the	 business	
circle	is	highly	masculinized.	As	more	and	more	Chinese	NGOs	began	to	learn	
from	the	wolf-like	enterprises,	the	human	resource	system	at	AF	went	through	
some	very	interesting	changes.	
	
The	general	situation	in	China’s	NGO	sector	is	quite	different.	 	 	 Although	there	
is	 no	 comprehensive	 data	 of	 Chinese	 NGO	workers’	 personal	 information,	 a	
national	survey	conducted	by	one	of	the	largest	Chinese	foundations	shows	that,	
in	2016,	more	than	60%	of	Chinese	NGO	workers	were	women;	however,	only	
30%	of	 the	 organizations	were	 led	 by	women.	 That	 is	 to	 say,	 although	men	
dominated	 the	 leadership	positions	 in	China’s	NGO	 sector	 like	 the	high-tech	
companies	in	Shenzhen,	in	order	to	be	as	‘wolf-like’	as	the	entrepreneurs,	most	
of	 China’s	 NGO	 leaders	 were	 male	 and	 their	 employees	 were	 not.	 In	 my	
fieldwork	at	AF,	I	found	that	even	though	AF’s	board	members	were	calling	for	
more	‘wolf-spirit’,	or	‘competitiveness’	in	the	foundation	workers,	many	of	their	
employees	were	not	 that	motivated	 to	 be	 ‘aggressive’	 and	 ‘devoted’	 to	 their	
work	 as	 expected,	 and	 this	 was	 especially	 true	 among	 the	 married	 female	
workers.	Being	an	NGO	worker	at	AF,	to	some	degree,	is	only	a	secondary	choice	
for	many	female	workers	and	their	families;	as	E	(the	personal	assistant	of	AF’s	
general	secretary,	female)	told	me	at	a	lunch,	she	was	‘not	coming	for	battle	but	
for	love’.	E	claimed	herself	to	be	a	very	pious	Tibetan	Buddhist,	which	finally	
led	her	to	AF’s	position.	 	 	
	
16	 Source:	the	official	website	of	Huawei,	https://www.huawei.com/cn/about-
huawei/sustainability/win-win-development/develop_love.	 	
17 	 Source:	 Harvard	 Business	 Review,	 https://www.hbrchina.org/2015-12-
18/3686.html	
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In	2016,	AF	had	81	full	time	workers,	about	60%	of	them	were	women;	among	
the	 married	 women	 workers,	 all	 of	 their	 husbands	 worked	 in	 “more	
competitive	industries”	like	high-tech	and	finance	in	the	city.	None	of	them	had	
partners	 working	 in	 the	 lower	 paid	 NGO	 sector	 like	 themselves.	 Of	 all	 the	
married	female	workers,	I	found	only	one	of	them,	Y,	was	living	in	a	rented	flat	
with	her	husband,	for	which	they	needed	to	pay	about	200	pounds	per	month.	
As	a	project	officer	at	AF,	Y’s	monthly	rent	took	about	one	third	of	her	salary.	
For	all	the	other	female	married	workers,	they	lived	in	their	self-owned	houses	
in	Shenzhen	with	their	families.	In	2016,	the	average	housing	price	in	the	city	
was	about	4500	pounds	per	square	meter,	while	 the	average	salary	at	AF	 in	
2016	was	 700	pounds	 per	month.	 This	 indicated	 that	 these	 female	workers	
were	not	the	major	breadwinners	in	their	own	families;	their	salaries	may	only	
constitute	a	small	part	of	the	family	income.	 	 	 	 	 	
	
Hoffman’s	(2006)	ethnographic	research	 in	 the	city	of	Dalian	 found	that,	 the	
emerging	 private	 sector	 was	 seen	 as	 a	 ‘battle	 field’	 with	 more	 risks	 and	
potentially	 higher	 payment.	 Inside	 many	 Chinese	 families,	 there	 were	 “one	
family,	two	systems”:	women	were	often	those	who	stayed	inside	the	remaining	
socialist,	 ‘less	 competitive	 (and	 thus	 less	 profitable)’	 bodies,	 like	 the	 state-
owned	companies,	public	education	institutes,	and	public	services.	Even	though	
these	 jobs	 could	 be	 much	 lower	 paid	 than	 the	 private	 sector,	 the	 ‘low	
competition	and	stable	welfare’	can	make	sure	that	they	had	enough	energy	for	
the	 family	care.	At	 the	same	 time,	men	were	expected	 to	 fight	 in	 the	private	
sector	and	make	a	good	fortune	so	as	to	build	up	their	masculinity	(ibid).	The	
sectors	outside	the	market,	in	this	sense,	have	been	gendered	as	the	“secondary	
sector”,	being	overridden	by	the	more	masculinized	for-profit	sector.	Hoffman’s	
research	partly	explained	the	high	percentage	of	women	doing	gongyi	in	today’s	
China,	since	gongyi	was	long	seen	as	state	agencies	in	the	socialist	era.	The	non-
profit	sector	in	many	parts	of	the	world	has	been	described	with	a	woman’s	face	
due	to	the	gender	stereotypes	(Yarrow,	2008;	Hindman	and	Fechter,	2011).	 	
	
In	some	casual	conversations	with	my	female	colleagues	during	the	lunch	break,	
when	asked	why	 they	 chose	 to	work	 in	 the	non-profit	 sector,	many	of	 them	
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would	make	 it	 clear	 that	 they	were	 not	 coming	 for	 “wealth	 or	 power”.	 As	 a	
colleague	D	aged	22	said,	“Who	would	come	to	AF	if	one	wants	to	make	money?”.	
Instead,	 many	 of	 the	 female	 workers,	 especially	 the	 married	 ones,	 would	
attribute	their	career	choice	to	their	own	interests	or	religion	(mostly	Tibetan	
Buddhism),	 and	 they	 held	 that	 working	 in	 the	 non-profit	 sector	 was	 less	
stressful	 than	most	of	 the	companies	 in	Shenzhen.	Only	 two	 female	workers	
(both	 single)	 directly	 connected	 their	 career	 choice	 with	 a	 certain	 kind	 of	
political	 ideology	 or	 their	 education	 backgrounds	 (philosophy	 and	
anthropology).	F,	a	fundraising	manager	told	me	that	she	would	never	do	the	
same	 job	 as	 her	 husband	 did	 in	 an	 Internet	 company	 in	 the	 city,	 since	 her	
husband	 needed	 to	 work	 about	 12	 hours	 a	 day,	 six	 days	 a	 week.	 “It	 is	 too	
competitive	in	the	business	circle	and	I	was	so	tired	of	it.	So,	my	husband	asked	
me	to	find	a	job	that	can	make	me	happier.	Then	I	found	working	for	a	charity	
is	exactly	what	a	Tibetan	Buddhist	should	do”,	F	said.	 	 	 	 	 	
	
Under	this	context,	 it	 is	not	surprising	to	find	that	AF’s	entrepreneurs	would	
view	the	non-profit	sector	as	“not	competitive	enough”	and	therefore	tried	to	
“innovate”	AF’s	human	resource	system	by	introducing	more	business	elites	to	
occupy	senior	positions.	At	the	same	time,	enhancing	competitiveness	means	
more	male	leaders	in	practice.	In	AF’s	board,	all	its	members,	the	entrepreneurs,	
were	men.	 In	 its	 senior	managers’	 team,	more	 than	70%	were	men;	and	 the	
salary	 gap	 between	 the	 highest	 and	 lowest-paid	 staff	 in	 the	 organization	
(among	the	80	workers)	was	more	than	15	times,	which	indicated	a	big	pay	gap	
between	 different	 genders.	 During	 my	 internship,	 most	 of	 the	 messages	 I	
received	 from	 E	 (on	 behalf	 of	 the	 then	 general	 secretary)	 were	 about	 the	
introduction	of	new	colleagues.	More	than	10	new	employees	joined	the	senior	
management	team	during	my	internship,	all	of	which	were	from	the	business	
world,	 just	 as	 the	 general	 secretary	 noted	 in	 the	 email,	 “To	 create	 a	 more	
competitive	 atmosphere	 within	 our	 organization,	 we	 need	 to	 bring	 more	
wolves	to	AF”.	Not	surprisingly,	only	two	of	these	new	senior	managers	were	
women,	all	of	them	were	working	for	the	public	communication,	branding,	and	
fundraising	issues.	 	 	 	
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As	most	of	the	new	senior	managers	had	never	worked	in	the	NGO	sector	before,	
their	coming	raised	interesting	debates	and	conflicts	within	the	organization.	
In	 September	 2016,	 all	 the	 AF	 senior	managers	 from	 different	 offices	 were	
asked	to	come	to	Shenzhen	to	attend	the	welcoming	meeting.	But	three	of	them	
asked	to	fly	first	class	rather	than	economy	class,	and	when	refused	by	the	then	
general	secretary	James,	these	three	new	managers	bought	their	own	first-class	
tickets.	 This	 incident	 triggered	 anger	 among	 some	 old	 workers.	 F,	 the	
fundraising	manager	who	had	been	working	at	AF	since	2015,	said	to	me	at	a	
dinner:	“You	know	what,	 these	professionals	are	not	coming	for	gongyi,	 they	
are	coming	to	rule	this	organization”.	 	 	
	
4.4	Chinese	state	and	the	creation	of	wolf-spirit	
	
Although	the	wolf-spirit	in	the	Chinese	NGO	sector	seemed	to	be	a	creation	of	
the	Chinese	 entrepreneurs,	we	 can	hardly	 attribute	 its	 impacts	 to	 the	 rising	
private	 sector	 in	 China	 only.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 at	 the	 national	 level,	 taking	
private	entrepreneurs	as	ambitious	innovators	and	reformers	has	been	a	very	
important	part	of	the	national	modernization	project	for	the	Chinese	state	in	its	
economic	 reform.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 though	 performing	 the	 gesture	 of	
distancing	 itself	 from	 the	 socialist	 moralities	 (just	 as	 I	 have	 discussed	 in	
Chapter	 2	 about	 Lei	 Feng),	 at	 the	 local	 level	 wolf	 spirit	 also	 fits	 into	 the	
development	model	of	Shenzhen.	This	led	to	the	close	collaborations	between	
the	Shenzhen	government	and	AF.	I	argue	that	the	popularity	of	wolf-spirit	in	
Chinese	society	is	more	like	a	state	narrative	in	making	a	nationalist	person	that	
can	 be	 incorporated	 into	 the	 various	 forms	 of	 state-directed	 development	
projects	or	reforms	(Hoffman,	2006,	2010),	while	AF’s	case	should	be	better	
understood	in	the	context	of	Shenzhen’s	NGO	regulation	reform	in	the	past	few	
years.	
	
Before	 the	 economic	 reform,	 ‘entrepreneurs’	 were	 known	 as	 ‘capitalists’	
according	to	Maoism.	They	were	the	class	that	should	be	eradicated	socially	and	
physically	 in	 China’s	 socialist	 revolution.	 People	 who	 started	 their	 own	
businesses	were	called	‘the	tails	of	capitalism’,	which	should	be	‘cut	down’.	It	
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should	be	noted	that	although	the	economic	reform	had	already	begun	in	the	
1980s,	the	appearance	of	private	entrepreneurs	was	still	under	serious	attack	
from	Marxists	in	and	outside	the	ruling	party.	The	word	‘entrepreneur’	was	not	
popularly	used	 in	China	until	 the	open	up	policy	 launched	 in	1992	by	Deng.	
Deng’s	call	for	further	reform	by	setting	up	special	economic	zones,	stopping	
ideological	debates,	and	opening	up	to	the	external	markets	and	capital	in	1992	
greatly	 contributed	 to	 the	 rise	of	private	businesses	 in	China’s	 coastal	 areas	
(Coase	 and	 Wang,	 2016).	 A	 visible	 consequence	 of	 the	 booming	 private	
business	was	the	phenomenon	of	 ‘xiahai’	 (jumping	 into	the	sea):	government	
officials,	 employees	 of	 state-owned	 companies,	 university	 scholars	 gave	 up	
their	 ‘tie	 fanwan’	 (iron	 rice	 bowl)	 and	 opened	 up	 their	 own	 businesses.	
According	 to	 the	 national	 statistics,	 in	 1992	 alone,	 there	 were	 about	 120	
thousand	government	officials	who	 left	 their	posts	and	xiahai;	more	 than	10	
million	officials	took	unpaid	leave	to	join	the	private	sector	(Coase	and	Wang,	
2016).	However,	this	is	not	to	say	that	doing	private	business	was	easy	at	that	
time.	On	the	contrary,	many	people	working	for	the	government,	state-owned	
companies	and	research	institutes	in	the	early	1990s	were	still	enjoying	many	
benefits	of	the	socialist	welfare	system.	Instead,	to	start	their	own	businesses	
outside	the	state	was	a	very	risky	move;	since	it	was	only	two	or	three	years	
after	 the	 1989	 student	movement,	 no	 one	was	 certain	 about	 how	 economic	
policies	and	political	situations	would	be	in	China.	That	was	why	people	called	
it	‘jumping	into	the	sea’;	it	was	more	like	a	gamble	to	start	a	private	business	at	
that	time.	
	
As	 a	 major	 beneficiary	 of	 Deng’s	 reform,	 Shenzhen	 was	 the	 first	 special	
economic	zone	in	China	thirty	years	ago,	and	it	has	also	been	‘the	experimental	
site	of	Beijing’	(Keith	et	al.,	2013;	Yang,	2013).	In	just	two	decades,	the	city,	once	
a	 fishing	village,	has	become	the	 largest	manufacturing	and	hi-tech	center	 in	
China.	At	the	beginning	of	the	establishment	of	Shenzhen,	this	coastal	city	was	
actually	one	of	the	 ‘seas’	 that	many	people	 ‘jumped	into’.	Compared	to	many	
other	Chinese	cities	 like	Beijing	and	Shanghai,	Shenzhen	had	much	less	state	
investment	 and	manufacturing	 infrastructure.	Much	 of	 the	 capital	was	 from	
foreign	 and	 private	 investors;	 today	 it	 is	 the	 city	 with	 the	 biggest	 private	
economy	in	China,	which	has	contributed	to	more	than	80%	of	the	positions	in	
the	local	job	market.	 	
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In	 many	 Chinese	 news	 reports	 and	 the	 official	 statements,	 Shenzhen’s	
development	achievement	is	not	only	limited	to	its	GDP;	the	city	has	been	also	
defined	 by	 various	 types	 of	 “new	 person”	 in	 the	 grand,	 official	 narrative	 of	
China’s	reform	(Walder,	1995).	These	‘new	persons’	include	the	‘open-minded’	
local	government	officials	who	tolerate	the	new	economic	activities	and	create	
a	 ‘business-friendly	 environment’,	 ‘innovative’	 private	 entrepreneurs	 who	
make	 their	 own	 business	 thanks	 to	 that	 friendly	 environment,	 to	 ordinary	
workers	who	took	the	risks	to	look	for	their	first	gold,	and	so	forth	(Yang,	2013).	
A	 very	well-known	 saying	 from	 a	 former	 city	 leader,	 as	 a	 representative	 of	
Shenzhen’s	“reform	spirit”	since	the	1980s,	goes	as	“time	is	money,	efficiency	is	
life”.	In	the	mainstream	Chinese	media,	Shenzhen	has	a	long	reputation	for	its	
“Shenzhen	speed”:	Deng	Xiaoping	first	used	the	term	“Shenzhen	Speed”	during	
his	 1984	 tour	 to	 describe	 the	 construction	 of	 Shenzhen	 University,	 where	
students	designed	and	built	their	own	campus.	During	his	second	tour	in	1992,	
Deng	was	taken	to	the	revolving	restaurant	at	the	top	of	the	International	Trade	
Building	in	the	city	center,	which	went	up	one	floor	every	three	days.	Very	soon,	
the	KK	100	Plaza	broke	that	record,	going	up	one	floor	every	two	days18.	All	
these	 new	 persons,	 the	 ‘Shenzhen	 speed’	 constructors,	 are	 telling	 the	 same	
story	of	how	a	person,	once	a	socialist	worker	of	class	struggles,	has	now	got	
rid	of	the	socialist	ideologies	and	the	‘traditional’	state	apparatus	and	joined	the	
new	economy	of	creating	personal	wealth.	In	addition	to	the	stories	of	‘jumping	
into	the	sea’	in	the	1980s	and	1990s,	in	recent	years	the	‘wolf	spirit’	has	a	new	
meaning	in	a	market	survey	sponsored	by	the	Shenzhen	government19:	as	the	
pioneer	 of	 Chinese	 reform,	 its	 corporates	 should	 now	 join	 the	 global	
competition	and	occupy	the	international	market.	The	survey	concludes	that	as	
most	of	the	private	corporates	in	Shenzhen	have	been	growing	from	very	small	
business	to	big	companies	in	the	past	decades,	they	are	full	of	‘wolf-spirits’,	and	
Huawei	is	the	‘head	wolf’	of	the	local	business	circle.	 	 	 	 	 	
	
18	 Source:	
https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E6%B7%B1%E5%9C%B3%E9%80%9F%E
5%BA%A6	
19	 Source:	https://www.yicai.com/news/5032247.html	
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In	Davies’s	research	on	Chinese	celebrity	entrepreneurs	(2011:	193-215),	he	
finds	 these	 entrepreneurs	 have	 been	 portrayed	 in	 the	 mainstream	 Chinese	
media	in	interesting	ways.	Successful	businessmen	have	become	a	role	model	
of	 how	 to	 “zuoren	 (做人 ,	 literally	 translated	 as	 ‘make	 person’	 or	 ‘become	
person’)”	 in	 China’s	 fast	 changing	 marketization	 reform,	 emphasizing	 their	
outstanding	personal	qualities	(such	as	perseverance,	creation	and	hard	work)	
and	talents	(knowing	how	to	manage	people	and	money).	By	studying	several	
phenomenal	 ‘reality	 shows’	 of	 national	 business	 competitions	 on	 China’s	
Central	TV,	Davies	suggests	that	Chinese	entrepreneurs	are	not	presented	as	an	
‘individual	 success’	 or	 ‘wealthy	 business	 model’	 only;	 their	 image	 has	 been	
deeply	 framed	 into	 the	 national	 discourse	 of	 making	 China	 ‘wealthy	 and	
powerful	 (fu	 qiang,	 富强 )’.	 The	 successful	 entrepreneurs	 have	 become	 a	
symbol	of	national	developmental	efforts,	a	‘national	hero	(minzu	yingxiong,民
族英雄)’	representing	the	bright	future	of	the	country	in	the	global	competition.	
Moreover,	 the	 repeated	 reports,	 TV	 programs,	 and	 the	 flooding	
autobiographical	 publications	 of	 celebrity	 entrepreneurs	 in	 China	 are	 also	
important	 means	 of	 creating	 narratives	 of	 the	 ‘new	 person’	 for	 the	 market	
economy.	 	
	
Echoing	Davies’	research,	the	thesis	pays	attention	to	the	cultural	and	symbolic	
meanings	of	‘being	a	Chinese	entrepreneur’,	and	my	analysis	in	the	last	section	
presents	how	the	entrepreneurs’	economic	capital	has	been	 transferred	 into	
symbolic	capital	of	‘wolf	spirit’	in	the	making	of	‘modern	gongyi’.	Very	similar	
to	the	history	of	the	Shenzhen’s	development	of	making	a	‘new	person’,	this	new	
model	of	gongyi	is	more	like	a	state-directed	project	with	local	entrepreneurs	
incorporated.	 In	 performing	 the	 wolf-spirit	 as	 something	 competitive	 and	
different	 from	 the	 GONGOs	 and	 Western	 international	 agencies,	 Shenzhen	
government	 and	 its	 officials	 have	 played	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	making	 it	 happen,	
acting	as	the	patron	again.	 	
	
	 115	
Since	2010,	the	city	government	of	Shenzhen	began	its	reform	experiment	in	
NGO	regulation	and	welfare	system	under	 the	supervision	of	 the	Ministry	of	
Civil	 Affairs	 in	 Beijing,	 which	was	 the	 start	 of	 the	 ‘Shenzhen	Model	 of	 NGO	
development’	(Lai	et	al.,	2015).	One	of	the	most	visible	policies	in	the	reform	
was	 to	 simplify	 the	 NGO	 registration	 procedures	 in	 Shenzhen;	 private	
foundations	and	service	delivery	organizations	were	particularly	encouraged	
to	 set	 up	 in	 this	 city	 (I	will	 discuss	 this	 policy	 further	 in	 the	 sixth	 chapter).	
Additionally,	 the	 Shenzhen	 Civil	 Affairs	 Bureau	 (CAB),	 the	 governmental	
institution	 in	 charge	 of	 NGO	 regulations,	 launched	 the	 ‘market-based’	 social	
service	 purchase,	 calling	 all	 the	 NGOs	 to	 join	 in	 the	 competitions	 for	
governmental	funding.	More	than	100	million	pounds	of	government	funding	
has	flooded	into	various	‘gongyi	competitions’	in	the	name	of	“venture	capital	
investment”	 every	 year	 (ibid.).	 From	 the	 community	 level	 to	 district	 and	
municipal	 levels,	 many	 government	 bodies	 have	 participated	 in	 sponsoring	
such	competitions.	At	the	same	time,	 in	order	to	raise	the	competitiveness,	a	
number	of	GONGOs	named	‘social	organization	incubation	centers’	have	been	
established	 in	every	district	 to	 ‘create	more	NGOs	 for	 the	city	development’.	
This	means	 that	 the	whole	NGO	 sector	 has	 become	 an	 industry	 that	 can	 be	
manufactured	on	a	large	scale.	In	this	Shenzhen	model,	the	local	government	is	
no	longer	just	a	regulator;	rather	it	has	become	a	more	powerful	but	invisible	
force	 in	 shaping	 the	 NGO	 sector	 by	 actively	 directing,	 participating	 and	
sponsoring	the	whole	game.	This	model	highly	emphasizes	the	role	that	NGOs	
should	play	in	serving	the	local	economy,	especially	the	local	enterprises	(ibid.;	
Wu	&	Chan,	2012).	
	
Therefore,	when	AF	failed	to	register	at	the	national	level	in	Beijing	from	2007	
to	2010,	its	founders’	strong	influence	in	the	business	sector	turned	out	to	be	
an	advantage	in	Shenzhen.	The	local	CAB	not	only	approved	its	registration	as	
a	public	donation	in	Shenzhen	so	that	it	could	compete	with	the	other	Chinese	
GONGOs	in	the	fundraising	market,	but	also	some	local	CAB	officials	joined	its	
supervisory	board.	Since	its	registration	with	the	Shenzhen	CAB	in	early	2011,	
AF	 has	 set	 up	 two	 boards	 above	 the	 executive	 team:	 the	 council	 board,	
consisting	of	entrepreneurs;	and	the	supervisory	board,	consisting	of	auditing	
consultancies	 and	 local	 CAB	officials.	 For	 example,	 the	 chair	 of	 the	 board	 of	
supervisors,	Mia,	was	the	highest-ranking	official	in	charge	of	all	NGO-related	
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issues	in	Shenzhen.	The	appearance	of	CAB	officials	in	AF’s	internal	governance	
seemed	 to	 be	 a	 political	 signal	 that	 AF	 had	 strong	 support	 from	 the	 city	
government.	 AF	 has	 never	 been	 a	 foundation	 of	 China’s	 emerging	
philanthropists.	To	a	large	degree,	just	like	the	economic	development	model	
of	 Shenzhen,	AF	 is	 also	 a	 product	 of	 the	national	 reform	 from	Beijing	 and	 a	
creation	 of	 the	 corporatism	 in	 Shenzhen 20 .	 Indeed,	 in	 many	 cases,	 the	
registration	of	AF	has	become	a	major	achievement	of	Shenzhen	CAB’s	social	
organization	 regulation	 reform	 experiment.	 In	 fact,	 the	 exhibition	 of	 the	
Shenzhen	Social	Organization	Development	(mentioned	at	the	beginning	of	this	
chapter)	is	located	just	next	door	to	AF’s	office	in	Shenzhen.	Shenzhen,	as	the	
local	CAB	claimed	in	the	exhibition	mentioned	at	the	beginning,	“is	the	city	of	
China’s	reform”.	 	
	
4.4.1	Moving	between	Beijing	and	Shenzhen:	the	moments	when	an	
ambitious	Chinese	NGO	could	be	a	problem	
	
During	my	fieldwork,	I	had	the	chance	to	observe	some	internal	board	meetings	
over	the	past	few	years,	where	AF	entrepreneurs	and	the	local	CAB	official	met	
to	discuss	AF	issues	on	a	seasonal	basis.	In	these	meetings,	AF’s	wolf	spirit	in	
competing	with	the	GONGOs	and	producing	greater	social	influence	was	much	
appreciated	 by	 the	 government	 officials.	 In	 some	 circumstances,	 some	 local	
CAB	officials	would	even	ask	AF’s	senior	managers	to	organize	some	training	
programs	 for	 the	 other	 foundations	 in	 Shenzhen,	 in	 order	 to	 promote	 their	
modern	gongyi	model	in	the	city.	However,	the	good	relations	with	Shenzhen	
government	 as	 well	 as	 the	 greater	 social	 impact	 are	 not	 enough	 for	
	
20	 As	I	have	discussed	in	Chapter	1,	this	thesis	aims	to	present	a	more	complex	
picture	of	how	corporatism	works	at	 the	 local	 level	 in	China	(but	not	to	take	
corporatism	as	a	state	regulatory	framework).	AF’s	case	here	shows	us	vividly	
how	 Chinese	 NGOs	 can	 be	 more	 incorporated	 into	 the	 state	 by	 the	 close	
collaboration	 between	 the	 emerging	 ‘philanthropists’	 and	 local	 government	
officials.	Although	the	new	foundations	like	AF	had	been	doubted	by	Beijing	at	
the	 very	 beginning,	 their	 special	 ties	 with	 the	 local	 state	 and	 government	
officials	have	been	tolerated.	 	 	 	
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legitimatizing	the	rising	entrepreneurs	and	their	organizations	in	China.	In	my	
fieldwork,	I	witnessed	two	incidents	that	challenged	the	legitimacy	of	AF;	these	
two	stories	demonstrated	 the	moments	when	 the	wolf-spirit	and	 its	alliance	
with	 private	 entrepreneurs	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 a	 problem	 for	 Chinese	 NGOs	
(rather	than	a	benefit).	These	two	cases	can	help	us	to	better	understand	the	
boundaries	 of	 ‘modern	gongyi’	 in	China’s	NGO	 sector	 and	Chinese	 society	 at	
large.	 	
	
The	first	case	is	about	its	disaster	relief	work	in	different	areas.	Most	of	the	time,	
AF	 often	 did	 its	 disaster	 relief	 activities	 with	 a	 high	 profile	 through	 close	
collaborations	with	 the	 local	media,	government,	and	volunteer	groups.	As	a	
foundation	with	a	donor’s	perspective,	all	these	humanitarian	actions	in	rural	
China	were	seen	as	good	opportunities	to	do	branding	and	attracting	donations	
at	the	same	time.	In	its	project	guidelines,	mobilizing	local	media	resources	to	
report	AF’s	work	constituted	a	very	important	part	of	their	disaster	relief	work.	
In	many	ways,	AF	was	not	just	using	media	as	external	resources	to	work	with,	
but	 the	 way	 it	 was	 working	 had	 been	 largely	 mediatized:	 its	 work	 was	
‘constrained	 to	 take	 on	 a	 form	 suitable	 for	 media	 representation’	 (Couldry,	
2008:	 376).	 Also,	 in	 order	 to	 do	 organizational	 branding,	 all	 of	 AF’s	 local	
partners	and	volunteers	were	required	to	wear	AF	uniforms	in	public.	But	all	
these	 guidelines	 were	 not	 applied	 to	 the	 humanitarian	 work	 in	 the	 Beijing	
summer	flood	in	2012.	 	
	
On	July	21,	2012,	a	flash	flood	hit	the	city	of	Beijing,	in	24	hours	the	floodwaters	
killed	 79	 people,	 destroying	 at	 least	 8,200	 homes 21 .	 Although	 the	 Beijing	
government	did	help	to	do	disaster	relief	work	during	the	day,	it	took	almost	a	
week	for	the	government	to	send	out	the	first	official	rescue	team,	which	led	to	
the	resignation	of	the	city	mayor	afterwards.	AF	also	joined	the	disaster	relief	
work	in	Beijing,	but	in	a	very	interesting	way.	At	a	board	meeting	in	2013,	Peter,	
	
21	 Source:	https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/July_2012_Beijing_flood.	
	
	 118	
the	 then	general	secretary	of	AF,	 reported	how	they	did	disaster	relief	work	
during	Beijing’s	summer	flood:	
	
“We	have	enough	disaster	relief	materials	and	delivery	equipment	in	
a	 nearby	 town	when	 the	whole	 city	was	 flooding	 everywhere.	 But	
when	 we	 were	 going	 to	 take	 actions,	 we	 just	 found	 that	 the	 city	
government	was	very	short	of	such	things.	How	can	we	send	out	so	
many	materials	and	rescue	boats	with	AF	logos	so	quickly,	when	the	
capital	 government	 has	 no	 boat	 at	 all!	 What	 would	 the	 national	
leaders	 in	 Beijing	 think	 of	 us,	 a	 non-official	 organization	 suddenly	
appearing	in	the	capital	city,	and	so	well	equipped?	 	 If	we	stick	to	our	
original	plans,	we	may	make	a	huge	political	mistake!	Finally,	we	left	
the	city	center	to	the	government,	and	sent	out	only	two	boats	to	the	
suburban	area	silently.	Also,	we	took	off	all	our	logos	and	told	citizens	
there	that	we	were	just	a	group	of	volunteers.	We	were	just	learning	
from	Lei	Feng”.	 	 	 	 	
	
Then	 he	 thanked	Mo	 for	 her	 suggestions	 of	 this	 ‘silent	 action’.	 Mo	 was	 the	
highest-ranking	official	in	charge	of	all	NGO-related	issues	in	Shenzhen,	sitting	
on	AF’s	supervisory	board.	Mo	knew	clearly	that	the	situation	in	Beijing	could	
be	quite	different.	As	the	strongest	local	government	in	China,	it	would	be	a	big	
humiliation	for	the	Beijing	government	if	they	found	that	even	an	NGO	could	do	
much	better	than	them.	Moreover,	AF’s	strong	performance	in	Beijing	may	also	
make	national	leaders	worry	about	the	national	resource	mobilization	of	this	
Shenzhen-registered	 foundation,	 which	 is	 the	 thing	 they	 wanted	 to	 avoid	
through	the	national	regulation	since	the	1980s22.	This	incident	shows	that	no	
matter	how	wolf-like	AF	could	be	in	China’s	NGO	sector,	they	were	more	likely	
to	constrain	their	“competitiveness”	and	“innovation”	in	a	more	technical	and	
commercialized	 area.	 Although	AF	workers	were	 imagining	 themselves	 as	 a	
political	alliance	with	the	private	entrepreneurs	against	the	totalitarian	state,	
their	“progressiveness”	was	quite	limited.	 	 	 	
	
22 	 More	 discussions	 of	 national	 regulation	 change	 of	 Chinese	 NGOs	 can	 be	
found	in	chapter	6.	 	 	
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Another	incident	was	a	public	crisis	of	questioning	the	close	relations	between	
the	 entrepreneurs	 and	 AF.	 In	 the	 summer	 of	 2016,	 an	 upcoming	 Chinese	
romance	 film	 was	 drawn	 into	 a	 political	 drama,	 as	 pressure	 from	 Chinese	
patriots	online	led	to	its	lead	character	being	removed	for	his	alleged	support	
of	Taiwan	independence.	While	the	lead	character	was	a	Taiwanese	actor,	Vicky,	
a	 popular	Mainland	Chinese	 actress,	 directed	 the	movie23.	 The	online	 attack	
came	 at	 a	 time	 when	 activity	 on	 the	 country’s	 social	 media	 platforms	 was	
agitated	 after	 the	 international	 court’s	 unfavorable	 ruling	 for	 China	 on	 the	
South	China	Sea.	The	social-media	protests	against	Vicky	were	backed	up	by	
state-owned	media,	 including	 a	military	 newspaper,	which	 asked	 her	 not	 to	
“touch	the	bottom	line”	of	“national	feelings.”	As	a	close	friend	of	several	board	
members	 of	 AF	 as	 well	 as	 a	 Buddhist,	 Vicky	 had	 just	 donated	 about	 100	
thousand	pounds	 to	AF,	due	 to	 the	serious	 flood	 in	 the	middle	of	China	 that	
summer.	Meanwhile,	a	picture	of	an	AF	founder	with	the	Dalai	Lama	was	also	
leaked	online,	since	the	founder	was	a	Tibetan	Buddhist.	All	these	seemed	to	be	
evidence	that	AF	was	a	group	set	up	by	and	for	people	who	were	‘anti-China’	
and	‘separatists’.	 	
	
In	 response	 to	 the	 attack,	 AF	 sent	 out	 an	 official	 statement	 denying	 all	 the	
accusation	and	claiming	that	as	‘a	patriotic	organization’,	it	had	reported	all	the	
required	 information	 to	 Shenzhen	 government	 regularly.	 However,	 several	
days	after	 the	 statement,	most	 attacks	online	were	 somehow	deleted,	which	
raised	another	round	of	anger.	A	national	newspaper,	owned	by	the	Communist	
Youth	League	in	Beijing,	said,	“We	should	be	very	careful	about	the	capitalists,	
they	are	controlling	our	mind,	and	selling	our	country	to	the	Westerners!”	Then	
there	were	more	and	more	online	posts	and	fake	reports	on	how	the	money	
donated	by	ordinary	Chinese	had	been	misused	by	 the	AF	entrepreneurs,	 in	
order	to	support	the	Western	politicians	and	the	Dalai	Lama.	Among	these	posts,	
the	mostly	discussed	 texts	among	AF	workers	were	 those	written	by	Maoist	
	
23 	 Source:	 https://www.theguardian.com/film/2016/jul/15/taiwanese-
actor-dropped-china-no-other-love-independence	
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scholars	in	some	Chinese	universities,	who	were	asking	to	what	degree	these	
super	rich	philanthropists	had	helped	the	poor	working	class;	also,	they	raised	
questions	about	whether	the	Shenzhen	government	had	been	corrupted	by	the	
emerging	capitalists.	 	
	
Although	wolf-spirit	as	a	symbol	of	China’s	economic	reform	has	been	largely	
accepted	 by	 the	 society,	 being	 seen	 as	 an	 affiliate	 of	 the	 Chinese	 private	
entrepreneurs	might	be	still	full	of	political	risk.	 	 	 	 	 	 	
It	 is	especially	 the	case	when	the	entrepreneur-founded	foundations	need	to	
fundraise	from	ordinary	people,	while	social	inequality	has	continued	to	grow	
and	Maoism	has	begun	to	regain	its	vigor	 in	such	social	context	(Cho,	2013).	
Competing	with	GONGOs,	building	a	 ‘donor-centered’	structure,	and	 learning	
from	 the	 entrepreneurs	 did	 bring	 AF	 more	 credits	 of	 looking	 like	 a	 more	
‘modern’	organization	and	distancing	itself	from	the	GONGOs;	however,	their	
close	relations	with	the	super-rich	entrepreneurs	also	meant	the	organization	
and	their	workers	fail	to	respond	to	the	increasing	social	inequalities	in	China.	
As	we	may	find	in	the	last	section,	AF	were	actually	creating	more	social	gaps	
in	terms	of	gender	in	their	daily	work.	That	is	exactly	the	political	dilemma	that	
the	new	foundations	and	their	workers	have	faced	since	their	establishment	in	
China.	 	
	
During	 this	 crisis,	 the	 city	 government	 of	 Shenzhen	 helped	 AF	 again.	 By	
introducing	 AF	 to	 the	 leaders	 of	 China	 Central	 Television,	 the	 Shenzhen	
government	 officials	 gave	 AF	 a	 helping	 hand	 from	 another	 influential	 state-
owned	media.	Very	soon,	a	news	report	 titled	“How	AF’s	rural	projects	have	
successfully	warmed	village	children’s	hearts”	was	broadcast	at	peak	time	in	
China.	 	
	 	 	
Conclusion	
	
This	chapter	talks	about	what	“modern	gongyi”	means	in	AF’s	case.	As	a	concept	
invented	by	the	private	entrepreneurs	in	China,	“modern	gongyi”	aims	to	create	
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a	new	man	with	“wolf-spirit”	among	Chinese	NGO	workers.	By	looking	at	the	
organizational	 reforms	 launched	by	 the	 entrepreneurs	 of	AF,	we	may	 find	 a	
highly	commercialized	culture	has	been	established	in	the	foundation.	But	this	
commercialized	 gongyi	 should	 not	 be	 simply	 understood	 as	 a	 cultural	
phenomenon.	 Commercialization,	 as	 a	 symbol	 of	 “modern	gongyi”,	 has	 been	
seen	as	a	strategy	of	distancing	oneself	from	the	socialist	 legacies	in	China,	a	
“competitiveness”	of	battling	with	the	state	affiliations	and	the	Western	donors.	
Under	the	condition	of	national	NGO	regulation	reform,	this	process	of	modern	
gongyi	making	has	been	tolerated	by	Beijing,	and	then	supported	and	fitted	into	
the	 local	 state	 in	 Shenzhen.	 In	 this	 sense,	 as	 a	 reformer	 of	 the	 traditional	
socialist	 gongyi	 and	 the	 state	 NGO	 regulations,	 this	 new	 foundation	 AF	 has	
somehow	been	more	incorporated	into	the	local	state	in	Shenzhen.	And	the	city	
government,	on	the	other	hand,	turns	out	to	be	a	patron	of	AF	and	the	modern	
gongyi.	 	
	
The	close	collaboration	between	the	Chinese	entrepreneurs	and	the	local	state	
has	 also	 shaped	many	 ordinary	 AF	workers’	 professional	 identity	 and	 their	
imagination	of	their	personal	life.	The	new,	“wolf-like”	NGO	workers	asked	for	
a	more	 “competitive”,	 “manly	man”	 in	 the	workplace,	 which	 put	 the	 female	
workers	 and	 their	 “non-commercial”	 experiences	 in	 a	 more	 marginalized	
position	in	AF’s	office.	The	next	chapter	moves	onto	the	different	AF	workers	
posited	at	different	levels	in	the	organization’s	hierarchy.	I	will	discuss	the	daily	
working	routine,	private	life,	and	personal	anxieties	in	and	outside	AF’s	office,	
so	as	to	present	a	more	comprehensive	understanding	of	what	“modern	gongyi”	
means	in	people’s	everyday	life.	 	 	
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Chapter	 5	 	 The	 making	 of	 a	 ‘professional	 gongyi	 worker’:	
everyday	life	of	AF	workers	
Cindy	was	the	first	person	I	knew	in	my	internship	at	AF.	In	my	first	month	in	
AF’s	office,	she	became	my	‘walking	sticker’	in	the	foundation	by	introducing	
me	to	many	other	colleagues.	 In	many	aspects,	Cindy,	a	project	officer	at	 the	
middle	level,	seemed	to	be	one	of	the	most	promising	workers	in	the	foundation:	
she	had	a	master’s	degree	from	overseas;	before	joined	AF,	she	had	worked	in	
a	 famous	 consultancy	 company	 in	 Hong	 Kong	 for	 three	 years.	 Born	 into	 a	
business	 family,	Cindy’s	parents	had	moved	to	Hong	Kong	several	years	ago,	
her	husband	was	also	working	in	a	well-paid	finance	company	there.	In	many	
ways,	Cindy	was	a	perfect	employee	for	AF:	she	did	not	ask	for	a	high	salary	
because	she	did	not	need	to	be	the	breadwinner	of	her	family;	her	experience	
in	the	business	world	could	be	helpful	for	promoting	the	“corporate	culture”	in	
AF;	she	also	had	a	very	good	personality,	getting	well	with	all	her	colleagues	in	
the	office.	In	fact,	during	my	internship	several	colleagues	told	me	that	Cindy	
might	get	promoted	very	quickly.	But	in	just	15	months,	Cindy	quit	her	job	at	
AF.	 As	 one	 of	my	 important	 informants	 and	 also	 a	 friend	 at	 AF,	 in	 her	 last	
working	days	in	the	office,	Cindy	said	to	me	“it	may	be	a	mistake	to	start	my	
new	NGO	career	from	here”.	 	
I	was	not	surprised	with	Cindy’s	decision.	In	my	fieldwork,	I	heard	complaints	
and	gossips	about	unfair	payments	and	personnel	management	system	among	
AF	 workers	 very	 frequently.	 The	 inequalities	 between	 men	 and	 women	
workers,	 between	 those	 from	 rich	 family	 conditions	 and	 disadvantaged	
backgrounds	were	discussed	during	the	lunchtime	break	very	often.	 	 As	Cindy	
and	I	were	in	the	same	working	team	under	the	leadership	of	Justin,	there	were	
only	 four	 full	 time	 workers	 (including	 me	 and	 Justin).	 In	 my	 internship,	 I	
witnessed	the	working	team	expanded	to	seven	project	officers	in	a	year,	but	
currently	 only	 Justin	 still	 remained	 there.	Workers	 at	 the	middle	 level,	 like	
Cindy,	had	the	highest	turnover	rate	at	AF1;	many	of	them	would	change	their	
jobs	in	less	than	two	years.	The	reasons	for	such	high	turnover	were	different	
from	one	 to	 another.	 For	 some	of	 them	who	 transitioned	 from	 the	 business	
	
1	 Interestingly,	 the	workers	at	 the	top	and	bottom	level	were	the	most	stable	
groups.	I	will	discuss	these	different	groups	of	workers	in	the	later	sections.	 	
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world	 to	 the	 NGO	 sector,	 they	may	 feel	 difficult	 to	 get	 used	 to	 the	working	
environment	at	AF;	 for	workers	who	were	 former	housewives	or	 from	 local	
GONGOs,	they	were	tired	of	the	longer	working	hours	and	pressure	from	the	AF	
board,	so	they	turned	to	some	government	positions	later.	
In	the	previous	chapter,	I	have	talked	about	the	making	of	“modern	gongyi”	in	
AF’s	 office.	 As	 the	 chapter	 argued,	 NGO	 workers	 were	 expected	 by	 the	
entrepreneurs	 to	 have	 more	 wolf	 spirits	 in	 their	 daily	 work;	 the	 internal	
structural	changes	were	not	just	happening	in	the	working	patterns,	languages	
and	skills	in	the	office,	but	also	it	did	have	profound	impacts	on	individuals	in	
terms	of	their	gender	and	marriage	status.	Before	moving	to	the	stories	of	AF’s	
partner	 organizations	 in	 other	 different	 places	 in	 China,	 this	 chapter	 goes	
further	 to	 discuss	 ‘modern	gongyi’	 outside	 the	 AF	 office,	 looking	 at	 how	AF	
workers’	 imagined	 and	 dealt	 with	 their	 jobs	 in	 their	 private	 life	 with	more	
details.	Although	AF	workers,	like	many	of	its	partner	organizations,	were	doing	
very	similar	jobs	from	project	management,	meeting	relevant	stakeholders,	and,	
so	 forth,	 the	way	that	 they	 thought	of	 their	 job	could	be	different	 from	their	
partner	 organizations	 at	 grassroots	 level.	 For	 the	 other	 organizations	 that	 I	
researched	in	my	fieldwork,	most	of	their	leaders	and	ordinary	workers	were	
like	running	a	small	family	business;	doing	gongyi	for	them	was	not	only	their	
daily	work,	but	it	had	been	deeply	embedded	into	their	personal	relations	in	
the	local	society	(see	more	in	Chapter	7).	 	
Given	that	a	more	corporate	culture	has	been	set	up	 in	 this	new	foundation,	
many	AF	workers	were	more	likely	to	imagine	themselves	as	a	‘professional’	or	
‘white	collar’	in	one	of	the	most	prosperous	cities	in	China.	Every	morning	when	
people	arrived	at	the	office,	the	fingerprint	readers	nearby	the	elevator	would	
remind	them	to	record	their	working	hours,	get	rid	of	their	own	personal	issues,	
and	 to	 be	 ‘more	 devoted’	 to	 their	 office	 work.	 In	 the	 last	 chapter,	 I	 have	
discussed	the	meaning	of	‘wolf-spirit’	in	terms	of	gender	and	domestic	labour	
division	among	AF	workers.	In	this	chapter,	I	continue	to	present	other	aspects	
of	‘wolf-spirit’	in	terms	of	workers’	everyday	life,	in	which	gender	also	works	
as	an	important	factor	in	and	outside	the	AF	office.	By	the	ethnography	of	AF	
workers’	working	hours,	 family	 structures,	 income	and	daily	 routines,	 I	 find	
that	 the	 new	domestic	 donors	 like	AF	 are	 creating	 and	 reproducing	 various	
forms	of	social	inequalities	among	its	workers,	rather	than	reducing	them.	To	
be	more	 ‘competitive’	and	 ‘efficient’,	 the	 foundation	asked	 for	more	workers	
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with	 longer	 and	 flexible	 working	 hours	 with	 lower	 pay.	 Hence,	 overtime	
working	was	quite	popular	among	most	of	its	workers,	more	jobs	with	lower	
paid	were	created.	 	 This	type	of	‘wolf	like’	workers	at	AF	highly	impacted	its	
staff’s	 family	 life:	 the	 harder	 they	work,	 the	more	 likely	 that	 they	would	 be	
promoted	 and	 gain	 a	 higher	 salary,	 the	 more	 ‘heroic’	 they	 can	 be.	 On	 the	
contrary,	the	more	they	were	devoted	to	being	family	caretaker,	the	more	likely	
they	 would	 be	 eliminated	 from	 the	 foundation.	 However,	 there	 are	 also	
exceptional	cases.	As	I	demonstrate	in	the	next	section,	family	background	and	
religion	also	played	crucial	roles	in	deciding	the	future	of	one’s	career	in	China’s	
NGO	sector.	In	this	chapter,	I	argue	that	the	normalization	process	of	Chinese	
NGOs	 is	 producing	 a	 new	way	 of	 living	 and	working	 as	 ‘professional	gongyi	
worker’.	 The	 making	 of	 this	 new	 gongyi	 worker	 needs	 to	 learn	 the	 new	
commercialized	 language	 and	 skills	 (as	 I	 have	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	
chapter);	meanwhile	a	professional	gongyi	worker	must	restructure	his	or	her	
everyday	life	in	many	aspects.	 	 	 	 	
	
5.1	The	organizational	hierarchy	of	AF	
Before	moving	to	the	stories	of	different	individuals	working	at	AF,	it	is	better	
to	firstly	introduce	AF’s	organizational	hierarchy	here.	This	chapter	divides	AF	
employees	into	three	groups	so	as	to	discuss	their	everyday	life	according	to	
their	different	position	levels	in	the	organization.	The	three	groups	are	senior	
managers,	middle	 level,	 and	entry	 level.	But	 it	 should	be	noted	 that	dividing	
them	 into	 three	 groups	 simplifies	 the	 complicated	 hierarchy	 of	 this	
organization	in	reality.	In	the	office,	there	were	66	workers	categorized	with	9	
different	 levels.	 For	 the	 same	 level	workers,	 their	 titles	were	 different	 from	
team	to	team.	I	present	the	hierarchy	as	below.	 	 	 	 	
	
	
	
	
	
1st-3rd	
level:	
General	Secretary,	1st	Level	
Salary:	50	thousand	pounds/year,	with	extra	housing	and	phone	call	allowances	
Projects	Center	
	
2nd	Level:	1	Vice	General	Secretary	
Communication	and	
Fundraising	Center	
2nd	Level:	1	Vice	General	
Secretary	
Administratio
n	Center	
n/a	
Salary	range:	25-36	thousand	pounds/year	
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senior	
manage
ment	
team	
(10	ppl)	
Social	
Innovatio
n	Team	 	
	
3rd	 Level:	 	
1	Director	
	
Disaster	
Relief	
Team	
	
3rd	 Level:	 	 	 	 	 	
1	Director	 	
	
Child	
Protection	
Team	
	
3rd	Level:	 	
1	Director	 	
	
Research	
Team	
	
3rd	
Level:	
1	
Director	
Public	
communica
tions	
	
3rd	Level:	 	 	 	 	
1	Director	
Fundraisi
ng	Team	
	
3rd	Level:	 	
1	Director	
	
	
	
3nd	Level:	 	
1	Director	
	
Salary	range:	12-24	thousand	pounds/year	
	
	
Middle:	
	
4th-6th	
level	
workers	
(29	ppl)	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
4th	Level:	 	
2	vice	
directors	
	 5th	Level:	 	
1	 Senior	
Project	
Officer	
5th	Level:	 	
1	 Senior	
Project	
Officer	
	 5th	Level:	 	
2	 Senior	
Managers	
5th	Level:	 	
2	 Senior	
Managers	
	
	
	
	 6th	Level:	
2	 Project	
officers	
6th	Level:	
2	 Project	
officers	
	 	 6th	Level:	
7	
Managers	
6th	Level:	
10	Managers	
Salary	range:	6-11	thousand	pounds/year	
	
Entry:	
	 	
7th-9th	
level	
workers	
(27ppl)	
7th	Level:	 	
2	
assistant	
officers	
7th	Level:	
3	
assistant	
officers	
7th	Level:	
2	 	
assistant	
officers	
7th	Level:	
2	
assistant	
officers	
	
	
	
7th	Level:	
6	
assistant	
managers	
	
	
	
	 	
	
	 	 	
	
	
	
8th	Level:	 	
1	Assistant	
	 9th	Level:	 	
3	
Consultan
ts	
	 	 9th	Level:	 	
2	
Consultant
s	
9th	Level:	 	
6	
Consultan
ts	
	
Salary	range:	3.6-6	thousand	pounds/year	
Table	5.1	The	organizational	structure	of	AF.	 	 A	summary:	66	people,	9	levels	
in	total.	 	 37	based	in	Shenzhen	(headquarters),	29	based	in	another	3	offices	
(Beijing,	Shanghai,	and	Chengdu).	Source:	internal	documents.	
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The	9	levels	above	were	divided	according	to	their	different	salary	levels	(The	
specific	salary	conditions	will	be	discussed	in	the	next	three	sections).	Among	
all	 the	 foundation	 workers,	 34	 of	 them	 only	 had	 experiences	 working	 in	
corporates	and	12	were	former	INGO	workers	without	any	business	experience.	
The	following	table	shows	the	statistics	of	gender.	 	
	 Total	 Amount	
(percentage	 of	
the	same	level)	
1-3th	 Level	
(percentage	 of	
the	same	level)	
Middle	 level	
(percentage	 of	
the	same	level)	
Entry	 level	
(percentage	 of	
the	same	level)	
Female	 40	(60.6%)	 3	(30%)	 11	(37.9%)	 26	(96.3%)	
Male	 26	(39.3%)	 7(70%)	 18	(62.1%)	 1	(3.7%)	
Table	5.2	The	percentage	of	male	and	female	workers	at	AF.	Source:	internal	
documents.	
	
AF’s	personnel	data	 in	2016	 is	a	mirror	of	 the	whole	NGO	sector	 in	China	 in	
many	ways.	 	
The	next	section	part	of	this	chapter	looks	at	the	senior	managers	at	the	top	of	
the	whole	executive	team.	By	introducing	their	different	education	background,	
working	 experiences,	 and	 family	 conditions,	 I	 argue	 that	 their	 different	
imaginations	 of	 “professional	 identities”	 are	 largely	 based	 on	 their	 different	
gender	and	religion.	Given	most	of	the	senior	managers	were	male	at	AF,	they	
were	expected	to	be	a	‘manly	man’	in	their	own	families	as	the	breadwinner.	At	
the	 same	 time,	given	 the	 longer	working	hours	and	 frequent	 travel	between	
different	AF	offices,	these	male	leaders	were	also	the	“missing	daddies”	in	their	
own	 families,	 which	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 a	 good	 story	 of	 showing	 their	
“devotedness”	 to	 gongyi.	 Then	 I	 move	 to	 the	 workers	 at	 the	 bottom	 of	 the	
organization,	one	 female	 living	 in	 the	 free	staff	dorm	and	 two	male	workers	
project	assistants.	 	 These	workers	might	have	even	longer	working	hours	than	
the	senior	managers,	but	with	a	much	lower	salary.	The	dorm,	though	in	a	quite	
basic	condition,	was	more	like	an	extension	of	their	office.	I	discuss	how	such	
situation	has	been	constructed	in	the	‘modern	gongyi’	model,	and	then	how	the	
female	workers	at	 the	bottom	of	 the	organization	could	 tolerate	 it	while	 the	
male	 workers	 could	 not.	 Finally,	 I	 summarize	 and	 discuss	 the	 different	 AF	
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workers’	 everyday	 life	 with	 relevant	 literature,	 which	 helps	 us	 better	
understand	the	meaning	of	being	a	professional	gongyi	worker	in	urban	China	
today.	 	
	
5.2	Workers	at	the	top:	the	senior	managers	
When	I	just	started	my	fieldwork,	AF	had	10	people	in	its	senior	management	
team.	Only	these	10	senior	managers	had	access	to	attend	the	seasonal	board	
meetings	with	the	entrepreneurs,	and	three	of	them	(one	general	secretary	and	
two	vice	general	 secretaries)	had	chances	 to	 speak	 in	 these	meetings.	There	
were	3	women	 and	7	men	 in	 the	 senior	management	 team,	 9	 of	 them	were	
married.	Although	all	these	senior	managers	had	very	similar	salary	packages	
from	15	hundred	to	25	hundred	pounds	every	month,	their	daily	routine	and	
private	life	was	quite	divided2.	In	fact,	I	was	surprised	to	see	the	highly	divided	
everyday	life	in	different	senior	managers,	not	only	in	terms	of	their	working	
hours,	but	also	their	career	paths,	family	backgrounds,	social	life,	and	the	way	
they	thought	about	their	work	as	“doing	gongyi”.	In	this	section,	I	take	two	male	
senior	managers	as	examples	to	show	and	analyses	the	differences	of	gongyi	
workers	at	the	top.	 	 	
	
5.2.1	Tim:	a	“professional	gongyi	manager”	
Before	my	fieldwork,	I	had	heard	Tim’s	name	repeatedly	from	my	friends	and	
other	NGO	workers	 in	 the	 city.	Born	 in	1988,	he	 grew	up	 in	 a	 rich	business	
family	in	Shenzhen,	got	his	bachelor’s	and	master’s	degrees	in	world-renowned	
universities	 in	the	UK	and	US.	Prior	to	AF,	he	set	up	his	own	organization	 in	
rural	education	when	he	was	still	an	undergraduate	student	at	London	School	
of	 Economics	 in	 2007,	 affiliated	 with	 a	 GONGO	 in	 Shenzhen.	 Tim	 has	 been	
awarded	many	 prizes	 by	 the	municipal	 Civil	 Affairs	 Bureau	 and	 Communist	
	
2	 The	general	secretary	was	an	exceptional	case,	however.	He	earned	about	50	
thousand	pounds/year	(4166	pounds/month)	with	extra	benefits.	According	to	
the	 council	 board	meeting	 notes	 that	 I	 read	 during	my	 internship,	 all	 these	
salary	 standards	 were	 decided	 and	 annually	 reviewed	 by	 the	 council	 board	
members.	 	
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Youth	League	in	Shenzhen,	such	as	“Gongyi	Ambassador”	and	“Role	model	of	
Shenzhen	youth”,	which	has	been	widely	reported	by	the	local	media.	Besides	
the	 government	 awards,	 Tim	 was	 also	 very	 popular	 among	 many	 other	
organizations	since	he	started	working	with	AF	as	a	fundraising	officer.	He	has	
been	 as	 a	 “gongyi	 expert”	 in	 many	 NGO	 trainings	 in	 China,	 listed	 as	 a	 paid	
consultant	 in	 “gongyi	 professionalization”	 in	 a	 Chinese	 service	 outsourcing	
website.	 I	was	very	 looking	 forward	 to	meeting	 this	 “gongyi	 star”	before	my	
fieldwork.	However,	after	my	fieldwork	began,	I	just	found	Tim	was	a	myth	at	
AF.	
Normally	driving	his	Benz	to	the	office,	Tim’s	work	at	AF	started	from	11am.	
Although	AF	had	a	canteen	providing	affordable	lunch	for	its	workers	(about	
1.5	pounds	per	meal),	Tim	never	 appeared	 in	 the	 canteen	 that	was	 just	 five	
minutes’	walk	from	the	office.	Instead,	he	would	normally	invite	two	or	three	
colleagues	out	for	lunch	in	the	fancy	shopping	malls	several	kilometers	away,	
driving	 together.	Then	at	 about	2pm,	Tim	would	be	back	 to	work	again	and	
leave	at	about	4pm.	Although	Tim	had	worked	at	AF	for	five	years,	when	asked	
how	they	thought	of	Tim,	many	AF	workers	just	shook	their	heads	and	said	that	
they	did	not	know	much	about	him.	Some	people	thought	that	Tim	was	not	very	
serious	with	his	job;	he	was	working	at	AF	just	for	fun.	There	was	also	gossip	
that	 Tim	 was	 working	 here	 only	 to	 build	 up	 connections	 with	 the	 board	
members,	which	may	help	him	to	establish	his	own	business	later.	
In	fact,	Tim	was	the	youngest	in	AF’s	senior	management	team.	In	just	five	years,	
he	 had	 got	 several	 promotions	 from	 an	 ordinary	 fundraising	 officer	 to	 the	
director	 in	 charge	 of	 all	 AF’s	 fund-raising	 issues,	 normally	 such	 promotions	
would	take	up	to	nine	to	ten	years	in	this	foundation.	He	earned	about	2300	
pounds	per	month,	about	three	times	higher	than	the	average	income	in	the	city.	
Meanwhile,	Tim	was	also	the	personal	secretary	of	AF’s	board	chair	William,	
offered	him	great	access	to	all	the	successful	entrepreneurs	sitting	in	the	board.	
But	in	my	interview	with	Tim3,	he	seemed	to	not	care	about	AF’s	job	very	much.	
Unlike	the	other	senior	managers	who	were	often	overtime	working,	Tim	told	
me	frankly	that	he	only	spent	about	60%	of	his	energy	on	AF’s	job:	
	
3	 Interview	on	23/05/2017	in	Shenzhen.	 	
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“From	4-5pm,	 I	would	 go	 to	 the	 gym,	 and	 then	having	dinner	with	
some	 business	 friends...you	 know,	 I	 also	 need	 to	 help	 my	 family	
business.	Then	I	will	work	on	my	own	companies,	I	have	been	running	
a	start-up	company	since	last	year,	and	I	have	some	other	investments	
too...I	won’t	let	AF	to	occupy	all	my	time,	it	simply	isn’t	worth	it”.	 	 	 	 	
In	all	of	my	informants,	Tim	seemed	to	be	the	most	“relaxed”	worker	I	have	ever	
met.	Just	like	the	other	married	female	workers	that	I	have	discussed	in	the	last	
chapter,	 he	 attributed	 to	 his	 motivation	 of	 doing	 gongyi	 to	 his	 religion	 of	
Buddhism,	although	he	never	revealed	his	belief	in	the	office.	As	a	“part	time	
businessman”	in	his	life	outside	the	office,	interestingly,	he	did	not	appreciate	
the	corporate	culture	and	 the	structural	changes	at	AF	all.	As	a	Buddhist,	he	
thought	 he	 could	 better	 understand	 the	 reasons	 why	 the	 entrepreneurs,	
especially	the	founder	Luck	Lee,	decided	to	set	up	this	foundation,	since	most	
of	the	board	members	were	also	Buddhists.	In	the	interview,	Tim	explained	his	
understanding	of	‘wolf-spirit’	like	this:	
“I	think	AF	in	recent	years	is	walking	in	a	wrong	way.	We	have	more	
and	more	humanitarian	projects	and	we	spend	most	of	 the	 time	 in	
thinking	how	to	design	the	projects,	how	to	sell	them	in	the	markets,	
how	to	exchange	these	projects	for	money…That	is	not	the	thing	that	
our	founder	wanted	at	the	beginning.	Our	founder	and	the	other	elites	
in	 the	 board,	 they	 want	 something	 much	 bigger;	 they	 wanted	 to	
change	culture,	they	are	eager	to	colonize	Chinese	people’s	brain	with	
a	new	idea,	just	like	a	religion”.	 	 	 	
In	many	ways,	Tim	is	an	exceptional	case	among	his	colleagues.	He	had	his	own	
little	 circle	 and	 distinctive	 lifestyle	 in	 the	 foundation.	 Unlike	 the	 other	 AF	
workers	(such	as	Justin)	who	normally	shared	their	working	projects	in	their	
social	media,	Tim	shared	a	lot	of	his	daily	sports	and	travels	abroad.	
	 	
5.2.2	Justin:	a	busy	manager	
In	many	casual	talks	with	AF	workers	during	my	fieldwork,	people	like	Justin	
were	 often	 praised	 as	 role	 models,	 not	 only	 because	 they	 had	 ‘made	 some	
achievements	 in	 gongyi’,	 but	 also	 they	 had	 ‘a	 wonderful	 family	 and	 a	
considerate	wife,	which	can	 fully	 support	 the	husbands’	work	 in	 the	outside	
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world’.	Justin	was	my	line	manager	and	supervisor	during	my	internship	at	AF.	
He	is	five	years	older	than	Tim;	before	AF,	he	had	worked	for	the	research	and	
project	evaluation	team	at	Oxfam	China.	Unlike	Tim	who	was	working	in	the	
office	 but	 very	 few	 people	 knew	 about	 him,	 Justin	 had	 a	 very	 different	
personality.	 As	 the	 director	 in	 charge	 of	 the	 research	 and	 post-disaster	
construction	 projects	 at	 AF,	 Justin	 travelled	 frequently	 in	 between	 different	
project	sites	and	offices	but	everyone	knew	him.	For	the	first	time	when	I	met	
him	 in	 the	 Shenzhen	 office,	 he	 just	 finished	 his	 travel	 in	 a	 village	 in	 Sicuan	
province,	carrying	a	big	backpack	with	him.	He	said	hello	 to	everyone	 in	 the	
office	and	then	turned	to	me	with	a	big	smile:	“You	must	be	Hailing!	Welcome!”.	 	
Justin	was	one	of	the	most	hard-working	people	at	AF.	He	often	started	his	work	
at	 around	 10	 am	 by	 bus	 or	 his	 motor,	 replying	 emails	 or	 meeting	 partner	
organizations	until	lunchtime.	When	he	was	not	travelling,	he	would	have	lunch	
at	the	staff	canteen,	have	a	quick	snap,	and	then	go	back	to	work	from	2pm.	In	
the	afternoon,	Justin	would	hold	meetings	with	his	different	team	members	in	
the	office.	Sometimes,	 if	 Justin	 just	 finished	a	 long	period	of	 travelling,	 these	
team	meetings	would	 be	 extended	 to	 dinners	 together,	which	 could	 last	 for	
several	hours	until	 late	night.	With	the	help	of	 Justin,	 I	was	invited	into	such	
dinners	almost	every	week,	which	often	started	with	the	continuing	discussions	
of	the	various	projects	in	the	office,	but	ended	with	tons	of	gossip	about	families,	
the	anxieties	of	marriage	and	housing	prices,	and	wine	spits.	Although	Justin	
cannot	drink	too	much	in	such	occasions,	he	was	believed	to	have	the	best	skills	
of	pushing	others	to	drink	at	AF.	After	the	dinner,	Justin	would	go	back	to	write	
various	reports	for	the	research	team,	since	that	was	the	only	time	that	he	could	
be	alone.	As	an	intern	working	with	him,	I	often	received	his	emails	at	2	or	3am.	
Since	Justin	spent	such	a	long	time	on	his	work,	he	was	a	heavy	smoker	so	as	to	
stay	awake	during	the	day;	sometimes	he	would	take	his	work	home	or	simply	
sleep	in	the	office.	 	
Although	 he	 had	 longer	working	 hours	 than	 Tim,	 Justin	 earned	 about	 1500	
pounds	per	month.	Unlike	Tim	who	often	wore	business	casual	 in	 the	office,	
Justin’s	outlook	was	always	blue	jeans	with	various	AF’s	working	T-shirt	that	
were	offered	free	to	its	workers.	We	had	dinner	a	number	of	times;	most	of	the	
restaurants	I	went	to	together	with	Justin	were	the	cheap	eats	in	the	city.	Born	
into	 a	 peasant’s	 family	 in	 one	 of	 the	 underdeveloped	 areas	 in	 China,	 Justin	
finished	his	undergraduate	and	master’s	education	in	Gansu	province.	He	had	
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long	time	fieldwork	experience	in	rural	China	firstly	as	a	sociology	student,	then	
a	community	organization	leader	receiving	funding	from	Oxfam,	and	finally	an	
Oxfam	 worker.	 “In	 all	 my	 training,	 I	 have	 been	 told	 that	 I	 am	 a	 rural	
development	worker”,	Justin	told	me	in	a	dinner,	“but	that	period	was	passed.	I	
need	 to	be	a	professional	gongyi	worker	now”.	 In	an	 interview	with	him4	 in	
May	2017,	Justin	talked	more	about	his	family	and	the	reason	why	joined	AF:	
“I	 did	 enjoy	my	working	 experiences	with	Oxfam…Oxfam	 is	 an	 old	
farmer	who	is	very	knowledgeable	in	how	to	deal	with	his	soil,	how	to	
plough	 the	 land;	 it	 is	 intensive	 agriculture.	 But	 AF	 is	 like	 an	
industrialized	 company,	 growing	 very	 fast	 so	 as	 to	 occupy	 more	
market	shares	of	gongyi	as	possible…But	I	had	to	make	a	choice	since	
I	was	going	to	marry.	Oxfam’s	salary	had	been	good	enough	for	me	as	
a	freshman	in	the	job	market,	but	I	need	to	settle	down…AF	paid	me	
double,	and	it	is	a	very	good	springboard	for	people	to	jump	to	other	
big	foundations”.	 	
Justin	finally	accepted	AF’s	job	offer	since	he	could	be	both	based	in	AF’s	two	
offices	of	Shenzhen	and	Chengdu	(the	capital	city	of	Sicuan	Province	in	western	
China).	The	housing	price	in	Chengdu	was	only	one	third	of	Shenzhen;	therefore,	
he	was	able	to	buy	his	new	family	a	small	apartment	there	after	getting	married.	 	
Comparing	with	Tim,	Justin’s	personal	situation	could	be	more	common	in	the	
senior	management	team.	As	most	of	the	senior	leaders	were	men,	these	male	
leaders	but	Tim,	were	all	the	backbones	in	their	own	families.	Justin’s	wife,	for	
instance,	 obtained	 the	 same	 higher	 education	 as	 his	 course	 mate.	 She	 was	
expected	 to	do	 in	 ‘a	 less	 competitive	 job	and	 take	care	of	 the	 family’;	 so	 she	
became	a	teacher	of	a	primary	school	in	Chengdu.	It	means	that	she	did	not	need	
to	travel	like	Justin;	she	can	have	longer	vacations	and	take	care	of	the	old	and	
young	in	the	family.	From	all	the	details	of	Justin’s	daily	life,	I	found	that	he	was	
trying	his	best	to	save	money;	in	fact,	he	was	also	doing	some	part	time	jobs	
with	his	tight	schedule	at	AF.	 	 In	a	lunch	break,	he	told	me	that	his	wife	would	
take	care	of	all	the	family	issues.	‘But	how	could	she	manage	to	do	a	full-time	
job,	look	after	your	baby	daughter	and	do	all	the	housework	at	the	same	time?’,	
	
4	 Interview	on	04/05/2017.	
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I	asked	Justin.	 ‘No	worries,	my	mother-in-law	is	living	with	us	to	help’,	Justin	
answered.	 	
At	AF,	both	Tim	and	Justin	have	been	described	as	“star	workers”,	although	in	
different	ways.	 Tim	was	 always	 the	 “expert	 of	 doing	professional	gongyi”	 in	
many	training	programs	organized	for	AF’s	partner	organizations	at	grassroots	
level.	He	was	a	very	experienced	trainer	in	teaching	fundraising	skills	and	the	
case	studies	of	American	philanthropists.	His	trainings	were	also	full	of	‘heroic’	
stories	of	how	experts	like	him,	with	more	professional	fundraising	skills	and	
“entrepreneur-like	 mind”,	 had	 successfully	 saved	 the	 struggling	 NGOs	 from	
financial	 broke	 to	 be	 a	 greater	 “change	 maker”.	 But	 Justin’s	 story	 often	
appeared	 in	 AF’s	 promotion	 leaflets	 in	 the	 general	 public	with	 another	 two	
senior	managers,	since	they	were	all	the	“missing	husbands”	and	“dads”	who	
sacrificed	their	own	family	time	to	work	for	a	noble	cause	as	gongyi.	In	Justin’s	
story,	he	was	still	keeping	working	in	the	disaster	relief	frontline	when	his	wife	
was	 giving	 birth	 to	 their	 first	 child.	 These	 self-sacrifice	 stories	 have	 been	
repeatedly	 mentioned	 throughout	 my	 ethnographic	 work,	 in	 various	 AF’s	
fundraising	campaigns	and	the	official	news	reports.	In	these	similar	narratives	
and	 stories,	 senior	managers	 like	 Justin	were	 described	 as	 an	 “reluctant	 Lei	
Feng”:	on	the	one	hand,	AF’s	founders	understood	that	this	new	foundation	as	
a	 ‘modern	gongyi’	 promoter	 should	not	 stick	 to	 the	old	 socialist	 tradition	as	
being	 a	 ‘Lei	 Feng’.	 However,	 as	 gongyi	 as	 an	 emerging	 profession	 is	 still	
neglected	 by	 the	mainstream	Chinese	 society,	 AF	workers	 like	 Justin	 had	 to	
work	harder	and	 sacrifice	more	 for	promoting	 gongyi.	 	 What	often	was	not	
mentioned	much	were	 the	details	 of	how	 the	 sacrificed	wives,	mothers,	 and	
children	were	struggling	to	overcome	the	family	difficulties	on	their	own,	just	
for	their	men’s	career	achievements.	 	
But	interestingly,	all	the	narratives	of	Tim	and	Justin	would	normally	only	lead	
to	the	same	conclusion	that	how	the	meaningful	that	gongyi	could	be	as	a	decent	
and	professional	job,	which	were	worth	more	than	the	donations	and	respects	
from	society.	The	argument	is	that	gongyi	as	a	profession	should	be	at	least	the	
same	important	as	the	other	profitable	sector	for	the	Chinese	society.	This	NGO	
worker,	 with	 Tim’s	 “professional	 skills”	 and	 Justin’s	 “gongyi	 hearts”,	 has	
constituted	a	perfect	 image	of	 ‘modern	gongyi”	 for	AF	and	 its	workers.	Such	
conclusions	 greatly	 help	 to	 make	 the	 senior	 male	 workers	 as	 “legendary	
heroes”,	getting	rid	of	their	image	as	an	“ordinary,	less-earned	man	working	in	
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a	 non-competitive	 sector”	 that	 was	 not	 “manly”	 enough	 in	 the	 mainstream	
culture.	On	the	contrary,	such	narratives	were	reclaiming	the	male	managers’	
masculinity	 by	 presenting	 their	 jobs	 in	 a	 different	 but	 heroic	 way,	 so	 that	
China’s	 NGO	 sector	 could	 be	 accepted	 at	 least	 like	 a	 normal	 profession,	 no	
longer	in	an	underground	area.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
5.3	Workers	at	the	bottom	
It	was	not	easy	to	recognize	who	were	working	at	the	bottom	and	who	were	not	
at	 AF	 at	 the	 first	 glance.	 AF’s	 66	 employees	were	 divided	 into	 9	 levels	with	
different	 salaries,	but	 for	 the	workers	at	 the	same	 level,	 their	 titles	could	be	
different	given	their	different	working	teams.	So,	in	my	first	days	at	AF,	I	was	
really	confused	with	the	different	titles	and	my	colleagues’	real	positions	in	the	
organization’s	 hierarchy.	 Moreover,	 as	 I	 have	 discussed	 above,	 some	 senior	
managers	may	 need	 to	 save	 every	 penny	 in	 their	 daily	 life	 to	 support	 their	
family	finance,	while	some	other	workers	who	earned	much	less	may	have	a	
better	 living	 standard	 from	 their	 daily	 outlook.	 By	 saying	 “workers	 at	 the	
bottom”	here,	 I	 point	 to	 the	workers	 at	 the	 entry	 level	 of	 the	 organization’s	
hierarchy	 (salary	 range	 from	 300	 to	 450	 pounds	 per	 month),	 whose	 living	
standards	were	largely	based	on	how	much	they	could	earn	from	AF.	In	fact,	as	
these	workers’	salary	levels	just	reached	the	lowest	income	level	in	Shenzhen	
(or	 half	 of	 the	 average	 income	 in	 the	 city),	 their	 income	 is	 very	 close	 to	
immigrant	 workers	 of	 the	 manufacture	 factories	 in	 the	 suburban	 area.	 But	
unlike	 the	 immigrant	workers	who	are	often	not	 very	well	 educated,	 all	 the	
workers	at	AF	had	at	least	a	bachelor’s	degree,	about	half	of	them	had	master’s	
degrees.	Although	earning	a	lower	income,	I	found	all	the	“bottom	level	workers”	
were	trying	their	best	to	keep	a	lifestyle	like	a	“white	collar”	working	in	the	city	
center.	Unlike	the	senior	managers	who	were	mostly	middle-aged	men	with	at	
least	 seven	 years	 working	 experience,	 the	 backgrounds	 of	 these	 entry-level	
workers	 were	 quite	 diverse.	 Some	 of	 them	 were	 young	 women	 who	 just	
graduated	from	the	college;	some	were	new	parents	who	had	been	struggling	
in	the	city	for	years.	 	 	
Both	 practitioners	 and	 scholars	 have	 discussed	 the	 low	 payment	 issues	 of	
China’s	NGO	workers.	Some	scholars	focus	on	the	limited	financial	resources	in	
the	 whole	 Chinese	 NGO	 sector,	 calling	 for	 more	 domestic	 donors	 and	
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foundations	(e.g.	Deng,	2015;	Lai	et	al.,	2015;	Kwan	Chan	and	Lei,	2017;	Zhu,	Ye	
and	 Liu,	 2018).	 Such	 arguments	 are	 strengthened	 given	 the	 withdrawal	 of	
international	donors	and	the	repeatedly	political	repression	from	the	Chinese	
state.	 Such	 research	 recognizes	 the	 external	 environment	 that	 shapes	many	
Chinese	 NGOs,	 but	 as	 I	 discuss	 in	 the	 introduction	 chapter,	 the	mainstream	
literature	neglects	 the	 rapidly	heterogeneity	happening	within	 the	 sector;	 in	
particular,	it	lacks	analysis	of	how	low	payment	and	inequalities	can	be	created	
from	 the	 internal	 structure	 of	 different	 NGOs.	 The	 emerging	 Chinese	
foundations	in	many	ways	are	no	longer	in	the	funding	crisis	anymore,	different	
from	the	first-generation	Chinese	NGOs	whose	survival	were	highly	dependent	
on	 international	 donors	 and	 the	 tolerance	 from	 the	 government.	 When	 the	
entrepreneurs	 bring	 their	 ideals	 and	 experiences	 directly	 from	 their	 own	
companies,	the	high	payment	gap	and	the	factory-like	working	model	just	come	
together,	as	a	symbiosis	of	the	“modern	gongyi”.	 	 	 	 	 	
Based	on	my	ethnographic	work	with	AF,	I	found	about	8	workers	who	can	be	
categorized	as	the	“working	at	bottom”,	and	three	of	them	were	living	in	the	
staff	dorm	as	my	roommates.	In	this	section,	I	tell	stories	of	two	workers,	one	
female	worker	and	one	male.	The	female	worker	was	my	roommate	in	the	dorm,	
who	shared	the	same	bunk	bed	with	me	for	five	months.	The	male	worker	had	
worked	at	AF	as	a	project	assistant	for	shorter	periods,	but	he	decided	to	quit	
his	job	very	soon.	 	
	
5.3.1	Lisa	and	her	sleepless	nights	
Just	sitting	next	to	Tim’s	desk,	Lisa	was	an	assistance	working	in	Tim’s	team.	
After	getting	her	bachelor’s	degree	in	public	administration	in	2015,	she	joined	
AF	with	an	interesting	title	as	“consultant”.	There	were	several	workers	at	AF	
with	 the	 same	 title;	 some	 of	 them	 were	 just	 part	 time	 workers.	 But	 after	
working	and	living	with	Lisa	in	the	same	office	and	dormitory,	I	realized	that	
Lisa’s	work	and	life	was	quite	unusual.	
Lisa	often	got	up	 from	bed	at	about	7am,	when	she	would	spend	an	hour	 in	
reading.	There	were	about	ten	books	piled	beside	Lisa’s	bed,	including	a	wide	
range	of	topics	from	English	grammar,	sociology	studies,	to	management	skills.	
At	8	am,	Lisa	would	makeup	herself	and	have	breakfast.	Lisa	normally	got	to	
work	at	about	8:30	am;	often	the	first	one	arrived	the	office	since	she	had	a	very	
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busy	schedule	almost	every	day.	As	an	assistant	of	fund-raising	events,	her	job	
includes	drafting	and	publishing	public	communication	messages,	taking	and	
editing	pictures,	replying	emails	 from	the	event	participants,	communicating	
with	the	event	outsourcing	companies,	checking	event	schedules	with	her	line	
manager,	running	the	AF’s	social	media	accounts,	etc.	It	seems	that	Lisa	was	not	
getting	 a	 job,	 but	 multiple	 jobs.	 At	 about	 12:30	 pm,	 Lisa	 would	 go	 to	 AF’s	
canteen	with	some	colleagues,	 take	a	 snap,	and	go	back	 to	work	 from	2	pm.	
Lisa’s	afternoon	work	often	finishes	at	6	pm,	but	after	the	dinner,	she	would	
take	her	laptop	back	to	the	dormitory	to	continue	her	work	until	9	or	10	pm.	 	
I	 got	 to	 know	 Lisa	 better	when	we	 shared	 the	 same	 dormitory	 room	 (with	
another	two	female	colleagues).	As	I	have	mentioned	in	the	methods	chapter,	it	
was	a	quite	basic	two-bedroom	apartment	of	about	70	square	meters	nearby	
AF’s	office.	The	living	room	was	used	as	the	AF’s	 lunch	canteen;	and	the	two	
bedrooms	were	for	men	and	women	workers,	two	bunk	beds	for	four	people	in	
each	 room.	 Except	 for	 the	 two	 residents	 like	myself	who	were	 just	working	
temporarily	 as	 an	 intern,	 Lisa	 and	 other	 residents	 had	 been	 living	 in	 this	
apartment	for	at	least	two	years.	In	fact,	Lisa	had	started	working	with	AF	firstly	
as	an	intern	assistant	in	her	last	year	undergraduate	in	a	nearby	city,	since	she	
can	only	get	about	60	pounds	a	month	at	that	time	therefore	AF	offered	her	a	
free	accommodation	in	the	dorm.	After	her	graduation,	AF’s	new	board	chair	
decided	 to	enhance	 the	 “corporate-style	management”	at	AF	 to	 recruit	more	
new	managers	with	experiences	in	the	private	sector,	as	a	result	the	quotation	
of	 the	 entry-level	 position	 was	 cut	 off.	 Lisa	 finally	 had	 to	 accept	 a	 contract	
without	any	pension	or	other	social	insurances	at	AF,	with	a	temporary	title	as	
“consultant”.	Since	the	contract	provided	her	about	350	pounds	a	month	which	
just	 reached	 the	 lowest	 income	 line	 in	 Shenzhen,	 she	 could	 hardly	 find	 any	
affordable	 place	 to	 live	 in	 the	 city	 that	 had	 the	 highest	 housing	 price	 in	 the	
country.	 After	 negotiation	 with	 the	 management	 team,	 Lisa	 was	 finally	
approved	to	stay	in	the	shared	dorm	for	free.	 	
Lisa	was	not	the	only	worker	in	this	situation	at	AF.	In	the	dorm,	another	two	
female	assistants	at	their	age	of	20s	had	almost	the	same	contracts	and	working	
hours	 like	 Lisa.	 A	 very	 interesting	 phenomena	 is	 that,	 given	more	 “business	
elites”	have	been	recruited	at	AF,	the	senior	management	team	became	bigger	
and	 bigger,	 which	 means	 the	 remaining	 entry	 level	 assistants	 were	 more	
needed	in	the	office	than	ever	before,	which	was	one	of	the	reasons	why	they	
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all	had	long	working	hours	every	day.	Therefore,	the	existence	of	AF’s	dorm	was	
not	just	functioning	as	a	“special	subsidy”	for	its	workers	or	interns,	instead,	it	
is	a	deliberate	construction	to	ensure	that	its	low	payment	and	long	working	
hours	be	tolerated	by	those	working	at	the	bottom,	so	that	cheap	labors	could	
be	produced	to	make	things	done	at	 the	 lowest	cost	(Pun,	2005;	Cho,	2017);	
while	the	elites	from	the	private	sector	would	be	ultimately	benefited	to	help	
maintain	the	“modern	gongyi	model”	in	this	organization.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
Figure	5.1	The	dorm	room	I	shared	with	another	three	female	workers	at	AF.	
Photo	by	the	author.	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
Given	 the	 quite	 different	 working	 schedules	 between	 Lisa	 and	 Tim,	 in	 our	
casual	chats	in	the	dorm,	Lisa	sometimes	did	show	her	confusions	with	Tim’s	
working	 schedule.	 But	most	 of	 the	 time	when	 talking	 about	Tim,	 she	would	
attribute	 Tim’s	 short	 working	 hours	 in	 office	 to	 his	 other	 “crucial	 duties	 of	
socializing	with	 important	people”,	and	then	 just	expressed	her	appreciation	
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with	 his	 education	 and	 family	 background,	which	 offered	him	 the	 skills	 and	
confidence	for	these	“crucial	duties	she	can	never	do”.	 	
Lisa	was	 often	 in	 anxiety,	which	made	 her	 sleepless	 at	 night.	Most	 of	 these	
sleepless	 nights	 were	 not	 related	 to	 her	 long	 working	 hours,	 but	 after	 Lisa	
received	the	phone	calls	from	her	parents,	asking	for	money.	As	the	only	child	
with	a	university	degree	in	her	family,	Lisa	was	born	into	a	small	town	about	
three	hours’	drive	from	Shenzhen.	In	fact,	both	Lisa’s	parents	had	proper	jobs	
in	her	hometown,	and	she	did	not	have	any	siblings	to	be	taken	care	of:	 	
“In	my	hometown,	people	like	me	who	can	earn	a	living	by	themselves	
have	to	pay	their	parents	back.	My	mom	told	me	that	is	what	a	filial	
daughter	 should	 do...She	 has	 asked	 me	 to	 give	 red	 pocket	 money	
(hongbao)	and	gifts	to	her,	my	grandparents,	and	my	young	nieces,	for	
almost	every	holiday!	I	do	not	know	how	to	say	no	to	this,	otherwise	
she	would	feel	so	ashamed	in	the	family...I	have	tried	my	best	to	save	
more	money,	but	every	time	there	was	a	festival,	my	savings	would	be	
just	zero”,	Lisa	said5.	
Lisa’s	 financial	 obligation	 of	 becoming	 a	 good	 daughter	 comes	 from	 the	
Confucian	 filial	 piety	 in	 China,	 which	 viewed	 daughters	 as	 “debts”	 in	 their	
original	family.	This	patriarchal	tradition	is	still	prevail	in	many	parts	of	China,	
especially	the	rural	area	(Shen,	2016).	The	most	possible	way	to	get	these	debts	
paid	 in	 the	 traditional	 culture,	 is	 to	 arrange	 a	 marriage	 for	 the	 grown-up	
daughters	as	early	as	possible,	so	that	her	parents	can	receive	a	great	number	
of	caili	(betrothal	gifts)	from	the	bridegroom	family.	In	fact,	Lisa’s	parents	did	
not	care	about	her	career	and	income	in	Shenzhen	at	all,	but	they	often	pushed	
her	to	get	married	soon	in	their	phone	calls,	and	thus	Lisa	had	had	several	dates	
arranged	by	her	parents.	Therefore,	 in	Lisa’s	daily	 life,	most	of	her	concerns	
were	actually	not	about	the	overtime	working	or	her	low-paid	contract	at	AF,	
but	the	anxieties	from	her	family.	In	most	cases,	she	was	not	taking	her	job	at	
AF	as	exploitation;	rather,	as	Lisa	said,	“doing	gongyi	here	is	an	escape	away	
from	the	tedious	old	town”.	In	fact,	in	many	of	our	daily	conversations,	Lisa	was	
very	proud	of	being	a	gongyi	worker	at	AF.	Unlike	many	of	her	 friends	who	
chose	to	stay	in	their	hometown	and	get	married	very	early,	Lisa	was	happy	to	
	
5	 A	private	conversation	with	Lisa	during	a	dinner	in	Shenzhen.	07/08/2017.	
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choose	a	different	path	and	devote	herself	 into	“a	greater	cause”.	The	reason	
why	 she	 got	 up	 so	 early	 to	 read	 every	morning	was	 that	 she	wanted	 to	 get	
admitted	to	a	good	postgraduate	program,	so	that	she	can	“catch	up	with	Tim	
one	day”.	 	
Lisa’s	story	echoes	with	some	scholars’	research	on	female	immigrant	workers	
in	China,	which	argues	that	the	massive	immigration	from	towns	and	villages	
to	the	urban	area	has	produced	mixed	impacts	on	women.	For	instance,	in	Shen	
(2016)’s	ethnographic	research	of	restaurant	waitresses	in	Shanghai,	she	finds	
that	that	these	new	working	opportunities	do	provide	female	workers	chances	
to	negotiate	and	redefine	the	traditional	culture	of	“being	a	filial	daughter”.	In	
many	cases,	independent	living	and	working	in	the	cities	empowers	women	in	
terms	of	their	bargaining	power	of	their	own	marriage	and	finance,	although	
they	may	be	still	under	the	influence	of	the	traditional	ideas	from	time	to	time.	
But	at	the	same	time,	women	in	this	new	world	may	also	face	more	difficulties	
than	men	due	to	institutionalized	discrimination	based	on	gender,	age	or	the	
household	registration	system	(Hukou)	in	China	(Thunø,	2005;	Otis,	2008;	Cliff	
and	Ngai,	2009;	Howell,	2012;	Peng,	2018).	Scholars	like	Pun	(2005)	finds	that	
rural	young	women	at	their	20s	to	30s	were	mostly	welcomed	by	the	Chinese	
sweatshop	factories	in	the	1990s,	since	they	were	the	most	disciplinable	group	
that	was	deeply	bonded	by	the	traditional	culture	and	family	obligations	to	be	
“a	good	daughter”.	 	
However,	what	was	interesting	in	Lisa’s	case	is	that,	most	of	the	labor	studies	
above	 focus	on	 “low-end	 industries”	only;	university	graduates	are	normally	
outside	 their	 research	 in	 China’s	 context	 since	 they	 are	 normally	 seen	 as	
“national	talents”	or	“white-collar	class”	in	the	reformist	era	(Hoffman,	2006;	
Rolandsen,	2008).	But	Lisa’s	experience	reminds	us	of	the	increasing	“working	
poor”	in	the	Chinese	society,	and	the	difficult	situations	that	women	may	face	
in	 the	 dilemma	 of	 the	 traditional	 patriarchic	 family	 and	 the	 embodied	
exploitation	in	the	workforce	(Liu,	2004;	Jieyu,	2007).	At	the	same	time,	Lisa’s	
story	 also	 tells	 us	 how	 the	 gendered	 anxiety	 caused	 by	 traditional,	 man-
dominated	 Confucian	 culture	 could	 ultimately	 make	 the	 unfair	 working	
conditions	 and	 huge	 payment	 gaps	 tolerable	 in	 the	 increasingly	
commercialized	 NGO	 sector	 in	 China,	 with	 the	 help	 of	 a	 particular	 social	
reconstruction	 of	 NGO	 workers’	 daily	 life	 in	 the	 dormitory	 and	 workplace	
(Xiang,	2007)	.	 	
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5.3.2	Jerry:	the	eliminated	good	husband	
It	should	be	noted	that	this	new	gendered	gongyi	work	is	not	only	affecting	the	
female	but	 also	male	workers.	The	most	 visible	 anxieties	 at	AF	were	not	 on	
women	like	Lisa,	instead	in	most	cases,	it	was	male	workers	who	talked	about	
their	pressure	and	anxiety	much	more	often.	These	“anxiety	talks”	was	quite	
popular	among	the	male	NGO	workers	who	had	only	worked	in	the	NGO	sector,	
without	 any	 exposure	 to	 the	 business	world	 before.	 As	 discussed	 in	 Justin’s	
story	above,	whether	in	or	outside	the	office,	when	talked	about	their	family,	
most	male	workers	I	have	ever	met	at	AF	would	tell	almost	the	same	story	of	
their	 great	 pressure	 from	 getting	 married,	 buying	 house,	 raising	 kids,	 and	
taking	care	of	their	parents.	As	I	discuss	in	the	first	section,	money-making	and	
“competing	in	the	market”	are	the	crucial	indicators	to	prove	their	masculinity	
in	their	own	family	and	the	mainstream	Chinese	society.	Like	Lisa,	 Jerry	and	
Chris	had	also	worked	at	the	entry	level,	struggling	to	make	a	living	in	the	city;	
but	they	never	got	the	chances	to	be	described	as	a	“legendary	story”	at	AF.	 	
Jerry	worked	at	AF	for	a	year	as	a	project	assistant	in	disaster	relief.	Before	I	
started	doing	my	fieldwork,	he	already	quitted	his	job.	In	an	interview,	I	asked	
him	when	he	felt	a	sense	of	achievement	during	his	working	experience	at	AF,	
he	shook	his	head	and	said,	“It	never	happened	to	me”.	According	to	Jerry,	his	
days	at	AF	were	 full	of	great	pressures,	because	people	there	were	so	“high-
end”:	many	of	them	had	degrees	from	the	overseas;	they	were	so	“confident	and	
knowledgeable”:	 	
“You	know	what,	a	photo	sent	by	Tim	 in	our	working	group	on	his	
internship	at	the	UN	in	New	York	just	made	me	feel	bad	with	myself.	
He	had	a	master’s	degree	from	Cornell,	he	can	social	so	well	with	our	
founders;	I	think	I	can	never	do	that	though	we	are	sitting	in	the	same	
office...”	 	 	
Born	 into	 a	 peasant’s	 family	 in	 the	 middle	 part	 of	 China,	 Jerry	 finished	 his	
undergraduate	degree	in	his	hometown	in	social	work.	Unlike	Justin	who	had	
contacts	with	the	international	development	industry	in	his	early	years,	Jerry	
never	heard	about	any	international	donors	at	all	during	his	college	years.	As	
part	 of	 the	 national	 NGO	 regulation	 reform	 since	 2011,	 the	 Shenzhen	 Civil	
Affairs	 Bureau	 decided	 to	 purchase	 social	 services	 from	 the	 local	 social	
	 140	
organizations	 as	 part	 of	 its	 welfare	 supply.	 The	 booming	 funding	 from	 the	
government	soon	stimulated	the	industry	of	social	workers’	production,	some	
organizations	and	GONGOs	also	travelled	a	long	way	to	Jerry’s	college	to	hire	
social	 work	 graduates.	 Jerry	 was	 part	 of	 this	 supply	 chain	 of	 China’s	 social	
worker	production	 in	 the	past	decade	(Kwan	Chan	and	Lei,	2017).	 Jerry	and	
some	his	course	mates	(including	his	girlfriend,	they	got	married	in	Shenzhen	
later)	 were	 hired	 by	 a	 Shenzhen	 GONGO	 as	 a	 social	 worker.	 However,	 in	
Shenzhen6,	Jerry	realized	that	the	payment	of	being	a	social	worker	was	so	low,	
only	300	pounds,	that	he	could	not	make	a	living	by	himself	in	this	expensive	
city.	Jerry’s	job	changes	from	a	social	worker	to	project	assistant	at	AF	helped	
him	raise	his	salary	to	400	pounds	per	month,	but	when	his	wife,	also	a	social	
worker,	gave	birth	to	their	son,	they	went	broke.	The	couple	had	to	move	to	the	
cheapest	area	of	Shenzhen,	one	hour’s	drive	 from	AF	office;	while	he	had	 to	
spend	40%	of	his	monthly	income	on	housing.	Very	soon	after	this	move,	Jerry	
quit	his	job	at	AF	and	became	a	part	time	Uber	driver,	since	he	also	shared	a	lot	
of	 housework	 with	 his	 wife	 and	 helped	 to	 take	 care	 the	 baby.	 He	 was	 also	
thinking	of	leaving	this	city.	 	
Though	working	in	a	junior	position,	Jerry’s	resignation	from	AF	seemed	to	be	
a	big	loss	to	his	line	manager	Larry	and	the	whole	disaster	relief	team.	When	I	
started	 my	 fieldwork,	 Larry	 was	 trying	 his	 best	 to	 persuade	 Jerry	 to	 stay	
(although	without	any	pay	rise).	Being	rejected,	Larry	then	started	to	recruit	a	
new	team	member.	About	one	month	later,	Chris	took	Jerry’s	post.	Chris	 just	
finished	his	master’s	program	in	development	studies	in	Australia,	three	years	
younger	than	Jerry.	In	his	first	week	at	AF,	I	asked	Chris	how	he	would	make	a	
living	in	the	city,	since	he	did	not	move	into	the	free	staff	dorm	so	that	he	had	
to	rent	a	place	by	himself.	Chris	answered	like	this:	
“I	 cannot	 just	 live	with	 so	 little	pay	 in	Shenzhen,	 I	 still	need	 family	
supports.	But	I	am	not	coming	for	the	salary	anyway.	AF	is	such	a	big	
platform	that	I	can	get	access	to	all	kinds	of	organizations	in	China,	I	
can	jump	to	a	better-paid	foundation	several	years	later	from	AF”.	 	
	
6	 According	 to	 the	municipal	 statistics	 bureau,	 Shenzhen’s	 housing	price	has	
been	increased	by	28	times	1981	and	2014.	Even	though	it	is	the	place	with	the	
highest	average	income	in	China,	it	would	take	an	average	incomer	more	than	
thirty	years	to	buy	their	first	home	in	this	city.	
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One	month	later	when	I	had	lunch	again	with	Chris,	he	just	finished	travel	with	
several	AF’s	partner	organizations	in	northern	China.	This	time,	Chris	seemed	
to	change	his	mind:	
“Do	you	have	any	good	 job	recommendations	 for	me?	 I	 think	 I	will	
jump	from	AF	very	soon.	You	know	why	they	wanted	me?	Not	because	
of	 my	 development	 degree,	 not	 my	 past	 internships	 with	 NGOs,	
no…they	want	a	man	who	can	travel	frequently	to	meet	the	partner	
organizations	and	 to	drink	with	 them.	Larry	 just	kept	asking	me	 to	
drink,	to	be	a	brother	with	them…I	have	vomited	several	times	this	
month!”	
Chris	was	not	the	only	one	who	complained	about	his	job	at	AF.	Just	before	him	
and	Jerry,	there	had	been	another	two	male	workers	who	quit	their	jobs	at	AF.	
Although	these	two	workers	had	slightly	higher	levels	as	project	officers,	their	
working	 contents	were	 almost	 the	 same:	 travel,	 drink,	 and	 brotherhood.	 As	
both	of	them	decided	to	have	their	own	children	like	Jerry,	they	did	the	same	
thing	as	Jerry	did:	quit	their	posts	and	moved	to	other	Chinese	cities.	In	fact,	in	
my	whole	fieldwork,	I	have	never	heard	about	any	stories	about	these	“leaving	
daddies”	 in	any	formal	or	 informal	conversations	with	 its	workers;	until	one	
day,	a	roommate	in	my	dorm	talked	about	them	in	a	quite	simple	sentence:	“the	
good	husbands	have	been	eliminated	from	AF,	they	are	not	wolf	enough”.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
5.4	The	making	of	a	‘professional	gongyi	worker’:	discussing	NGO	workers	
in	China	 	
In	studying	Chinese	NGO	workers,	the	mainstream	research	looks	at	them	in	
the	perspective	of	 state	politics,	 focusing	on	 their	various	personal	 relations	
with	the	governmental	officials	(e.g.	Hildebrandt,	2011;	Hsu	&	Hasmath,	2014);	
The	importance	of	personal	relations	in	grant-making	resonates	the	argument	
that	most	of	the	NGOs	and	their	workers	are	“extremely	weak”	in	front	of	their	
donors	 in	 China	 (Kang,	 2019).	 But	 just	 as	 Ishkanian’s	 research	 shows,	 NGO	
workers	cannot	be	reduced	to	a	“political	person”	only;	 this	 is	especially	 the	
case	when	a	state	has	been	undergoing	great	social	and	economic	 transition	
and	thus	NGO	workers	need	to	redefine	their	socio-economic	position	via	their	
daily	work	in	the	NGO	sector.	Chinese	NGO	workers	share	many	similarities	as	
what	discussed	in	Ishkanian’	work.	Like	many	other	Chinese,	the	daily	work	of	
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NGO	workers	is	deeply	influenced	by	their	daily	life	in	terms	of	gender,	marital	
status,	economic	conditions,	education,	etc.	 	 	
Anthropologists	of	current	Chinese	society	describe	China	as	‘an	increasingly	
hyper-materialistic	society,	where	a	new	life	orientation	is	emerging	and	what	
it	means	to	be	a	man	is	shifting’	(Zhang,	2010).	Furthermore,	Liu	(2002:	176-
177)	observes	 the	 rise	of	 a	 ‘new	man’	 since	China’s	 economic	 liberalization:	
“This	man,	as	a	reincarnation	of	an	old	spirit,	keep	his	eyes	wide	open,	both	at	
work	 and	at	 home,	 checking	 and	 examining	how	everyone	 around	him—his	
neighbors,	 colleagues,	 and	 friends—manage	 their	 lives.	 Life	 has	 become	 a	
management	 of	 material	 things,	 comparable	 to	 and	measurable	 in	 terms	 of	
other	people’s	possessions.	 	 Based	on	Liu’s	 research,	 some	researchers	also	
find	that	the	marketization	reform	in	China	have	greatly	changed	the	gender	
relations	 (Hershatter	 and	 Wang,	 2008;	 Osburg,	 2013a).	 The	 increasing	
marketization	has	brought	with	bigger	inequalities	between	men	and	women,	
and	some	researchers	explain	these	phenomena	as	the	changing	expectations	
and	imaginations	of	what	‘men’	and	‘women’	should	be	like	in	today’s	Chinese	
society	(Zhang,	2010;	Yang,	2013;	Wu,	2018).	As	Zhang	says,	“men	must	now	
contend	even	harder	than	women	in	the	race	of	material	gain	in	order	to	claim	
their	 manhood	 and	 gain	 marriage.	 Masculinity	 in	 post	 socialist	 China	 is	
increasingly	being	defined	by	one’s	entrepreneurial	ability	and	 the	power	 to	
provide	and	consume”	(2010:	186).	 	
In	 many	 aspects,	 the	 hard-working	 husbands	 at	 AF	 did	 confirm	 those	
anthropologists’	discussions.	Being	a	wolf-like	worker	in	the	office	means	more	
pressure	from	the	entrepreneurs	and	the	increasingly	competitive	fundraising	
market.	Being	a	family	head	means	men	are	expected	to	buy	houses	and	cars	in	
one	of	the	most	expensive	cities	in	the	world,	even	though	the	average	income	
of	Chinese	NGO	workers	is	much	lower	than	the	business	world.	Being	a	project	
assistant	with	 the	 lowest	pay	means	 that	 the	 junior	workers	always	need	 to	
think	about	another	way	out,	keeping	an	eye	on	the	job	and	marriage	market.	
The	diffusing	pressure	of	material	things	led	to	a	high	turnover	in	AF’s	human	
resource	system:	when	I	was	just	starting	my	fieldwork,	there	were	66	workers	
in	 the	 foundation;	 in	6	months,	 the	headcount	 raised	 to	81.	One	year	after	 I	
finished	my	fieldwork,	about	three	fourths	of	the	AF	workers	I	knew	left	their	
posts.	When	I	finished	my	yearlong	fieldwork	in	China,	most	of	the	middle	level	
workers	I	knew	had	left	AF.	
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But	the	everyday	life	of	being	a	gongyi	worker	in	the	last	two	sections	also	tell	
us	 something	more	 than	 just	how	 to	make	a	 living	 in	 a	 rapidly	materialistic	
society.	In	AF	workers’	daily	narratives,	we	may	find	that	‘doing	gongyi’	is	still	
a	highly	moralized	job,	different	from	many	other	jobs	in	the	city.	Interestingly,	
this	 moralized	 job	 has	 been	 discussed,	 presented,	 and	 reproduced	 not	 in	 a	
‘modern’	way	as	it	expected	to	be.	On	the	contrary,	narratives	go	back	to	the	
socialist	 morality	 of	 Lei	 Feng,	 so	 that	 to	 be	 better	 incorporated	 into	 the	
mainstream	society	in	China.	As	a	new	‘noble	cause’,	gongyi	justified	most	of	the	
self-sacrifices	 that	 I	 encountered	 during	 my	 internship,	 if	 not	 all.	 The	
unbalanced	 work	 and	 family	 life	 among	 most	 of	 its	 male	 senior	 managers,	
which	turned	out	to	be	‘heroic’	performance	of	reclaiming	their	masculinity	and	
‘wolf	spirit’	in	the	Chinese	society.	In	Tim’s	case,	gongyi	went	even	further	to	be	
a	mere	 spiritual	work,	 a	 performance	beyond	 the	materialistic	 privileges	he	
enjoyed	in	his	daily	life.	In	some	other	cases,	this	‘noble	cause’	of	gongyi	also	
helped	female	workers	at	the	bottom	escape	from	the	traditional	patriarchy	of	
their	 original	 families	 in	 the	 rural.	 By	 imagining	 herself	 as	 an	 office	 lady	
working	for	gongyi	in	the	modern	cities,	the	basic	living	conditions	in	the	dorm	
and	the	long	working	hours	seemed	to	be	more	tolerable.	 	
	
Conclusion:	Cindy’s	“mistake”	
Given	the	rising	domestic	entrepreneurs	in	the	Chinese	society	and	their	close	
collaborations	 with	 the	 state,	 NGO	 workers	 understand	 their	 profession	 of	
“gongyi	workers”	 in	 very	different	ways.	The	 changing	 landscape	of	Chinese	
NGOs	 is	 creating	 a	polarized	 ecology	 in	 the	daily	work	of	NGO	workers:	 the	
flooding	funding	from	the	private	sector	and	the	endorsements	of	the	business	
elites	does	attract	a	great	number	of	“talents”	with	better	education,	family	and	
working	 backgrounds,	making	 the	 sector	more	 “prosperous”	 and	 “high-end”	
than	ever	before,	no	longer	seen	as	an	underground	industry.	But	at	the	same	
time,	under	the	modern	gongyi,	the	NGO	sector	in	China	does	not	reduce	social	
inequality	 but	 strengthen	 and	 reproduce	 it	 from	 its	 internal	 structure.	 The	
polarized	payment	and	living	conditions	among	AF	workers	are	creating	even	
more	social	inequalities	in	different	forms.	Cho	(2017)’s	ethnographic	research	
on	 the	 actual	 social	 work	 practices	 in	 Shenzhen's	 Foxconn	 industrial	 zone	
reveals	 how	 neoliberal-style	 outsourcing	 has	 created	 precarious	 labor	
conditions	 for	 frontline	 social	 workers.	 Her	 research	 finds	 that	most	 of	 the	
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government-commissioned	social	work	positions	in	the	factories	were	filled	up	
with	 migrant	 youth	 from	 the	 countryside,	 reproducing	 and	 perpetuating	
China's	rural–urban	divide.	These	social	workers,	normally	seen	as	part	of	the	
“white	collar	class”	and	“civil	society	actors”	in	sharing	the	state	responsibilities	
for	 providing	 social	welfare,	may	 just	 find	 themselves	 ended	up	 like	 factory	
workers	they	were	working	for.	 	
But	at	the	same	time,	the	moralized	narratives	around	gongyi	and	self-sacrifice,	
as	widely	reported	as	Justin’s	stories,	have	constituted	a	crucial	part	in	defining	
what	 is	 professionalism	 among	 China’s	 NGO	 workers	 while	 sustaining	 the	
existing	social	inequalities	in	the	society.	Although	in	the	new	foundations	like	
AF,	the	emerging	Chinese	entrepreneurs	have	reinvented	the	meaning	of	gongyi	
in	many	ways	 by	 bringing	 in	more	 commercialized	 knowledge	 and	 skills,	 a	
highly	moralized	gongyi,	as	we	discuss	in	the	last	section,	has	many	similarities	
with	the	narratives	of	Lei	Feng	in	the	reformist	era.	 	 	 	 	 	 	
In	May	2017,	when	I	had	almost	finished	my	fieldwork	in	China,	I	found	a	new	
man’s	image	and	personal	stories	appeared	in	AF’s	official	website.	Named	as	
Anthony,	 he	 took	 over	 Cindy’s	 job.	 	 Much	 like	 Tim,	 Anthony	 has	 been	
described	as	a	“young	gongyi	professional”	who	chose	to	give	up	the	business	
world	as	a	self-sacrifice	and	helped	AF	to	do	modern	gongyi.	In	fact,	Anthony	
had	also	worked	 in	 the	business	consulting	 industry	 for	several	years,	while	
established	 his	 own	 companies	 and	 other	 investments	 at	 the	 same	 time.	 It	
seemed	that	Anthony	would	have	a	bright	future	in	doing	modern	gongyi	at	AF.	
After	quitting	her	job	by	the	end	of	2016,	Cindy	travelled	across	the	country	to	
visited	more	rural	schools	and	grassroots	organizations	in	different	provinces	
before	going	back	home.	In	March	2017,	I	met	her	and	her	husband	in	Sicuan.	
She	told	me	again	that	she	regretted	starting	her	NGO	career	from	AF,	what	she	
needed	 more	 was	 the	 knowledge	 and	 skills	 to	 work	 with	 the	 grassroots	
community:	“AF	just	gave	me	a	piece	of	job	to	know	what	is	gongyi.	But	I	need	
more	than	just	doing	gongyi”.	Then	Cindy’s	husband	said	to	me	with	a	big	smile:	
“But	Hailing,	thank	you	so	much.	Now	Cindy	can	go	home,	you	must	be	one	of	
those	friends	who	persuaded	her	to	leave	this	foundation!”	 	
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Chapter	 6	 	 Everyone	 can	 do	 gongyi:	 AF	 and	 its	 partner	
organizations	 	
	
Women	 Development	 Center	 (WDC)	 started	 its	 cooperation	 with	 AF	 in	 has	
started	since	2015.	WDC’s	history	can	be	traced	back	to	1990s;	it	was	one	of	the	
first-generation	Chinese	NGOs	that	have	been	supported	by	the	international	
donors.	 Its	 founder	Gillian	was	a	senior	government	official	 in	the	provincial	
government,	 but	 in	 1989,	 given	 her	 sympathetic	 stance	 with	 the	 student	
movements	 in	 Beijing,	 her	 political	 career	 has	 stagnated	 since	 then1 .	 As	 a	
participant	of	1995	World	Women’s	Conference	in	Beijing,	Gillian	was	one	of	
the	 first	 local	partners	and	consultants	of	various	 international	development	
agencies	 in	 China.	 Although	 Gillian	 and	 her	 organization	 had	 been	 affiliated	
with	 the	 provincial	 government	 for	 a	 long	 time,	WDC	 can	 have	 a	 very	 high	
degree	of	autonomy	in	terms	of	its	internal	governance,	daily	operation,	to	the	
financial	structure.	In	fact,	according	to	my	interviews	with	two	WDC	workers,	
before	2009,	donations	from	international	agencies	took	up	to	96%	of	WDC’s	
total	annual	income2.	The	main	reason	for	its	collaboration	with	AF	was	quite	
simple:	most	of	 its	 international	donors	began	 to	 leave	China.	From	2009	 to	
2015,	 the	 donation	 that	 WDC	 received	 from	 international	 agencies	 was	
decreased	by	40%;	they	had	to	look	for	new	donors	anyway.	 	
But	WDC’s	cooperation	with	AF	came	with	more	difficulties	than	most	of	other	
partner	organizations.	In	December	2016,	I	met	Gillian	in	an	NGO	conference	in	
south	 China,	 when	 she	 had	 retired	 from	 her	 government	 position	 and	 her	
leadership	at	WDC.	In	a	lunch,	Gillian	described	her	first	experience	of	working	
with	AF	in	2013	like	this:	
“We	were	so	angry	when	my	colleagues	and	I	 first	read	the	project	
contract	that	AF	sent	to	us.	AF	does	not	need	to	do	much	but	most	of	
the	responsibilities	would	be	ours.	It	requires	our	colleagues	to	wear	
the	AF	uniforms	on	the	project	sites,	taking	the	project	outputs	as	its	
	
1	 A	private	conversation	with	Gillian	in	2015.	 	
2 	 In	 its	 annual	 report,	 the	 total	 income	 of	 WDC	 in	 2015	 was	 around	 700	
thousand	pounds.	 	 	
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own	products,	WDC	won’t	be	even	mentioned	at	all…is	that	the	way	
how	 these	 new	 foundations	 treat	 its	 partners?	 This	 is	 totally	
exploitation!”	 	 	 	
WDC	did	not	sign	the	contract	in	2013,	although	in	2015	they	restarted	their	
cooperation	again.	In	my	interview	with	WDC’s	current	leader	Jim	in	April	2017,	
he	told	me	the	reason	why	they	could	cooperate	with	AF	was	that,	AF	decided	
to	set	up	a	new	project	which	specifically	focuses	on	child	protection	in	a	long	
term,	 not	 just	 short	 term	disaster	 relief	work,	 for	which	 the	 project	 officers	
needed	 more	 help	 from	 WDC.	 In	 fact,	 Jim	 took	 the	 project	 as	 a	 way	 of	
implementing	 the	 participatory	 methods	 that	 he	 had	 been	 trained	 by	 and	
applied	with	his	 former	donors,	or	 in	his	words,	“to	bring	 in	the	elements	of	
development	work”.	Jim	told	me	in	an	exciting	tone	that	working	with	AF	was	
not	simply	for	money,	but	to	change	the	domestic	donors	in	another	way:	
“They	 [AF]	 say	 that	 everyone	 can	 do	 gongyi,	 they	 say	 public	
participation	is	important…OK,	let	me	tell	you	how	to	do	participation	
in	a	more	sophisticated	way.	We	are	not	just	to	implement	AF’s	ideas,	
but	 we	 try	 to	 involve	 more	 children	 and	 schoolteachers	 into	 our	
projects	 on	 campus...International	 donors	 are	 leaving,	 now	 the	
domestic	donors	are	so	crucial	for	the	whole	NGO	sector,	they	really	
need	to	learn	more	about	development”3.	
WDC’s	 story	 here	 leads	 us	 to	 AF’s	 partner	 organizations	 that	 imagine	 and	
perform	gongyi	in	different	ways.	In	the	previous	chapters,	I	discuss	how	gongyi,	
as	new	knowledge	and	a	‘wolf-like’	man	in	making,	has	been	reinvented	by	the	
emerging	Chinese	entrepreneurs,	and	encouraged	by	the	local	state	which	also	
fits	 into	 the	 development	 path	 of	 Shenzhen.	 Chapter	 5	 talks	 about	what	 the	
‘modern	gongyi’	means	to	NGO	workers’	everyday	life.	In	Chapter	6	and	7,	I	turn	
to	 AF’s	 partner	 organizations	 in	 different	 places	 at	 both	 organizational	 and	
individual	levels,	looking	at	how	gongyi	has	been	disseminated	from	the	new	
foundations	to	other	NGOs.	Looking	at	AF’s	national	network	across	the	country,	
the	 two	chapters	do	not	 take	 these	partner	organizations,	mostly	grassroots	
NGOs,	as	a	passive	learner	or	follower	of	“modern	gongyi”.	Instead,	as	we	can	
see	 from	WDC’s	 story	 here,	 these	 partner	 organizations	 also	 played	 crucial	
roles	in	negotiating	and	redefining	what	gongyi	could	be	like.	It	is	through	this	
	
3	 Interview	with	Jim	on	04/04/2017.	 	
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renegotiation	process	that	gongyi,	as	a	language	and	knowledge,	can	be	widely	
disseminate	and	reproduced	in	a	larger	scale	in	the	NGO	sector	and	the	Chinese	
society	at	large,	not	limited	to	the	new	foundations	only.	Chapter	6	focuses	on	
how	 gongyi	was	 performed	 and	 negotiated	 differently	 at	 the	 organizational	
level;	 I	 discuss	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 interactions	 between	 AF	 and	 its	 partner	
organizations	 and	 try	 to	 understand	 these	 interactions	 in	 the	 context	 of	
different	 local	politics.	Chapter	7	examines	the	private	 lives	of	different	NGO	
leaders.	In	particular,	I	pay	attention	to	how	doing	gongyi,	as	a	lifestyle	(rather	
than	a	salary-based	job	at	AF),	has	been	interconnected	with	the	organizational	
culture,	social	lives	and	political	identities	in	the	local	society.	 	
As	one	of	the	most	influential	donors	today	in	China,	AF	does	play	a	crucial	role	
in	grant	making	in	the	field	of	disaster	relief	and	child	protection.	For	many	of	
its	 partner	 organizations	 across	 the	 country,	 AF	 was	 not	 just	 an	 important	
funding	 resource,	 but	 also,	 they	 had	 learned	 AF’s	 language	 of	 the	
commercialized	modern	gongyi	in	various	training	programs.	 	 On	the	project	
sites,	 AF’s	 partners	would	wear	 the	 same	 t-shirts	 and	 use	 the	 same	 slogan,	
‘everyone	can	do	gongyi’,	which	also	constituted	part	of	AF’s	branding	work.	
Although	many	 AF’s	 partner	 organizations	were	 former	 partners	 of	 various	
international	donors,	they	still	kept	active	given	the	changing	donors	but	with	
very	different	faces.	In	this	chapter,	I	argue	that	the	emerging	domestic	donors	
have	greatly	changed	the	nature	of	NGO	alliance	in	China:	in	most	cases	they	
are	 not	 replacing	 the	 role	 of	 international	 donors	 in	 supporting	 grassroots	
organizations,	 but	more	 like	 producing	 and	 buying	 smaller	 organizations	 as	
their	subcontract	manufacturers.	 	
Furthermore,	by	studying	AF’s	partner	organizations	in	different	places	in	this	
chapter,	 I	 also	 suggest	 that	 this	 collaboration	 between	 AF	 and	 its	 partner	
organizations	was	deeply	embedded	in	the	various	forms	of	corporatism	in	the	
local	 society.	 The	 dissemination	 of	 the	 modern	 gongyi	 across	 the	 country	
cannot	 be	 simply	 attributed	 to	 commercialization	 of	 Chinese	 NGO	 sectors,	
neither	 to	 the	 withdrawing	 INGOs.	 Instead,	 I	 argue	 that	 this	 seemingly	
commercialized	language	is	highly	politicized	in	its	nature,	which	can	help	us	
understand	the	complicated	corporatism	in	China	in	the	following	ways.	 	
Firstly,	 like	the	municipal	government	of	Shenzhen,	the	local	governments	in	
other	places	also	warmly	welcomed	the	entrepreneurs	and	their	foundations,	
while	 taking	 a	 hostile	 attitude	 towards	 international	 donors.	 As	 we	 have	
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analyzed	in	chapter	4,	AF’s	establishment	and	development	were	largely	based	
on	a	“progressive”,	entrepreneur-friendly	environment	in	Shenzhen.	The	close	
collaboration	between	entrepreneurs	and	Shenzhen	government	contributed	
to	 the	 creation	 of	 “modern	 gongyi”.	 But	 for	 other	 local	 governments	 in	 an	
underdeveloped	area	with	different	 social	 and	economic	environments,	 they	
might	have	their	own	imaginations	and	interpretations	of	this	modern	gongyi.	
The	other	 less	developed	places	 in	my	case	studies	 took	AF	as	an	 important	
external	 resource	 of	 implementing	 their	 poverty	 reduction	 policies.	 The	
symbolic	meanings	of	the	entrepreneurs	and	AF	as	a	‘innovator’	or	‘reformer’	
in	 doing	 modern	 gongyi	 China	 (distancing	 from	 the	 socialist	 legacies	 and	
GONGOs)	 were	 not	 that	 significant	 in	 these	 contexts.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 as	 I	
present	in	this	chapter,	many	AF’s	partner	organizations	were	GONGOs	in	the	
local	society;	also	many	organization	leaders	had	governmental	affiliations	in	
various	 ways.	 Therefore,	 my	 research	 finds	 that	 in	 the	 practice,	 the	 wide	
dissemination	and	use	of	modern	gongyi	across	the	country	highly	depends	on	
whether	 AF’s	 projects	 and	 funding	 can	 be	 more	 aligned	 with	 the	 local	
government	agendas.	The	“modern	gongyi”	that	AF	promoted	finally	turned	out	
to	 be	 a	 helping	hand	of	 various	 local	 governments	 and	GONGOs	 in	 different	
places,	 rather	 than	 “distancing	 from	 the	 state”.	 Under	 this	 condition,	 as	 this	
chapter	suggests,	using	the	 language	of	gongyi	 in	the	 local	society	 is	also	the	
process	of	being	incorporated	into	the	local	state.	 	 	
Besides,	the	restrictive	NGO	regulations	and	decentralized	reform	in	China	also	
put	 the	 players	 of	 local	 politics	 in	 a	more	 advantaged	 position	 in	 facing	 the	
external	donors.	Although	AF’s	national	network	seems	to	be	a	quite	successful	
story	in	terms	of	its	geographical	scale	and	partner	organization	numbers,	this	
cross-regional	network	had	to	work	in	a	gray	area	according	to	relevant	NGO	
regulations	set	up	by	Beijing	(see	next	section).	Given	the	severe	restrictions	on	
cross-regional	activities,	how	AF’s	gongyi	idea	and	knowledge	could	be	learned,	
imagined,	practiced	 in	different	places	highly	depends	on	 the	different	NGO-
state	relations	and	the	personal	backgrounds	of	the	organizational	founders	in	
the	local	community	(rather	than	on	AF	itself).	In	some	cases,	AF’s	gongyi	model	
was	largely	duplicated	by	the	local	business	elites	to	build	up	‘cross-boundary’	
collaborations	with	government	officials.	But	in	other	cases	gongyi	was	seen	as	
a	 political	 shelter	 against	 the	 status	 quo,	 which	 brings	 unsteadiness	 of	
corporatism	in	China.	 	
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This	chapter	will	firstly	go	through	the	national	regulation	change	of	Chinese	
NGOs	 in	 the	past	 three	decades,	 analyzing	 the	 structural	 reasons	 of	why	AF	
could	set	up	the	national	network	across	different	regions	in	China’s	context.	
Then	the	chapter	will	put	the	gongyi	disseminating	and	reinterpreting	process	
back	into	two	different	local	contexts,	presenting	the	dynamics	in	negotiating	
gongyi	between	AF,	partner	organizations,	and	the	local	governments.	 	
	
6.1	National	Policy	Change	
Researchers	 have	 different	 approaches	 of	 categorizing	 the	 history	 of	 NGO	
policy	change	in	China	starting	from	1980s	(e.g.	Cheng,	Ngok	and	Zhang,	2010;	
Spires,	Tao	and	Chan,	2014;	Lai	et	al.,	2015).	While	many	of	them	have	reached	
a	similar	conclusion	of	the	first	two	historical	periods	of	NGO	policy	change	in	
China	of	1980s	and	1990s,	still	there	are	debates	on	the	periods	since	2000.	Let	
me	start	with	1980s	first.	 	
The	first	period	is	from	1978	to	1991.	From	1978	to	the	early	1980s,	there	was	
no	specific	regulation	on	NGOs	since	all	the	charities	or	other	civic	associations	
had	 been	 identified	 as	 ‘capitalist	 tails’	 or	 ‘feudalist	 traditions’,	 so	 they	were	
eradicated	in	the	socialist	revolution.	However	after	the	economic	reform	since	
the	 late	 1970s,	 NGOs	 started	 to	 grow	 in	 China,	 among	 which	 business	
associations	and	research	institutes	were	very	active.	It	should	be	noted	that	
there	were	hot	debates	around	whether	and	how	to	reform	the	socialist	system	
across	the	country,	from	ordinary	citizens,	university	students	to	the	political	
elites.	 Such	 debates	 were	 not	 only	 around	 economic	 issues,	 but	 also	 about	
political	 reforms	 (Lieberthal	 and	 Lampton,	 1992).	 Many	 study	 groups	 and	
salons	were	organized	by	university	scholars	for	public	debates.	 	 It	was	also	
the	 time	 that	 the	 term	 ‘civil	 society’	was	 translated	 from	English	 to	Chinese,	
known	as	‘gongmin	shehui’	(Calhoun	et	al.,	2006).	However,	after	the	failure	of	
the	student	movement	 in	1989,	all	 the	groups,	salons	and	 law	drafting	work	
were	asked	to	shut	down.	In	three	months,	a	set	of	national	regulations	were	
announced	 on	 NGO	 issues,	 called	 as	 ‘Management	 Regulations	 on	 the	
Registration	of	Social	Organizations’(Hildebrandt,	2011).	The	1989	regulations	
turned	out	to	be	the	foundations	of	China’s	NGO	policy	reform	in	the	past	three	
decades	(Howell,	2012).	In	these	regulations,	business	associations	which	were	
beneficial	to	the	economic	development	have	been	encouraged;	organizations	
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with	governments	as	their	supervisory	bodies)	were	allowed	to	register;	while	
the	 independent	 labor	 unions,	 underground	 student	 organizations	 and	
religious	 groups	 were	 strictly	 prohibited	 (ibid.).	 In	 order	 to	 prevent	 any	
possible	 nation-wide	 movement,	 the	 1989	 regulation	 also	 limited	 the	
geographical	 spaces	 that	NGOs	 can	work	within	 to	 the	 bureaucratic	 level	 of	
government	they	registered	with.	For	instance,	for	GONGOs	like	the	China	Red	
Cross,	since	it	is	registered	with	the	Ministry	of	Civil	Affairs	at	the	national	level,	
then	it	has	the	right	to	work	across	the	country.	Along	with	this	policy,	there	is	
another	policy	to	strictly	ban	all	the	NGOs	from	setting	up	sub-branches	across	
regions;	even	though	NGOs	could	establish	their	regional	offices,	the	relations	
between	 the	 headquarters	 and	 the	 regional	 offices	 should	 not	 be	 in	
subordination(Saich,	 2000).	 So	 for	 AF,	 since	 it	 was	 only	 registered	 at	 the	
municipal	level,	in	theory	it	is	not	allowed	to	work	outside	Shenzhen	or	set	up	
sub-branches	in	other	regions.	 	 	
The	second	period	is	from	1992	to	1999.	This	period	started	with	the	political	
leader	 Deng	 Xiaoping’s	 ‘South	 Tour’	 in	 Shenzhen	 and	 the	 launch	 of	 Special	
Economic	Zones	in	coastal	areas.	With	deepening	economic	reform,	the	1995	
UN	Fourth	World	Conference	on	Women	in	Beijing	became	a	political	signal	for	
China’s	opening	up	policies.	This	conference	made	international	aids	and	NGOs	
visible	in	China,	which	created	many	domestic	women	NGOs	and	study	groups	
consequently	 (Hershatter,	 2014).	 But	 the	 political	 climate	 changed	 in	 1998	
again.	In	1998,	a	popular	folk	religion	called	Falun	Gong	caught	the	attention	of	
Beijing.	 With	 more	 than	 70	 million	 followers	 across	 the	 country,	 this	
underground	religious	group	accumulated	huge	influences	very	soon.	Given	the	
then	president	Jiang	Zemin’s	decision	to	the	then	president	Jiang	Zemin	decided	
to	close	up	the	whole	organization	since	1996,	Falun	Gong’s	charismatic	leader	
Li	 Hongzhi	 finally	 turned	 his	 religion	 into	 a	 political	 group	 against	 Beijing	
(Penny,	 2005).	 Between	 1998	 and	 1999,	 all	 the	 NGOs	were	 required	 to	 re-
register	with	the	government	again.	As	a	result,	the	number	of	registered	social	
organizations	fell	from	220,000	in	1998	to	136,841	in	2000,	almost	a	third	less	
than	 the	 181,060	 groups	 registered	 in	 1993.	 Alongside	 with	 this,	 the	 state	
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specified	the	NGOs	into	three	sets	of	organizations4	 with	different	regulation	
measures	(Howell,	2012).	 	
The	 third	 period	 started	 from	 2000s	 until	 now,	with	 the	 striking	 feature	 of	
growing	NGOs.	 There	 has	 been	no	 visible	 ‘tidying	up’	 policy	 since	 2000	 like	
before,	and	the	number	of	registered	social	organizations	in	China	has	reached	
810000	 in	 April	 2018.	 Different	 scholars	 explain	 the	 rocketing	 number	 in	
different	ways.	For	Howell	(2012;2015),	the	growing	Chinese	NGOs	should	be	
attributed	to	the	entry	of	the	World	Trade	Organization	in	2001.	China’s	deeper	
integration	into	the	global	economy	leads	to	the	rising	inequalities	at	the	same	
time,	 which	 witnesses	 the	 social	 groups	 losing	 out	 in	 the	 economic	 reform	
getting	organized.	Howell	also	mentions	the	 increasing	strategies	of	NGOs	to	
circumvent	the	state	regulations	and	gain	legal	identities.	 	
However,	 Feng	 (2015)	 notices	 that	 the	 Regulations	 of	 the	 Management	 of	
Foundations	in	2004	could	be	more	influential	among	Chinese	NGOs	than	many	
other	 factors.	 Although	 relevant	 regulations	 on	 foundations	 had	 been	
established	in	the	1990s,	they	set	up	very	high	criteria	for	public	foundations:	
for	those	who	wanted	to	register	at	the	national	level,	the	initial	funding	had	to	
be	 above	 8	 million	 pounds;	 the	 provincial	 level	 had	 to	 be	 above	 4	 million	
pounds.	But	in	practice,	almost	all	the	national	public	foundations	had	to	have	
funding	of	more	than	50	million	pounds	for	registration5.	Therefore,	before	the	
2004	foundation	regulations,	most	of	the	foundations	in	China	were	established	
by	government	or	state-owned	companies.	In	the	2004	foundation	regulations,	
private	 foundations	 were	 allowed	 to	 register	 at	 the	 local	 level	 with	 initial	
funding	 of	 2	 million	 yuan	 (200	 thousand	 pounds).	 Since	 then,	 the	 private	
foundations,	 mostly	 founded	 by	 private	 companies	 and	 new	 riches,	 have	
outnumbered	the	public	ones,	rising	from	712	in	2004	to	6495	in	2017.	Some	
researchers	hold	that	a	more	tolerant	policy	in	2004	means	the	state	would	like	
to	 introduce	more	private	wealth	 to	 the	 third	sector,	which	provides	a	good	
foundation	 for	 other	 types	 of	 organizations	 and	 social	 welfare	 system	 to	
develop	(Xiaoming,	2015;	Howell	and	Duckett,	2019;	Kang,	2019).	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
4	 The	three	sets	of	organizations	were:	private	non-enterprise	organizations;	
foundations;	 and	 ‘shehui	 tuanti’	 (social	 groups)	 established	 to	 develop	
memberships	only.	 	 	
5	 Source:	NGOCN.	
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Researchers	 above	 analyze	 the	 recent	 third	 historical	 period	 from	 different	
perspectives.	 Some	 look	 at	 the	 external	 and	 global	 factors,	 while	 others	
examine	the	policies	from	the	central	state.	But	both	of	their	analyses	fail	to	put	
the	historical	development	of	China’s	NGOs	in	a	more	dynamic	perspective.	As	
we	may	find	from	the	1980s	to	the	late	1990s,	the	rise	and	fall	of	China’s	NGOs	
revealed	that	the	NGOs	were	seen	as	more	related	to	national	security	issues;	
although	the	state	tried	to	separate	the	business	associations	with	other	types	
of	organizations.	So	the	policies	and	 ‘tidying	up’	movements	launched	by	the	
central	state	have	played	a	major	part	in	shaping	the	political	ecology	of	China’s	
NGO	 sector.	 However,	 the	 increasing	 number	 of	 NGOs	 started	 since	 2000s	
cannot	 be	 simply	 attributed	 to	 the	 central	 government	 alone.	 Instead,	 the	
changing	 state-society	 relations	 at	 the	 local	 level	 have	 transformed	 the	way	
how	the	multi-level	state	think	about	NGOs	in	China	(Teets,	2013,	2015;	Hsu	
and	Hasmath,	2014b).	 	
For	one	 thing,	 the	national	policies	become	highly	selective	 for	various	 local	
governments	 in	 terms	 of	 how	 to	 apply	 them.	 In	 2014,	 an	 NGO	 called	 Liren	
(literally:	 “cultivating	 talents”)	 was	 shut	 down	 by	 the	 Chinese	 government.	
Their	22	rural	libraries	in	different	provinces	were	closed;	some	of	their	senior	
managers	were	also	arrested	by	the	national	security6.	However,	Liren’s	cross	
regional	 activities	 had	 started	 since	 2008,	 although	 the	 organization	 was	
registered	with	the	city	government	of	Chengdu.	In	fact,	most	of	Liren’s	rural	
libraries	were	founded	by	close	cooperation	with	various	local	governmental	
bodies,	 like	 education	 bureaus	 and	 public	 schools.	 That’s	 to	 say,	many	 local	
governments	 in	 different	 regions	 had	 at	 least	 tolerated	 such	 ‘illegal’	 cross-
regional	activities.	However,	in	September	2014,	in	only	one	month,	all	Liren	
libraries	 were	 asked	 to	 be	 shut	 down	 by	 their	 local	 governments	 for	many	
different	 reasons;	 its	headquarter	was	also	closed	 too	 in	 the	name	of	 ‘illegal	
cross-regional	activities’.	Local	governments	alone	cannot	take	such	quick	and	
well-coordinated	actions.	According	to	the	news	reports	of	Liren	workers,	the	
order	of	 repression	may	come	directly	 from	Beijing,	 for	 two	possible	 ‘highly	
politically	 sensitive’	 reasons:	 one	was	 its	 public	 declaration	 of	 its	 “liberalist	
stance”,	e.g.	their	close	links	with	human	rights	activists,	the	books	displayed	in	
	
6 	 Source:	 https://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/09/22/rural-library-
chain-closes-citing-tremendous-pressure/	
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their	 libraries	 were	 also	 mainly	 translated	 from	 the	 Western	 countries	 in	
humanities	and	social	 sciences.	The	other	was	Liren	 founder’s	public	speech	
about	his	identity	as	a	Christian.	Given	its	founder’s	personal	connections	with	
underground	 churches	 in	 China,	 Liren	 was	 also	 doubted	 as	 part	 of	 the	
underground	Christian	community	movements.	But	no	matter	what	reason	it	
could	be,	this	case	at	least	shows	the	differences	between	the	local	and	central	
governments	in	regulating	NGO	in	China:	the	central	government	is	much	more	
politically	 sensitive	 and	 proactive	 in	 regulating	 NGOs,	 while	 	 local	
governments	 may	 be	 intending	 to	 treat	 NGOs	 in	 a	 more	 apolitical	 way	 by	
viewing	their	projects	as	a	complement	of	the	local	welfare	system.	 	 	 	
Given	 the	 priority	 on	 economic	 development	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 investment	 on	
social	welfare,	some	local	states	also	realized	the	role	that	NGOs	could	play	on	
poverty	alleviation,	welfare	delivery	and	reducing	social	tensions	in	the	early	
2000s.	To	some	degree,	the	booming	number	of	NGOs	in	China	in	the	current	
third	period	could	be	also	a	product	of	local	governments	in	responding	to	the	
increasing	social	service	demands	and	social	tensions	at	first.	Then	the	various	
NGO	management	models	at	the	local	 level	changed	the	national	policy	since	
2010s	by	encouraging	more	service	delivery	organizations	across	the	country.	 	
As	Teets	(2013)	says	in	her	research,	there	are	many	‘civil	societies’	and	various	
development	models	in	China.	
Yunnan	province	is	a	good	example.	As	China	entered	into	WTO	in	2001,	more	
and	 more	 international	 organizations	 came	 into	 China.	 Most	 of	 these	
organizations	may	have	projects	in	multiple	regions,	but	most	of	their	project	
sites	 were	 in	 southwestern	 China,	 the	 regions	 with	 the	 least	 economic	
development	and	the	most	ethnic	minority	groups.	Although	most	of	the	INGOs	
cannot	get	recognized	from	Beijing	for	a	legal	status,	in	many	cases	they	were	
tolerated	 or	 even	 warmly	 welcomed	 by	 the	 local	 governments.	 Because	
southwestern	provinces	with	much	worse	social,	geographical,	and	economic	
conditions	 cannot	 attract	 foreign	 direct	 investment	 as	 much	 as	 the	 eastern	
provinces,	INGOs	were	seen	as	one	of	the	very	few	external	resources	for	local	
development.	The	arrival	of	INGOs	helped	to	create	a	number	of	local	partner	
organizations	to	do	development	work,	although	most	of	 their	projects	were	
under	 the	 name	 of	 ‘poverty	 alleviation’.	 Yunnan	 province,	 the	 area	with	 the	
most	ethnic	groups	and	transnational	heroin	trade,	and	the	highest	HIV/	AIDs	
infection	rate	in	China,	became	the	home	of	many	INGOs	(Hildebrandt,	2012).	
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It	was	through	the	international	aids	that	Yunnan	set	up	its	health	regulation	
and	education	system	of	HIV/AIDs	from	villages	to	the	capital	city	(Teets,	2015).	
In	2010,	the	Civil	Affairs	Bureau	(CAB)	in	the	provincial	government	in	Yunnan	
became	the	first	governmental	body	that	gave	INGOs	a	legal	status	in	China;	the	
registration	 procedures	 for	 their	 domestic	 partner	 organizations	 were	 also	
largely	simplified	 (Spires,	Tao	and	Chan,	2014).	Although	such	policies	were	
only	valid	within	the	province,	the	local	policy	innovations	did	strongly	support	
the	NGO	sector	in	a	longer	term.	
Unlike	Yunnan	that	viewed	NGOs	as	a	helper	and	financial	source	of	its	‘poverty	
alleviation’	 programs,	 provinces	 in	 eastern	 China	 viewed	 them	 more	 like	
‘welfare	contractors’	or	‘deliverers’	of	the	local	states.	One	example	is	Shanghai.	
Due	to	the	one-child	policy	since	late	1970s,	many	Chinese	cities	have	to	face	a	
rapid	 aging	 population	 structure	 in	 the	 past	 three	 decades,	 as	 the	 one-child	
policy	was	more	 strictly	 implemented	 in	 cities	 than	 in	 rural	 areas.	 Shanghai	
turned	out	to	be	one	of	the	most	aged	cities	in	the	world	since	late	1990s7.	Given	
the	large	demands	on	elderly	care	services,	in	2000,	Shanghai	became	the	first	
Chinese	city	to	start	governmental	purchase	of	social	service	from	NGOs	(Lai,	
2001).	A	number	of	service	delivery	organizations,	especially	the	community	
social	work	 centers	 providing	 elderly	 care	 and	medical	 therapies,	 appeared	
with	the	booming	funding	from	various	local	government	bodies	(ibid).	 	
Consequently,	 the	 government	 purchase	 of	 social	 services	 in	 Shanghai	 and	
some	other	cities	led	to	the	national	welfare	reform	in	2006	by	the	decision	to	
‘build	up	a	grand	team	of	social	workers	across	the	country’8.	A	number	of	social	
work	centers	fully	funded	by	various	local	states	have	appeared	in	communities,	
providing	 services	 from	 elderly	 care,	 youth	 education,	 nursery	 services	 to	
marriage	counseling.	During	my	fieldwork	in	both	Shenzhen	and	Guangzhou,	I	
found	that	the	government	purchase	of	social	work	was	so	popular	that	even	
other	types	of	organizations	were	also	asked	to	take	the	national	social	workers’	
test	 so	 as	 to	 demonstrate	 their	 professionality	 as	 part	 of	 the	 local	 NGO	
registration	procedures.	
	
7	 Source:	Shanghai	Civil	Affairs	Bureau.	 	
8	 Quoted	from	a	speech	made	by	the	then	national	leader,	president	Hu	Jintao.	
Source:	the	official	website	of	Chinese	Communist	Party.	 	
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However,	even	under	 the	same	welfare	reform,	 the	national	political	 leaders	
have	 different	 priorities	 from	 the	 local	 states.	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 the	
national	reform	was	 initially	 launched	 in	 the	sixth	plenum	of	 the	16th	China	
Communist	Party	Central	Committee,	against	the	background	of	‘constructing	
a	 harmonized	 society’	 (Zheng	 and	 Tok,	 2007).	 In	 fact,	 ‘constructing	 a	
harmonized	society’	was	one	of	the	major	themes	during	Hu	Jintao’s	presidency	
from	2003	to	2013,	it	was	also	the	time	when	the	national	budgets	of	internal	
police	and	security	outnumbered	the	national	defense	in	China	(Ewing	2003).	
As	one	of	the	‘harmonious	society’	goals	is	to	establish	a	basic	safety	net	for	the	
people,	 the	 national	 political	 leaders	 encouraged	 both	 central	 and	 local	
governments	to	do	more	social	service	purchases	from	social	organizations.	But	
at	 the	same	 time,	 the	central	 committee	also	mentioned	 the	urgent	needs	of	
‘keeping	social	stability’	that	all	the	social	services	should	respond	to.	Therefore,	
many	 local	 budgets	 of	 social	 service	 also	went	 to	 organizations	 that	 can	 do	
‘harmonious	society	construction’	like	offering	psychological	counseling	to	the	
local	activists	(ibid;	Cho,	2017).	Since	Xi	Jinping’s	leadership	in	2013,	a	new	type	
of	 social	workers	 has	 also	 been	 created:	 social	workers	 of	 communist	 party	
construction.	 The	 major	 work	 of	 these	 social	 workers	 includes	 organizing	
communist	 party	 members	 to	 learn	 the	 new	 speeches	 of	 Xi	 and	 do	 some	
volunteer	works	 in	 their	communities.	Meanwhile,	most	of	 the	social	service	
centers	have	been	asked	to	change	their	names	into	‘community	service	center	
for	communist	party	members	and	the	people’	(Womack,	2017).	 	 	
Except	 the	welfare	 reform	 and	 the	 rising	 of	 social	 service	 delivery,	 another	
striking	 feature	 since	Xi’s	 presidency	 is	 the	 (still)	 changing	policies	 towards	
INGOs,	 which	 greatly	 affects	 the	 landscape	 of	 domestic	 organizations.	 From	
2013	to	2016,	the	number	of	arrested	social	activists	and	human	rights	lawyers	
in	 China	 outnumbered	 the	 amount	 of	 Hu	 Jintao’s	 whole	 presidency	 (Vogel,	
2015).	Many	 of	 them	 have	 been	 accused	 in	 the	 name	 of	 ‘receiving	Western	
funding	to	overthrow	socialist	regime	in	China’.	The	national	securities	or	CABs	
also	 warned	 NGOs	 that	 received	 funding	 from	 INGOs.	 The	 climax	 of	 INGOs	
withdrawal	appeared	in	between	2016	and	2017,	when	the	new	law	on	INGO	
regulation	was	finally	in	effect,	asking	all	the	INGOs	to	register	with	the	national	
security	departments,	alongside	with	many	other	restrictions	(Teets	and	Hsu,	
2016;	 Shieh,	2018).	During	my	 fieldwork,	 although	organizations	 like	World	
Vision	and	Oxfam	told	me	that	they	have	registered	under	the	new	rules,	it	is	
still	very	difficult	to	carry	on	their	projects	in	the	local	communities,	since	local	
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governments	 have	 been	 told	 not	 to	 cooperate	 with	 the	 Western	 donors	
anymore.	 	
To	 summarize,	 the	 first	 two	 historical	 periods	 of	 China’s	 NGO	 sector	 were	
largely	 dominated	 by	 the	 policies	 from	 the	 central	 state.	However,	 although	
there	are	many	positive	comments	on	the	increasing	numbers	of	organizations	
in	 the	 current	 third	 period	 since	 2000s,	 the	 factors	 in	 shaping	 the	 NGO	
regulation	 have	 been	 more	 complicated	 than	 before.	 The	 differences	 and	
dynamic	negotiations	between	the	central	and	local	states	greatly	affect	how	
NGOs	could	be	regulated	in	different	parts	of	China.	As	Landry	(2008)	suggests,	
the	 Chinese	 state	 is	 not	 a	 homogenous	 actor,	 rather	 it	 is	 a	 ‘fragmented	
authoritarianism’.	 Besides,	 the	 changing	 social	 structures	 in	 terms	 of	
demography	and	economic	development	also	contribute	to	the	shifting	nature	
of	China’s	NGO	sector,	regardless	of	the	long-lasting	national	security	concerns	
from	 Beijing.	 These	 differences	 and	 dynamics	 within	 the	 state	 apparatus	
provide	political	opportunities	for	new	foundations	like	AF	to	build	up	national	
influence	in	China.	At	the	same	time,	the	fragmented	nature	of	the	Chinese	state	
also	 requires	 these	 new	donors	 to	 be	more	 embedded	 in	 the	 different	 local	
NGO-state	relations	in	different	regions.	
	
6.2	“Everyone	can	do	gongyi”:	AF	and	its	partner	organizations	
For	most	of	the	donors	in	the	development	industry,	local	partner	organizations	
could	be	very	important	for	their	project	implementation.	But	for	new	domestic	
foundations	in	China	like	AF,	the	grassroots	organizations	were	not	only	their	
project	partners,	but	also	crucial	for	promoting	their	social	influence,	branding,	
and	fundraising	campaigns	in	the	country.	In	fact,	before	AF’s	final	registration	
as	public	foundation	in	Shenzhen,	its	founders	had	put	forward	a	very	famous	
slogan	 “everyone	 can	 do	 gongyi”,	 which	 appeared	 repeatedly	 among	 AF’s	
workers	and	media	reports	throughout	my	fieldwork.	By	saying	“everyone	can	
do	gongyi”	here,	there	have	been	two	meanings	at	AF.	On	the	one	hand,	in	many	
news	 reports	 and	 interviews	 with	 AF’s	 entrepreneurs,	 they	 took	 ordinary	
Chinese	people’s	donations	in	their	everyday	life	as	a	very	important	indicator	
of	‘gongyi’;	therefore	in	those	reports,	the	slogan	“everyone	can	do	gongyi”	has	
become	 an	 issue	 of	 how	 to	 mobilize	 more	 individual	 donors	 and	 create	 a	
donating-culture	in	China.	 	
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In	Tim’s	story	in	Chapter	5,	he	mentioned	that	the	entrepreneurs	at	AF	were	
much	 more	 ambitious	 than	 simply	 focusing	 on	 the	 various	 humanitarian	
assistance	projects.	As	he	 said,	what	 those	elites	 really	wanted	 to	do	was	 to	
change	the	Chinese	culture;	or	in	his	words,	“change	people’s	minds	and	hearts”.	
Tim’s	saying	echoes	with	one	of	AF’s	founder	Luck	Lee,	a	pious	Buddhist,	who	
made	an	internal	speech	in	2017	saying	that	“As	every	Chinese	can	do	one	small	
piece	of	gongyi	everyday	with	us,	more	good	karma	would	be	created,	and	our	
social	environment	can	be	improved”.	 	 	 	
But	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 leaders	of	AF’s	 executive	 team	may	have	different	
understandings.	When	 I	was	 doing	my	 fieldwork,	 AF	 had	 had	 three	 general	
secretaries.	 The	 first	 general	 secretary	 took	 her	 leadership	 position	 for	 two	
years	 before	 AF’s	 registration	 in	 Shenzhen,	mostly	 because	 she	was	 a	 close	
friend	and	business	partner	of	Luck	Lee,	and	a	pious	Buddhist	too.	The	second	
and	 the	 third	 general	 secretaries,	 Peter	 and	 James,	 were	 more	 likely	 to	
understand	 “everyone	 can	 do	 gongyi”	 as	 “working	 with	 grassroots	
organizations	in	different	places”,	since	then	the	foundation	began	to	set	up	its	
partnership	with	 various	 NGOs	 across	 the	 country.	Peter	 and	 James	 all	 had	
experiences	 working	 with	 different	 international	 and	 domestic	 donors,	 and	
both	of	them	viewed	the	“everyone	can	do	gongyi”	in	a	more	complicated	way	
rather	than	mere	donation.	As	James	said	in	an	internal	speech	in	September	
2016:	 	
“AF	should	become	a	platform	of	creating	opportunities	for	ordinary	
people	to	do	gongyi…	they	can	donate,	they	can	volunteer,	they	can	
work	with	their	local	NGOs,	anyway,	AF	should	mobilize	more	public	
participation.	This	 is	how	more	social	 capital	 can	be	created	 in	our	
country”.	 	 	 	 	 	
But	to	build	up	partnerships	with	other	NGOs	in	different	geographical	areas	is	
never	easy	in	China.	AF’s	national	network	was	largely	based	on	several	natural	
disasters	 happening	 between	 2008	 and	 2013;	 it	 was	 during	 those	 natural	
disasters	that	it	started	to	support	the	disaster	relief	work	through	various	local	
organizations	 and	 voluntary	 groups,	 trying	 to	 organize	 them	 into	 a	 more	
“standardized”	network	step	by	step.	Given	the	repressive	NGO	regulations	in	
Beijing,	it	is	very	unusual	to	see	an	organization	like	AF	establishing	such	a	big	
network	 covering	 more	 than	 28	 provinces	 (out	 of	 31)	 in	 the	 past	 decade,	
supporting	more	than	2000	organizations	or	voluntary	groups	from	big	cities,	
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towns,	to	even	villages.	That	is	partly	the	reason	why	foundations	like	AF	with	
a	national	network	are	particularly	 influential	 of	 creating	and	disseminating	
knowledge	in	the	whole	NGO	sector	in	China.	In	the	early	2016,	a	notice	from	
Ministry	of	Civil	Affairs	raised	concerns	about	AF	leaders,	which	iterated	the	
strict	 prohibition	 of	 ‘illegal	 cross-regional	 activities’	 of	 NGOs.	 AF	 had	 good	
reasons	 to	 worry	 about	 such	 regulations.	 It	 was	 only	 registered	 with	 the	
Shenzhen	government,	so	in	theory	its	activities	should	only	be	limited	within	
the	city.	Although	there	was	no	sign	that	the	Shenzhen	government	would	apply	
the	notice	seriously	against	AF,	AF’s	national	network,	which	is	illegal	according	
to	the	national	regulations,	has	been	very	well	known	to	the	state.	That	is	to	say,	
although	AF’s	work	might	be	tolerated	by	the	Shenzhen	government,	no	one	
can	guarantee	that	its	political	shelter	in	Shenzhen	can	be	sustained	in	a	long	
period	nor	its	projects	in	other	places	can	be	protected.	Although	it	has	involved	
in	more	than	100	small	and	medium-sized	disasters	across	the	country	every	
year,	the	intense	media	coverage	it	received	did	not	necessarily	justify	its	legal	
status	in	Beijing.	The	national	network	has	been	moving	in	a	gray	area.	 	
Under	this	condition,	 it	 is	crucial	 for	AF	to	build	up	a	good	relationship	with	
different	governments	at	 the	 local	 level	 so	 that	 to	ensure	 its	projects	 can	be	
done	from	one	place	to	another.	Therefore,	it	is	not	surprising	to	find	that	most	
of	 AF’s	 local	 partners	 had	 to	 maintain	 good	 connections	 with	 various	 local	
governmental	institutions	or	GONGOs	in	different	provinces.	AF’s	need	for	good	
governmental	relations	in	local	areas	offered	opportunities	for	its	local	partner	
organizations	to	negotiate	and	redefine	gongyi.	
As	I	have	presented	in	the	last	two	chapters,	inspired	by	the	entrepreneurs,	AF	
reformed	its	organizational	structure	to	be	more	“professional”	or	“modern”.	
By	reading	its	management	guidelines	and	project	reports,	I	found	that	similar	
reforms	 also	 applied	 to	 its	 national	 network	 to	 enhance	 its	 management	
efficiency.	 One	 is	 standardization.	 The	 foundation	 had	 set	 up	 all	 the	 project	
details,	 as	 many	 as	 it	 could,	 from	 organizing	 local	 volunteers,	 distributing	
disaster	 relief	materials,	 collecting	 local	 information,	 to	 implementing	 post-
disaster	 infrastructure	 reconstruction	projects,	 etc.	AF	even	drafted	 samples	
for	its	partner	organizations	to	post	on	the	social	media	in	communicating	with	
the	 general	public	 about	 their	 activities.	That’s	 to	 say,	 to	 a	 large	degree,	 the	
projects	that	AF’s	partner	organizations	did	were	on	behalf	of	AF	in	the	local	
communities;	all	its	partner	organizations	were	much	more	like	a	‘contractor’	
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or	“retailer”	of	AF.	Like	some	of	them	told	me	in	a	very	direct	way:	“we	are	doing	
AF’s	projects,	not	ours”.	 	
The	other	 is	 to	 “make	 the	game	more	competitive”,	which	can	be	seen	as	an	
extension	 of	 the	 “wolf-spirit”	 promoted	 within	 AF.	 AF	 set	 up	 a	 series	 of	
variables	to	evaluate	their	partner	organizations	in	different	provinces,	which	
included	 key	 factors	 from	 the	 number	 of	 implemented	 projects	 and	
beneficiaries,	local	resource	mobilization	(like	volunteer	numbers),	how	many	
awards	 won	 from	 the	 local	 governments,	 to	 how	many	 “good	 pictures	 and	
stories	were	disseminated”	in	local	official	media.	All	these	variables	were	set	
as	 indicators	 to	measure	 the	 “public	 participation”,	 or	 in	 another	words,	 to	
achieve	“everyone	can	do	gongyi”.	Every	year,	AF	would	also	send	out	a	ranking	
of	their	partner	organizations	in	difference	provinces	based	on	those	variables,	
which	 would	 largely	 decide	 AF’s	 funding	 distribution	 among	 its	 partner	
organizations	for	the	next	year.	In	AF’s	network,	NGOs	from	different	provinces	
needed	to	compete	with	each	other	to	get	a	higher	ranking,	so	that	to	ensure	
more	funding.	In	short,	AF	had	successfully	made	its	each	partner	organizations	
to	be	a	“standardized	project	assembly	line”	to	deliver	what	it	wanted,	and	the	
whole	 national	 network	 became	 a	 “competitive	 game”	 to	 satisfy	 its	 donor-
centered	strategy.	By	emphasizing	“standardization”	and	“competitiveness”,	AF	
also	wanted	to	“teach”	other	Chinese	NGOs	its	“modern	gongyi”	ideas.	
My	interests	in	AF’s	partner	organizations	started	from	the	daily	conversations	
among	AF	workers	in	their	office.	Sitting	in	the	office	and	talking	to	the	workers,	
I	 realized	 that	 the	 “standardization”	 and	 “competitiveness”	 did	 not	 actually	
work	very	smoothly	among	its	partner	organizations.	Very	few	of	AF’s	partner	
organizations	would	do	all	the	jobs	that	AF	“taught”	them	to	do.	Given	that	the	
AF’s	projects	were	quite	demanding	in	terms	of	workload,	my	fieldwork	with	
some	 of	 its	 partner	 organizations	 found	 that	most	 of	 them	would	 only	 take	
some	measurement	variables	seriously.	Even	for	AF’s	“star	partners”	that	had	
done	all	the	jobs,	their	understandings	of	gongyi	in	reality	may	not	come	from	
AF,	but	from	the	local	politics.	Some	may	just	want	to	take	advantage	of	AF’s	
brand	to	leverage	more	governmental	recognition;	others	may	think	highly	of	
AF’s	project	management	system	learned	from	the	entrepreneurs,	but	they	did	
not	want	to	be	just	a	retailer	or	a	follower	of	AF	in	the	local	society.	Against	this	
background,	 I	 started	my	 second-stage	 fieldwork	with	 AF’	 local	 partners	 in	
several	different	provinces.	In	the	following	parts	of	this	chapter,	I	divide	these	
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partner	organizations	 into	two	types:	one	 is	more	 like	“a	close	 friend”	of	AF,	
sharing	most	of	its	modern	gongyi	ideas	and	enjoying	many	special	ties	with	the	
local	governments.	The	second	is	the	organizations	that	may	have	very	different	
imagination	and	agenda	of	what	gongyi	should	be	like	from	AF,	but	for	some	
reasons	(e.g.	taking	AF	as	a	political	shelter	to	conceal	their	activism	in	the	local	
state)	they	chose	to	stay	within	this	modern	gongyi.	 	 	
	
6.3	GVC:	a	true	friend	of	gongyi	 	
In	 many	 aspects,	 AF’s	 local	 partner	 organization	 in	 the	 H	 province,	 Gongyi	
Volunteer	Center	(GVC),	was	an	ideal	one	in	AF’s	eyes.	GVC	started	its	disaster	
relief	work	 in	 the	 province	 since	 2006,	when	AF	 had	 not	 been	 founded	 yet.	
GVC’s	director	Perry	knew	many	AF	workers	very	well	before	they	started	their	
cooperation.	In	fact,	in	many	internal	meetings	and	pictures,	Perry	was	told	to	
be	 AF’s	 helping	 hand	 to	 establish	 its	 national	 network	 by	 attracting	 more	
grassroots	organizations	and	setting	up	the	organizational	evaluation	system.	
Until	 today,	 GVC	 is	 still	 helping	 AF	 to	 manage	 its	 national	 network	 of	 the	
disaster	relief	projects.	 	 To	a	large	degree,	GVC	had	been	thought	more	like	an	
extension	 of	 AF,	 rather	 than	 an	 independent	 organization:	 according	 to	my	
interviews	with	both	AF	workers	and	Perry,	AF’s	funding	took	at	least	80	to	90	
percent	of	GVC’s	annual	budget	(about	700	to	900	thousand	pounds	per	year);	
almost	 all	 its	 work	 was	 closely	 related	 to	 AF’s	 projects.	 In	 fact,	 in	 many	
occasions	 AF’s	workers	would	 call	 the	 GVC	workers	 directly	 as	 its	 ‘national	
network	 coordinators’,	 rather	 than	 the	 ‘partners	 from	G’	 like	what	 they	 call	
workers	from	other	partner	organizations.	The	office	of	GVC	in	the	city	of	G	was	
decorated	 much	 like	 a	 branch	 of	 AF,	 full	 of	 AF’s	 logos,	 pictures	 or	 leaflets.	
Moreover,	as	a	local	organization	with	more	than	10	years	history,	GVC	knew	
the	local	society	well	in	the	province;	the	organization	maintained	a	very	high	
ranking	in	AF’s	national	network	in	terms	of	local	resource	mobilization.	 	
More	importantly,	GVC	was	not	a	simple	“grassroots”	organization	in	G	area,	a	
bit	like	AF	in	Shenzhen.	GVC	had	a	very	good	and	close	relationship	with	both	
the	municipal	and	provincial	governments,	enjoying	an	extraordinary	political	
status	in	the	local	NGO	community.	In	theory,	it	is	affiliated	with	the	Spiritual	
Civilization	 Office	 in	 the	 city,	 the	 propaganda	 department	 of	 the	 Chinese	
Communist	Party	branch	in	the	province.	But	interestingly,	unlike	many	other	
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Chinese	GONGOs	whose	funding	and	human	resources	were	mostly	controlled	
by	 the	government,	GVC	enjoyed	a	high	degree	of	 autonomy	 from	 financing,	
organizational	management	to	its	daily	operation.	In	GVC’s	early	history,	it	was	
firstly	a	volunteer	team	affiliated	with	a	local	GONGO	(Red	Cross	in	G	area)	but	
funded	by	Oxfam	to	do	humanitarian	assistance	work	in	poor	neighborhoods	in	
the	city.	It	was	also	because	of	Oxfam	that	GVC	finally	became	a	more	formal	
organization	and	got	to	know	the	then	Oxfam	workers	who	transited	to	AF	later.	
Around	 2010s	 when	 Oxfam	 decided	 to	 withdraw	 most	 of	 their	 work	 and	
funding	from	H	Province,	GVC	turned	to	AF	for	help.	 	
GVC’s	 history	 is	 deeply	 intertwined	 with	 the	 personal	 development	 of	 its	
founder	and	current	director	Perry,	too.	In	GVC’s	early	years	when	Perry	was	
its	volunteer	team	leader,	he	also	had	official	titles	awarded	by	the	local	Red	
Cross.	During	the	cooperation	with	Oxfam,	Perry	was	a	very	active	participant	
of	 Oxfam’s	 “civil	 society	 training	 network”,	 through	 which	 he	 kept	 close	
relations	 with	 many	 social	 and	 political	 activists	 in	 China.	 And	 then	 after	
establishing	GVC,	Perry	paid	more	attention	to	the	local	governmental	relations	
and	got	even	more	official	titles	from	various	local	GONGOs	and	the	communist	
party	branch.	The	history	of	GVC	and	its	founder	Perry	demonstrates	the	nature	
of	 changing	 discursive	 and	 financial	 donors	 in	 China’s	 NGO	 sector,	which	 is	
never	 simply	 a	 new	 substitution	 of	 the	 old	 one.	 GVC’s	 transition	 from	 an	
international	donor	to	a	domestic	one	means	that	Chinese	NGOs	need	to	adjust	
their	working	strategies	and	the	relations	with	the	state	at	the	same	time,	it	also	
decides	what	other	organizations	they	can	be	networking	with.	 	 	 	 	
Perry’s	multiple	“hats”	on	his	head	did	help	AF’s	national	network	in	the	whole	
province.	 In	 the	past	 several	years,	every	winter	when	AF	started	 its	annual	
snow	disaster	 relief	work	 in	G,	GVC	would	make	 it	 as	 a	big	 event	 ceremony	
under	the	name	of	“targeted	poverty	alleviation”,	attracting	many	local	official	
news	media.	As	one	of	the	poorest	provinces	in	China,	since	Xi’s	leadership	in	
2013	 H	 province	 has	 been	 taken	 as	 one	 of	 the	 “core	 working	 area”	 to	 do	
“targeted	poverty	alleviation”.	Therefore,	the	ceremony	organized	by	GVC	was	
illustrated	as	a	great	contribution	that	AF	had	done	to	reduce	local	poverty	in	
H	province.	Many	senior	government	officials	from	the	provincial	government	
would	be	invited	to	give	their	speeches	in	these	“poverty	alleviation	ceremonies”	
with	 AF’s	 entrepreneurs.	 With	 the	 help	 of	 GVC	 and	 Perry,	 the	 political	
endorsement	from	local	government	officials	made	G	become	the	province	with	
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the	most	AF	project	sites	and	funding	from	in	the	national	network.	During	my	
fieldwork	in	G,	I	was	a	bit	surprised	that	most	of	the	AF’s	activities	were	not	
only	reported	by	the	mainstream	state	media,	but	many	reports	would	also	be	
listed	 on	 the	 official	 websites	 of	 provincial	 or	 municipal	 governments,	
appreciating	the	contribution	that	AF	had	made	as	“a	social	force”	in	“poverty	
reduction”	and	“enhancing	gongyi	environment	in	G”.	Very	interestingly,	since	
GVC’s	experience	in	the	local	society	was	so	successful,	AF	also	put	it	into	their	
standardized	 project	 procedures.	 According	 to	 AF’s	 project	 implementation	
handbook,	before	each	project	started,	all	AF’s	partner	organizations	would	be	
asked	to	do	a	big	“project	launching”	ceremony	to	attract	media	attention	and	
get	 governmental	 officials’	 endorsement.	 The	 number	 of	 such	 activities	 and	
participants	was	also	part	of	the	organizational	evaluation	in	terms	of	realizing	
“everyone	can	do	gongyi”.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
If	GVC’s	working	 strategy	and	political	 access	 in	 the	 local	 society	made	 it	 “a	
close	friend”	of	AF,	then	the	organizational	culture	in	GVC	made	it	“a	true	friend”.	
Before	my	fieldwork	with	AF’s	partner	organizations,	 I	had	heard	about	GVC	
and	Perry’s	stories	for	many	times	in	AF’s	office.	In	these	conversations,	GVC	
had	been	described	as	a	very	“professional	gongyi	organization”,	with	a	clear,	
highly	standardized	project	management	system;	its	leaders	and	workers	were	
also	 “passionate”	 with	 their	 work,	 always	 ready	 to	 “occupy	 more	 markets	
(regions)”	not	covered	by	AF	network	yet.	Like	AF’s	human	resource	structure,	
its	male	 leader,	 Perry,	 has	 led	GVC	 since	 its	 establishment.	Although	Perry’s	
wife	has	been	also	working	with	Perry	in	charge	of	its	daily	operation,	Perry	
has	been	seen	as	the	“absolute	leader”	in	all	my	informants;	as	he	was	the	one	
to	“work	outside”:	dealing	with	AF,	meeting	government	officials,	talking	to	the	
other	NGO	leaders,	socializing	with	the	local	media,	etc..	At	the	same	time,	most	
workers	at	GVC,	just	like	AF,	were	female.	 	 	 	 	
	
6.4	GH:	who	is	the	“true	friend	(zhen	pengyou)”?	 	
Located	in	K	Province,	Gongyi	Heart	(GH)	joined	AF	in	2013.	On	the	face	of	it,	
GH	shared	many	similarities	with	GVC:	both	of	them	were	founded	by	a	couple,	
running	 like	a	 family	business.	One	of	GH’s	 founders	Humphrey	was	also	an	
active	member	of	Oxfam’s	civil	society	network	years	ago,	where	he	got	to	know	
Perry.	GH’s	development	has	also	been	greatly	 supported	by	Oxfam	 from	 its	
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early	 years	 until	 now,	 under	 its	 “civil	 society	 and	 gender	 mainstreaming”	
program.	As	a	good	friend	of	Humphrey,	GVC’s	leader	Perry	was	sitting	in	GH’s	
council	board.	In	fact,	if	one	looks	at	GH’s	self-introduction	and	organizational	
mission	stated	on	its	website	or	leaflets,	one	may	find	the	contents	seem	to	be	
exactly	 the	 same	 as	 those	 in	 AF’s	 promotion	 leaflets.	 GH	 stated	 its	
organizational	 mission	 as	 “disseminating	 gongyi	 spirit,	 changing	 the	
backwardness	of	gongyi	work	in	K	Province,	being	a	supporting	center	to	help	
other	gongyi	organizations	in	the	province	by	enhancing	their	organizational	
capacity”.	This	statement	looks	exactly	like	what	AF	had	declared	by	“everyone	
can	do	gongyi”	and	its	NGO	network.	But	in	my	fieldwork,	I	find	GH	was	never	
a	 “close	 friend”	 of	 AF	 like	 GVC.	 The	 way	 that	 GH	 understood	 gongyi	 was	
different	from	AF,	although	they	did	share	a	very	similar	thinking	pattern.	Also,	
unlike	GVC	that	enjoyed	extraordinary	political	connections	in	H	province,	GH	
and	its	workers	had	a	very	different	position	in	the	local	politics,	which	greatly	
influenced	what	gongyi	would	be	like	in	the	local	society.	Let	us	start	with	GH’s	
history	first.	
GH’s	founder	Humphrey	was	born	in	the	1970s	in	a	small	town	in	K	Province.	
But	he	left	his	hometown	at	a	very	young	age	and	worked	for	an	international	
agency	in	rural	community	development	for	years	before	he	founded	GH.	As	an	
INGO	worker,	he	went	 to	Gansu,	Yunan	and	Sicuan	Provinces	 to	work,	 all	of	
which	are	the	poorest	regions	 in	China.	However,	Humphrey	also	 found	that	
although	 these	 regions	 are	 poorer	 than	 others,	 they	 enjoyed	 the	 most	
international	aids	and	therefore	contributed	to	some	of	the	most	prosperous	
local	NGO	communities	 in	China.	 In	2010,	Humphrey	decided	to	quit	his	 job,	
went	back	to	his	hometown	J,	and	set	up	his	own	organization.	In	a	journalist	
interview,	Humphrey	said,	“since	J	is	neither	poor	nor	rich	enough,	it	seems	to	
be	totally	forgotten.	No	INGOs,	no	domestic	donors,	nothing.	If	no	one	takes	care	
of	 NGOs	 in	 J,	 I	 would	 do	 it”.	 From	 Humphrey’s	 word,	 he	 took	 gongyi	 as	 an	
equivalent	 of	 NGO	 development.	 In	 my	 fieldwork,	 I	 found	 him	 not	 very	
interested	 in	 the	 issues	 like	 donation	 or	 media	 coverage	 that	 were	 highly	
emphasized	by	AF	and	GVC.	In	his	knowledge,	gongyi	was	more	an	independent	
sector	consisted	by	formal,	structured	organizations	with	their	own	expertise	
to	deal	with	local	social	problems,	rather	than	something	that	can	be	directly	
related	to	the	general	public.	 	 	 	
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Humphrey’s	 wife	 Sue	was	 a	 devout	 Buddhist,	 active	 in	 volunteer	 work	 and	
underground	religious	activities	when	at	grad	school.	When	Humphrey	wanted	
to	launch	his	own	organization,	Sue	became	his	first	employee.	Different	from	
GVC	that	had	about	20	workers,	in	2017	GH	was	still	a	very	small	organization,	
with	only	3	full	time	workers	(including	the	couple	founders)	and	2	part-time	
ones.	When	I	was	visiting	GH	in	the	winter	of	2016,	about	60%	to	70%	of	GH’s	
annual	income	came	from	AF;	two	out	of	the	three	full	time	workers’	salary	at	
GH	were	also	from	AF’s	funding.	The	office	of	GH	was	a	small	room	located	in	a	
quite	 old	 building,	 shared	with	 another	 organization.	 There	were	 five	 small	
tables	in	the	room,	which	was	very	crowded	with	big	boxes	of	disaster	relief	
materials,	books,	documents	and	snacks.	 	
When	Humphrey	launched	GH	in	Nan,	the	capital	city	of	K	province	in	2011,	he	
found	 it	 very	 difficult	 to	 get	 registered	 with	 the	 local	 government.	 In	 an	
interview	with	him,	he	attributed	his	difficulties	to	the	“backwardness	of	the	
local	 gongyi	 environment”.	 In	 2010	 when	 Humphrey	 called	 the	 Civil	 Affair	
Bureau	in	the	city	Nan	for	registration	for	the	first	time,	the	officials	just	asked	
questions	about	his	personal	background	and	then	refused	his	application.	As	
a	stranger	in	the	city,	Humphrey’s	working	experience	of	INGO	as	well	as	GH’s	
funding	 from	 Oxfam	 made	 him	 very	 “suspicious”	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	 the	 local	
government.	Then	he	soon	found	that	except	GONGOs,	there	were	only	less	than	
ten	registered	NGOs	in	the	capital	city	at	that	time;	the	local	government	did	
not	know	much	about	the	unregistered	groups	either.	This	awkward	situation	
lasted	until	2012,	when	a	serious	summer	flood	occurred	in	K	province.	For	the	
first	time,	Humphrey	and	Sue	decided	to	do	disaster	relief	by	cooperating	with	
AF:	 GH	 helped	 to	 coordinate	 the	 local	 volunteer	 groups,	 and	AF	 offered	 the	
materials	 and	media	 resources	 (including	 coverage	 from	 People’s	 Daily	 and	
China	 Central	 TV,	 the	 influential	 state-owned	 media	 in	 Beijing).	 The	 media	
reports	 and	 the	 endorsement	 from	AF	 seemed	 quite	welcomed	 by	 the	 local	
government:	although	they	knew	little	about	GH	and	Humphrey,	but	they	all	
had	heard	about	 the	entrepreneurs	and	AF	quite	often.	Being	depicted	as	 “a	
helping	hand”	of	the	local	government	in	the	summer	flood	in	the	news	reports,	
GH	proved	its	“practical	values”	as	a	welfare	deliverer	to	the	local	society.	Then	
in	the	end	of	2012,	Humphrey	organized	a	conference	so	that	the	unregistered	
groups	in	K	could	communicate	with	each	other	(most	of	which	had	helped	GH	
in	the	summer	disaster	relief);	the	local	officials	were	also	invited.	Soon	after	
the	 conference,	 the	 registration	 procedures	 in	 the	 city	 of	N	were	 simplified.	
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Humphrey’s	 organization,	 with	 other	 8	 organizations,	 got	 registered	 at	 the	
beginning	of	2013.	At	a	diner	with	Humphrey	and	his	wife,	he	explained	how	
AF	was	valuable	to	his	organization:	
“So,	 you	 see?	 AF	 is	 a	 quite	 useful	 political	 umbrella	 for	 our	
organization.	The	 local	government	may	not	understand	what	NGO	
means,	but	 they	all	know	AF	and	 its	 founders,	 they	understand	 the	
good	deeds	we	have	done	in	the	summer	flood.	Even	now	some	INGOs	
give	 me	 resources	 to	 do	 disaster	 related	 issues,	 I	 can	 just	 tell	 the	
officials	that	these	donations	are	just	like	AF.	Think	about	this,	if	now	
I	 call	 off	 the	 cooperation	 with	 AF,	 GH	 would	 be	 like	 the	 only	
organization	fully	funded	by	international	organizations	in	K	province.	
What	would	the	government	do	to	us?”	 	
Humphrey’s	 words	 can	 make	 more	 sense	 if	 we	 compare	 the	 two	 types	 of	
projects	sponsored	by	its	two	major	donors:	AF	and	Oxfam.	For	AF-sponsored	
projects,	most	 of	 its	 funding	went	 to	 the	 purchase	 of	 various	 disaster	 relief	
materials	in	the	local	society;	and	most	of	GH’s	jobs	(as	AF’s	local	partner)	were	
around	logistics	and	volunteer	coordination.	But	for	the	projects	sponsored	by	
Oxfam,	GH	did	a	lot	of	work	on	“civil	rights	protection	programs”	in	providing	
small	grants	and	public	advocacy	for	the	social	minority	groups	including	the	
disabled,	 LGBTQ,	 and	 HIV	 groups	 in	 K	 province.	 According	 to	 Sue,	 Oxfam	
seemed	 	 like	their	“true	friend	(zhen	pengyou,	真朋友)”	in	doing	‘real	gongyi’,	
but	AF	was	just	using	GH	as	a	tool	for	marketing	and	branding	in	occupying	the	
‘local	market’	for	the	foundation	itself.	
Not	surprisingly,	the	local	government	did	not	welcome	GH’s	partnership	with	
Oxfam:	during	my	fieldwork	I	attended	a	meeting	between	Humphrey	and	the	
local	government	officials.	In	the	meeting,	GH	was	criticized	as	“not	focusing	on	
its	major	role	of	being	an	NGO	supporting	center	but	wasting	too	much	energy	
on	 those	 fields	 that	 government	 would	 never	 support”.	 In	 fact,	 GH’s	 close	
collaboration	 with	 Oxfam	 and	 local	 activism	 did	 raise	 concerns	 from	 the	
national	security	departments	in	the	city	Nan	with	frequent	checks	and	close	
surveillances	of	their	daily	operation.	I	also	found	that	in	some	conversations	
with	Perry	and	AF	leaders,	they	were	not	happy	with	those	programs	related	to	
sexual	minority	and	HIV/AIDs	group	either,	thinking	these	works	would	only	
bring	GH	more	troubles.	 	
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Except	 the	 cooperation	 in	 specific	 disaster	 related	 projects,	 AF	 also	 tried	 to	
shape	GH’s	daily	work	by	disseminating	its	knowledge	of	how	to	do	gongyi.	But	
these	 efforts	 went	 not	 smoothly	 in	 the	 end.	 In	 2015,	 AF	 and	 several	 new	
domestic	 foundations	 launched	 a	 grant	 together	 to	 promote	 “professional	
gongyi”.	An	important	part	of	this	program	was	called	as	‘Gongyi-Business	Elite	
Plan’.	This	plan	aimed	to	attract	talents	from	the	business	world	to	work	for	
NGOs,	 so	as	 to	 raise	NGOs’	 ‘working	efficiency’	and	 their	 “professionality”	 in	
terms	 of	 fundraising,	 marketing,	 branding,	 and	 management.	 Ten	 business	
professionals	 would	 be	 paid	 by	 AF	 to	 work	 for	 its	 ten	 different	 partner	
organizations	 at	 ‘a	market	 price’:	 at	 least	 10	 thousand	 pounds	 per	 year	 per	
person.	 Humphrey	 and	 Sue	 told	 me	 that	 they	 did	 not	 want	 to	 join	 such	 a	
program	 at	 the	 first	 hand,	 since	 they	 did	 not	 think	 they	 really	 need	 a	
‘sophisticated	 fundraising	officer’	 in	such	a	small	organization.	However,	 the	
leaders	of	AF	thought	that	it	was	just	because	GH	was	still	so	small	in	the	past	
several	years;	GH	should	change	their	development	strategy	to	become	“bigger	
and	more	competitive”.	In	fact,	in	an	internal	meeting	of	AF	when	some	senior	
managers	 discussed	 their	 partner	 organizations,	 a	 project	 officer	 Anthony	
complained	about	Humphrey	and	GH	like	this:	
“Last	 year	 I	 wanted	 to	 help	 GH	 to	 design	 a	 good	 product	 that	 can	
enhance	their	competitiveness	in	the	market,	so	that	they	can	sell	that	
product	to	those	who	can	pay	them	more.	But	the	whole	counseling	
process	was	extremely	hard.	I	need	to	change	Humphrey’s	brain	first,	
but	it	was	really	difficult	to	communicate	with	him	about	the	product	
design”.	
Anthony’s	words	 raised	 agreements	 among	 some	of	 his	 colleagues,	 the	 then	
program	director	Calvin	concluded:	
“To	select	which	partner	organization,	we	should	give	more	supports	
is	also	a	process	of	 selecting	a	good	organization	 leader.	There	 is	a	
group	of	old	NGO	people	in	our	sector	that	have	been	long	influenced	
by	international	donors,	the	so-called	civil	society	ideas.	These	people	
are	full	of	stubborn	ideals,	but	do	not	notice	that	time	has	changed.	
Humphrey	seems	a	bit	more	lightened	up	now	by	working	with	us”.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Finally,	 for	 the	 ‘Gongyi-Business	 Elites	 Plan’,	 AF’s	workers	 persuaded	GH	 to	
accept	 a	 very	experienced	 insurance	 salesman.	 “You	know,	 they	 told	us	 that	
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insurance	 salesman	 knew	 how	 to	 do	 promotion	 by	 knocking	 on	 everyone’s	
door,	that’s	what	we	need	for	social	mobilization	and	public	participation	today.	
So	we	finally	agreed	to	have	a	try”,	Sue	said.	But	only	three	months	later,	the	
insurance	salesman	recommended	by	AF	resigned	 from	his	 job;	Sue	 told	me	
that	the	salesman	couldn’t	understand	her	and	Humphrey	at	all,	or	in	her	words,	
“no	any	self-identity	with	our	organization	and	the	way	we	work”.	In	fact,	this	
program	created	a	very	 ironic	scene	 in	GH:	based	on	 the	“market	price”,	 the	
plan	 paid	 more	 than	 800	 pounds	 a	 month	 to	 an	 experienced	 salesman	 to	
enhance	the	“professionalization	and	organizational	competitiveness”;	but	as	
the	organizational	directors,	Humphrey	and	Sue	could	only	get	about	300	to	
400	pounds	a	month	each,	although	their	salary	was	funded	by	the	same	donor.	 	
	
6.5	“We	should	do	gongyi	together!”	
So	far,	 it	seems	that	AF	was	only	useful	 in	a	very	utilitarian	way	for	GH,	as	a	
political	shelter	and	a	financial	resource.	Also	given	the	big	differences	between	
GH	 and	 GVC,	 the	 Humphrey	 couple	 often	 had	 conflicts	 with	 Perry	 and	 AF	
leaders	in	funding	distribution.	It	seemed	that	the	partnership	between	the	two	
organizations	may	not	be	that	strong	since	they	had	very	different	agenda.	But	
the	 longer	 I	 stayed	with	GH	workers,	 the	more	 I	 realized	 that	GH	were	 still	
sharing	 the	 same	 thinking	 pattern	 of	 gongyi,	 although	 there	 could	 be	
differences	in	terms	of	specific	working	skills	and	strategies	in	their	daily	work.	
It	should	be	noted	that	Humphrey’s	“stubborn	civil	society	ideas”	were	largely	
based	 on	 the	 anti-state	 politics	 in	 China.	 Although	 Humphrey	 and	 Sue	 put	
helping	the	social	minority	groups	as	his	working	priority	(rather	than	serving	
the	donors),	they	held	that	it	was	the	state	and	the	party-state	that	should	be	
responsible	 for	 these	 groups,	 rather	 than	 others.	 Like	 many	 Chinese	
intellectuals	who	take	private	entrepreneurs	as	a	“natural	ally	of	Chinese	civil	
society”	 in	 the	 post	 1989	 era,	 Humphrey	 thought	 it	was	more	 important	 to	
make	 solidarity	 with	 other	 NGOs	 and	 non-state	 actors,	 regardless	 of	 the	
differences	between	them.	Against	 this	backdrop,	 the	AF	workers,	as	well	as	
many	private	entrepreneurs,	often	shared	the	same	name:	“liberalists	(ziyou	
zhuyi	zhe自由主义者)”	(Li,	2017).	 	 At	a	dinner	with	me,	Humphrey	explained	
why	he	would	why	he	would	like	to	keep	a	long	partnership	with	AF	and	GVC:	
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“You	know,	even	I	had	serious	debates	with	AF	and	Perry,	I	think	we	
are	 still	 friends.	 Because	 we	 all	 have	 strong	 gongyi	 qinghuai	
(mentality	 or	 passion,	 情怀)”.	 “Then	what	 do	 you	mean	 by	gongyi	
qinghuai	 here?	 A	 warm	 heart	 to	 do	 good	 deeds?”	 I	 asked.	 “No,	 of	
course	not.	We	are	all	liberals,	we	believe	in	the	same	value,	like	what	
a	good	government	should	be	like	in	China…So	we	should	do	gongyi	
together!”	 	 	 	 	 	 	
In	 my	 fieldwork,	 Humphrey	 was	 not	 the	 only	 one	 preferred	 to	 identifying	
themselves	as	a	“liberalist”,	rather	than	just	a	“NGO	worker”.	There	was	even	
an	active	social	media	group	named	“Liberalists	of	China’s	NGO	sector”	with	
more	than	200	members,	while	Humphrey,	Perry,	Calvin,	and	many	other	AF	
workers	were	all	active	members	of	this	group.	The	group	chats	maintained	a	
wide	array	of	topics	from	financial	situations	in	China,	discussions	of	Friedrich	
Hayek’s	books,	NGO	regulation	changes,	to	world	politics.	In	the	group	chats,	I	
found	 that	 people	 normally	 took	 “civil	 society”	 almost	 as	 an	 equivalent	 of	
“gongyi”.	The	slight	difference	between	these	two	words	was	that	“civil	society”	
in	China’s	NGO	sector	in	the	past	contained	only	political	meanings	as	anti-state	
politics	(see	more	in	chapter	2);	now	for	gongyi,	people	also	need	to	think	more	
proactively	 about	 “cooperating	 with	 more	 cross	 borders	 (like	 the	 business	
elites)”.	But	no	matter	what	languages	people	used	in	China’s	NGO	sector,	they	
were	identified	as	the	same	in	the	political	nature	as	‘liberal’.	
In	this	sense,	GH	should	be	seen	as	a	supporter	of	AF	and	reproducer	of	gongyi	
thinking	patterns.	The	support	was	not	just	demonstrated	in	similar	political	
stances,	but	also	these	NGO	workers	had	very	similar	mindsets	in	terms	of	the	
role	 that	 NGOs	 should	 play	 in	 contributing	 to	 Chinese	 society.	 In	 many	
circumstances,	Humphrey	and	Sue	 told	me	 that	 they	 thought	 ‘the	grassroots	
NGOs	in	China	are	quite	immature’,	so	 ‘they	should	be	more	“organized”	and	
“professional”	 by	working	with	 big	 donors’.	 Then	 I	 asked	 them	why	 a	more	
organized	 and	 professional	 organization	 could	 be	 so	 important	 in	 China,	
Humphrey	gave	me	an	interesting	answer:	 	
“Have	you	ever	heard	about	Tocqueville?	 In	his	book,	he	concluded	
that	NGOs	could	contribute	to	democracy.	That	is	exactly	what	China	
needs	today.	The	stronger,	the	more	organized	NGO	we	have	today,	
the	better	it	would	be	for	future”.	 	
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Humphrey’s	words	were	very	similar	to	many	of	AF’s	leaders’	internal	speeches,	
which	 often	 claimed	 that	NGOs,	 including	 their	 partner	 organizations	 in	 the	
local	societies,	were	important	in	producing	a	stronger	social	force	in	China	for	
a	 more	 peaceful	 social	 and	 political	 transformation.	 In	 my	 fieldwork,	 I	
encountered	 Tocqueville’s	 name	 repeatedly,	 in	 particular,	 his	 theories	were	
part	of	the	internal	training	contents	at	AF	in	August	2016.	During	my	visits	to	
different	 organizations	 across	 the	 country,	 I	 could	 also	 find	 Tocqueville’s	
Democracy	in	America	very	often	on	their	bookshelves.	 	 	
But	Tocqueville	never	mentioned	the	specific	strategies	of	how	to	make	NGOs	
stronger	 (particularly	 in	 China’s	 context);	 while	 AF’s	 standardized	 projects	
turned	 out	 to	 be	 a	 good	 option	 of	 “strengthening	 grassroots	 organizational	
capacity”	across	the	country	in	a	short	period.	In	reality,	GH’s	partnership	with	
AF	became	one	of	the	important	procedures	of	disseminating	and	reproducing	
gongyi	paradigm	in	the	local	society:	in	the	past	few	years,	GH	actively	invited	
all	the	organizations	and	groups	they	knew	in	K	province	to	do	AF’s	projects	
(for	 example,	Humphrey	 invited	 a	mutual	 help	 group	of	 homophiles	 to	 help	
distribute	the	flood	relief	materials).	Such	projects	were	quite	easy	and	highly	
standardized,	like	distributing	disaster	relief	materials	or	building	AF-designed	
art	classrooms	or	playgrounds.	More	than	one	interviewee	even	told	me	that	
the	most	they	learnt	from	AF	was	not	about	how	to	do	disaster	relief	or	child	
protection,	 but	 the	 standardized	 project	 management	 skills.	 This	 statement	
echoed	with	a	public	speech	made	by	AF’s	then	program	director	Calvin	in	the	
National	Charity	Fair	in	Shenzhen	in	2016.	He	said	he	was	very	proud	to	see	
that	AF	had	successfully	promoted	grassroots	NGOs’	capacity	by	the	everyday	
training	of	“project	management”	skills:	“that	is	the	way	AF	does	modern	gongyi:	
we	are	not	supporting	organizations	from	one	to	another,	we	are	supporting	
organizations	 in	a	 large	 scale	 so	 that	everyone	can	participate	 in	 the	easiest	
way”.	 	
	
Discussion	and	conclusion	
There	have	been	discussions	on	the	interactions,	especially	the	networking	and	
alliances	 among	NGOs	 in	 China.	 In	 literatures,	 scholars	 pay	 attention	 to	 the	
limitations	 that	 constrain	 the	 cooperation	 among	 Chinese	 NGOs	 and	 the	
survival	strategies	(e.g.	Dong,	Guo,	&	Huang,	2019;	Hu,	Guo,	&	Bies,	2016;	Peng	
	 170	
&	Wu,	2018;	Shieh	&	Deng,	2011;	Teets,	2009).	These	scholars	explain	how	the	
various	 NGO	 regulations	 and	 the	 political	 censorship	 in	 China	 have	 greatly	
impeded	 the	networking	 and	 collaboration	 among	different	NGOs	 and	other	
social	actors.	As	we	discuss	further	in	this	chapter,	 those	repressive	national	
policies	can	be	dated	back	to	three	decades	ago;	the	1989	Student	Movement	in	
Beijing	could	be	one	of	the	major	reasons	in	producing	such	restrictive	policies.	
Also	 some	other	 scholars	 look	at	how	NGO	cooperation	could	be	possible	 in	
China’s	context,	particularly	they	examine	the	rise	and	fall	of	the	NGO	alliances	
appeared	 in	 several	 devastating	natural	 disasters	 in	 the	past	 few	years	 (e.g.	
Deng,	2008;	Dong	et	al.,	2019;	Kang,	2017;	Teets,	2009a).	Most	of	their	research	
emphasize	the	role	that	social	media	played	in	establishing	such	alliances	in	a	
very	short	time	(e.g.	A.	Yang,	2017;	G.	Yang,	2012),	and	attribute	the	collapse	to	
the	 external	 political	 factors	 and	 mistrusts	 among	 different	 organization	
leaders	(e.g.	Kang,	2017;	Lai,	Zhu,	Tao,	&	Spires,	2015).	In	these	researches,	the	
political	 limitation	of	NGO	networking	 in	China	not	only	constrain	 the	social	
environment	 they	 are	 living	 in,	 but	 also	 it	 greatly	 shapes	 people’s	mindset:	
organizations	 need	 to	 be	 self-constrained	 and	 censored	 to	 survive	 in	 this	
dynamic	political	environment.	 	
But	what’s	missing	 in	the	current	discussion	 is	 that	most	researchers	do	not	
analyze	 the	 nature	 and	 internal	 structure	 of	 these	 so-called	 networking	 or	
cooperation.	 In	this	chapter,	 I	argue	that	 in	the	various	forms	of	 interactions	
between	NGOs,	new	knowledge,	 language	and	skills	of	gongyi	have	also	been	
disseminated	and	negotiated.	The	rise	and	fall	of	Chinese	NGO	alliance	may	not	
be	 necessarily	 attributed	 to	 the	 external	 political	 opportunities,	 since	
“collaboration”	or	 “cooperation”	may	also	 lead	 to	 interest	and/or	 ideological	
conflicts	 as	well	 as	 hierarchy	production.	 For	 example,	Wu	 (2012),	 suggests	
that	 the	 languages	 and	 ideologies	 used	 in	 China’s	 NGOs	 are	 borrowed	 from	
various	local	public	intellectuals,	activists	and	scholars.	This	would	suggest	that	
the	 activists	 and	 NGO	 leaders	 are	 natural	 allies.	 However,	 the	 potential	
collaboration	is	undermined	by	very	different	agendas.	This	is	illustrated	very	
clearly	 in	 Zhou’s	 (2018)	 research	 on	 China’s	 equal	 education	 campaign	 in	
Beijing	 	 where	 the	 gap	 between	 the	 human	 rights	 organizations	 and	 the	
community-based	NGOs	 led	 to	 the	 collapse	 of	 their	 partnership.	 The	human	
rights	 activists	 saw	 the	 campaign	 as	 part	 of	 a	 larger	 constitutional	 project	
aimed	 at	 challenging	 the	 political	 regime.	 By	 contrast,	 NGO	 workers	 at	 the	
community	level	simply	wanted	to	improve	immigrant	children’s	welfare	and	
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thought	the	activities	would	threaten	any	progress	that	has	been	made	in	this	
regard	(ibid).	 	
The	 chapter	 reminds	 us	 to	 reflect	 on	 the	 concepts	 like	 “partnership”	 or	
“collaboration”	 that	people	often	use	 in	studying	 the	 third	sector,	 since	such	
words	may	neutralize	or	conceal	the	mechanisms	of	hierarchy	making	process	
among	different	 social	organizations	 in	 the	 reality.	Besides,	 even	 though	 the	
Chinese	 state	 does	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	 shaping	 the	 knowledge	
dissemination	 and	 organizational	 interactions	 in	 China’s	 NGO	 sector,	 their	
impacts	 in	 shaping	 Chinese	NGOs	 could	 be	 also	 highly	 contextualized	 at	 the	
local	 level,	deeply	embedded	within	the	local	economic	conditions	and	social	
relations.	 Corporatism	 is	 still	 a	 very	 useful	 analytical	 tool	 in	 understanding	
Chinese	NGOs	today,	but	this	research	also	suggests	using	it	in	a	more	localized	
and	flexible	way.	 	
Moreover,	a	thread	of	the	stories	in	this	chapter	is	the	legacies	and	influences	
of	international	aids	in	China.	Although	they	have	been	leaving	the	mainstream	
arena	in	China’s	NGO	sector,	their	local	partners	and	former	workers	are	still	
playing	very	important	but	invisible	roles	in	shaping	the	whole	sector.	These	
“old	NGO	people”,	as	Calvin	called	it	(in	section	6.4),	have	still	kept	active	in	this	
field	though	with	very	different	faces.	Although	many	international	donors	in	
China	have	been	criticized	as	‘not	grounded	enough’	(as	discussed	in	chapter	4,	
also	see	Hsia	and	White,	2002;	Spires,	2012),	their	precedents	seem	to	be	no	
better:	 the	new	domestic	donors	 are	 trying	 to	 ‘modernize’	Chinese	NGOs	by	
large	scale	standardizing,	disciplining	the	smaller	organizations	with	different	
agendas.	 This	 trend	 has	 been	 strengthened	 by	 grassroots	 workers’	 popular	
belief	of	the	ideas	on	anti-state	politics.	However,	we	can	hardly	say	that	the	
new	donors	and	their	hegemonic	gongyi	is	de-contextualizing	or	escaping	from	
the	Chinese	society.	Rather,	 it	 is	better	 to	view	it	as	a	mirror	and	product	of	
political	and	social	change	in	China	today.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
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Chapter	7	 	 The	making	of	a	‘gongyi	people’:	everyday	life	in	the	
local	society	 	
It	was	a	rainy	December	afternoon	in	the	city	of	Nan,	K	Province.	I	was	sitting	
in	GH’s	office,	shaking	my	feet	to	keep	myself	warm.	The	temperature	was	8	
Celsius	degree	outside,	while	the	office	room	was	also	cold	and	very	humid	with	
only	a	 small	heater	 (there	was	no	 central	heating	 in	 the	 city).	 I	 knew	 it	was	
better	to	stay	in	the	room,	at	least	it	was	bright	and	smelled	good.	There	was	a	
stinky	 toilet	 just	 next	 door	 that	we	 had	 to	 share	with	more	 than	 20	 people	
working	on	the	same	floor,	a	quite	old	toilet	with	a	dirty	pit	and	a	rusty	faucet.	
There	 were	 four	 desks	 in	 the	 office;	 one	 of	 them	 belonged	 to	 another	
'organization'	working	for	the	local	disabled	people,	although	this	organization	
only	had	one	full	time	worker.	GH	did	not	rent	the	office;	it	belonged	to	a	local	
GONGO	called	‘City	Nan’s	Social	Organization	Incubation	Center’,	affiliated	with	
the	Civil	Affairs	Bureau	(CAB)	of	the	city	government.	The	whole	floor,	including	
five	 office	 rooms	 and	 two	 conference	 rooms,	was	 owned	 by	 the	GONGO.	 By	
signing	up	an	‘incubating	contract’	with	this	GONGO,	GH	could	move	into	one	of	
the	rooms	for	free;	at	the	same	time,	GH	became	one	of	the	cases	in	showing	
how	successful	the	incubation	center	was	in	producing	more	NGOs	in	the	city.	
Most	of	the	people	working	next	door	to	GH's	room	were	the	local	CAB	officials.	
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Figure	7.1	A	picture	of	GH	office.	Photo	by	the	author.	
	 	
This	was	the	first	time	that	I	visited	Humphrey	and	Sue	in	their	office,	although	
I	had	known	them	a	year	ago	through	a	mutual	friend.	The	couple	was	the	only	
two	full-time	workers	at	that	time,	although	they	also	had	a	part-time	worker	
and	several	volunteers.	GH’s	office	did	not	surprise	me	at	all;	as	in	my	former	
working	experience,	I	had	seen	many	Chinese	NGOs’	offices	just	like	this	in	a	
small	room,	with	very	few	workers.	 	
Comparing	with	AF	workers	in	a	hierarchic	organization	in	the	city	of	Shenzhen,	
doing	gongyi	in	this	small	office	room	in	K	province	has	different	meanings.	For	
one	thing,	in	my	fieldwork	with	AF’s	partner	organizations	across	7	different	
provinces,	none	of	them	had	set	up	any	devices	or	designed	their	office	rooms	
in	the	way	that	deliberately	separated	their	 ‘gongyi	 jobs’	 from	other	parts	of	
everyday	 life.	As	we	discussed	 in	Chapter	5,	 in	 the	 ‘learning	 from	corporate’	
reform,	AF	set	up	a	system	to	record	each	staff’s	working	hours,	including	the	
fingerprint	 reader	 in	 the	 office.	When	 an	 AF	worker	 entered	 into	 the	 office	
every	morning,	he	or	she	needed	to	change	into	a	different	identity	by	scanning	
their	fingerprint,	registering	their	attendance	via	the	online	system,	sitting	in	a	
fixed	table	with	their	name	tags	and	official	titles,	and	sometimes,	getting	a	free	
iced	coffee	from	the	reception	desk	to	‘refresh	themselves’.	It	is	difficult	to	say	
that	 how	 this	 well-designed	 office	 life	 would	 contribute	 to	 AF's	 various	
humanitarian	projects,	but	it	did	help	most	of	the	AF	workers	establish	a	new,	
professional	 identity	 as	 part	 of	 the	 'white-collar'	 community	 in	 one	 of	 the	
prosperous	 cities	 in	 the	 country.	 Therefore,	 in	 many	 public	 speeches	 and	
presentations,	 I	 found	 that	 most	 of	 my	 AF	 colleagues	 would	 introduce	
themselves	by	their	official	titles	at	AF	to	show	the	professionalism1.	 	
But	 things	were	 quite	 different	 for	 the	 grassroots	 organizations	 in	 the	 local	
society	 that	 I	 encountered.	 Given	 the	 limited	 size	 of	 these	 organizations,	 I	
hardly	 knew	 what	 their	 ‘official	 titles’	 were;	 most	 of	 them	 would	 simply	
introduce	 themselves	as	 ‘a	gongyi	people’	 (gongyi	 ren,	公益人),	or	 ‘a	person	
	
1	 The	attempts	of	creating	a	professional	 identity	 is	not	unique	for	AF,	 I	also	
found	very	similar	phenomena	during	my	visits	with	other	new	foundations	in	
China.	 	
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working	for	gongyi’.	In	some	public	occasions,	they	would	not	even	mention	the	
name	of	their	organizations,	as	these	organizations	were	not	the	only	way	that	
they	were	doing	gongyi.	Instead,	people	like	Humphrey	and	Perry	would	talk	
about	which	part	of	China	they	were	from	(as	a	representative	of	the	local	NGO	
community),	 explaining	 who	 they	 were	 and	what	 they	 did	 by	 their	 various	
relations	with	the	local	GONGOs,	governmental	bodies,	business	circle.	Before	
my	fieldwork	with	AF’s	partner	organizations,	what	I	had	learned	in	AF’s	office	
were	not	 their	daily	operations	at	 the	organizational	 level,	but	mostly	about	
these	organization	leaders’	names,	their	personal	networks	and	backgrounds,	
as	well	as	their	various	social	relations	in	the	local	society.	 	
Furthermore,	 many	 of	 these	 local	 organizations	 were	 running	 like	 a	 family	
business.	Each	‘family	business’,	as	demonstrated	in	this	chapter,	also	involves	
gendered	labor	divisions,	very	similar	to	the	‘one	family,	two	systems’	pattern	
as	AF	workers.	In	the	meantime,	the	‘gongyi	people’	in	this	chapter	were	more	
open	to	showing	and	discussing	their	work	with	their	faiths,	although	they	did	
it	in	different	ways.	Therefore,	we	may	find	that	for	local	 ‘gongyi	people’,	the	
boundaries	between	“private	life”	and	“work”,	“home”	and	“office”,	“family”	and	
“business”	could	be	quite	ambiguous.	The	ambiguousness	also	appeared	from	
the	multiple	jobs	and	identities	of	these	‘gongyi	people’	and	their	everyday	life.	
Like	Chapter	5,	this	chapter	focuses	on	the	meaning	of	gongyi	at	individual	level,	
aiming	 to	 answer	 the	 third	 overarching	 question.	 In	 AF’s	 case,	 most	 of	 its	
workers	only	had	one	job	as	a	‘gongyi	professional’	working	at	AF.	But	for	the	
‘gongyi	people’	in	the	local	society,	they	could	also	be	running	other	businesses	
at	the	same	time,	such	as	small	companies,	religious	groups,	consultants	of	local	
governments,	affiliations	of	the	local	GONGOs,	and	so	forth.	
In	my	 fieldwork,	 I	 found	 that	 these	multiple	 social	 identities	and	 jobs	of	 the	
‘gongyi	people’	were	not	separated	from	each	other;	on	the	other	hand,	 they	
were	highly	 intertwined.	The	capacity	of	 cultivating,	bridging,	and	managing	
the	various	social	relations	has	largely	redefined	what	is	a	professional	gongyi	
worker	in	the	local	society,	which	differs	from	AF	workers	in	many	ways.	The	
most	crucial	knowledge	and	skills	in	this	new	professionalism,	as	I	present	in	
the	case	studies,	are	not	those	from	the	corporates	and	entrepreneurs,	but	the	
capabilities,	 performances,	 and	 relations	 that	 could	 contribute	 to	 more	
oligarchic	and	charismatic	NGO	leaders	 in	the	 local	society.	Given	their	close	
relations	with	the	local	government	and	officials,	these	extraordinary	‘gongyi	
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people’	and	their	organizations	finally	helped	the	local	NGO	community	to	be	
deeper	incorporated	into	the	local	state.	In	this	sense,	I	argue	that	corporatism	
is	 not	 just	 a	 concept	 of	 understanding	 the	 state	 politics	 in	 authoritarian	
countries,	 but	 also	 in	 the	 local	 society,	 it	 is	 an	 arrangement	 of	 organizing	
people’s	everyday	life	from	their	social	relations,	family	life,	to	their	religions.	
This	 chapter,	 like	 chapter	 6,	 divides	 the	 ‘gongyi	 people’	 into	 two	 types:	 the	
‘incapable	gongyi	people’,	and	those	‘successful’,	 ‘professional	gongyi	people’.	
For	 the	 “failing”	 type,	 I	 discuss	 the	 personal	 history	 of	 Humphrey	 and	 my	
participation	observation	experience	with	him	in	doing	modern	gongyi	in	the	
city.	For	the	“successful”	type,	I	talk	about	the	stories	of	Perry	and	Sarah’s	daily	
life,	which	would	lead	us	to	their	daily	activities	in	different	spaces.	Then	the	
chapter	summarizes	and	discusses	the	key	factors	in	constituting	a	successful,	
professional	'gongyi	people’	that	I	have	found	in	the	local	society:	building	and	
managing	social	relations	across	different	sectors,	practicing	their	religions	in	
distinctive	ways,	and	their	relations	with	the	local	state.	 	 	
	
7.1	Humphrey:	the	life	of	“poor	philanthropist”	
Born	 in	1973,	Humphrey	 is	older	 than	Sarah	and	Perry,	but	very	 few	people	
would	call	him	“elder	brother”	in	the	NGO	sector.	In	AF’s	office,	quite	often	my	
colleagues	would	praise	him	for	his	hard	work,	but	GH	was	seen	as	a	negative	
example,	 lacking	 “organization	 capacity	 of	 doing	 modern	 gongyi".	 In	 an	
interview	with	a	former	AF	worker	in	Beijing,	she	thought	that	the	"reason	why	
GH	is	still	so	small	[in	terms	of	its	size]	is	that	the	organization's	leader	is	so	
weak	[of	linking	the	media	and	government	resources]	in	the	local	society".	In	
my	 fieldwork,	 a	 study	of	Humphrey's	personal	history	makes	 it	 clearer	why	
Humphrey	and	his	organization	was	not	 that	 respected	as	 the	others:	as	 the	
person	who	had	been	"far	lagging	behind”	in	China’s	economic	development,	
Humphrey	never	got	the	chance	to	set	up	his	own	company	or	dig	out	his	first	
gold	like	the	other	successful	‘gongyi	people’.	AF’s	modern	gongyi	model,	which	
highly	emphasized	the	commercial	skills	in	fundraising	and	marketing,	was	a	
huge	challenge	for	people	like	Humphrey	who	never	had	such	business	skills	or	
experiences.	Furthermore,	seen	as	an	organization	with	potential	political	risks,	
Humphrey	and	GH	never	had	the	advantage	(like	GVC)	of	learning	the	language	
of	communicating	with	the	local	authorities.	 	 	
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7.1.1	Humphrey’s	early	years	 	
There	were	many	different	versions	of	Humphrey's	early	life.	Someone	said	he	
had	many	years	of	working	experience	in	a	multinational	company	in	Shanghai	
and	spoke	very	good	English;	therefore,	to	become	a	gongyi	worker	was	a	big	
sacrifice	 for	 his	 career	 development.	 However,	 when	 I	 tried	 to	 confirm	 this	
story	with	Humphrey	and	his	wife	Sue,	both	of	them	laughed	and	shook	their	
heads.	Sue	said:	“Oh	I	cannot	imagine	that	Humphrey	would	be	so	high	ended	
one	 day.	 He	 did	 work	 in	 Shanghai	 for	 some	 years,	 but	 never	 in	 any	 big	
companies”.	
Humphrey	was	born	into	a	village	in	Province	K	when	his	mother,	 like	other	
young	 students	 from	 Shanghai,	was	 asked	 by	Mao	 to	 give	 up	 schooling	 and	
educate	herself	in	the	countryside.	In	the	late	1980s,	as	a	state	“compensation”,	
Humphrey’s	family	finally	got	an	opportunity	to	go	back	to	Shanghai	to	work	
again.	Humphrey	decided	 to	 take	 this	opportunity	 so	 that	his	younger	sister	
could	have	the	money	to	continue	her	studies.	In	the	early	1990s,	Humphrey	
was	allocated	with	a	job	to	work	for	a	university	in	Shanghai:	a	boiler	operator	
He	spent	ten	years	there	working	with	coals	and	hot	streams,	during	which	he	
earned	an	associate	degree	in	English	through	self-study.	Before	went	back	to	
his	hometown	to	establish	GH,	Humphrey	never	worked	for	any	big	companies	
or	 in	governmental	positions.	 Instead,	 as	 I	 read	 from	an	article	written	by	a	
friend	 of	 Humphrey	 in	 his	 blog,	 Humphrey	 attended	 many	 activities	 that	
seemed	to	be	"useless"	in	the	reformist	era:	teaching	English	in	rural	schools,	
joining	English	song	competitions,	launching	a	band,	writing	novels,	etc.	He	also	
joined	Action	Aid	for	five	years,	working	as	a	project	assistant	in	the	poorest	
regions	in	China.	Like	the	article	said,	"I	would	never	forget	that	in	this	noisy	
world,	 in	a	boiler's	chaotic	dorm,	a	person	was	working	at	the	bottom	of	the	
society	trying	to	absorb	nutrition	from	the	books	and	growing	up	like	a	big	tree".	
Humphrey’s	wife	Sue	had	a	master’s	degree	 in	religious	studies.	As	a	devout	
Buddhist,	 Sue	 was	 active	 in	 volunteer	 work	 and	 underground	 religious	
activities	when	at	grad	school,	and	finally	she	turned	Humphrey	a	Buddhist	too.	
So,	when	Humphrey	wanted	to	 launch	his	organization,	Sue	became	the	first	
employer.	 In	 the	 local	 NGO	 circle,	 many	 people	 knew	 Humphrey	 very	 well,	
taking	him	as	the	spokesman	of	GH.	Although	Sue	also	contributed	a	lot	to	the	
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organization	(if	not	less),	very	few	would	come	to	her	if	they	had	any	problems.	
In	an	evening	at	their	home,	Humphrey	started	to	smoke,	one	cigarette	after	
another	in	the	living	room,	when	Sue	and	I	were	having	tea	next	to	him.	Sue	
suddenly	talked	about	the	labor	division	rules	in	their	everyday	life	to	me:	
“Hey,	you	see,	this	is	the	reason	why	I	do	not	want	to	speak	outside	
and	socialize	with	the	other	organizations	with	Humphrey.	This	is	a	
man’s	 world,	 you	 need	 to	 join	 their	 hobbies,	 either	 drinking	 or	
smoking.	 Look	 at	 the	 AF	 senior	 managers,	 they	 are	 all	 heavy	
smokers…I	 have	 tried	 to	 persuade	 Humphrey	 to	 give	 up	 smoking	
many	times	but	it	is	not	working	at	all	as	long	as	he	needed	to	hang	
out	with	those	guys…I	really	dislike	these	things,	it	is	much	better	to	
stay	at	home	and	do	my	work…".	
In	many	aspects,	Sue	and	Humphrey’s	labor	division	in	their	office	and	home	
was	a	bit	different	from	most	of	the	AF	workers	in	the	pattern	of	‘one	family,	
two	systems’.	Although	Humphrey	had	been	seen	as	the	absolute	leader	of	GH,	
in	 their	everyday	 life	 from	project	management,	organizational	operation,	 to	
their	 family	 finance,	 it	was	 Sue	 rather	 than	Humphrey	 that	made	 the	major	
decisions.	 During	 my	 ethnography	 with	 this	 couple,	 although	 there	 were	
arguments	 from	 time	 to	 time,	 I	 could	 hardly	 see	 anyone	 of	 them	 as	 really	
‘dominating’	 either	 the	 office	 or	 their	 home.	 This	 also	 applies	 to	 my	
observations	of	GVC,	between	Perry	and	his	wife.	In	both	couples,	the	husband	
and	wife,	as	the	co-founders	of	their	businesses,	enjoyed	more	equal	status.	 	 	 	 	 	
During	my	stay	at	Humphrey	and	Sue’s	home,	I	was	surprised	that	they	even	
set	up	a	room	for	worshipping	 the	Buddha	 in	 their	apartment.	Both	of	 them	
would	wake	up	at	6	am	every	day,	za-zen	and	mediation	for	1	hour,	worship	on	
bended	knees	for	30mins,	and	then	cook	their	breakfast.	They	would	do	this	
again	before	sleep.	But	unlike	Perry	who	would	like	to	perform	Buddhism	with	
his	business	and	NGO	worker	altogether,	Humphrey	and	Sue	told	me	that	they	
tried	to	avoid	their	religion	in	their	daily	work	deliberately,	“since	this	is	a	quite	
personal	thing,	there	is	no	point	in	showing	it”,	said	Sue.	 	 	
The	office	of	GH	is	a	small	room	located	in	a	quite	old	building.	The	room	is	very	
crowded	with	big	boxes	of	disaster	relief	materials	from	AF,	books,	documents,	
and	snacks.	The	whole	atmosphere	was	quite	relaxing,	people	often	made	jokes	
with	each	other,	and	the	director	Humphrey	often	played	music	 in	the	office	
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during	the	lunch	break.	Unlike	the	AF	workers	that	are	more	conservative	about	
their	personal	stories,	I	almost	got	to	know	everyone’s	personal	background	in	
the	 office	 for	 the	 first	 time	 when	 I	 joined	 the	 “afternoon	 tea”	 at	 GH,	 when	
everyone	shared	their	snacks	in	the	room.	 	 As	a	recipient	of	AF’	funding,	Sue’s	
salary	was	380	pounds	per	month	in	2017;	Humphrey’s	was	even	lower,	about	
300	to	350,	which	just	reached	the	local	lowest	income	line.	 	
	
7.1.2	Getting	to	know	the	business	circle:	a	failed	attempt	
Inspired	 by	 AF’s	 modern	 gongyi,	 Humphrey	 tried	 to	 hang	 out	 with	 local	
entrepreneurs.	 In	 February	 2017,	 I	 had	 a	 chance	 to	 go	 with	 him	 for	 such	
occasion,	but	it	turned	out	to	be	a	quite	awkward	experience,	which	made	me	
realize	 the	 challenges	 that	 NGO	 leaders	 like	Humphrey	 had	 in	 getting	more	
integrated	into	the	local	elite	circles	for	“modern	gongyi”.	Humphrey	wanted	to	
thank	two	entrepreneurs	who	co-owned	a	 local	express	company,	since	they	
helped	Humphrey	 to	 send	 out	 disaster	 relief	materials	 in	 both	 summer	 and	
winter	 in	 the	 whole	 province	 for	 free.	 So,	 Humphrey	 hoped	 that	 these	 two	
entrepreneurs	 can	 continue	 their	 free	 express	 service	 in	 the	 next	 year	 and	
donate	 to	GH.	 I	 took	a	small	wooden	award	designed	by	GH,	and	Humphrey	
carried	two	bags	of	organic	rice	as	gifts.	It	took	us	more	than	2	hours	to	get	to	
the	company	office	by	bus.	Then	we	were	introduced	to	Mr.	Wang's	office	and	
kept	waiting	there	for	more	than	20	minutes	before	Mr.	Wang	appeared.	Mr.	
Wang	was	the	CEO	of	this	company	and	served	us	tea.	 	 Humphrey	expressed	
his	gratitude,	and	Wang	suggested	I	take	a	picture	for	him	and	Humphrey	with	
that	award.	Then	Wang	asked	 for	my	contact	 to	make	sure	he	can	have	 that	
picture	later.	When	I	sent	the	picture	to	his	phone,	he	murmured,	“Ah,	the	words	
on	the	award	are	not	big	enough”.	“Really?	Let	me	magnify	the	picture	for	you”,	
I	said.	“Wonderful!	That	is	what	I	want”,	Wang	said	with	a	big	smile,	“you	know	
why	I	need	this	picture?	I	would	post	it	on	my	social	media,	so	the	head	of	my	
son’s	school	could	see	it.	You	see,	there	is	‘AF	Benevolent	Enterprises’	on	the	
award.	The	school	head	will	be	happy	if	he	knows	I	have	such	a	close	relation	
with	AF”.	 	 	 	
Then	Mr.	Wang	 told	us	 that	 he	had	wanted	 to	 transfer	his	 son	 into	 a	 better	
primary	school,	but	he	did	not	know	anyone	in	such	schools.	 	 But	by	delivering	
materials	during	the	disasters,	he	got	to	know	a	team	leader	of	a	local	volunteer	
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group	who	was	a	friend	of	a	good	primary	school	head.	AF	had	donated	that	
school’s	playground	before.	So	very	 luckily,	Wang	found	access	to	the	school	
head	and	sent	him	a	present	(about	120	pounds).	Now	his	son	is	sitting	in	the	
new	 school.	 After	 hearing	 this	 story,	 Humphrey	 and	 Wang	 both	 laughed,	
smoking	and	drinking	tea	together.	Humphrey	said,	“How	wonderful	it	is!	You	
see,	a	good	act	will	be	well	rewarded.	You	are	accumulating	your	virtue	and	luck;	
the	Buddha	will	give	 it	back	to	your	offspring”.	Mr.	Wang	was	very	happy	to	
hear	this,	so	he	opened	a	small	bottle	of	liquor	and	invited	us	to	join	him.	“Sorry	
I	cannot	drink	this,	 I	am	a	Buddhist”,	Humphrey	said.	“Really?	So	you	do	not	
drink	and	eat	meat	at	all?	What	a	pity!”	Wang	said.	Then	Humphrey	told	Wang	
about	GH's	plan	and	asked	whether	he	was	interested	in	donating,	"We	are	all	
local	people,	and	we	do	have	enough	ambitious	entrepreneurs.	So,	we	need	to	
help	 each	 other	 and	 support	 the	 local	 gongyi”,	 Humphrey	 said.	 But	 Wang	
seemed	confused,	“I	do	not	understand	your	gongyi	circle	at	all.	So	what	are	you	
making	 a	 living	 on,	 philanthropist?	 Are	 you	 leading	 a	 group	 of	 volunteers?”	
Humphrey	shook	his	head,	he	seemed	to	realize	that	to	attract	funding	from	Mr.	
Wang	was	not	easy.	So	they	turned	to	Mr.	Wang’s	son’s	story	and	Humphrey’s	
religion	again.	 	 	
After	another	hour	of	repeating	gratitude,	Mr.	Liang	arrived.	Mr.	Liang	is	the	
founder	 with	 a	 larger	 share	 of	 this	 company.	 He	 nodded	 his	 head	 when	
Humphrey	and	I	came	in,	and	then	turned	to	Mr.	Wang	to	discuss	their	business.	
After	 about	 half	 an	 hour,	 Mr.	 Wang	 introduced	 Humphrey	 to	 Liang,	 and	
Humphrey	 expressed	 his	 gratitude	 again.	 Mr.	 Liang	 shook	 hands	 with	
Humphrey,	serving	him	tea,	and	then	turned	to	his	phone	calls.	I	thought	Mr.	
Liang	was	quite	busy	at	that	moment,	but	I	was	wrong.	After	several	phone	calls,	
Liang	 began	 to	 search	 for	 something	 on	 the	 Internet——actually,	 he	 was	
refreshing	his	social	media.	It	seemed	that	Mr.	Liang	had	already	heard	about	
Humphrey	and	what	was	he	doing	before	we	arrived,	but	he	was	not	interested	
at	all.	So	after	another	very	awkward	hour,	Humphrey	said:	“Mr.	Liang,	I	have	
one	last	request	before	I	go,	I	am	going	to	set	up	a	website	for	my	organization,	
GH,	could	I	put	your	company	logo	on	the	website	as	a	way	of	thanksgiving?”	
“Oh,	of	course,	no	problem!	What	a	pity	that	you	are	leaving	so	early	today,	you	
should	stay	here	for	dinner.	I	always	admire	people	like	you,	philanthropists!	
“Mr.	Liang	turned	off	his	phone.	 	 	 	
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On	our	way	back,	I	asked	Humphrey	whether	he	had	tried	to	wear	formal	suits	
or	not,	suggesting	maybe	a	more	formal	suit	could	make	him	look	better	on	such	
occasions.	Humphrey	shook	his	head	and	said,	“Never.	I	do	not	think	I	belong	to	
suits.	I	am	proud	that	all	my	clothes	are	secondhand	from	my	friend”,	he	smiled,	
“I	think	it	is	OK	(to	wear	like	this	in	front	of	this	businessmen).	People	imagine	
that	we	are	just	poor	volunteers.	In	fact,	we	really	are”.	Then	he	murmured	to	
himself,	 “I	 planned	 to	 stay	 longer	with	 them	 so	 to	 know	 them	better.	 But	 it	
seems	that	we	are	still	too	different,	aren’t	we?”	
If	we	call	GVC’s	leader	Perry	a	local	elite	in	G,	then	Humphrey	and	Sue	must	be	
in	 a	 much	 lower	 social	 status.	 They	 came	 from	 very	 different	 social	
backgrounds,	enjoyed	a	totally	different	political	status	in	the	local	society.	And	
thus,	 their	organizations	 just	seemed	to	be	 in	two	different	worlds:	GVC	was	
like	a	part	of	a	well-running	medium-sized	family	group	with	good	business,	
leading	by	an	extraordinary	boss	who	can	manage	the	different	social	relations	
in	the	local	community.	However,	GH	was	like	a	small	family	store	struggling	to	
find	a	balance	between	different	stakeholders,	especially	 the	donors	and	 the	
state.	In	fact,	during	my	stay	at	Humphrey	and	Sue's	home,	I	even	encountered	
two	calls	that	Humphrey	received	late	at	night.	The	caller	seemed	to	be	drunk,	
scolding	Humphrey	loudly	that	since	GH	had	received	so	many	donations	from	
the	big	donors,	he	should	distribute	more	money	among	"his	local	brothers".	
The	caller	was	a	local	official	in	charge	of	the	NGO	regulation	issues;	he	was	also	
the	supervisor	of	several	local	GONGOs	that	had	a	partnership	with	Humphrey.	
Seeing	me	very	surprised	by	the	call,	Sue	tried	to	comfort	me	like	this:	"That	is	
quite	normal,	we	have	to	face	it	regularly...	as	long	as	we	are	not	a	big	boss	here".	
	
7.2	Perry’s	life:	a	successful	‘gongyi	people’	in	the	local	society	
I	was	a	bit	surprised	by	what	I	saw	for	the	first	time	I	visited	GVC	in	person.	The	
whole	 organization	was	more	 like	 part	 of	 a	 traditional	 family	 group	 run	 by	
Perry	 and	 his	 wife,	 rather	 than	 any	 typical	 “professional”	 organization	 or	
“modern	gongyi”	that	I	had	heard	from	AF’s	office.	When	I	was	entering	Perry’s	
office	room	by	walking	through	GVC’s	office	for	the	first	time,	I	just	found	myself	
in	another	world:	outside	Perry’s	room,	the	organization	 looked	 like	 just	 the	
same	as	AF’s	office,	from	the	AF	logos,	leaflets,	even	the	big	fish-tank-like	crystal	
glass	 everywhere.	 But	 behind	 the	door	 of	 Perry’s	 room,	 I	 saw	 a	 big	Buddha	
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statue	there,	surrounded	by	a	small	basin	and	bamboo	curtain.	There	was	also	
a	smog-making	machine	behind	the	Buddha,	so	to	make	the	statue	more	elegant	
and	mysterious.	Perry	invited	me	to	enjoy	tea	in	front	of	the	Buddha	and	I	found	
the	whole	tea	table	and	tea	sets	were	quite	exquisite.	The	whole	room	was	more	
like	 a	 private	 tearoom	 for	 relaxing	 and	 socializing,	 rather	 than	 a	 real	
“professional	working	place”	like	the	other	parts	of	GVC’s	office.	
After	 the	 interview	with	Perry,	 I	 had	 lunch	with	him	and	 several	 other	GVC	
workers.	Interestingly,	all	the	workers	were	calling	Perry	as	“elder	brother	(大
哥,	dage)”,	 treating	him	with	much	greater	respect	than	simply	an	employer.	
Before	Perry	arrived,	food	had	been	ordered	based	on	his	personal	preferences;	
once	Perry	showed	up,	a	male	worker	asked	him	whether	he	wanted	to	smoke	
and	 then	 light	a	cigar	 for	him.	 In	our	dinner	 later,	 the	same	scene	happened	
again:	 Perry	 would	 sit	 in	 the	 middle	 in	 front	 of	 a	 big	 round	 dining	 table,	
surrounded	by	his	workers	who	were	ready	to	serve	him.	After	the	lunch,	Perry	
suggested	me	to	have	a	look	at	his	teahouse	together	in	the	city	center,	and	then	
another	male	worker	just	became	the	driver	of	Perry’s	brand-new	SUV.	In	our	
conversations,	 Perry	never	mentioned	his	workers	 as	his	 “employees	 (员工,	
yuangong)”,	instead	he	would	call	them	“my	younger	sisters	or	brothers	(小弟
小妹,	xiaodi	xiaomei)”,	 trying	to	personalize	the	relations	 in	his	organization,	
while	he	was	the	family	head.	
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Figure	7.2	Pictures	of	Perry’s	teahouse	with	lots	of	decorations	from	Tibetan	
Buddhism.	Source:	the	public	Wechat	account	of	the	teahouse.	
	
	 183	
Perry’s	teahouse	offered	another	crucial	perspective	in	understanding	his	daily	
life,	 in	which	he	just	spent	more	than	90	thousand	pounds	on	refurbishment	
and	decoration.	In	that	teahouse,	Perry	told	me	proudly	that	to	make	sure	the	
high	 quality	 of	 their	 tea,	 they	 also	 bought	 a	 tea	 plantation	 and	 set	 up	 a	 tea	
company	in	Taiwan	last	year.	That	is	to	say,	unlike	many	other	full-time	NGO	
workers,	gongyi	was	 only	 a	 "part-time	 job"	 for	 him.	 Comparing	 to	 his	 other	
businesses,	GVC	might	not	be	the	most	important	one.	Interestingly,	in	Perry's	
teahouse,	I	came	to	realize	that	he	and	his	wife	were	not	going	to	divide	their	
different	 jobs	 into	 separated	 time	 slots	 and	 geographical	 spaces.	 In	 that	
teahouse,	I	found	a	banner	in	the	entrance	stating	that	it	was	also	'the	G-City	
Club	 for	AF	Family",	 surrounded	by	a	 variety	of	Buddha	beads.	 In	AF,	 all	 its	
workers,	volunteers	and	donors	would	be	called	'AF	family'.	I	have	never	heard	
of	such	club	anywhere	else	but	at	Perry's	teahouse.	Perry	told	me	this	was	the	
only	physical	club	that	had	been	approved	by	AF,	so	that	the	internal	training	
of	many	other	AF	partner	organizations	could	take	place	here.	At	the	same	time,	
Perry’s	wife	also	made	it	as	a	local	Buddhist	society,	they	organized	a	number	
of	Buddhist	lectures	and	preaching	workshops	there.	 	
During	my	visit	to	the	teahouse,	Perry	and	his	wife	also	received	several	guests	
from	 the	 local	 business	 circle,	 including	 two	 bankers	 and	 one	 real	 estate	
developer.	In	the	discussion,	I	found	that	they	were	also	frequent	visitors	of	the	
teahouse,	buying	tea	and	participating	in	the	Buddhist	activities	there.	But	this	
time,	 the	 visitors	were	not	 only	 coming	 for	 tea	 but	 also	 to	 discuss	 donation	
issues	 and	 business	 cooperation	 with	 AF.	 In	 just	 one	 hour,	 the	 real	 estate	
developer	decided	to	donate	70	thousand	pounds	to	the	charity	marathon	to	be	
hosted	in	the	province.	The	charity	event	was	initiated	by	AF	to	launch	more	
“public	 participation”	 in	 doing	 gongyi,	 which	 had	 been	 hosted	 in	 different	
Chinese	cities	for	years.	In	order	to	realize	“everyone	can	do	gongyi”,	normally	
the	marathon	would	be	held	in	the	city	center	or	famous	tourist	attractions	to	
gain	more	participants.	But	Perry	finally	decided	to	put	the	marathon	route	in	
a	newly	developed	tourist	area	in	the	suburban-based	on	the	suggestions	of	the	
city	government;	as	 the	new	tourist	area	was	part	of	 the	 “poverty	reduction	
project”	 for	 the	 ethnic	 minority	 groups	 in	 China	 since	 Xi’s	 leadership.	 Both	
Perry	and	the	real	estate	developer	were	quite	happy	with	their	cooperation	in	
the	teahouse:	through	this	donation,	the	real	estate	developer	could	get	access	
to	AF’s	entrepreneurs	and	he	was	confident	that	this	marathon	event	would	be	
good	 for	 his	 company	 branding.	 For	 Perry,	 the	 marathon	 became	 a	 good	
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opportunity	to	strengthen	his	extraordinary	capacity	of	getting	things	done	in	
the	local	society	by	satisfying	both	the	government	officials	and	AF.	In	our	later	
conversation,	Perry	was	quite	positive	 that	 in	 the	next	year,	he	could	have	a	
bigger	say	in	how	to	distribute	the	donation	money	with	AF.	
The	 overlapping	 space	 from	 leisure,	 religion,	 NGO,	 to	 business	 activities,	
seemed	to	be	a	good	thing	for	the	teahouse'	revenue,	Perry's	teahouse	was	very	
popular	in	the	city	that	it	only	accepted	the	customers	with	early	appointments.	
At	the	same	time,	it	also	became	a	small	hub	for	building	up	an	elite	circle	with	
the	 local	 businessmen,	 monks	 and	 NGO	 leaders.	 Under	 this	 situation,	 since	
Perry's	different	"jobs"	were	interconnected,	it	was	not	surprising	to	find	that	
the	GVC	workers	I	met	in	its	office	also	had	work	to	do	in	the	teahouse	(and	
maybe	in	Perry's	tea	company	too)	at	the	same	time.	A	female	GVC	employee	
that	I	had	seen	in	an	AF's	public	event	was	introduced	as	project	assistants;	but	
she	also	showed	up	in	the	teahouse,	making	tea	for	its	visitors.	In	this	"family	
group",	none	of	these	workers,	including	Perry,	were	acting	like	a	real	full-time	
AF	worker	 in	 the	 fish-tank	 office	 in	 Shenzhen.	 In	 fact,	 in	 our	 conversations,	
Perry’s	wife	 told	me	 that	 she	 thought	 both	 running	 the	 teahouse	 and	 doing	
gongyi	were	just	different	ways	of	practicing	Buddhism	in	her	daily	life:	“I	do	
not	want	to	show	that	people	doing	gongyi	are	only	those	self-sacrificed;	we	can	
be	quite	fashion	too…it	is	not	necessary	to	hide	my	faith	in	the	workplace,	I	can	
present	it	in	a	very	elegant	way”.	 	
GVC’s	 extraordinary	 status	 in	 the	 NGO	 community	 did	 not	 just	 come	 from	
Perry’s	personal	political	ties	with	the	local	governmental	officials.	It	is	more	
likely	a	combination	of	Perry’s	economic	and	social	capital	in	the	local	society	
that	has	made	Perry	and	his	organization	a	perfect	broker	of	gongyi.	Being	part	
of	the	local	society,	Perry	knew	how	to	work	with	the	local	government	and	the	
business	circle	very	well,	and	also,	how	to	make	a	profit	from	it.	This	has	made	
him	an	almost	 irreplaceable	actor	 in	 the	 local	 society	 in	 the	eyes	of	external	
donors;	regardless	of	the	language	or	policy	changes	in	China’s	NGO	sector.	In	
fact,	in	March	2017	when	I	visited	Perry,	he	just	decided	to	work	with	Oxfam	
again.	 Although	 his	 organization	 had	 turned	 to	 AF	 and	 cut	 down	 their	
collaboration	with	Oxfam	in	the	past	five	years,	GVC	could	be	one	of	the	very	
few	organizations	that	could	still	cooperate	with	international	donors	without	
many	political	risks	in	the	province.	In	the	interview,	Perry	explained	his	new	
action	like	this:	“Oxfam’s	civil	society	ideas	are	still	very	important	for	us	so	I	
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think	it's	time	to	do	more	NGO	training	programs	with	them	now.	It	is	a	great	
complement	to	AF.	We	just	need	to	change	the	program	title	a	little	bit,	don't	
mention	the	sensitive	word	civil	society…"	
Perry	was	 not	 the	 only	 one	 that	 I	 encountered	 in	my	 fieldwork	who	 can	 be	
called	as	 ‘the	successful	gongyi	people’	by	AF	workers.	 In	AF’s	 ranking	of	 its	
partner	 organizations	 across	 the	 country,	 almost	 all	 the	 high-ranking	
organization	leaders	were	just	like	Perry,	enjoying	an	extraordinary	status	in	
their	communities;	while	gongyi	was	only	part	of	their	daily	life.	Interestingly,	
many	of	them	also	attributed	their	passion	of	gongyi	to	their	religions	(mostly	
Buddhism),	although	they	presented	their	religions	in	different	ways2.	 	
For	instance,	Sarah,	an	organization	leader	in	eastern	China,	was	also	in	charge	
of	 several	 GONGOs	 in	 her	 city	 under	 the	 supervision	 of	 the	 local	 Youth	
Communist	League.	In	a	dinner	with	her	in	April	2017,	she	told	me	that	gongyi	
only	constituted	half	of	her	energy	in	the	daily	life,	since	she	was	running	two	
listed	companies	with	her	husband	in	real	estate	marketing.	As	a	Buddhist	since	
young,	her	gongyi	career	was	started	by	the	volunteer	activities	with	the	local	
Lions	 Club,	where	 she	 can	meet	 other	 Buddhist	 entrepreneurs.	 However,	 in	
2012	the	local	Youth	Communist	League	(YCL)	came	up	to	her	and	suggested	
that	her	volunteer	group	can	be	legally	registered	as	long	as	it	is	under	YCL's	
supervision.	 Later,	 with	 the	 national	 NGO	 regulation	 reform,	 the	 local	
government	decided	to	invest	more	money	in	purchasing	social	services,	and	
then	Sarah's	organization	became	one	of	the	major	beneficiaries	of	government	
funding.	Although	Sarah	did	not	have	 funding	 from	international	donors	 like	
Perry,	how	they	had	been	gradually	incorporated	into	the	local	state	was	almost	
the	same:	firstly	recognized	as	an	economic	"success"	in	the	local	society,	then	
their	 efforts	 in	 combing	 their	 Buddhist	 faith	 and	 volunteer	 activities	 were	
tolerated	and	neutralized	by	the	local	state.	Finally,	their	close	cooperation	with	
the	 local	 state	 in	doing	gongyi	brought	 them	more	privileges	and	benefits	 in	
terms	 of	 their	 social	 status	 and	 organizational	 incomes.	 During	 my	 visit	 in	
	
2	 Although	I	did	not	get	chances	to	do	more	in-depth	participant	observation	
with	the	other	“gongyi	people”	just	like	Perry,	I	attended	two	internal	meetings	
held	by	AF	 in	May	2017,	when	most	of	 its	partner	 leaders	were	there.	These	
meetings	 and	 my	 daily	 conversations	 with	 AF	 workers	 are	 very	 helpful	 in	
getting	the	general	background	information	of	the	NGO	leaders.	 	 	
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Sarah’s	organization,	I	also	met	many	other	NGO	leaders	from	different	towns	
of	 the	 province	 coming	 to	 visit	 Sarah,	 like	 Perry	 who	 was	 called	 as	 “elder	
brother	 (dage)”,	 Sarah	was	 also	 called	 by	 the	 organization	 leaders	 as	 “elder	
sister	 	 (dajie,	大姐)”.	 	 	 	
	
7.3	The	making	of	a	‘gongyi	people’	 	
As	I	argue	in	the	first	chapter,	the	language	of	gongyi	should	be	the	'keyword'	
in	 understanding	 the	 changing	 landscape	 of	 the	 Chinese	NGO	 sector.	 By	 the	
changing	 landscape	 here,	 I	 look	 at	 how	 Chinese	 NGOs	 have	 become	 more	
depoliticized	and	commercialized	in	many	aspects	in	Chapters	4	and	5.	In	AF’s	
case,	the	foundation	workers	were	asked	to	be	more	wolf-like,	aggressive,	and	
self-sacrificed,	which	partly	constituted	their	daily	anxieties	living	in	the	most	
prosperous	areas	in	China	(see	Chapter	5).	But	the	cases	I	present	here	could	
be	different.	Most	of	AF’s	partner	organizations	were	located	in	less	developed	
cities	or	towns.	During	my	visits,	I	could	hardly	hear	the	organization	leaders	
talking	about	their	pressures	of	being	a	wolf-like	worker,	or	buying	houses	and	
cars	 as	 most	 of	 the	 white	 collars	 in	 Shenzhen	 have	 to	 face	 today.	 In	 our	
conversations,	regardless	of	whether	we	were	discussing	their	private	life	or	
NGO	work,	most	of	the	organization	leaders	would	direct	our	discussions	to	the	
questions	of	how	to	manage	the	various	social	relations	in	their	local	society,	
including	how	to	deal	with	the	local	officials,	how	to	be	more	integrated	into	
the	local	media	and	business	circle,	and	how	to	work	with	different	donors	from	
the	outside	world.	 	
It	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 these	people	 I	 talked	 to	had	no	 anxieties	 at	 all,	 but	 it	 is	
because	they	were	living	a	quite	different	life	and	therefore	what	gongyi	means	
to	 them	 in	 their	 daily	 life	 should	 be	 understood	 in	 different	 ways.	 	 In	 this	
context,	this	chapter	of	local	NGOs	pays	attention	to	a	slightly	different	word	
that	AF’s	partner	organizations	called	themselves,	“gongyi	people".	Identifying	
themselves	as	'a	person	in	the	local	society',	rather	than	an	'urban	professional',	
my	study	reveals	how	corporatism	at	the	local	level	can	be	strengthened	and	
reproduced	through	the	various	social	relations	and	everyday	practices	of	the	
local	NGO	workers.	My	 study	of	 these	NGO	 leaders	 also	 turned	out	 to	be	 an	
exploration	of	their	personal	history	and	network	of	“how	to	become	a	success”	
in	the	local	society	in	China.	 	
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7.3.1	Building	and	managing	social	relations	
In	 Osburg’s	 study	 of	 China’s	 new	 rich,	 he	 looks	 at	 how	 the	 personal	
relationships	 in	 the	 city	 of	 Chengdu	 can	 be	 cultivated	 among	 the	 local	
businessmen	as	well	as	between	the	local	government	officials	and	the	business	
circle.	These	personal	relationships,	called	as	guanxi	in	the	Chinese	language,	
have	been	seen	as	a	legacy	of	the	planned	economy,	which	are	supposed	to	be	
swept	away	by	the	expanding	market	reform	in	the	past	decades	(Guthrie	1998;	
King	 1991).	 Also,	 there	 are	 scholars	 emphasizing	 the	 adaptability	 and	
continuing	evolution	of	guanxi	 in	the	reformist	era	(for	example,	Bian,	1994;	
Wank,	 1999;	 Ho,	 2009).	 Osburg’s	 (2013)	 ethnographic	 study	 of	 guanxin	 in	
Chengdu	finds	that	these	personal	networks	should	be	understood	as	“evolving	
cultural	practices”	which	have	contributed	to	the	local	market	economy	in	the	
reformist	era.	In	his	research	on	the	local	corruption	in	Chengdu,	Osburg	argues	
that	 the	 elite	 networks	 between	 the	 private	 entrepreneurs	 and	 local	
government	officials	are	“at	the	very	heart	of	capitalist	development	in	urban	
China”	 (ibid:	 32).	 Given	 that	 the	 networks	 provide	 opportunities	 for	 the	
personal	wealth	and	status	accumulation,	these	local	elites	are	more	“rallied”	
together	to	achieve	the	economic	growth	goals	set	up	by	Beijing.	In	particular,	
Osburg	 examines	 how	guanxin	 has	 been	 produced	 in	 certain	 new,	 exclusive	
spaces	of	leisure	in	the	city,	for	instance,	the	various	salons,	karaoke,	private	
clubs,	spas,	and	so	forth	(ibid.:	37-75).	Based	on	the	traditional	native-place	ties,	
these	 new	 spaces	 have	 become	 important	 platforms	 of	 building	 up	 more	
exclusive	personal	relationships	between	business	associates	and	other	 local	
elites,	which	has	also	contributed	to	the	growing	social	inequality	in	China.	 	
My	study	of	some	NGO	leaders’	daily	life	echoes	with	Osburg’s	findings	in	two	
ways.	 Firstly,	 as	 these	NGO	 leaders	were	 running	 their	 own	 businesses	 and	
enjoying	governmental	titles	at	the	same	time,	the	people	they	met,	the	places	
they	work,	and	the	leisure	time	they	spent	every	day	were	much	more	complex	
than	most	of	the	ordinary	NGO	workers	I	knew	in	the	field.	The	most	important	
job	in	dealing	with	the	various	social	relations	for	them	was	not	to	clarify	the	
differences	but	to	manage,	maintain,	and	live	with	them	(Yan:	2003).	The	daily	
social	activities	that	these	NGO	leaders	did	in	their	clubs	or	salons	were	not	just	
to	 strengthen	 their	 personal	 networks,	 but	 also	 these	 social	 spaces	 and	
relationships	have	constituted	to	a	culture	of	defining	them	as	the	"big	bosses"	
	 188	
in	the	local	society.	Therefore,	we	can	find	that	although	the	major	donors	of	
these	 organizations	 have	 changed	 from	 international	 agencies	 to	 domestic	
entrepreneurs,	these	organizations	can	still	keep	an	extraordinary	status	in	the	
local	 society.	 The	 current	 highly	 commercialized	 gongyi	 language	 has	 given	
these	 ‘successful’	 NGO	 leaders	 more	 power	 in	 disciplining	 the	 other	
organizations	in	China’s	NGO	community.	 	
Secondly,	as	the	corruption	in	Chengdu	shows,	NGO	leaders	with	better	guanxi	
in	 their	 local	 society	 may	 not	 contribute	 to	 a	 more	 open	 and	 accountable	
environment	 for	 China’s	 NGO	 sector,	 although	 their	 organizations	 did	 have	
“stronger	 organizational	 capacity”	 in	 getting	 projects	 done	 in	 their	 local	
communities	 (Hsu	&	Hasmath,	 2014;	Hildebrandt,	 2013).	 In	my	 fieldwork,	 I	
found	it	difficult	to	talk	to	many	of	the	“big	bosses”	that	I	had	heard	in	AF’s	office.	
Perry	 and	 Sarah	were	 two	 of	 the	 very	 few	 leaders	 that	 I	 can	 get	 access	 to,	
although	both	of	them	were	also	very	cautious	of	talking	about	the	details	of	
their	 personal	 history	 and	 wealth,	 family	 backgrounds,	 and	 their	 social	
networks.	At	the	same	time,	the	other	organization	leaders	from	the	bottom	of	
the	society	such	as	Humphrey	were	more	likely	to	be	defined	as	“the	lag	behind”	
in	China’s	NGO	community,	since	they	were	seen	as	“less	capable	of	mobilizing	
the	 local	 resources”	 for	 their	gongyi	work.	 In	 this	 sense,	gongyi	 and	Chinese	
NGOs,	 being	 deeply	 embedded	 in	 the	 various	 forms	 of	 corporatism	 and	 an	
increasingly	polarized	NGO	sector,	is	producing	new	forms	of	social	inequality	
from	the	internal	structure	of	the	NGO	industry,	as	a	mirror	of	the	mainstream	
Chinese	society.	
	
7.3.2	Performing	Buddhism	 	
Doing	gongyi	 in	 local	 society	means	more	 than	 just	managing	guanxi,	 it	 also	
indicates	that	the	NGO	leaders	need	to	legitimate	what	they	do	in	the	sense	of	
morality	(Yarrow,	2008).	My	fieldwork	with	different	local	NGO	leaders	finds	
that	their	common	belief	in	Buddhism	turned	out	to	be	an	important	strategy	
of	 claiming	 their	morality	 in	 the	 local	 society,	 though	performed	 in	different	
ways.	In	fact,	many	AF	workers	may	have	their	own	religions	in	their	private	
life,	but	most	of	them	were	reluctant	to	show	their	faith	in	the	workplace.	On	
the	one	hand,	 the	party-state	 in	China	 is	 still	 ruled	by	 the	Communist	Party;	
religious	groups,	 especially	Christian	home	churches,	have	been	under	 strict	
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surveillance	 (see	more	 in	 chapter	6).	 Therefore	AF,	 as	 an	 influential	NGO	 in	
China,	tried	to	keep	a	non-religious	face	in	the	public.	On	the	other	hand,	as	the	
AF	office	has	been	deliberately	designed	as	a	place	to	separate	its	workers	from	
their	other	aspects	of	life	under	the	name	of	doing	modern	gongyi,	so	talking	
about	their	religions	was	perceived	as	"unprofessional"	in	the	workplace.	But	
the	 situations	 in	 AF’s	 local	 partners	 were	 quite	 different.	 Given	 the	 vague	
boundary	 between	 their	 private	 and	 non-private	 life,	 performing	 and	
discussing	Buddhism	was	also	part	of	their	NGO	and	business	work.	Just	like	
my	informant	Perry	said	to	me,	“the	mortal	life	can	be	also	a	pure	land,	we	need	
to	practice	[Buddhism]	no	matter	where”.	 	 	 	
Cao’s	(2008)	ethnographic	research	of	“Boss	Christians”	in	the	city	of	Wenzhou	
finds	that	the	underground	Christians	and	churches	had	overlapped	with	the	
emerging	private	entrepreneurs	in	China.	With	more	than	90%	of	the	economy	
in	Wenzhou	was	from	the	private	sector,	especially	family-owned	businesses,	
the	 church-based	 social	 networks	 become	 quite	 crucial	 for	 these	 small	
businesses	 in	 terms	 of	 informal	 financing	 and	 information	 exchange.	 More	
importantly,	being	a	Christian	in	the	local	society	has	become	a	symbol	of	most	
well	 to	do	 families,	 so	 that	 they	 can	present	 themselves	 to	 the	nonbelievers	
(mostly	immigrant	workers),	as	having	the	most	authentic	reason	to	embrace	
the	 Western-style	 life	 and	 a	 high-class	 culture	 taste.	 Boss	 Christians	 in	
Wenzhou	 maintained	 a	 higher	 social	 status	 by	 performing	 their	 faith	 in	
distinctive	ways,	 for	 instance,	 large	scale	drinking	and	banqueting	events	for	
their	 "church	 branding"	 and	 owning	 pianos	 at	 home	 as	 a	 Western	 culture	
symbol.	
Unlike	Christianity	that	has	been	seen	as	an	imported	symbol,	the	development	
of	Buddhism	has	been	much	more	popular	among	ordinary	Chinese	with	 its	
history	dating	back	to	two	thousand	years	ago.	There	have	been	several	culture	
fevers	 of	 Buddhism	 in	 reformist	 China,	 from	 the	 revival	 of	martial	 arts	 and	
supernatural	powers	in	the	1980s	to	the	numerous	reconstruction	projects	of	
traditional	 temples	 and	 monasteries	 across	 the	 country	 (Birnbaum	 2003;	
Palmer	2007;	Lai	2003).	But	the	way	that	different	groups	of	people	perform	
Buddhism	in	creating	a	social	hierarchy	is	much	like	the	Christians	in	Wenzhou.	
Although	all	 the	 three	NGO	 leaders	 I	discuss	 in	 this	chapter	were	Buddhists,	
they	 tended	 to	 emphasize	 the	 differences	 in	 their	 daily	 Buddhist	 practices	
rather	than	their	common	faith.	Like	the	“Boss	Christians”	in	Wenzhou,	Perry	
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and	Sarah	were	the	“Boss	Buddhists”	in	their	cities:	comparing	with	Humphrey,	
they	did	not	need	to	talk	about	Buddhism	in	a	very	straightforward	way	in	their	
daily	work,	but	the	expensive	and	delicate	Buddha	statues	and	decorations	in	
their	offices	and	private	clubs	have	perfectly	presented	their	devotedness	and	
outstanding	cultural	tastes,	which	in	return	justifies	their	morality	in	doing	the	
noble	cause	of	gongyi.	However,	for	Humphrey,	his	way	of	practicing	Buddhism	
was	just	like	the	immigrant	workers	in	Wuzhou	who	participated	in	the	church	
activities	for	learning	a	new	language	of	being	a	success.	As	a	person	living	in	
the	bottom	of	the	society	in	his	early	life,	connecting	his	work	with	Buddhism	
was	 the	 only	 "language"	 that	 Humphrey	 could	 “speak”	 when	 he	 tried	 to	
socialize	with	the	local	business	circle	in	doing	modern	gongyi.	In	the	eyes	of	
Perry	 and	 some	 other	 AF	workers	 however,	 Humphrey’s	 practice	 of	 talking	
about	his	personal	belief	was	quite	“unprofessional”.	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
Conclusion	
In	September	2016,	AF	just	finished	another	round	of	recruitment,	with	four	
new	 project	 officers	 in	 different	 humanitarian	 projects.	 In	 an	 internal	 AF	
meeting	 I	 attended,	 the	 then	vice	general	 secretary	Calvin	made	a	 speech	 to	
these	 new	 employees,	 in	which	 he	 spent	most	 of	 the	 time	 talking	 about	 the	
importance	of	relationship	maintenance	with	their	local	partner	organization	
leaders:	
“These	gongyi	people	are	not	simple.	They	are	the	key	to	keeping	our	
project	safe	in	different	provinces.	They	are	the	big	bosses	in	the	local	
society…they	 are	 very	 sophisticated	 people	 in	 our	 circle,	 old	 and	
clever	enough	to	take	advantage	of	their	donors.	You	can	push	their	
staff	to	work,	but	don’t	push	them	too	hard.	If	you	find	yourself	can’t	
deal	with	them,	come	to	me”.	
At	 the	beginning	of	 this	 chapter,	Calvin	described	 these	NGO	 leaders	as	 “big	
bosses	(dalao)”,	my	fieldwork	finds	that	the	secret	of	“becoming	a	dalao”	is	not	
in	specific	projects	they	were	doing,	but	the	way	they	live.	Becoming	a	‘gongyi	
people’	in	China’s	NGO	sector,	in	the	cases	that	I	have	discussed	in	this	chapter,	
means	to	live	within	and	to	become	part	of	the	corporatism	on	a	daily	basis.	The	
capacity	of	building	and	managing	various	social	relations	in	the	local	society	
constitutes	the	major	“competitiveness”	in	the	gongyi	market	in	front	of	various	
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donors;	 while	 the	 distinctive	 way	 of	 practicing	 faith—by	 showing	 but	 not	
talking—helps	these	NGO	leaders	to	reach	a	higher	social	class	in	China.	 	
However,	what	is	behind	such	lifestyle	and	personal	capacity	is	the	increasingly	
widening	gap	between	different	social	groups	in	China,	and	the	marginalization	
of	the	organizations	and	their	workers	which	are	not	able	to	be	"incorporated"	
into	China's	development	path	in	the	past	decades,	if	they	are	not	"kicked	out"	
by	the	fast-changing	game.	That	is	the	reason	why	in	this	chapter,	I	divide	the	
NGO	 leaders	 into	 two	 different	 types	 and	 discuss	 their	 different	 lives	 as	 a	
‘gongyi	people’	 in	the	 local	society.	 In	the	 introduction	of	this	thesis,	 I	 talked	
about	the	experience	of	meeting	a	group	of	the	disabled	and	their	donor	Oxfam	
in	 an	 unexpected	 way.	 During	 my	 fieldwork	 with	 Humphrey	 and	 this	
‘marginalized’	 groups	 in	 the	Nan	 city,	 I	 had	never	heard	any	of	 them	calling	
themselves	as	‘gongyi	people’.	Although	most	of	the	disabled	group	members	
also	had	other	jobs	to	do,	most	of	their	jobs	were	part-time	and	lower-paid	in	
the	 city;	 while	 their	 group	 activities	 had	 been	 surveilled	 by	 the	 municipal	
government	for	a	long	time.	"Gongyi	people”	is	a	word	that	I	have	had	a	lot	from	
the	mainstream	Chinese	media	reports,	from	AF's	and	other	foundations'	office,	
from	Perry	and	Sarah,	but	never	from	the	disabled	group	I	met.	While	'doing	
gongyi’	in	China	has	produced	more	and	more	powerful	‘gongyi	people'	in	the	
local	society,	some	others	in	the	same	society	may	have	been	silenced.	 	 	 	
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Chapter	8	 	 Conclusion	 	
“Make	 sure	 that	 the	 government	 plays	 the	 leading	 role	 [in	 doing	
gongyi].	To	guide	social	forces	to	participate	[gongyi]	on	a	larger	scale.	
Introduce	market	and	competition-based	systems	so	that	to	motivate	
more	participants	and	reinforce	the	vitality	of	gongyi	organizations.	
Do	 the	 best	 to	 provide	 more	 gongyi	 services	 for	 people’s	 social	
demands	in	different	levels	and	geographic	areas”1.	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Guidelines	 of	 the	 Central	 Committee	 of	 the	
Communist	 Party	 of	 China	 and	 the	 State	 Council	 on	 Promoting	 the	
Reform	of	Social	Development,	2012	
“So	 far,	 the	 government	 has	 made	 great	 achievements	 in	 poverty	
alleviation,	now	it	is	time	for	us	[entrepreneurs]	to	participate…being	
an	entrepreneur	in	this	country	is	more	than	just	being	a	businessman.	
A	businessman	only	thinks	about	making	profits,	but	an	entrepreneur	
also	thinks	about	the	national	interests,	the	future	generation,	and	the	
whole	society”2.	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Jack	Ma	at	2018	China	Green	Companies’	Summit	
“I	am	working	here	[AF]	for	myself,	for	these	child	protection	projects,	
not	for	the	big	bosses	[the	entrepreneurs	sitting	in	the	board]...I	want	
to	be	a	child	protection	expert;	you	know,	I	want	to	deal	with	social	
problems	directly,	not	something	as	a	gongyi	worker.	I	just	recently	
found	that	gongyi	is	so	meaningless	(mei	yi	si,	没意思)	to	real	social	
problems...”	 3	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Cliff,	a	former	AF	worker	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
When	talking	about	gongyi,	people	talk	about	a	wide	range	of	issues	such	as	Lei	
Feng	spirits,	the	new	‘philanthropists’,	the	social	workers	in	the	state-funded	
community	 center,	 and	 sometimes,	 ‘civil	 society’.	 Although	 there	 are	 many	
	
1	 Source:	http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2012/content_2121699.htm	
2Source:	https://tech.sina.com.cn/i/2019-03-29/doc-ihsxncvh6451711.shtml	
3	 From	a	casual	conversation	on	17/04/2017.	
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academic	debates	on	NGO-state	relations	in	China,	the	internal	power	structure,	
politics,	 culture,	 and	knowledge	production	of	 the	NGO	sector	 in	China	have	
been	understudied.	By	looking	at	the	recent	development	of	gongyi,	this	thesis	
aims	to	 fill	 this	gap	 in	 two	ways.	On	the	one	hand,	 I	understand	the	 internal	
politics	 of	 the	 Chinese	 NGO	 sector	 from	 an	 organizational	 perspective,	
examining	 their	 organizational	 culture	 as	well	 as	 their	 interactions	with	 the	
local	state	and	business	circle.	On	the	other	hand,	I	look	at	how	gongyi	as	a	new	
profess	 works	 at	 the	 individual	 level,	 putting	 Chinese	 NGO	 workers	 into	 a	
bigger	picture	 of	 social	 change	 in	China.	By	 studying	 the	 language	of	gongyi	
from	 these	 two	aspects,	 I	 argue	 that	gongyi	 reveals	a	 complicated	picture	of	
Chinese	 NGOs	 and	 society	 today.	 The	 popular	 use	 of	 gongyi	 presents	 the	
increasing	 commercialization	 of	 Chinese	 NGOs	 and	 the	 rising	 of	 Chinese	
entrepreneurs	 as	 donors	 in	 the	 past	 decade.	 Although	 self-claimed	 as	
distancing	from	the	state,	the	close	collaborations	between	the	local	state	and	
the	private	sector	finally	strengthen	the	corporatism	in	the	country.	At	the	same	
time,	the	new	skills,	culture,	and	knowledge	brought	up	by	gongyi	also	widen	
the	social	inequalities	between	NGO	workers	in	their	everyday	life;	grassroots	
organizations	are	now	deeply	disciplined	and	marginalized	in	the	sector.	The	
thesis	presents	a	complicated	picture	of	the	changing	roles	that	NGOs	play	in	an	
authoritarian	state.	The	regulatory	framework	of	the	Chinese	state	has	become	
much	more	multilayered,	and	NGO	workers	have	to	reidentify	themselves	and	
rearrange	their	everyday	life	accordingly.	 	
Although	there	are	people	not	using	this	popular	language,	the	wide	usage	of	
gongyi	 in	 the	mainstream	 Chinese	 society	 indicates	 the	 process	 of	 how	 the	
Chinese	NGO	sector	have	got	tolerated	and	normalized	in	the	country	in	some	
way.	By	a	close	examination	of	the	internal	structure,	conflicts,	and	interactions	
within	 the	NGO	sector,	my	research	demonstrates	how	a	seemingly	growing	
civil	society	 in	the	authoritarian	state	has	strengthened	the	status	quo	by	 its	
deeper	embeddedness	with	corporatism	at	the	local	level	in	the	past	decade.	 	
	
8.1	Revisiting	the	research	questions	
As	introduced	at	the	beginning	of	the	thesis,	this	research	aims	to	answer	the	
three	interconnected	questions:1)	given	the	rise	of	the	Chinese	private	sector	
and	 the	 authoritarian	 state,	 how	 do	 the	 Chinese	 entrepreneurs	 identify	
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themselves	as	a	new	donor	under	the	name	of	gongyi,	and	how	do	they	imagine	
what	NGOs	should	be	like	in	China?	2)	what	roles	does	the	Chinese	state	play	in	
shaping	gongyi	 in	different	 local	 contexts?	3)	what	did	 this	 gongyi	mean	 for	
ordinary	 Chinese	 NGO	 workers,	 in	 particular,	 how	 does	 gongyi	 shape	 the	
private	life	and	personal	identities	of	Chinese	NGO	workers,	and	how	do	they	
deal	with	gongyi	in	different	ways?	
The	 thesis	 answers	 these	 three	 questions	 by	 an	 ethnographic	 study	 of	 an	
entrepreneur	 founded	 foundation	 in	 the	 city	 of	 Shenzhen	 and	 its	 partner	
organization	 in	 different	 places.	 Chapters	 4	 and	 5	 aims	 to	 answer	 the	 first	
question.	 The	 two	 chapters	 discuss	 the	 new	 knowledge	 brought	 up	 by	 the	
private	entrepreneurs	 in	China,	 “modern	gongyi”.	Under	 this	modern	gongyi,	
this	thesis	argues	that	a	highly	commercialized	culture	has	been	established	in	
the	foundation’s	office.	Meanwhile,	modern	gongyi	also	redefines	NGO	workers	
with	“wolf-spirit”,	which	produced	profound	uneven	impacts	on	its	workers	by	
creating	 more	 gender	 inequalities	 and	 strengthening	 the	 ‘one	 family,	 two	
systems’	in	the	reformist	era.	 	
The	second	question	is	mostly	discussed	in	Chapters	4	and	6.	By	discussing	the	
different	state-NGO	interactions	in	different	places,	this	research	demonstrates	
that	the	roles	that	the	Chinese	state	played	in	these	cases	are	different,	given	
the	fragmented	nature	of	the	Chinese	state	itself.	In	the	city	of	Shenzhen,	gongyi	
is	 largely	a	product	of	 the	close	collaboration	between	 the	 local	government	
and	 the	 rising	 private	 sector.	 The	 foundation,	 doubted	 by	 the	 central	
government	 in	 some	 way,	 has	 been	 welcomed	 and	 incorporated	 into	 the	
neoliberal	development	model	in	Shenzhen.	The	city	government	has	become	
a	patron	of	emerging	entrepreneurs	and	their	foundations.	However,	in	GH	and	
GVC’s	 cases	 in	 two	 different	 provinces,	 the	 situations	 are	 quite	 different.	
Without	a	prosperous	private	economy	like	the	city	of	Shenzhen,	the	local	state	
played	a	more	decisive	role	in	defining	gongyi.	AF	and	its	partner	organizations	
needed	 to	 respond	 to	 the	political	demands	and	economic	orders	 from	 local	
governments	in	a	more	direct	way.	For	NGOs	like	GVC	that	maintained	a	good	
relationship	with	the	local	state,	doing	gongyi	with	domestic	donors	provides	
them	with	a	new	platform	to	strengthen	their	extraordinary	status	in	the	local	
community.	 But	 for	 those	 like	 GH	 that	 kept	 partnerships	with	 international	
donors,	gongyi	and	AF	turned	out	to	be	a	political	shelter	for	them	to	survive.	 	
In	answering	this	question,	I	present	the	multi-layered	state	and	the	process	of	
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how	corporatism	works	in	different	places	in	different	ways,	in	which	gongyi	
has	been	learned,	renegotiated,	redefined,	and	reproduced.	 	 	 	
The	answer	to	the	third	question	is	closely	connected	with	the	second	one	and	
has	been	mostly	discussed	in	Chapters	5	and	7.	 	 These	two	chapters	examine	
the	NGO	workers'	everyday	life	in	different	organizations	and	geographic	areas.	
Seen	as	an	emerging	profession	in	China,	doing	gongyi	has	different	meanings	
in	different	contexts.	In	the	more	developed	urban	communities,	the	life	of	wolf-
like	‘gongyi	professionals’	does	contribute	to	an	emerging	middle	class,	helping	
NGO	 workers	 to	 be	 more	 normalized	 and	 incorporated	 into	 mainstream	
Chinese	society.	But	at	the	same	time,	wolf-like	gongyi	workers	in	practice	is	
highly	masculinized	in	its	nature,	consolidating	the	widening	gap	of	men	and	
women	 in	 the	 workforce	 and	 at	 home.	 For	 those	 NGO	workers	 in	 the	 local	
organizations,	we	may	 find	gongyi	 becomes	a	highly	 relational	 thing,	 as	 it	 is	
greatly	shaped	by	their	relations	with	the	local	state	and	the	business	circles.	It	
is	not	only	"a	job",	but	also	a	way	of	living:	cultivating,	maintaining	and	bridging	
social	 relations,	 and	performing	 their	personal	 faith	 in	a	proper	way.	 In	 this	
sense,	doing	gongyi	helps	to	define	what	calls	a	person	in	the	local	society.	 	 	 	 	 	
	
8.2	The	theoretical	contributions	of	this	research	
The	analytical	framework	of	this	thesis	is	developed	around	two	major	themes:	
corporatism	and	everyday	life	 in	reformist	China.	All	 four	empirical	chapters	
have	 covered	 these	 two	 themes	 in	 different	 ways.	 Here	 I	 would	 like	 to	
summarize	 the	analytical	 framework	again	and	clarify	how	my	 research	 can	
engage	with	the	current	academic	discussions.	
	
8.2.1	Corporatism	 	
In	chapter	1,	I	present	the	different	approaches	to	understanding	NGOs	in	China.	
Normally	 seen	 as	 a	 "new	 creature"	 since	 China's	 economic	 reform,	 non-
governmental	organizations	have	been	 taken	as	an	 indicator	of	a	new,	more	
autonomous	 associational	 life.	 Many	 scholars	 rely	 on	 insights	 from	 the	
literature	 on	 civil	 society,	 which	 usually	 assumes	 that	 social	 actors	 have	 a	
contentious	or	counterbalancing	relationship	with	the	state	(Cohen	and	Arato,	
1992;	 Gllener	 1984)	 and	 that	 the	 various	 activities	 it	 explains	 will	 lead	 to	
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political	change	(e.g.	Putnam,	1993;	Keane,	1998).	In	China’s	context,	academic	
discussions	on	whether	and	how	to	apply	civil	society	theories	in	the	country	
have	been	ongoing	since	the	1989	Student	Movement	in	Beijing	(Zhao,	1998,	
2002,	2013).	The	 independence	of	Chinese	NGOs	 in	 relation	 to	 the	state	has	
become	the	major	concern	of	many	civil	society	researchers	(e.g.	Wu,	2017;	Ma	
&	Parish,	2014;	Spires	et	al.,	2014;	Shieh,	2017).	Some	researchers	conclude	
that	even	if	civil	society	might	not	bring	democracy	to	China,	civil	liberties	are	
sure	to	increase	because	of	the	very	existence	of	these	social	organizations	(e.g.	
Morton,	2005).	
However,	this	civil	society	approach	has	been	challenged	in	many	ways.	Some	
researchers	argue	that	the	state	must	be	taken	into	consideration	when	using	
the	concept	of	civil	society	(Chamberlain,	1993;	Nevitt,	1996;	Zhou,	1993),	as	
Chinese	 NGOs	 have	 been	 highly	 regulated	 after	 the	 1989	 Beijing	 Student	
Movement.	Some	scholars	like	Howell	(2012)	rectify	this	with	the	Gramscian	
concept	of	civil	society,	suggesting	that	Chinese	NGOs	and	civil	society	are	more	
like	 an	 extension	 of	 the	 capitalist	 state.	Moreover,	 although	 the	 civil	 society	
approach	helps	understand	the	changes	and	dynamics	of	Chinese	politics,	it	is	
still	limited	in	explaining	the	status	quo.	Given	the	increasing	numbers	of	NGOs	
and	 the	 resilience	 of	 authoritarianism	 in	 China,	 the	 liberal	 civil	 society	
approach	 has	 limitations	 in	 understanding	 the	 changing	 landscape	 of	 the	
Chinese	NGO	sector	in	the	past	decade.	 	 	 	 	
My	 research	 on	 the	 popular	 language	 and	 knowledge	 production	 of	 gongyi	
reveals	 that	 the	corporatism	framework	does	have	 its	strengths	 in	analyzing	
Chinese	NGOs	in	analyzing	the	local	politics	and	state-NGO	relations	in	a	more	
decentralized	way.	Therefore,	in	this	thesis,	I	propose	two	ways	of	expanding	
the	existing	corporatism	framework	as	follows.	 	
Firstly,	 in	 scholarly	history,	 corporatism	since	 the	1990s	has	been	 seen	as	a	
useful	 theory	 in	 understanding	 China's	 economic	 development	 model.	 The	
interaction	between	the	local	government	and	private	businessmen	is	the	key	
to	 contributing	 to	 China's	 economic	 growth	 (Oi,	 1995).	 My	 analysis	 of	 the	
changing	Chinese	NGO	 sector	 is	 inspired	by	 this	 academic	 tradition	 so	 as	 to	
present	 a	more	 complicated	 picture	 of	 Chinese	NGOs	 today.	 By	 increasingly	
complicated	picture	here,	I	go	beyond	the	state-NGO	relations	and	point	to	the	
collaboration	between	 three	groups	of	actors:	 the	 local	 state,	 entrepreneurs,	
and	Chinese	NGOs.	In	this	thesis,	I	argue	that	corporatism	is	not	just	appeared	
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in	the	increasing	state	surveillance	and	regulations	towards	NGOs;	but	also	it	is	
working	 through	 many	 indirect	 ways,	 for	 instance,	 deeper	 collaboration	
between	 the	 state	 and	 the	 emerging	 domestic	 donors	 at	 the	 local	 level,	 the	
commercialization	of	the	NGO	sector,	as	well	as	the	changing	everyday	life	of	
ordinary	NGO	workers	in	China.	The	new	knowledge	of	‘doing	gongyi’,	I	propose,	
is	largely	a	product	of	these	new,	complicated	interactions	between	the	three	
groups	of	actors	in	this	thesis.	 	 	 	
But	at	the	same	time,	China’s	decentralization	reform	since	the	1990s	also	calls	
for	a	more	flexible	application	of	 the	corporatist	 framework	 in	analyzing	the	
social	 and	 political	 change	 among	 various	 regions	 (Hsu,	 2012).	 As	 I	 have	
discussed	 in	 Chapter	 6	 on	 China's	 NGO	 regulation	 change,	 the	 fragmented	
nature	of	 the	Chinese	state	has	also	contributed	 to	different	ways	of	dealing	
with	NGOs	in	different	places,	departing	from	a	unified	authoritarian	regulatory	
regime.	 Therefore,	 my	 study	 of	 gongyi	 in	 different	 places	 demonstrates	 the	
importance	of	discussing	the	various	forms	of	corporatism	in	different	parts	of	
China.	 The	 research	 presents	 the	 process	 of	 how	 the	 reproduction	 of	 a	
seemingly	 commercialized	 knowledge	 could	 be	 possible	 in	 China	 with	 the	
negotiations	and	reinterpretations	between	the	entrepreneurs,	NGOs,	and	the	
local	governments.	 	
The	 increasing	state	control	 towards	Chinese	NGOs	 in	 recent	years	does	not	
necessarily	mean	 that	 there	 has	 been	 a	more	 formal,	 unified,	 or	 established	
platform	of	social	surveillance	at	the	national	level.	As	AF	and	its	entrepreneurs’	
stories	 tell	 us,	 in	 many	 cases	 these	 new	 organizations	 have	 been	 deeply	
integrated	 into	 the	 local	 state	 via	 their	 daily	 interactions	 with	 the	 local	
authorities,	government	officials,	and	so	forth.	Although	AF	workers	may	still	
think	that	they	are	representing	a	liberal,	progressive	force	in	the	country,	the	
organization	they	were	working	for	had	become	a	social	arm	of	the	state.	Under	
such	condition,	many	Chinese	NGO	workers	have	developed	different	personal	
identities	and	ways	of	living,	which	includes	their	own	understandings	of	the	
state	politics,	the	roles	that	entrepreneurs	play	in	the	Chinese	society,	their	own	
economic	status,	as	well	as	religions.	In	this	sense,	my	research	goes	beyond	the	
existing	literature	that	mostly	takes	corporatism	as	a	regulatory	strategy	of	the	
Chinese	state.	Corporatism,	through	everyday	practices	in	and	outside	various	
Chinese	 NGOs,	 provides	 a	 better	 framework	 to	 analyze	 the	 normalization	
process	of	the	Chinese	NGO	sector	in	the	past	decade.	 	
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8.2.2	Everyday	life	in	reformist	China	
As	the	keyword	of	understanding	the	changing	landscape	of	the	Chinese	NGO	
sector,	gongyi	tells	us	more	than	the	state-NGO	relations	in	China.	Although	the	
making	 of	 gongyi	 has	 been	 closely	 related	 to	 the	 deepening	 corporatism	 in	
different	parts	of	China	in	the	past	decade,	this	research	argues	that	gongyi	also	
presents	 how	 the	 normalization	 process	 of	 the	 Chinese	 NGO	 sector	 is	
happening	in	the	details	of	people’s	everyday	life	unevenly,	which	contributes	
to	the	increasing	social	inequality	in	the	country.	Using	the	language	of	gongyi	
and	identifying	oneself	as	a	‘gongyi	professional/people’	gives	new	meanings	of	
NGO	as	a	profession	in	Chinese	society.	In	the	empirical	chapters	(especially	in	
chapters	4,	5	and	7),	I	pay	attention	to	different	people’s	career	paths,	family	
and	education	backgrounds,	and	their	religious	life.	 	
In	 China,	 the	 everyday	 life	 of	 NGO	 workers	 is	 still	 understudied.	 Given	 the	
authoritarian	NGO	regulations	in	the	country,	it	is	very	difficult	to	get	accurate	
data	of	their	working	information,	like	the	exact	number	of	how	many	people	
working	in	the	sector,	the	percentage	of	men	and	women,	not	to	mention	their	
average	 incomes.	 Although	 there	 has	 been	more	 and	more	 research	 on	 the	
changing	Chinese	NGOs	on	the	organizational	level	in	recent	years,	how	such	
changes	in	the	past	decade	have	influenced	Chinese	NGO	workers’	career	paths	
and	private	life	is	still	unknown.	My	ethnographic	work	with	AF	workers	and	
its	 partner	 organizations	 reveals	 that	 the	 normalization	 process	 of	 Chinese	
NGOs,	 featured	 with	 commercialization,	 was	 never	 a	 simple	 task	 for	 the	
individuals	who	were	working	 in	various	organizations.	The	pains	and	gains	
they	were	experiencing	everyday	demonstrated	in	their	economic	conditions,	
former	working	experiences,	social	relations,	faiths,	marriage	status,	as	well	as	
their	gender	identities.	 	
As	 ordinary	Chinese	 living	 in	 the	 reformist	 era,	my	AF	 colleagues	 and	other	
informants	in	the	field	may	share	many	commonalities	with	other	Chinese:	they	
were	 eager	 to	 be	 a	manly	man	 in	 the	 own	 families	 and	 the	workplace	 (see	
chapter	4	and	5),	 anxious	with	 their	 incomes,	 career,	 and	 social	 status;	 they	
were	 asked	 to	 be	 more	 "professional"	 in	 the	 workplace,	 but	 such	
"professionalism"	may	bring	 them	conflicts	 in	 their	 family	 life.	Whether	 it	 is	
‘wolf-like	professionals’	in	the	big	cities	or	‘capable	gongyi	people’	in	the	local	
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society,	my	research	finds	that	these	new	identities	are	creating	new	forms	of	
hierarchies	and	social	exclusions,	just	like	the	popular	language	of	‘suzhi’	that	
we	have	discussed	in	the	first	chapter.	What	behind	the	popularity	of	gongyi	in	
Chinese	NGO	workers’	everyday	life,	 is	 the	strengthening	of	"one	family,	 two	
systems”	 since	 China’s	 economic	 reform	 (Hoffman,	 2006),	 as	 well	 as	 the	
marginalization	of	the	disadvantaged	groups.	 	
However,	what	distinguishes	the	NGO	workers	and	other	social	groups	in	China	
lies	in	their	political	ideologies	and	the	ways	they	dealt	with	these	ideologies	in	
their	everyday	life.	In	China,	working	in	the	NGO	sector	is	still	seen	as	a	highly	
politicized	job	in	its	nature.	Even	for	the	very	commercialized	fundraising	work,	
my	 AF	 colleagues	 still	 imagined	 it	 as	 a	 ‘progressive’	 way	 of	 challenging	 the	
socialist	legacies	and	reforming	the	state.	This	imagination	was	shared	by	most	
informants	in	different	places	regardless	of	their	different	economic	and	social	
status,	which	constituted	the	political	nature	of	the	gongyi	language	in	China.	
The	shared	political	imagination	made	long-term	partnerships	among	different	
NGOs	possible.	But	as	I	argue	in	the	second	chapter,	such	‘progressive	gongyi’	
is	highly	self-limiting	 in	China.	Working	under	this	gongyi	model	asks	one	to	
maintain	 certain	 strategies	 and	 lifestyles	 of	 living	within	 the	 corporatism	 in	
one’s	 everyday	 life:	 becoming	 part	 of	 the	 local	 state	 affiliations,	 building	 up	
connections	with	 the	 local	officials	and	 the	business	elites	circle,	performing	
personal	beliefs	 in	an	 indirect	way,	etc.	 In	 this	sense,	corporatism	involves	a	
number	of	strategies	and	ways	of	living	on	a	daily	basis.	 	
	
8.3	The	never-ending	gongyi	
I	finished	the	fieldwork	in	July	2017,	but	I	still	keep	in	touch	with	some	of	my	
informants	in	the	field	throughout	my	whole	writing	up	process.	In	the	recent	
two	 years,	 AF	 is	 still	 one	 of	 the	 top	 foundations	 receiving	 the	 most	 public	
donations	and	media	coverage	in	China,	but	its	ranking	slides	down	a	bit	from	
3rd	to	8th.	As	 the	only	non-state	organized	 foundation	 in	 the	 top	10,	AF	has	
been	 gradually	 caught	 up	 by	 other	 GONGOs.	 For	 AF	 and	 all	 the	 other	
organizations,	 I	 knew,	 they	were	 asked	 to	 set	 up	 a	 communist	 party	branch	
within	their	own	organizations	by	the	local	government.	AF,	as	the	role	model	
of	Shenzhen’s	NGOs	in	the	eyes	of	the	city	government,	became	the	first	one	to	
have	such	a	branch	in	Shenzhen;	a	retired	local	official	was	appointed	as	the	
general	 secretary	 of	 AF’s	 party	 branch.	 From	 2017	 until	 recently,	 my	 old	
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colleagues	told	me	that	this	new	secretary	organized	political	study	sessions	on	
the	current	Chinese	President	Xi	 Jinping’s	words	and	speeches	on	a	monthly	
basis,	more	workers	were	mobilized	to	 join	the	communist	party.	 It	remains	
unknown	to	me	that	to	what	degree	these	party	branches	may	change	the	daily	
operation	of	the	organizations,	and	whether	there	are	conflicts	in	terms	of	the	
organizational	structure	and	internal	governance.	 	 	 	
	
But	grassroots	organizations	may	need	to	face	more	challenges	than	before.	In	
fact,	along	with	the	new	charity	 law,	another	 influential	 law	on	international	
organizations	 also	went	 into	 effect	 in	 January	 2017	 in	 a	 very	 silenced	way.	
According	 to	 this	 law,	 international	 donors	 are	 asked	 to	 register	 with	 and	
regularly	report	to	the	police	department	in	China.	By	the	end	of	2017	when	I	
was	back	in	the	UK,	Sue	told	me	via	online	chats	that	she	and	Humphrey	went	
to	an	NGO	training	program	organized	by	Oxfam	with	another	10	organization	
leaders	 at	 that	 time;	 it	 was	 an	 annual	 meeting	 of	 Oxfam's	 NGO	 network	 in	
middle	China.	As	soon	as	they	were	back	in	their	own	cities	after	the	training,	
all	of	the	attendees	received	the	calls	from	the	local	police	almost	at	the	same	
time,	asking	them	to	report	to	the	police	of	the	meeting.	 	 Sue	thought	that	the	
collective	calls	were	sending	a	very	clear,	warning	message	not	from	the	local	
government,	 but	 from	 Beijing:	 no	 matter	 whether	 the	 INGOs	 were	 legally	
registered	or	not,	working	with	them	in	China	means	political	danger.	Until	this	
year,	she	still	keeps	working	with	Oxfam	but	meanwhile,	she	has	been	invited	
to	 ‘have	 tea’	 with	 the	 local	 police	 almost	 every	 month.	 Managing	 local	
government	relations	has	become	more	and	more	difficult	for	her.	 	 In	fact,	the	
disabled	group	that	I	met	 in	the	hotel	 lobby	in	the	cold	evening	in	2017	was	
dismissed	in	early	2019.	
	
Most	 of	 the	 colleagues	 I	 knew	at	AF	have	 left	 their	 jobs	 (even	 including	 the	
general	secretary);	only	five	old	workers	remained	in	the	foundation.	My	line	
manager,	Justin	is	still	there,	although	he	has	been	hunting	jobs	for	a	while.	Tim,	
the	youngest	senior	manager,	is	at	AF	too,	he	just	got	another	promotion	this	
early	year,	seemingly	to	be	the	next	general	secretary.	Jerry,	the	young	dad	who	
quit	his	job	after	the	birth	of	his	son,	has	made	a	living	in	the	city	by	setting	up	
his	 own	 NGO,	 providing	 cloth	 recycling	 services	 for	 the	 middle-class	
communities.	 Jerry’s	 NGO	 is	 fully	 funded	 by	 both	 AF	 and	 the	 municipal	
government,	as	Shenzhen	has	been	designed	as	the	first	city	in	the	country	to	
promote	the	waste	recycling	industry.	Now,	Jerry’s	organization	has	expanded	
to	 some	 other	 places	 like	 the	 city	 of	 Beijing	 and	 Shanghai,	 with	 the	 recent	
	 201	
donation	from	the	Alibaba	Foundation.	Taken	the	waste	recycling	industry	as	a	
good	 investment	 opportunity,	 many	 companies	 including	 Alibaba	 have	
invested	 in	 a	 number	 of	 waste	 recycling	 companies,	 social	 enterprises,	 and	
NGOs.	 	 	 	 	
Many	of	other	informants	are	still	in	the	NGO	sector	but	choose	to	work	in	other	
entrepreneur-founded	 foundations	 in	 different	 cities.	 Interestingly,	 although	
AF's	partner	organizations	are	relatively	smaller	in	turns	of	their	size,	I	have	
hardly	seen	any	informants	I	visited	changing	their	jobs	in	the	past	two	years.	
However,	what	has	not	been	changing	much	is	people's	minds	and	ideologies.	
The	 online	 chat	 group	 of	 ‘Liberalists	 of	 China’s	 NGO	 sector’	 (I	mention	 this	
group	in	chapter	6)	is	still	active	until	very	recently.	In	an	evening	of	October	
2016,	when	I	had	already	left	AF,	I	found	this	group	was	active	again	as	usual,	
given	 the	presidential	 election	 in	 the	U.S.	 became	quite	 intense	at	 that	 time.	
Hunter,	a	former	senior	manager	at	AF,	forwarded	a	news	report	of	the	election	
and	said:	 	
“I	support	Trump!	I	support	the	Republicans.	I	think	most	people	in	
this	group	must	agree	with	me	that	we	only	need	a	small	government;	
the	democrats	are	creating	more	lazy	people	in	the	US,	just	like	what	
China	did	in	the	socialist	era!	I	don’t	believe	in	Hillary	either,	women	
are	just	too	sensitive	to	be	a	political	leader”.	 	 	
Hunter’s	words	 in	the	group	chats	soon	got	several	 followers	who	were	also	
supporters	of	Trump,	all	of	them	were	AF’s	partner	organization	leaders	like	
Humphrey.	 Until	 two	 hours	 later,	 Yvette,	 a	 junior	 project	 assistant	who	 just	
joined	AF,	 sent	 out	 a	message:	 “What	 is	wrong	with	 you	guys?	 I	 just	 cannot	
believe	that	discriminatory	languages	can	just	appear	in	this	liberalist	group	in	
such	a	straightforward	way.	I	am	quitting	from	this	group	now”.	 	 	 	
In	 the	 past	 two	 years,	 Hunter	 became	 a	 general	 secretary	 of	 another	
entrepreneur-founded	 foundation	 in	 Shenzhen,	 although	 this	 year	 he	 has	
started	a	new	business:	helping	more	newly	rich	Chinese	immigrants	to	Europe.	
Yvette	is	still	working	in	the	AF	at	almost	the	same	position	two	years	ago.	I	am	
not	surprised	by	what	Hunter	did	in	the	past	few	years;	his	political	ideology	
has	 been	 developed	 for	 more	 than	 three	 decades	 in	 the	 country.	 Such	 a	
'liberalist'	ideology	is	a	symbiosis	of	the	state-directed	reforms	as	well	as	the	
marketized	 economy.	 Since	 the	 1980s,	 the	 authoritarian	 state	 and	 the	
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remarkable	economic	growth	together	have	created	an	interesting	social	space	
that	is	relatively	autonomous	from	the	socialist	era,	ideologically	distinct	from	
the	official	propaganda,	but	deeply	incorporated	into	China’s	development	path	
in	various	ways.	That	 is	what	 I	present	 in	 this	 thesis	as	 the	politics	of	doing	
gongyi.	But	we	should	also	admit	that	there	are	always	people	reminding	us	of	
the	 alternatives	 of	gongyi;	 I	 learn	 these	 alternatives	 from	 the	 closed	 factory	
women’s	 groups,	 from	 Yvette,	 and	 from	 the	 eliminated	 good	 husbands	 and	
daddies	that	are	‘not	wolf	enough’.	 	 	 	 	 	 	
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Appendix	A:	Interviews	with	NGO	workers	in	Shenzhen	
No.	 Gender	 Age	 Working	fields	 Date	 Code	
1	 	 Male	 25	 Poverty	reduction,	 	
T	Foundation	
07/07/2016	 A1	
2	 	 Male	 33	 NGO	capacity	training	 08/07/2016	 A2	
3	 Female	 24	 Former	AF	worker	 02/11/2016	 A3	
4	 	 Male	 28	 Former	AF	worker,	
Working	at	a	GONGO	now	
03/11/2016	 A4	
5	 Male	 26	 Former	AF	worker	 07/11/2016	 A5	
6	 Male	 30	 Child	protection,	 	
Partner	organization	of	AF	
07/11/2016	 A6	
7	 Female	 31	 Project	officer	at	AF	 11/05/2017	 A7	
8	 Female	 29	 Senior	manager	at	AF	 23/05/2017	 A8	
9	 Female	 32	 Project	officer	at	AF	 24/05/2017	 A9	
10	 Male	 24	 Project	assistant	at	AF	 25/05/2017	 A10	
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Appendix	B:	Interviews	with	NGO	workers	in	Beijing	
No.	 Gender	 Age	 Working	fields	 Date	 Code	
1	 	 Female	 62	 Rural	education,	 	
environmental	protection	
15/11/2016	 B1	
2	 	 Female	 52	 Senior	manager	at	AF	 16/11/2016	 B2	
3	 Male	 28	 Project	officer	at	AF	 19/11/2016	 B3	
4	 	 Female	 27	 Project	officer	at	AF	 22/11/2016	 B4	
5	 Male	 32	 Disaster	relief	 22/11/2016	 B5	
6	 Male	 30	 Child	protection,	 	
Partner	organization	of	AF	
07/11/2016	 B6	
7	 Male	 25	 Child	 protection	 and	 NGO	
capacity	training;	 	
Y	Foundation	
20/07/2017	 B7	
8	 Female	 27	 Disaster	relief	and	poverty	
reduction;	 	
GONGO	
20/07/2017	 B8	
9	 Female	 34	 NGO	capacity	training,	
L	Foundation	
21/07/2017	 B9	
10	 Female	 28	 Child	protection,	INGO	 22/07/2017	 B10	
11	 Male	 27	 Project	officer	at	AF	 23/07/2017	 B11	
12	 Female	 29	 Project	officer	at	AF	 24/07/2017	 B12	
13	 Male	 33	 NGO	capacity	training,	
N	Foundation	
25/07/2017	 B13	
14	 Female	 27	 Child	protection,	INGO	 27/07/2017	 B14	
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Appendix	C:	Interviews	with	NGO	workers	in	other	places	
No.	 Gender	 Ag
e	
Working	fields	 Date	 Provinc
e	
Cod
e	
1	 	 Male	 33	 Disaster	 relief	 and	
community	development;	
Partner	organization	of	AF	
13/03
/2017	
G	 G1	
2	 	 Female	 29	 Disaster	 relief	 and	
community	development;	
Partner	organization	of	AF	
14/03
/2017	
G	 G2	
3	 Male	 32	 Disaster	 relief	 and	 child	
protection;	 	
Partner	organization	of	AF	
16/03
/2017	
G	 G3	
4	 	 Female	 31	 Community	development;	 	 	 	 	
Partner	organization	of	AF	
28/03
/2017	
T	 T1	
5	 	 Female	 30	 Community	development	 30/03
/2017	
T	 T2	
6	 Male	 30	 Senior	manager	at	AF	 04/05
/2017	
T	 T3	
7	 Female	 25	 Former	AF	worker	 04/05
/2017	
T	 T4	
8	 Male	 30	 Former	AF	worker;	
Working	 at	 C	 Foundation	
now	
03/04
/2017	
Y	 Y1	
9	 Male	 23	 Child	protection,	 	
Partner	organization	of	AF	
03/04
/2017	
Y	 Y2	
10	 Male	 52	 Gender,	 child	 protection,	
community	development;	
04/04
/2017	
Y	 Y3	
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Partner	organization	of	AF	
11	 Female	 33	 Disaster	 relief	 and	 child	
protection;	 	
Partner	organization	of	AF	
13/04
/2017	
H	 H1	
12	 Male	 31	 Poverty	reduction,	 	
M	Foundation	
25/05
/2017	
H	 H2	
13	 Male	 42	 NGO	capacity	training	 17/07
/2017	
H	 H3	
14	 Female	 27	 Gender	 and	 immigrant	
workers’	rights	
15/09
/2015
;	
18/07
/2017	
H	 H4	
15	 Female	 29	 Gender	 and	 immigrant	
workers’	rights	
12/09
/2015
;	
17/07
/2017	
H	 H5	
16	 Male	 35	 Disaster	 relief	 and	 child	
protection;	 	
Partner	organization	of	AF	
03/05
/2017	
I	 I1	
	
